[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Philosophy](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana) › [Exegesis of the Vedic ritual (Pūrvamīmāṃsā)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa) › [Kumārila's school](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta) › [Nyāyaratnamālā](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala) › [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt) › 4.4 # Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 4.4 English (machine translation) 4.4 - **Language:** English ### [4.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4) The author of the sub-commentary verses himself has indicated the means of valid cognition, / by stating that pervasion is indeed cognizable by repeated observation. ### [4.4.p1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p1) For the previous paths were crooked, resorting to great contrivance, not based on direct experience, and resorted to out of mere impudence by the maxim of 'the resort of the helpless', because of resorting to the perception-hood—which contradicts direct experience—of a cognition whose nature is conjecture, namely: 'Surely this smoke is restricted to fire.' And there is this straightforward path: restriction is cognizable by repeated observation. What then is this means of valid cognition called 'repeated observation'? It cannot be stated restricting it to any single one; rather, by whichever one among perception and the rest the frequent co-presence of the inferential mark with the possessor of the mark is cognized, that very thing, accompanied by the non-observation \[of the mark\] in counter-instances, can serve as the means of valid cognition for restriction. \[Objection:\] Surely, co-presence is cognized in various places by repeated observations, but co-presence everywhere cannot easily be found by living beings. Even from non-observation in counter-instances, an absence is cognized only in proximate counter-instances; but exclusion from all counter-instances is truly impossible to obtain, because there is no non-cognition of the perceptible \[in distant ones\], ### [4.4.p2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p2) and because absence is not established merely by non-observation. How then can restriction, which consists in pervasion of all places and times, be cognizable by repeated observation? And this was doubted by the master himself when he said: ### [4.4.p3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p3) "For the positive concomitance of the pervader is not seen in each thing to be pervaded; ### [4.4.p4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p4) for it could be obtained only endlessly through individual births and so forth." ### [4.4.p5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p5) Likewise: ### [4.4.p6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p6) "For being a probative reason is not cognized through absence from counter-instances," and so forth. ### [4.4.p7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p7) The meaning is that the absence in all counter-instances cannot be obtained. And here the defense was stated: "There, merely by its non-observation, it is an indicator of its co-present \[partner\]"—here, "there" means in the counter-instance. This is what is meant: Let it be granted that the absence of the inferential mark in all counter-instances is not established; non-observation of the inferential mark in counter-instances certainly exists, and by that much, smoke or the like, being observed as co-present, becomes an indicator of fire or the like, which is co-present. As for the claim that co-presence too is impossible to see everywhere, in that regard also an answer has been given: ### [4.4.p8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p8) "As to what is said: 'Co-presence / is impossible to see everywhere,' ### [4.4.p9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p9) it may not indeed be seen everywhere, / but it is certainly seen in two or three \[instances\]." ### [4.4.p10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p10) When the coexistence of fire and smoke is established because \[their observation\] is confined to limited places, ### [4.4.p11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p11) or because the negative instance is not seen, its capacity to convey \[the inferable\] is established. ### [4.4.p12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p12) This is the meaning: granted that coexistence is not observed everywhere, its observation in two or three places is indeed easy to do. With just that much, in the absence of observing a counterexample, inference occurs. For if an invariable rule in the form of pervasion over all places and times were admitted by us to be an auxiliary to inference, then there would be an objection. But it is not stated by us in this way. Rather, wherever smoke and the like are seen, there everywhere without exception they coexist with fire and the like, and they are not seen where there is no fire—just this much is the cause for the arising of an inference. For just this much makes smoke convey fire to ordinary people. But it does not depend on apprehending the positive and negative concomitance in all subjects and counter-subjects, which would make the means of valid cognition hard to attain. Therefore, the designation of 'invariable rule' is not made with reference to all places and times; rather, whichever invariable rule of coexistence of the sign with the possessor of the sign holds in observed places and times, that alone is called the invariable rule. Therefore, that alone is the auxiliary to inference. And since that is easily accessible through multiple observations alone, the invariable rule of coexistence with the possessor of the sign is not unauthoritative. As he said: 'By the mere observation of coexistence, it is an indicator of its coexistent partner.' ### [4.4.p13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p13) Through how many observations of coexistence, then, does an inference arise? Who indeed could state this? It arises through just as many as are observed, but it cannot be stated by counting. Even those who say that the invariable rule is grasped by perception assisted by repeated observation, and even those who, when the invariable rule is grasped even upon a single observation, require repeated observation in order to eliminate the suspicion of an extraneous condition—they too do not specify it in this way; likewise, neither do we; so there is no difference between them and us. 'Should, then, the fire's pervasion of all places and times of smoke not be understood by one who wishes to infer?' True, it need not be understood. 'Well, in that case, how is the possessor of one part of the subject, whose relation is not known even in general, designated by the phrase 'whose relation is known'?' This does not designate the possessor of one part of the subject; rather, it designates the possessor of one part of the example. This, then, is the meaning of the Bhāṣya: when the relation has been known between two parts—smoke and fire—in a different possessor of parts altogether, such as a kitchen, having seen that one part, smoke, elsewhere in a mountain or the like, or in that very kitchen at another time, fire is inferred, because it is observed thus in ordinary life. And so, having stated that by the word 'whose relation is known' there is a designation of the knower, the meaning is: not of the knower. When it is asked, 'of which object of valid cognition is it the possessor of parts?', it is said: 'of the example's possessor of parts.' As they said: 'If some possessor of parts has had its connection known through two parts, ### [4.4.p14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p14) another \[whole\] similar to that, or that very one, is inferred distinctively through those two.' ### [4.4.p15](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p15) 'Or that very one through those two' intends another time. And stating it thus, he says that under the view that the word 'whose relation is known' has the possessor of parts as the meaning of another word \[in the compound\], it designates the possessor of one part of the example. Be that as it may, inference arises just from the invariable rule of coexistence in observed places. But as for this apprehension arising from repeated observation that 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire', how is that \[explained\]? For it does not fail to exist, nor is it unauthoritative, because it arises firmly for all people at all times. Therefore, this must be stated to be subsumed under some means of valid cognition. It is replied: this apprehension is inferential, because it arises for one whose relation is known. And because it has an imperceptible form, it is not sensory, owing to the absence of direct perception and because that would contradict experience. For once one has apprehended the coexistence of smoke with fire in many places and times, an inference occurs: 'All other places possessing smoke, whether past, future, or remote, possess fire, because they possess smoke, like the observed kitchen and the like.' Therefore, because it follows the totality of causal conditions for a means of valid cognition in accordance with ordinary experience, an inference regarding another property-bearer arises precisely from the invariable rule of coexistence residing in a different property-bearer; this is unexceptionable. And he says: 'Therefore, in whatever property-bearers, by whatever \[probans\], of whatever sort, ### [4.4.p16](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p16) in whatever place or time, the state of being pervaded was previously ascertained, ### [4.4.p17](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p17) for that \[probandum\], of such a sort it would be in that much \[space or time\]; but in another observed property-bearer, ### [4.4.p18](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p18) the pervaded portion indicates the pervading portion in the very same way.' ### [4.4.p19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4.p19) By the words 'of whatever sort' and 'of such a sort', it is shown that a form deficient compared to the form observed in the example is neither a sign nor a possessor of a sign. For ordinary people do not infer fire from doves and the like merely through the quality of whiteness, without the presence of smokiness. Nor does an altered grass-product observed in frost, which is not invariable with hot fire, cause one to infer an un-hot fire when the heat is sublated due to contradiction with the coldness apprehended by perception. And the course of means of valid cognition must be followed by examiners in accordance with ordinary life, not in contradiction with it. Thus, by this, it is shown that all non-instigating reasons are fallacious. A form over and above that, however, must be accepted intact. Therefore, the coexistence of the state of being harm with the state of being demerit is apprehended when accompanied by the state of being prohibited, as in the killing of a Brahmin and the like; hence harm without the state of being prohibited is seen to have coexistence with demerit in approaches to a teacher's wife and the like, so it is an inferential indicator. Just as the pupil engaged in duties such as study is observed to have coexistence with the teacher repeatedly, one cannot infer a teacher merely by \[the presence of\] a pupil alone. Likewise, the coexistence of the dark complexion of Devadatta's sons is caused by the particular foods, drinks, and so on consumed at the time of embryonic development; in the absence of that, one cannot infer the dark complexion of another son of his by the mere fact of being Devadatta's son. By this, the inference that slender plants, trees, and the like, through their being qualified by spatial arrangement, have an agent who possesses perceptual apprehension, like a pot and the like, is refuted. To explain: in those cases where ## Other recensions (1) - [English (machine translation) (mt)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt*mt.4.4) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [Nyāyaratnamālā](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala.4.4) — Pārthasārathi Miśra, Sanskrit --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darsana.mimamsa.bhatta.nyayaratnamala~en-mt.4.4) · Pramāṇa