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Translation of Bhashapariccheda (Bhāṣāpariccheda)

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English
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184 passages, 4,537 words
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complete digital text
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pramana-mt · Machine translation by Gemini 3.8 Flash (2026-10-10) of in.darsana.nyaya_vaisesika.bhasapariccheda · Machine output without human authorship: no copyright is claimed (CC0 1.0). The original text keeps its own…

Contents

Text

1

To him who has the lustre of a fresh rain-cloud, who stole the garments of the cowherd maidens, / to that Kṛṣṇa, the seed of the tree of worldly existence, be reverence! (1)

2

Substance, quality, action, universal together with particularity, / inherence, and likewise absence: these seven are proclaimed the categories of reality. (2)

3

Earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, the embodied self, and mind / are the substances. Now the qualities: colour, taste, then odour; (3)

3_1

Thus ends the section classifying the qualities.

4

touch, number, dimension, and then distinctness; / conjunction and disjunction, posteriority and priority; (4)

5

cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, heaviness, / fluidity, viscidity, latent disposition, unseen merit and demerit, and sound indeed. (5)

6

Upward throwing, downward throwing, contraction, / expansion, and locomotion: these are the five actions. (6)

7

Revolution, evacuation, flowing, upward flaring, / and oblique locomotion are here included simply under locomotion. (7)

8

The universal is declared twofold: higher and lower. / But existence, which resides in the triad of substance and the rest, is called higher. (8)

9

A generic property distinct from the higher is called lower. / But a generic property such as substanceness is called higher-lower. (9)

10

Because it is more pervasive, it is higher; and because it is less pervasive, it is also lower. / Particularity is proclaimed to be ultimate and resident in eternal substances. (10)

11

The relation of a pot and the like to its potsherd and the like, of quality and action to substances, / and of a generic property to them, is proclaimed to be inherence. (11)

12

Absence is twofold, through the division into relational and mutual absence. / Prior absence, posterior absence, and absolute absence: (12)

13

thus relational absence is held to be of three kinds. / The common property of all seven is said to be knowability and the like. (13)

14

The five positive entities, beginning with substance, are manifold and possess inherence. / The first three possess existence; quality and the rest are devoid of quality and action. (14)

14_2

Thus ends the exposition of the common properties of the six categories of reality beginning with quality.

15

All [categories] beginning with generic property are held to be destitute of a universal. / Being a cause is declared of everything other than infinitesimal spherical dimension. (15)

15_3

Thus ends the exposition of the common properties of the categories of reality other than infinitesimal spherical dimension.

16

The regular antecedence of that which is free of being a superfluous antecedent / is causality; it is proclaimed to be of three kinds. (16)

17

Being an inherent cause should be known, and then being a non-inherent cause; / likewise, the third is stated by knowers of the Nyāya system to be being an instrumental cause. (17)

18

That in which an effect is inherent should be known as the producer that is inherent; / the producer proximate to that is the second; and distinct from these two is the third. (18)

19

That which is antecedent along with [the cause], or that whose [antecedence depends on] taking up the cause, / or that whose antecedence is known only when its antecedence to another is known; (19)

20

or that whose antecedence is not apprehended without apprehending its antecedence to the producer; / or that which is extraneous to the regular and necessary antecedent: (20)

21

these are the five superfluous antecedents. Staffness and the like are the first; / the colour of the staff and the like in relation to a pot are shown to be the second. (21)

22

The third is ether; the potter's father is the next; / the fifth is a donkey and the like; among these, this [last one] is [the extraneous element alongside] the necessary [antecedent]. (22)

23

Being an inherent cause should be known to belong to substance alone. / And being a non-inherent cause should be known to reside only in quality and action. (23)

24

Being supported is here stated of everything other than the eternal substances. / Substanceness and possession of qualities belong to the nine beginning with earth. (24)

25

Earth, water, fire, wind, and mind: / these are the loci of posteriority and priority, corporeality, action, and velocity. (25)

26

Omnipresence and supreme greatness belong to time, ether, self, and space. / The five beginning with earth are the physical elements; four indeed possess touch. (26)

27

Origination of a substance occurs in four. Now, of ether and embodied selves, / the specific quality is held to be non-pervasive and momentary. (27)

28

The first three possess colour, fluidity, and perceptibility. / Two are heavy, two have taste; in two, fluidity is adventitious. (28)

28_4

Thus ends the exposition of distinctive properties.

29

Selves and the group of physical elements possess specific qualities. / What is stated as the common property of one is the distinctive property of another. (29)

30

The eight beginning with touch, and the latent disposition called velocity, are the qualities of air. / The eight beginning with touch, colour, velocity, and fluidity are the qualities of fire. (30)

31

The eight beginning with touch, velocity, heaviness, fluidity, / colour, taste, and viscidity: these fourteen are in water. (31)

32

These fourteen, destitute of viscidity and endowed with odour, are in earth. / The sextet beginning with cognition, the quintet beginning with number, and mental impression, (32)

33

merit and demerit: these fourteen are the qualities of the self. / The quintet beginning with number belongs to time and space; they and sound are in ether. (33)

34

The quintet beginning with number, cognition, desire, and effort are in God. / Posteriority and priority, the five beginning with number, and velocity are in the mind. (34)

35

There, earth is the locus of odour and is held to possess manifold colour. / Taste is there of six kinds; odour is held to be of two kinds. (35)

36

Its touch should be known as neither hot nor cold, and produced by heat. / It is twofold: eternal and non-eternal. The eternal is atomic in character. (36)

36_5

The non-eternal is other than that; that alone possesses parts. / Atomic in character: earth consisting of atoms is eternal. (36)

37

The non-eternal is other than that; that alone possesses parts. / And it is threefold: body, sense organ, and object. (37)

38

Body is born of a womb and the like; the sense organ is of the nature of the olfactory organ; / the object is stated to extend from the dyad up to the cosmic egg. (38)

39

The colour is white, taste and touch in water are sweet and cold; / viscidity is there, and fluidity is stated to be natural. (39)

40

Eternality and the rest are as in the first, but the body is not born of a womb. / The sense organ is the gustatory organ; the ocean, snow, and the like are held to be the object. (40)

41

Hot is the touch of fire; its colour is white and luminous. / Fluidity is adventitious, and eternality and the rest are as before. (41)

42

The sense organ is the eye; fire, gold, and the like are held to be the object. / Touch not produced by heat, and neither hot nor cold, is held to belong to air. (42)

43

This [air] moves horizontally, and is known through touch and other marks. / Its eternality and the rest are stated as before; its sense organ is the skin, pervading the body.

44

Its object is held to be from vital breath up to the great wind. / But sound should be known as the distinctive quality of ether.

45

Its sense organ is the ear; though one, [it is distinguished] by limiting adjuncts. / Time is the producer of things produced, and is held to be the locus of all worlds.

46

It is the cause of cognitions of posteriority and priority; moments and the like arise through limiting adjuncts. / Space is said to be one and eternal, the cause of cognitions of distance, nearness, and the like.

47

Though single, through differences in limiting adjuncts it takes designations such as the east. / The self is the ruler of the senses and the rest, for an instrument is accompanied by an agent.

48

Consciousness does not belong to the body, because of [its] absence in dead bodies. / If it belonged to the senses, how could there be recollection when they are destroyed?

49

Nor is the mind so, for then cognition and the like would be non-perceptible. / The self is the locus of merit and demerit, and is perceptible through connection with its specific qualities.

50

It is inferred from activity and the like, just as a charioteer is from the movement of a chariot. / It is the locus of the 'I'-notion, and is the object of the mind alone.

51

It is all-pervading and endowed with qualities like cognition; cognition is held to be of two kinds: / experience and recollection; experience is of four kinds:

52

perception, inference, comparison, and that produced by verbal testimony. / Perception is held to be of six kinds according to the divisions of olfactory [perception] and the rest.

53

Odour, as well as the generic property of odour and the like, is held to be the object of the olfactory organ; / likewise taste of the gustatory organ, and sound of the auditory organ.

54

Manifest colour is the object of the eye, as are substances possessing it, distinctness, number, / disjunction, conjunction, posteriority, priority, viscidity, fluidity, endowed with dimension,

55

action, generic property residing in an eligible substrate, and inherence of such kind. / The eye grasps [these] through connection with light and manifest colour.

56

A substance possessing manifest touch is the object of touch, and so is that [touch itself]. / What is other than colour and eligible for the eye [is grasped by touch]; colour is a cause here as well.

58

The cognition termed indeterminate is accepted to be beyond the senses. / Magnitude is the cause in the six kinds [of perception]; the sense organ is held to be the instrument.

59

The intermediate operation is the connection between the sense organ and the object; that too is of six kinds: / the apprehension of a substance is from conjunction; from inherence in what is conjoined,

60

[is the apprehension] of what inheres in substances; likewise from inherence in that, / [is the apprehension] of what inheres in those; of sound, from inherence [in the ear];

61

and the apprehension of what resides in sound is by inherence in what is inherent. / Perception of inherence is by the relation of qualifier and qualified.

62

Similarly, the apprehension of absences occurs through the relation of qualifier and qualified, / where there is the hypothetical deduction: 'If it were present, it would be perceived.'

63

Extraordinary intermediate operation is proclaimed to be of three kinds: / based on universal character, based on cognition, and born of yoga.

64

The cognition of the universal is accepted as the contact with its loci. / The causal totality producing cognition of that property through that sense organ is required.

65

The operation based on cognition belongs to that very [sense organ] whose object it has become. / That born of yoga is said to be of two kinds, by distinction between the united and the striving.

65_6

The united has constant manifestation; the other is assisted by meditation.
Now the section on inference.

66

Consideration is the intermediate operation; cognition of invariable concomitance is the instrument.

67

In inference, the sign being known is not the instrument; / for otherwise there would be no inferential cognition by means of a future sign or the like.

68

Cognition of the presence of the pervaded in the subject is called consideration. / Invariable concomitance is defined as non-relation to anything other than the possessor of the probandum.

69

Or, invariable concomitance is said to be the co-presence in the same locus of the probans with the probandum, / which is not the counterpositive of an absence residing in the possessor of the probans.

70

The subject is that in which a established conclusion devoid of the desire to establish does not abide; / inferential cognition arises from the cognition of [the probans] residing there.

71

Inconclusive, contradictory, unestablished, counterbalanced, / and mistimed: the pseudo-probanses are indeed fivefold.

71_7

Thus ends the general definition of the pseudo-probans.

72

The first is common, the next is uncommon, / and likewise inconclusive: the inconclusive is threefold.

73

That which is present in the similar instance and in the contrary instance is the common; / but that which is excluded from both is held to be uncommon.

74

Likewise, the inconclusive is that which has an exclusively affirmative subject. / That which does not exist in the possessor of the probandum at all is proclaimed contradictory.

75

Unestablished in locus is the first, and also unestablished in nature; / unestablished in pervasion is the other: therefore the unestablished is threefold.

76

Where the subject is unestablished, as in 'The mountain of jewels [has fire]'; / 'A lake is a substance, because of possessing smoke'—here the other is unestablished.

77

Unestablished in pervasion is the other, as in 'blue smoke' and the like. / When there is consideration of two opposed probanses, there is counterbalancing.

77_8

Thus ends the determination of the counterbalanced.

78

Sublation is declared where the subject is devoid of the probandum, / as when odour or the like is established of a pot at the moment of its origination.

79

Now the section on comparison.
When a villager sees a gavaya or the like for the first time, / the cognition of similarity to cows and the like is held to be the instrument.

80

Recollection of the sentence expressing the analogical transfer is called the intermediate operation. / Cognition of the expressive power of words such as gavaya is the result of comparison.

80_9

Thus ends the determination of sublation.

80_10

The section on verbal testimony.

81

The cognition of words is the instrument, while the cognition of word-meanings is the intermediate operation; / verbal comprehension is the result, and cognition of expressive power is the auxiliary cause.

82

Metaphorical indication is connection with the primary meaning, through the unintelligibility of the intended meaning. / Cognition of contiguity, semantic fitness, expectancy, and intention is held [to be the cause].

83

Contiguity is said to be the immediate proximity of words. / Semantic fitness is proclaimed to be the possession of that [property] in that word-meaning.

84

When there is apprehension of intention along with it, the comprehension of syntactic relation with it certainly arises. / / Expectancy is [syntactic need], while intention is proclaimed to be the speaker's desire.

85

The mind is said to be the instrument in the direct perception of pleasure and the like. / Because of the non-simultaneity of cognitions, its atomicity is stated here.

86

Now, qualities should be known as inhering in substances, devoid of qualities, and devoid of action: / colour, taste, touch, odour, posteriority, priority,

87

fluidity, heaviness, viscidity, speed—these are qualities of corporeal entities; / merit and demerit, mental impression, sound, cognition and the like as well.

88

All these are proclaimed by the learned to be incorporeal qualities. / The qualities ending with disjunction, beginning with number, are held to belong to both.

89

Conjunction, disjunction, and likewise numbers such as duality, / distinctness of two, and so on: these qualities reside in many [substances].

90

Therefore, all the remaining qualities are held to occur in single ones. / The sextet beginning with cognition, [the qualities] ending with touch, viscidity, natural fluidity,

91

Unseen merit and demerit, latent disposition, and sound: these are special qualities. / [Those] beginning with number and ending with priority/posteriority, as well as unnatural fluidity,

92

Heaviness and speed: these are proclaimed to be common qualities. / [The qualities] beginning with number and ending with priority, fluidity, and viscidity

93

Are graspable by two sense-organs; now, those ending with touch, and sound, / Are graspable by a single external sense-organ; heaviness, unseen merit and demerit, and latent disposition

94

Are beyond the senses; but the special qualities of all-pervading [substances] / Are proclaimed to be produced not from qualities of their cause.

95

However, those ending with touch that are unproduced by baking, and such fluidity, / Viscidity, speed, heaviness, single distinctness, and dimension,

96

And elasticity—these arise from qualities of their cause. / Conjunction, disjunction, and speed arise from action.

97

In the case of those ending with touch, dimension, single distinctness, viscidity, and sound, / There is non-inherence; now, in the case of a special quality

98

Of the self, there is instrumentality; in the case of hot touch and heaviness, / As well as in speed, fluidity, and likewise the pair beginning with conjunction,

99

Causality is twofold indeed; now, non-pervasive / Is a special quality of an all-pervading [substance], as well as the pair beginning with conjunction.

100

Colour is graspable by the eye, causes apprehension of substance and the like, / And is an auxiliary to the eye; it is manifold, such as white.

101

In an atom of water and the like, it is eternal; elsewhere, it has a cause. / Taste, however, is graspable by the tongue, manifold such as sweet,

102

An auxiliary to the cognition of taste, and its eternality and so on are as before. / Odour is graspable by the nose and a benefit to the nose itself;

103

It is proclaimed to be of two kinds: fragrance and non-fragrance. / Touch is graspable by the sense-organ of skin, and benefits the skin;

104

It is held to be of three kinds according to the distinction of neither-hot-nor-cold, cold, and hot. / Hardness and so forth exist only in earth, and eternality and so on are as before.

105

However, their state of being produced by baking exists in earth and nowhere else; / Even there, in the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, baking occurs in the atom,

106

Whereas in the doctrine of the Naiyāyikas it is accepted even in the dyad and so forth. / The specific cause of the verbal usage of counting is number: such is the meaning.

107

Oneness is accepted as eternal in eternal [substances] and non-eternal in non-eternal ones; / Duality and so forth, ending with a hundred thousand quadrillion, are held to arise from enumerative cognition.

108

These are proclaimed to pervade multiple substrates; / And their destruction is explained to occur from the destruction of enumerative cognition.

109

The cognition of multiple onenesses is accepted as enumerative cognition. / Dimension is the cause of the verbal usage of measurement;

110

Atomic, long, large, and short: thus is its division spoken of. / In a non-eternal [substance] it is non-eternal; in an eternal one it is declared eternal.

111

The non-eternal arises from number, from dimension, and also from loose aggregation; / But in the dyad and so forth it is declared to be produced by number.

112

In a pot and the like, dimension is said to be produced by dimension; / Loose aggregation, which is conjunction termed loose, produces

113

Dimension in a ball of cotton and so forth; but destruction [arises] from destruction of the substrate. / Like number, distinctness is the cause of the notion of 'distinct'.

114

Its purpose is not accepted as fulfilled by mutual absence, / For the awareness 'this is distinct from that' is distinct from 'this is not that'.

115

The coming together of two unjoined things is declared to be conjunction; / It is proclaimed to be of three kinds: the first arises from the action of either [thing];

116

Likewise, another arises from the movement of both, and another arises from conjunction. / The first is proclaimed as the conjunction of a hawk and a mountain and the like;

117

The collision of two rams is given as the second instance; / Conjunction of a tree and a pot arising from the conjunction of a half-pot and a tree

118

Is the third. That which arises from action is also proclaimed to be of just two kinds: / Impact and pushing; here the first is a cause of sound,

119

And the second is not a cause of sound. Disjunction also is of three kinds: / The first arises from single action, the other arises from action of both,

120

And the third arises from disjunction; the third is also of two kinds: / Arising from disjunction of causes alone, and arising from disjunction of a cause and a non-cause.

121

Posteriority and priority are proclaimed to be of two kinds: / Spatial and temporal; but spatial [belongs] only to a corporeal [substance].

122

Posteriority arises from the cognition of a greater number of conjunctions of corporeal things; / Priority arises from the cognition of fewer of them: so it is said.

123

Their non-inherent cause is conjunction with space in their substrate. / From the cognition of a greater number of sun's revolutions arises

124

Posteriority; priority, however, from the cognition of fewer of them. / Here the non-inherent cause is the conjunction of time and the body.

125

Their destruction is explained to occur by the destruction of enumerative cognition. / The elaboration of cognition has mostly been explained earlier.

126

Now the remaining other manner is demonstrated: / Cognition is accepted as twofold: invalid cognition and valid cognition.

127

That cognition of 'that' in what is devoid of that is explained as invalid cognition; / Its elaboration is error; doubt is also proclaimed.

128

The first is the cognition of the self in bodies, the cognition of yellowness in a conch shell and the like; / It takes the form of a conviction; now doubt is demonstrated:

129

A cognition such as 'is it a man or a post?' is doubt; / A cognition whose qualifier is not an absence of that, but whose qualifier is that, is conviction.

130

That doubt is a cognition of both absence and existence in a single [locus]; / The apprehension of a common property and the like is the cause of doubt.

131

A defect is the generator of invalid cognition; a virtue is that of valid cognition. / A defect is held to be of various kinds, having the nature of bile, distance, and so forth.

132

In perception, contact with the qualified entity together with the qualifier is a virtue; / But in inference, on the other hand,

133

Consideration with respect to the subject qualified by the probandum is a virtue; / In analogical acquisition, however, the cognition of similarity in the primary denotatum is a virtue.

134

In verbal comprehension, however, the valid knowledge of semantic compatibility or intention / would be the quality. But valid cognition is here said to be cognition distinct from error. // 134

135

Or rather, that cognition whose qualifier is that [character] and whose qualificand possesses that [character] / is valid cognition. Indeterminate [cognition] is neither valid cognition nor error. // 135

136

For that is devoid of qualifiethood and the like, not grasping any relation. / Validity cannot be apprehended by itself, because doubt would then be impossible. // 136

136_11

… Thus ends the exposition of misapprehension …

137

The non-apprehension of deviation, as well as the apprehension of co-occurrence, / [are causes] in the apprehension of pervasion of the probans; hypothetical reasoning in some cases dispels doubt. // 137

138

That which pervades the probandum but does not pervade the probans / would be an adjunct; its precise definition is now set forth. // 138

139

All [properties] co-occurring with the probandum are adjuncts, / whose deviation from their probandum occurs in a single locus of the probans. // 139

140

The inference of deviation is the purpose of the adjunct. / Testimony and comparison are not accepted as having separate authority [as means of knowledge] // 140

141

by the Vaiśeṣikas, whose view is that they are included in inference. / That is not correct, because verbal comprehension and the like occur without cognition of pervasion. // 141

141_12

… Thus ends the exposition of the separate authority of testimony and comparison …

142

The threefold nature of inference arises from the division [of probans] into purely positive and so on; / but the twofold nature of pervasion arises from positive and negative [concomitance]. // 142

142_13

… Thus ends the exposition of the threefold nature of inference …

143

Positive pervasion has indeed been stated; negative [pervasion] and so on is now stated here: / that which is the state of the absence of the probans pervading the absence of the probans. // 143

144

Presumption is by no means accepted here as an additional means of knowledge; / for it is fully accounted for through the cognition of negative pervasion. // 144

145

Pleasure is universally desired by the living world; it is produced by merit. / Pain is produced by demerit, repugnant to conscious beings. // 145

146

Desire for the absence of pain and for pleasure arises solely from cognition of them; / but desire for its means arises if there is cognition of being a means to the desired. // 146

147

The desire to act is desire whose qualifier is attainability through effort; / the cause of that is the cognition of being a means to the desired and attainable through effort. // 147

148

The cognition of being a cause of what is strongly detested is an impediment; / while the cognition of not being a cause of that is the cause, according to some. // 148

148_14

The cognition of being a means to what is detested is the cause of aversion.
… Thus ends the exposition of aversion …

149

Activity, withdrawal, and also the cause of life: // 149

150

thus the threefold nature of effort has been declared by the traditional scholars. / Desire to act, cognition of being a means to the desired and attainable through effort, // 150

151

and direct perception of the material cause are the generators of activity; / withdrawal arises from aversion, if there is cognition of being a means to what is detested. // 151

152

Effort originating from life is always imperceptible to the senses; / that is declared to be the cause of the circulation of vital breaths in the body. // 152

153

Heaviness is imperceptible to the senses, residing in the two [substances] beginning with earth; / in non-eternal [substances] it is non-eternal, and in eternal ones it is cited as eternal. // 153

154

That alone is the non-inherent cause in the action called falling. / Fluidity is innate, and the other is incidental. // 154

155

The innate is in water; the second is in earth and fire. / In the atom [and] in water it is accepted as eternal, elsewhere non-eternal. // 155

156

The incidental arises from union with fire in gold, clarified butter, and the like. / Fluidity is the cause of flowing, but the instrumental cause in agglomeration. // 156

157

Viscidity is in water; it is eternal in an atom, non-eternal in a composite. / In other oils, combustion is assisted because of its abundance. // 157

158

The varieties of latent disposition are momentum, and then elasticity and mental impression. / Momentum exists only in corporeal things, sometimes produced by action, sometimes produced by momentum. // 158

159

The latent disposition called elasticity exists in earth, or according to some in all four [corporeal substances]. / It is to be known as imperceptible to the senses, and in some cases is the cause of motion. // 159

160

The latent disposition called mental impression resides in the living self, imperceptible to the senses; / a decisive cognition not consisting in indifference is its cause. // 160

160_15

It is also said to be the cause in remembrance and recognition.
… Thus ends the exposition of latent disposition …

161

Merit and demerit are unseen merit and demerit; merit is the cause of heaven and so forth. // 161

162

That is proclaimed to be the operation of bathing in the Gaṅgā, sacrifice, and the like; / but it is held to be destroyed by the touch of the water of the Karmanāśā and so on. // 162

163

Demerit is the cause of hell and so forth, produced by condemned actions; / it is destroyed by expiation and the like. These two qualities reside in the living self. // 163

164

These two, produced by latent traces, are also destroyed by knowledge. / Sound is tone and phoneme; tone is that which arises from mṛdaṅga drums and so forth. // 164

165

Phonemes, which are produced by conjunction of the throat and so forth, are held to be [sounds such as] ka and the rest. / All sound resides in ether, but only that which has arisen in the ear is grasped. // 165

166

Its propagation is said to follow the analogy of waves and ripples; / according to some, its propagation follows the analogy of the kadamba flower. // 166

167

Non-eternality is [established] by the cognitions: 'ka is produced' and 'ka is destroyed'; / but the cognition 'this is that same ka' rests on membership in the same class, // 167

168

because [such recognition] is observed even in what belongs to the same class, as in 'this is that very medicine.' / Therefore all phonemes are strictly non-eternal; this is indeed our doctrine. // 168

168_16

… Thus ends the Kārikāvalī composed by the venerable Viśvanātha Pañcānana …

168_17

Category: Nyāya Philosophy