Mimamsasutra 88

In case of conflict, however, it should be disregarded; for only in the absence [of conflict] is there inference. //

Now, where there is a conflict with direct scriptural statement, how is it there? For instance, the complete wrapping of the post of udumbara wood is contradicted by the direct scriptural statement: 'Having touched the post of udumbara wood, he should sing the Udgītha.' [The smṛti text,] 'Vedic studenthood for forty-eight years,' is contradicted by this: 'Having a son born and black-haired, one should set up the sacred fires.' [The smṛti text,] 'One whose Soma has been purchased should not be fed,' is contradicted by this: 'Therefore, when the animal sacrifice to Agni and Soma is completed, one should eat in the sacrificer's house.' When the view is reached that this [smṛti] is an authoritative means of valid knowledge, on account of the common identity of the agent—we say: because of impossibility, it is understood to be delusion. How is there impossibility? Because of the injunction of touching, it is impossible for it to be completely wrapped and to be touched by the one singing the Udgītha. Understanding that it is to be touched by the Udgātṛ singing, by what could we annul this conviction on account of the smṛti text of complete wrapping?—so we say.
[Objection:] Well, delusion arises from lacking a basis, and as for that smṛti, a Vedic statement will be the basis.
[Reply:] A Vedic statement could be the basis if the touching were a delusion. But if there is no delusion, [such a basis] is inadmissible because of impossibility. Just as when an experience is impossible it is not postulated, so too with a Vedic statement. How then is there the smṛti of complete wrapping? It is delusion. How is delusion postulated? Because of conflict with the cognition derived from direct scriptural statement. Then why are these two injunctions not treated as an option, like rice and barley, or like the Bṛhat and Rathantara chants? An option does not occur when there is no cognition of delusion. If the cognition of complete wrapping is an authoritative means of valid knowledge, touching is a delusion; if touching is an authoritative means of valid knowledge, the smṛti is a delusion. But one who asserts an option concedes at least the validity of touching in one alternative. And its basis is direct scriptural statement. If that is admitted to be valid, it is not merely alternative. And the smṛti of complete wrapping, being alternative, cannot postulate a direct scriptural statement even in one alternative, because it is annulled by the cognition of touching. And therefore, while that [scripture] is not a delusion, scripture cannot be postulated. Nor will this be non-delusion in one alternative and delusion in the other alternative. For whatever is its basis in one alternative is the very same in the other as well. If it is not a delusion in one alternative, then because the validity of direct scriptural statement is equal, it is also not a delusion in the other. Nor is that direct scriptural statement [valid only] in one alternative; for having fixed syllables, it cannot be called an erroneous recitation. Hence, it is understood that this cognition does not pass from one alternative to another because of delusion. In that case, it is postulated, because of conflict, that the complete wrapping has as its basis a cognition derived from mishearing, dreams, and the like. For there is no means of valid knowledge whatsoever to indicate that its validity must be accepted when there is conflict. Therefore, just as in one alternative a direct scriptural statement cannot be postulated, so also in the other alternative, because the cause is the same.
Moreover, in the case of mutual dependence, there is determination from another source. What is this mutual dependence? If the smṛti is valid, touching is a delusion; if touching is valid, the smṛti is a delusion: this constitutes mutual dependence. In that case, the basis of touching is already established, whereas that of smṛti is to be postulated; that is the determination from another source. Because its basis must be postulated, the validity of the smṛti cannot be established. Because of its invalidity, touching is not a delusion. Because that is not a delusion, the postulation of a Vedic statement for smṛti is inadmissible, since there is an absence of a means of valid knowledge. [Objection:] If that is so, then because the cognition that rice is the means is also not a delusion, the direct scriptural statement of barley would not be admissible!
[Reply:] True, it would not be admissible if it were not perceptible. But this is perceptible. For what is perceptible is never inadmissible. But [here both are admissible] because there exist two direct scriptural statements. For these are two sentences: therein, by one sentence, the fact that barley alone is the means is understood, and by one, the fact that rice alone is the means. Nor can a meaning understood from a sentence be denied. Therefore, an option between rice and barley is admissible, as well as between the Bṛhat and Rathantara chants. Therefore, it is said that a smṛti contradicted by direct scriptural statement is not an authoritative means of valid knowledge. And for this reason, complete wrapping and the like should not be observed.

NOTES:
*{1/571: E2: 2,98; E4: 1,281; E5: 2,85; E6: 1,46}*
*{1/572: E2: 2,102; E4: 1,281; E5: 2,89; E6: 1,47}*