Verses on Sāṃkhya 18

Thus, by means of two verses, the understanding of primordial matter has been accomplished. Hereafter we will undertake the understanding of the spirit. Here [an opponent] says: "Certain teachers believe that there is no supreme self distinct from the body, the sense faculties, the intellect, and so forth. Moreover:

"The spirit is only as much / as falls within the scope of the senses.""

To this, it is replied: the self exists, distinct from the body, the sense faculties, the intellect, and so forth. What is the example? Like a sword and its scabbard; like the stalk and the muñja reed. And it is said:

"Just as in the case of a mosquito and an udumbara fruit, an inner stalk and a muñja reed, and fish and water, / there is distinctness despite oneness, so it is with the field and the self, O king!"

In this way, although united like milk and water with the body, the sense faculties, the intellect, and so forth, the supreme self, the spirit, also exists distinct from them. Because of subtlety, like primordial matter, it is not perceived; therefore, the reason is stated for its understanding:

Because composite things are for the sake of another, because of the reverse of the three constituents and the rest, and from superintendence, / the spirit exists, from the condition of being an experiencer, and because of activity for the sake of isolation. //

The spirit exists, because composite things are for the sake of another. Because a composite thing is for the sake of another, for that reason [spirit exists]. In this world, whatever composite things are observed are for the sake of another, such as couches, chariots, and shelters. Similarly, the composite, or assemblage, of the limbs, the intellect, and so on, is indeed for the sake of another. (Therefore, surely there exists [someone] supervising each other, for whose sake this composite exists—this is the connection.) Couches, chariots, and the like are composites of wood; houses and the like are composites of wood, bricks, and so forth. For those chariots, houses, couches, and the like do not accomplish anything for their own sake, nor are they for the sake of one another; rather, there is that Devadatta and so on who lies on this couch, goes by chariot, and dwells in the house (as known by the intellect). In this way, these [things]—intellect and so on, the eye and so on—are not for their own sake, nor are they for the sake of one another; rather, they are for the sake of another. And whoever that 'other' is, that is the self. Therefore we infer that the spirit exists, for whose sake the composite of the eye and so on, [namely] the body, has arisen. And for this reason also it exists: because of the contrariety to the three constituents and so on. That collection in the beginning of which the three constituents occur is 'the three constituents and so on'. The contrariety to the three constituents and so on—from that we see that the spirit exists. As stated in the previous verse: 'possessed of the three constituents, lacking discrimination', and so forth, as the common nature of the manifest and primordial matter. And [then]: 'and the spirit is contrary to that'. By contrariety to the attributes of possessing constituents, lacking discrimination, being an object, being common, being unconscious, and being productive, the existence and distinctness of the self is established. And for this reason also it exists: from supervision. For an assemblage of objects does not act without a supervisor. Just as in this world a chariot yoked to horses capable of leaping, galloping, and running proceeds when supervised by a charioteer; whereas if it proceeded unsupervised by a charioteer, destruction of the body would ensue, and it does not proceed for the destruction of the self. Moreover, it is said in the Ṣaṣṭitantra: 'Primordial matter proceeds when supervised by the spirit.' Hence we see that this supreme self, the spirit, exists, supervised by which primordial matter produces the intellect, egoity, subtle elements, sense faculties, and gross elements. Therefore the spirit exists. And for this reason also it exists: because of the condition of an experiencer. In this world there are six flavors: sweet, sour, bitter, salty, pungent, and astringent. Seeing a meal endowed with these six flavors, an experiencer is established: 'There is an experiencer for whom this meal is meant.' In this way, seeing this manifest and unmanifest, we establish that this supreme self, the spirit, exists, for which experiencer this manifest and unmanifest is the experienced object. And for this reason also it exists: and because of activity for the sake of isolation. 'Isolation' (kaivalya) means the state of being isolated, [which means] liberation. The activity of primordial matter is activity for the sake of isolation—for primordial matter [to bring about isolation for the spirit].