Vaisheshikasutra 3.1

3.1.1

prasiddhā indriyārthāḥ |

prasiddhāḥ—universally known, perceived; Indriyārthāḥ object of the senses.

1. The objects of the senses are universally known.

[Read sūtra 3.1.1 above]

The objects of the Senses, e.g., Smell, Taste, Colour, Touch, and Sound, are capable of being apprehended by the several external sense-organs. Amongst them, the universal cognition or experience of Sound having been shown by the aphorism, “Sound is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the ear” (II. ii. 21). it is in like manner demonstrated that Smell, etc., ending with Touch (i.e., Smell, Taste, Colour, Touch) are universally known. Thus Smell is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the olfactory organ; Taste is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the organ of taste; Colour is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the eye alone; Touch is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the organ of touch alone. And by the word, ‘object’ there is, in all these cases,, denoted a real entity possessed of properties, and therefore the definitions cannot be too wide by over-extending to Smell-ness, etc., and to the non-existence of Smell, etc. Hence Smell-ness is the possession of a sub-class of Attribute-ness, appearing in what is apprehended by the olfactory organ. So also with regard to Taste, etc. Consequently, supersensuous Smell, etc., are not left out.—1.

‘Prasiddhāḥ,’ means subject of ascertainment by perception.

3.1.2

indriyārthaprasiddhir indriyārthebhyo 'rthāntaratve hetuḥ |

indriyārtha-prasiddhiḥ—the universal experience of the objects of the senses; indriyārthebhyaḥ—from the senses-and their object; arthāntarasya—of a different object; hetuḥ—mark.

2. The universal experience of the objects of the senses is the mark of (the existence of) object different from she senses and their objects.

[Read sūtra 3.1.2 above]

‘Hetuḥ,’ i.e., Mark, ‘Arthāntarasya,’ i, e.. of the Soul. ‘Indriyār-thebhyaḥ, i.e., from the senses as well as their objects. The meaning is that it is the mark of the Soul which is a different object from Colour.etc., as well as from those which possess them. Though it is implied here that only knowledge is the mark of the existence of the Soul, yet inasmuch as there being a universal experience of the objects of the senses, the immediate presentation to the mind of Colour, etc., is more commonly known, the mark of there being a Soul is described as constituted by that universal experience, blow this universal experience must reside somewhere, either as an effect as a water-pot, or as an Attribute, or as an Action. This universal experience, again, since it is an act in the same manner as cutting is an act, must be produced by an instrument. That which is the instrument of the universal experience is the senses; and the latter, being an instrument, must be employed by an agent, as an axe and the like, are employed. Thus, that in which this universal experience resides, and which employs the olfactory and other organs for its instruments, is the Soul.—2.

3.1.3

so 'napadeśaḥ |

saḥ—that, i.e., perception; anapadeśaḥ—the semblance or simulacrum of a mark; a false mark.

3. Perception (as a mark inferring the body or the senses as 'its substratum) (is) a false mark.—119.

[Read sūtra 3.1.3 above]

‘Anapadeśaḥ’ means the appearance or semblance of an ‘apadeśa—’ i.e., mark. Thus the meaning is that the being an effect of the body or the senses is the mere semblance of a mark—inasmuch as such an argument applies to the cognition produced by a lamp is therefore not-one-pointed, i.e., multifarious.—3.

The sense or the object cannot be a mark for the inference of the Self.

3.1.4

kāraṇājñānāt |

kāraṇājñanāt—because the causes or constituents are devoid of cognition or consciousness.

4. (The body or the senses cannot be the seat of perception), because there is no consciousness in the causes (i.e., the component parts, of the body).

[Read sūtra 3.1.4 above]

It is meant (that the body or the senses cannot be the seat of perception), because of the absence of consciousness in the hands, feet, etc., or in their parts, which are the causes, i.e., components of the body. For it is observed that the particular attributes of Earth, etc., are preceded by like attributes in their causes. In like manner, if there existed consciousness in the components of the body, it might possibly exist also in the body. But this is not the case. It cannot be urged that consciousness may exist also in the components of the body; for it would entail the absence of uniformity in the actions of the body, since uniformity is never observed amongst a plurality of sentient beings. It would then also follow that, after the amputation of the hand, there will be no more recollection of that which was experienced within the limit of the hand, according to the maxim, “One does not remember that which has been experienced by another.” Moreover, the supposition would entail that, after the destruction of the body, there would be no experience of the consequences of the acts performed by the body, e.g., causing hurt, etc., for certainly Maitra does not suffer the consequences of the sins committed by Caitra. And hence there would be an annihilation of acts performed, and an accession of acts not performed.—4.

3.1.5

kāryājñānāt |

kāryeṣu—in the effects; jñānāt—because there would be consciousness.

5. Because (there would be) consciousness in the effects.

[Read sūtra 3.1.5 above]

If, as a matter of fact, consciousness existed in the primary causes of the body, namely the ultimate atoms, then it would also exist in the water-pot, etc., which are the effects originated by them also. Moreover, consciousness would exist in products such as water-pots, etc., also because the particular attributes of Earth pervade all terrene existence. But consciousness is not observed to exist in these products.—5.

3.1.6

ajñānāc ca |

ajñānāt—because it is not known; ca—and.

6. And because it is not known (that any minute degree of consciousness exists in the water-pot, etc).

[Read sūtra 3.1.6 above]

The meaning is that there is no consciousness in the water-jar, etc., inasmuch as it is not known by any means of knowledge. If you admit that which is beyond the range of all means of knowledge, then you will have to admit also that a hare has horns, and so on. For, by no kind of evidence, is it known that consciousness exists in the water-jar, etc—6.

3.1.7

anya eva hetur ity anapadeśaḥ |

anyat—something else; eva—certainly; hetuḥ—make; iti—hence; anapadeśaḥ—no mark.

7. A mark is certainly something else (than that of which it is a mark). Hence (a mark, which is identical with the thing of which it is a mark, is) no mark (at all.)—123.

[Read sūtra 3.1.7 above]

The mark or means of proof can but be something else than that which is to be proved. It cannot be identical with that which is to be proved; for, were it so, it would follow that the thing which is to be proved, would have no difference from the means of proof. Therefore, a means of proof, constituted by identity with that which is to be proved, is no means of proof, i.e., no mark at all.—7.

Something quite different is the mark of inference of the Self; the sense or the object cannot be such a mark. What this ‘something quite different’ is, is declared in the eighteenth aphorism of this chapter.

3.1.8

saṃyogi samavāyy ekārthasamavāyi virodhi ca, kāryaṃ kāryāntarasya, kāraṇaṃ kāraṇāntarasya, virodhy abhūtaṃ bhūtasya, bhūtam abhūtasya, abhūtam abhūtasya, bhūtaṃ bhūtasya |

saṃyogi—the conjunct; samavāyi—the combined or inherent; ekārthasamavāyi—the combined together in one thing, or co-inherent; virodhi—the contradictory.

9. The conjunct, the combined, the con-combined, and the contradictory also (are marks of inference).

[Read sūtra 3.1.9 above]

“The body has skin, because it is the body”—here the mark is the conjunct or the contiguous. For skin is described as a natural integument of matter capable of growth and decay. And it is neither an effect nor a cause of the body, but merely produced together with the body and in invariable conjunction with it. Similarly, the combined is also a mark. For instance, “Ether possesses Magnitude or extension, because it is a Substance, like a water-pot, etc.”; here Magnitude or extension which is to be proved is proved by the property of Substance-ness which is in essential combination with Ether. Or, to take another example. The extension of an atom, a particular form or limit of extension or Magnitude is proved by this that the relativity or degree of extension or Magnitude must somewhere cease; whereby the ultimate atom is inferred as that in which the limit of extension rests.

The inference of Ether by Sound, etc., and the inference of the Soul by knowledge, etc., are inferences of the cause by the effect; so that they are not instanced here.—9.

kāryam—an effect; kāryāntarasya—of another effect.

10. One effect (may be the mark of inference) of another effect.

[Read sūtra 3.1.10 above]

An effect e.g., Colour, is the mark of another effect, e.g., Touch. This is merely illustrative. Thus, that which is not an effect, e.g., the unity of Ether, is a mark of the individual separateness of Ether, and so in the case of its extreme largeness.—10.

virodhi—the contradictory; abhūtam—the non-existent, or non-product, or that which has not taken place; bhūtasya—of the existent, or that which has taken place.

11. The opposite, i.e., the non-existent (is a mark) of the existent.

[Read sūtra 3.1.11 above]

That which has not taken place, e.g., a shower, is a mark of that which has taken place, e.g., the conjunction of air and clouds, (where clouds being dispersed by air, showers do not take place). So also is the recitation of a mantra which is the contradictory or counter-agent of a tumour, etc. Thus that which has not taken place, i.e., has not been produced, e.g., a tumour, etc., is the mark of that which has taken place, e.g., the recitation of a mantra or sacred text, (where a tumour is prevented by the recitation of the appropriate mantra).—14.

bhūtam—that which has taken place; abhūtasya—of that which has not taken place.

12. That which has taken place—(is a mark) of that which has not taken place;—128.

[Read sūtra 3.1.12 above]

That which has taken place, e.g, a tumour, etc., is a mark of that which has not taken place, e.g., the recitation of a mantra. So also that which has taken place, e.g., the conjunction of air and cloudsis a mark of that which has not taken place, e.g., a shower. Similarly that which has taken place, e.g., a burn, is a mark of that which has not taken place, e.g., the application of a gem. etc., to destroy the burning power of the fire. Similar instances should be understood.—12.

bhūtaḥ—that which has taken place; bhūtasya—of that which has taken place.

13.—That which has taken place, (is a mark) of that which has taken place.

[Read sūtra 3.1.13 above]

There is sometimes inference of an existing contradictory from another existing contradictory as when, on seeing a snake swelling with anger, it is inferred that there is an ichneumon behind a bush. In this case, the snake excited is that which is, existent, and the ichneumon hidden by the bush is also in existence. Therefore, an existent, as the mark of another existent object. On the other hand, a shower cannot exist at the same time as the conjunction of air and clouds,, nor can tumours, etc., co-exist with the recitation of mantras.—13.

3.1.9

prasiddhapūrvakatvād apadeśasya |

prasiddhipūrvakatvāt—because preceded by (the recollection of) the ‘pervasion’ or universal relation; apadeśasya—of the mark.

14. (These are valid marks), because the characteristic of an inferential mark is that it is preceded by (the recollection of the) universal relation (of itself and of that of which it is a mark).

[Read sūtra 3.1.14 above]

‘Prasiddhī’ means recollection of universal relation. ‘Apadeśa’ denotes a mark. Therefore the mark attended with the recollection of universal relation, is described by that member of an argument which states the mark, or by that member which states the deduction; so that the mark is, as has been stated, preceded by recollection of universal relation. Thus universal relation, (i.e., a true major premiss) exists-in all these cases of inference of an agent by the instruments such as the organ of hearing, etc., and of the Soul as their substratum by the attributes such as knowledge, etc.; whereas there is no universal relation in the inference by which you (i.e., the opponent) have sought to establish knowledge as a i attribute of the body, through the mark that it is an effect of the body. This is the import.

It may be asked, what is this universal relation? It is not merely inviolable relation; for, in the case of inference from cause to effect, it is not known that inviolable or invariable concomitance is the being not the ground of the co-existence of the absolute non-existence of that which has to be proved, and because inference from cause to effect it is impossible that invariable concomitance is the not being the seat of that which is not the seat of that which has to be proved, and also because smoke, etc., are the seat of that which is not the seat of that, whatever it may be, which has to be proved.

Nor is it inseparable existence, for that is either the non-existence -of the mark in the absence of that which is to be proved, or existence of the mark after deduction has been drawn from that which is to be proved. It cannot be said that because sometimes there is non-existence of smoke, also where no ass exists, and there is existence of smoke also where an ass exists, therefore uniform agreement and uniform difference are intended here; because the very same uniformity is the subject of enquiry.

Nor is it relation to a whole. If it be the relation of the whole of the major term to the middle term, such relation does not exist even in the case of smoke, etc., which are not equally pervasive as their corresponding major terms. Let it be relation of the whole of the middle term to the major term; but this is impossible, for there does not exist in the whole of the middle term relation to a single major term. Let it be relation of the whole of the major term to the whole of the middle term. This also is not valid, for it is nowhere possible that there should be relation of the whole of the major term to the whole of the middle term, inasmuch as the individuals denoted by the major and ths middle term are related each to each. And in the case of the terms being unequally pervasive, there would be a want of pervasion or universal relation.

Nor is the relation essential. For essence means either the nature or condition of a thing, or (condition in itself, or production by itself). Now, if the nominal affix which converts ‘essence’ into the form ‘essential,’ has the sense of production thereby, then the definition will be too narrow to apply to universal relation characterised as Combination. If the affix bears the sense of dependence upon it or residing in it, in that case also the definition will be too narrow to apply to Combination, for combination does not reside in, i.e., depend upon, anything whatever; and also because even Conjunction neither resides in, nor is produced by, smoke-ness, etc., which are the properties of the middle term.

Nor is the relation, non-accidental or non-coditional. For an upādhi, accident or external condition, itself is difficult to ascribe, and were it easy to ascribe, would be difficult to conceive. And were it easy to conceive, it would still involve ‘mutual dependence’ or ‘reciprocity’ or argument in a circle, for there being pervasion of the major term, the conception of the non-pervasion, etc., of the middle term would depend upon the conception of the universal relation.

Nor is universal relation mere relation. For, though variable relation also appears as universal relation, though its reference to particular place and particular time, yet, as the knowledge of it does not govern the inferential process, it is, therefore, required to determine that universal relation only which, by being known, will become the means of inference.

Nor is universal relation co-existence with the major term which is not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence appertaning to that which contains the middle term, (i.e., the minor term) For fire also is the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence, present in that which has smoke, since it is not that in a kitchen hearth there is not the absolute non-existence of volcanic fire. In such an instance as “This has conjunction, because it is a Substance,” the definition would become too narrow, as the absolute non-existence of Conjunction would be co-extensive with the mark or means of inference. It cannot be said, Universal relation is co-extension with the major term which is not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence which is co-extensive with itself and which is the contradictory of the counteropposite, because the absolute non-existence of conjunction falls short of being the contradictory of the counteropposite.” For the absolute non-existence of conjunction also is the contradictory of the counter-opposite; otherwise, it would be useless to imagine differences of delimiting circumstances for differences of delimitations are not imagined for the purpose of showing the states of being produced and non-eternal.

Nor is universal relation the not being the foundation or substratum of non-co-extension with the major term; for in the inference from cause to effect, there is not konwn any such non-co-extension with the major term. It is in fact another form of being the foundation of that which is not the foundation of the major term.

Nor is the universal relation of a thing the possession of the form which determines its relation to something else, for the characteristic of fire also has the function of determining relation to or the coextension of smoke. It cannot be sait that because of wider extension this is not the case; for it is obsevred that, that which determines the pervasion (e.g., fire) has a wider extension (iṇ. other words, fire exists-where there is no smoke), and the characteristic of Smoke also has a wider extension inasmuch as there exists smoke pendant on the surface of the sky e.g., in clouds). If therefore, a qualification be added for the purpose of excluding such instances, then it must be allowed thṇt, that which determines the characteristic of being the middle term (yyāpya) the same is intended to determine the characteristic of being co-extended, and hence there is the fallacy of self-dependence (ātmāśraya). The view also that two things are universally related, when the One possesses the form of determining the co-existence of the other in a common substratum, is fallacious in the same way.

In reply to the above objections, we may proceed to state as follows: pervasion or universal relation is a non-accidental relation; while by the being non-accidental is meant co-existence in the same substratum with a variably present sādhya or that which has to be proved (i.e., the major term which is predicated of the minor, in the conclusion), of all those in which the mark or middle term is sometimes present and sometimes absent, or co-existence in the same substratum with a sādhyd [sādhya?] co-existent with the absolute non-existence of the counteropposites of all those which are the counter-opposites of the absolute non-existence co-existing in the same substratum with the mark. The meaning of the two expressions is co-existence in the same substratum with the sādhya which is not pervaded by anything that does not pervade the sādhana or the middle term; in other words, it is the characteristic of being pervaded by all that which is pervasive of the sādhya. It may be said that this is difficult to understand from the relative compound which has been employed here. For this reason there is need of observation and argument also. In other words, pervasion, vyāpi, is co-existence in the same substratum with the sādhya which is not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence co-existing in the same substratum with the sādhana. By absolute non-existence is intended that which possesses the counter-opposite determined by the genera of fire-ness, etc., Therefore, even though in the smoke of the kitchen hearth there is co-existence in the same substratum with the absolute non-existence of mountain fire, yet it is no fault, because there never arises the intuition that there is not fire in that which has smoke. Substanceness, however, is never co-existent in the same substratum with the absolute non-existence of the charateristic of being in conjunction, for we never have the intuition that substance is not conjunct, because, although conjunctions singly do not appear in that which is the subject of pervasion, yet the generic quality of being conjunct appears in that which is the subject of pervasion, and is itself pervasive.

Objection.—But the being non-accidental implies the absence of accident or adjunct, upādhi; and upādhi itself is difficult to obtain.

Answer.—It is not so. Because the characteristic of upādhi belongs to that which does not pervade the sādhana, i.e., the middle term, while it does pervade the sādhya, i.e., the major term. So it has been said, “upādhi is that which is dependent upon another upādhi, (for determining non accidentally), in the case of the sādhana, and which is not dependent upon another upādhi, (for determining non-accidentality), in the case of the sādhya.”

Objection.—But the definition does not include an upādhi which is only non-pervasive of the sādhya. For example, Air is perceptible, because it is the substratum of touch which is perceptible. Here the possession of developed colour is such an upādhi. So also is the characteristic of being produced by eating herbs (which might produce blackness), in, “He is black, because he is the son of Mitrā” (a low-born woman). For, the possession of developed colour is not pervasive of perceptibility, since it does not exist in the perception of the Soul as well as of Attribute and Action; nor is the characteristic of being produced by eating herbs pervasive of blackness, since it does not exist in the case of the blackness of the black crow, cuckoo, cloud, black-berries, etc.

Answer.—The objection is not valid. For, that which is non-pervasive of the sādhana, while it is pervasive of the sādhya as finally determined,—the same is intended as the upādhi. And a sādhya becomes finally determined, when it is determined by a property, by determination by which the pervasiveness of the upādhi remains unbroken. In the instances given the possession of developed colour is pervasion of perceptibility by the determination or limitation of external substantiality, and is apprehended by agreement and difference. As regards the second instance, it has been ascertained in the works of Caraka, Suśruta, and other medical writers, that the characteristic of being produced by eating herbs is pervasive towards the sādhya determined by the blackness of a person, which can be produced (artificially). Other cases should be similarly understood.

Objection.—Still it is not the meaning of the word, upāphi. An upādhi is something the property of which shines in another object, e.g., a China rose, etc., in reference to a crystal, etc. In the case of an unequally pervaded upādhi., there being absence of the characteristic of that which can be pervaded, its property cannot shine in the approved sādhana.

Answer.—This is true. The primary use of the word, upādhi, is only where it is equally pervaded (as the sādhya), e.g.,in the possession of fire produced from moist faggots, (for wherever there is such fire, there is smoke, and vice versa). In other places, its use is secondary. The secondary sense infers variation, or deviation, according to the rule that, that which deviates from the pervader of something, also deviates from that thing. And there exists sādhana which deviates from the upādhi which is pervasive of the sādhya. Hence, that the sādhana deviates from the sādhya, and that, that which is not pervaded by that which pervades an object, is also not pervaded by that object, together infer that there is no proof of the characteristic of being pervaded, or brings forward a contrary argument, satpratipakṣa,[1] there being proof of the non-existence of the sādhya from the non-existence of the upādhi, which is pervasive of the sādhya, in the pakṣa, i.e., the subject, which is the minor term). So it has been said, “The disputant may bring forward an upādhi, governing the sādhya finally determined, even though it be divorced from the rule or determination of the sādhya maintained by the speaker, such upādhi being equally (a means of discrediting the conclusion, or) a source of satpratipakṣa.” And such upādhi is brought forward by arguments adverse to the absence of arguments in favour of bādha obstruction, (í. e., the certainty of the non-existence of the sādhya), and deviation (i.e., the non-co-existence of the sādhana with the sādhya).

It has been held that by the non-co-existence of which the non-co-existence of the sādhana with the sādhya arises, the same is upādhi. But here the instrumental case-ending is used to express neither instrument, nor means, mode, nor mark. Nor is the construction to be completed thus, By the non-co-existence of which being known, the non-co-existence of the sādhana with the sādhya becomes known; for the definition, not applying to an unknown upādhi, would not apply to upādhis in obvious cases of non-co-existence. It is diffcult to ascertain it (i.e., upādhi) significatively [significantly?] or by its significance, since it is impossible to formulate or invent, an upādhi without (first) establishing the characteristic of being the means of the inference of non-co-existence. The characteristic of being other than the pakṣa (or the subject of the conclusion), again, though suffering from the characteristic of an upādhi, is yet not an upādhi; for, it would involve obstruction to itself, e.g., dubiousness and not-one-pointedness in the pakṣa. For if there is no doubt about it, then it is not a pakṣa if it is a pakṣa, then doubt is necessary, and consequently, dubiousness and not-one-pointed-ness become certain. That which remains to be said on this topic, may be sought in the Mayūkha.—14.

3.1.10

aprasiddho 'napadeśaḥ |

aprasiddhaḥ—unproved, Anāpedeśaḥ, a fallacious mark; asan—non-existent; sandigdhaḥ—dubious; ca—and; anapadeśaḥ—A fallacious mark.

15. The unproved is a false mark; the non-existent and the dubious also are false marks.

[Read sūtra 3.1.15 above]

‘Aprasiddhaḥ, means that which is not pervaded or in universal relation, and that the universal relation of which has not been observed, and that which is in opposite universal relation, i.e., the contradictory. The word includes the two forms of the unproved, in point of universal relation or being pervaded, and the contradictory. ‘Asan’ means nonexistent in the pakṣa or the minor term, i.e., that which has not the property or possibility of residing in the pakṣa or subject. And this is due sometimes to the unreality of the form (attributed to the mark), and sometimes to the absence of uncertainty and the desire to prove as) in the proof of that which has been already proved. ‘Sandigdhaḥ’ means that which causes the doubt whether the sādhya be existent or non-existent (in the subject of the conclusion). And this arises sometimes from the observation of common property, sometimes from the observation of a non-common property, and sometimes from the observation of the mark accompanying the sādhya as well as its non-existence. The first is general multifarious, the second is particular multifarious, and the third is inconclusive.—15.

Candrakānta splits up III. i. 15 into two aphorisms: “Aprasidhaḥ anapadeśaḥ” and Asanasandigdhaḥ ca anapadeśaḥ.”

3.1.11

asan sandigdhaś cānapadeśaḥ |

aprasiddhaḥ—unproved, Anāpedeśaḥ, a fallacious mark; asan—non-existent; sandigdhaḥ—dubious; ca—and; anapadeśaḥ—A fallacious mark.

15. The unproved is a false mark; the non-existent and the dubious also are false marks.

[Read sūtra 3.1.15 above]

‘Aprasiddhaḥ, means that which is not pervaded or in universal relation, and that the universal relation of which has not been observed, and that which is in opposite universal relation, i.e., the contradictory. The word includes the two forms of the unproved, in point of universal relation or being pervaded, and the contradictory. ‘Asan’ means nonexistent in the pakṣa or the minor term, i.e., that which has not the property or possibility of residing in the pakṣa or subject. And this is due sometimes to the unreality of the form (attributed to the mark), and sometimes to the absence of uncertainty and the desire to prove as) in the proof of that which has been already proved. ‘Sandigdhaḥ’ means that which causes the doubt whether the sādhya be existent or non-existent (in the subject of the conclusion). And this arises sometimes from the observation of common property, sometimes from the observation of a non-common property, and sometimes from the observation of the mark accompanying the sādhya as well as its non-existence. The first is general multifarious, the second is particular multifarious, and the third is inconclusive.—15.

Candrakānta splits up III. i. 15 into two aphorisms: “Aprasidhaḥ anapadeśaḥ” and Asanasandigdhaḥ ca anapadeśaḥ.”

3.1.12

viṣāṇī tasmād aśvo viṣāṇī tasmād gaur iti ca |

Candrakānta splits up III. i. 15 into two aphorisms: “Aprasidhaḥ anapadeśaḥ” and Asanasandigdhaḥ ca anapadeśaḥ.”

3.1.13

ātmendriyamano'rthasannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat |

ātmā-indriya-artha-sannikarṣāt—from contact of the soul, the sense, and the object; yat—which; niṣpadyate—is produced; tat—that; anyat—other, different.

18. That (i.e., knowledge) which is produced from the contact of the soul, the sense, and the object, is other (than a false mark).

[Read sūtra 3.1.18 above]

3.1.14

pravṛttinivṛttī ca pratyagātmani dṛṣṭe paratra liṅgam |

pravṛtti-nivṛttī—activity and inactivity, occupation and withdrawal; Ca and. pratyag-ātmani—in the in-going or in-dwelling soul, in one’s own soul; dṛṣṭe—observed; paratra—elsewhere, of other souls; liṅgam—mark.

19. And activity and inactivity, observed in one’s own soul, are the marks of (the existence of) other souls.

[Read sūtra 3.1.19 above]