Manava Dharmashastra 2.10

2.10.1

"kimidaṃ śabdārthasambandhasmaraṇamabhidhānakośaśāstram--'ātmabhūḥ parameṣṭhī' tyādivanna dharmaśāstraṃ, yenedamucyate 'śrutistu vedo vijñeyo dharmaśāstraṃ tu vai smṛtiriti |' ucyate | iha sadācāro na śrutirna smṛtirnibandhābhāvāt | nibaddhāścarā hi smṛtayaḥ prasiddhāḥ | atastasya smṛtitvamupapādayati | yatkāryadharmaśāstrasya tat dharmaśāstram | yatra dharmaḥ śiṣyate kartavyatayā pratīyate sā smṛtiḥ | nibandhānibandhāvaprayojakau | śiṣṭasamācārādapi dharmasya kartavyatāvagatiḥ | so'pi smṛtireva | tataśca yatra kasmaicitkāryāya smṛterupādānaṃ tatra sadācāro'pi grahītavyaḥ | dharmaśāstraṃ cetsmṛtirve do'pi sarvamukhyaṃ dharmaśāsanamiti tasyāpi smṛtitvaprasaṅgastannivṛttyarthamāha śrutistu vedo vijñeyaḥ | yatra śrūyate dharmānuśāsanaśabdaḥ sā śrutiḥ | yatra ca smaryate sā smṛtiḥ | tacca samācāre'pyastītyataḥ so'pi smṛtireva | na hi tatrāpyasmṛtavaidike śabde prāmāṇyam | athavā śrutigrahaṇaṃ smṛterve datulyatvārtham | "kiṃ punaḥ śrutismṛtyoḥ samānaṃ kāryaṃ yatsamācāre'pyanena prāpyate" | ucyate | te sarvārtheṣvamīmāṃsye | 'te' śrutismṛtī | sarveṣvartheṣvatyantāsambhāvyeṣvapi dṛṣṭaviṣayaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ, --yathā tasmādeva hiṃsālakṣaṇātpadārthātkvacidabhyudayaḥ kvacitpratyavāyaḥ, (2) 'surāpānānnarakaḥ somapānātpāpaśuddhiḥ' ityādī pakṣapratipakṣagamanena vicāro na kartavyaḥ | āśaṅkāpakṣāntarasambhāvanaṃ mīmāṃsanam | yathā--"hiṃsā cetpāpahetuḥ svarūpāviśeṣādvaidikyapi tathā bhavitumarhati | atha vaidikyabhyudayaheturlaukikyapi tathā syāt, tadrūpasamānatvāt" |

The Veda should be known as the ‘revealed word,’ and the Dharmaśāstra as the ‘recollections’; in all matters, these two do not deserve to be criticised, as it is out op these that Dharma shone forth.—(10)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):
Objection:—“Is this a treatise on the meanings of words, a lexicon,—like the works beginning with such words as Ātmabhūḥ, Parameṣṭhī (are the names of Brahmā), and so forth,—that it is stated that ‘Revealed Word’ means the Veda, and ‘Recollections’ means the Dharmaśāstra?”

Answer:—In ordinary life, the ‘Practices of Cultured Men’ are not regarded either as ‘Revealed Word’ or as ‘Recollection,’ on the ground of their being not codified; codified treatises alone are known as ‘Smṛtis,’ ‘Recollections’; and it is for the purpose of declaring that these Practices also are included under ‘Smṛti’ that the author has set forth this verse.

‘Dharmaśāstra,’ ‘Dharma-ordinance,’ is that which serves the purpose of ‘ordaining’ (teaching) Dharma as to be done; and ‘Smṛti’ is that wherein Dharma is taught, i.e., laid down as to be done; and codification or non-codification is entirely immaterial. Now as a matter of fact a knowledge of what should be done is derived from the Practices of Cultured Men also; so that these also come under ‘Smṛti.’ Hence whenever mention is made of ‘Smṛti’ in connection with any matter, the Practices of Cultured Men should also be taken as included under the name.

“If all Dharmaśāstra (‘ordinance of Dharma’) is ‘Smṛti’ then the Veda also, which is the ‘ordinance of Dharma’ par excellence, would have to be regarded as Smṛti,”—with a view to preclude the possibility of such an idea being entertained, the author has said—‘The Veda should be known as the Revealed Word.’ Where the words conveying the ‘Teaching of Dharma’ are directly perceived (heard), it is the ‘Revealed Word’; while where the words of Teaching are only recollected, it is ‘Smṛti’; and since this latter condition is also fulfilled by the ‘Practices of Cultured Men,’ this latter also comes under ‘Smṛti’; as a matter of fact, no authority can attach to any Practice, in corroboration whereof a Vedic text is not ‘recollected.’

Or, the mention of the ‘Revealed Word’ may be explained as serving the purpose of showing that the Smṛti is equal to the Veda.

Question:—“What is that common function of Revealed Word and Recollection which rhe present verse seeks to attribute to the Practices of Cultured Men?”

Answer:—‘In all matters these two should not be criticised’;—‘These two’—i.e., Revealed Word and Recollection.—‘In all matters’—i.e., even in regard to apparently inconceivable things, such as are entirely beyond the scope of those means of knowledge that are applicable to perceptible things; e.g., (a) the same act of killing leads, in one case, to good, and while in another case it leads to sin; (b) the drinking of wine leads to Hell, while the drinking of Soma removes sin. In such matters, we should not proceed to discuss the various pros and cons. ‘Criticism’ consists in raising doubts and conceiving of contrary views. For example—“If the act of killing is sinful, then since the act of killing is the same in all cases, that done in the course of Vedic sacrifices should also be sinful;—if the latter killing is a source of good, ordinary killing also should be conducive to good; the act being exactly the same in both cases.”

2.10.2

yasya yadrūpaṃ vedādavagataṃ tasya tadviparītarūpasambhāvanamasattarkāśrayairasampragdhetubhiryadvicāraṇaṃ tatsiddhāntābhiniveśaḥ sa iha pratiṣidhyate | na punarayamarthoveḍsyādyaḥ pūrvapakṣa utasvidyaḥ siddhānta ityeṣā mīmāṃsā niṣidhyate | yato vakṣyati "yastarkeṇānusandhatte sa dharma veda netara" iti | "kiṃ punarayamadṛṣṭārtho mīmāṃsāpratiṣedhaḥ |" neti brūmaḥ | tābhyāṃ dharmo hi nirbabhau | anena tārkikapramāṇānāṃ vedārthaviparītasādhanānāmābhāsatāmāha | īdṛśā hi teṣāṃ hetavaḥ- "vaidikī hiṃsā pāpahetuḥ, hiṃsātvāllaukikahiṃsāvat" | tatra hiṃsāyāṃ pāpahetutvaṃ na kutaścidanyataḥ pramāṇātsiddhyamantareṇāgamam | evaṃ cennāsti hiṃsāyāḥ pāpasādhanasiddhau hetuḥ yāvadāgamaḥ prāmāṇyena nābhyupagataḥ | abhyupagate cāgamaprāmāṇye tadviruddho heturna yujyate, aprāmāṇyāpatterāgamasya | tataścetaretarāghātaḥ | pūrvaṃ prāmāṇyena parigrahaḥ paścādaprāmāṇyamiti | so'yaṃ svavacanaviruddhaḥ pakṣaḥ | nainaṃ tārkikā anumanyante, 'mama mātā bandhyeti' vat | āgamaviruddhaśca | athocyate-"naivāgamaḥ pramāṇam | kathaṃ tadvirodhodbhāvanaṃ dūṣaṇam | anṛtavyāghātapunaruktadoṣebhyaḥ | kārīryādikarmaṇāṃ tatsamanantaraṃ phalārthitayā'nuṣṭhīyamānānāṃ na niyamato'nuṣṭhānasamanantaraṃ phalaprāptiḥ | kālāntare bhaviṣyatīti ceduktamatra-'kṛtā śaradi kārīrī bhṛśaṃ śuṣyatsu śāliṣu | vasante jāyate vṛṣṭistasyā gomarakaḥ phalamiti' | yānyapyanyatrabhāviphalāni jyotiṣṭomādīni tatrāpi niranvayavināśātkarmaṇo varṣaśate phalaṃ bhaviṣyatīti niḥsandigdhavaitālikavyavahāropamametat | tasmādanṛtam |

What is prohibited here is that ‘criticism,’ in which we conceive of the form of an act to be quite the reverse of what is declared in the Veda, and proceeding to examine it by means of reasonings based upon false premisses, begin to insist on the conclusion thus arrived at. It is not meant to prohibit such enquiry and discussion as to whether the Prima Facie View or the Established Thesis is in due accord with the Veda. That such an inquiry is not meant to be prohibited is clear from what the author says later on—‘He alone, and none else, knows Dharma, who examines it by reasonings.’ (Manu, 12.106)

Question:—“Is this criticism prohibited with a view to some invisible (superphysical) results?”

We say—no. Because it was out of these two that Dharma shone forth. [This is what is intended by the said prohibition.]

This assertion points out the fact that all the arguments, set forth by casuists in support of things contrary to what is laid down in the Veda, are fallacious. These arguments are of the following kind—“The killing of animals in the course of Vedic sacrifices must be sinful, because it is killing, like any ordinary killing.”—Now that killing is sinful is learnt from no other source of knowledge except scriptures; under the circumstances, no reason can be found to establish the sinfulness of killing until the scriptures have been accepted as authoritative; and when once the authority of the Veda has been admitted, it could not be reasonable to bring forward arguments against it, as this would invalidate the (acknowledged) authority of scriptures; and this would involve self-contradiction: at first the scriptures were admitted to be authoritative, and then subsequently they are held to be un-authoritative; and this opinion would be contrary to the person’s own previous assertion,—no casuist ever says ‘my mother is childless’; and it is also contrary to the scriptures.

The Casuist might argue as follows:—

“Scripture is not authoritative; why then should contrariness to it be regarded as undesirable? That the scripture (Veda) is unauthoritative is proved by such discrepancies as (a) untruthfulness, (b) inconsistency and (c) repetition.

(a) Such sacrifices as the Kārīrī (which is laid down as to be performed for obtaining rain) are performed by men desiring min, but as a matter of fact no rain comes after the performance. As regards the rain that might come at some future time, it has been well said—‘The Kārīrī having been performed during the autumn, when the cornfields were drying up, if the rain falls during the spring, this only leads to cattle-disease!’ Further, as regards the Jyotiṣṭoma and such other sacrifices, which are spoken of as bringing their rewards at some future time, since the acts will have completely disappeared after performance, the assertion that their reward would come after a hundred years would be exactly like the confident assertion of the Vampirist. From this it is clear that the Veda is untruthful,

2.10.3

vyāghātaḥ-udite hotavyamanudite juhvato doṣaḥ | "prātaḥprātaranṛtaṃ te vadanti purodayājjuhvati ye'gnihotram" | tathā'nudite hotavyaṃ--"yathā atithaye pradrutāya dadyāttādṛgetadyajjuhuyā"dityekatroditahomo vidhīyate'nuditahomanindayā tadvaiva viparītamanyat | tatraikaḥ pakṣa āśrīyatāmityanadhyavasāyaḥ | yadevāgnihotrādyaṃ kasyāṃ śākhāyāṃ vidyate tadeva śākhāntare'pi | sarvaśākhāpratyayamekaṃ karmetyabhyupagamaḥ | tataśca punaruktam |"tatrānṛtameva tanna bhavatītyetenaiva pādena pratipādyate | yate| vedāddharma eva kartavyatāmātraṃ yāgādiviṣayaṃ nirbabhau vibhāti gamyate | na punaḥ kālaviśeṣaḥ phalotpattau, adhikāravākyeṣu kālaviśeṣāśravaṇāt | vidhito hi phalaṃ bhavatītyetāvadgamyate | kālāvacchedo na vidhiḥ | dhātvarthasambandhino hi kālavibhāgā bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānāḥ | na caitadvātvarthaḥ phalaṃ kintu vaidham | dhātvarthaphalaṃ hi tadānīmeva nirvartate devatoddeśena dravyatyāgo havirvikārādi | yadi kaścitkasyacidājñākaro bhavati tena preṣyataṃ 'gaccha yāhi grāmamiti' sa ājñāsampādane pravṛtta kadācitprārambha eva vetanaphalaṃ labhate, kadācinmadhye, kadācitkṛtaājñāviṣaye ; samanantaramanyedyurvā kālāntare'thavā | evametacchāstraphalamaniyatakālam | divyavṛṣṭyādestu svābhāvyena pratyāsattimātraṃ gamyate | na tu tadaharevotpattiḥ | pratibandhakāni ca yathā phalasyaivaṃvidhasya loke bhavanti tathā vede'pi, purākṛtaṃ duṣkṛtādi | tathā ca veda evaitaddarśayati, ‘yadi na varṣettathaiva vasediti’ | sarvasvāre tu vivadante | ‘naitatkratuphalam | aṅgametatsmaraṇam |

(b) There is ‘inconsistency’ also: when it is said ‘libations should be offered after sunrise,’ if it were offered before sunrise, it would be clearly wrong; as it is said—‘those who perform the Agnihotra before sunrise utter falsehood morning after morning.’ Then again, it is said ‘that the libations should be offered before the sun has risen,’ for (it is said) ‘the offering made after sunrise would be like the offering of reception to the guest after he had gone.’ Now in the former we have the injunction of offering after sunrise, and a deprecation of offering before sunrise, while in the latter we have the reverse. So that people are always in doubt as to which alternative they should adopt.

(c) The same Agnihotra that is enjoined in one Vedic Rescension is found to be enjoined in another Rescension also; and it has been held (by the Mīmāmsakas) that the act, mentioned in the various texts, is one and the same (Agnihotra) And this is a clear Repetition.”

That there is no ‘untruthfulness’ in the Veda is what is meant by the last quarter of the Verse (‘it was out of these that Dharma shone forth’). Because out of the Veda ‘Dharma alone—i.e., only that a certain act should be done, in the form of sacrifice,—‘shone forth,’ is expounded; and it does not say anything definite in regard to the time at which the rewards shall appear; this is clear from the fact that the passages that speak of rewards do not make mention of any time; all that we learn from the Injunction is that a certain result shall follow, and the Injunction does not specify the time. As a matter of fact, divisions of time, past, present and future, are related to what is expressed by the verbal root; while the Result is not denoted by the verbal root at all; it is only implied by the Injunction; what is denoted by the verbal root (i.e., the act of ‘sacrifice’) is actually accomplished at the time (of the performance), in the form of the offering of a substance for the benefit of a certain deity,—the fulfilment of this offering appearing in the form of the transformation of the substance offered (into the fire, for instance). Further in ordinary life also, we find that when a person, who is an obedient servant of another, is directed to go to a certain place, he at once obeys the order; though as regards his wages, in some cases he may obtain it at the very beginning; but also sometimes during the act, or even after the act has been accomplished; and then also he may get them on the same day, or the next day, or at some future time. In the same manner, there is no limit as to the time at which the results spoken of in the scriptures will appear; all that is meant is that (by the performance of the act) the result, in the shape of Heaven, Rain or so forth, is brought within reach,—and not (hat they appear on the very same day. Then again, just as there are obstacles in the way of the realising of results of acts done in the ordinary course of life, so there are also in the case of the acts prescribed by the Veda,—such obstacles consisting of past sins and so forth. This (possibility of the Rain not coming immediately after the act) is clearly shown in the Veda itself when it says ‘if the rain should not come, the man should continue as before.’ And as regards the Sarvasvāra sacrifice (which is laid down as leading the performer to heaven), people have explained that the reward does not consist in the immediate entrance to Heaven, in fact it consists in what the man actually desires, and the desire is in the form ‘may I reach heaven without difficulty [ i.e., after death; immediate translation to heaven would mean immediate death, which no man desires].

As regards the argument that there is no difference in the act of killing as done in ordinary life and as done during a Vedic sacrifice,—what has to be borne in mind is the fact that the sinfulness of the act of killing is known only from the scriptures, it is not amenable to perception or any ordinary means of knowledge; and there is certainly a difference: the ordinary killing is prompted by passion, while the sacrificial killing is prompted by Vedic Injunction; and as the killing of the animal offered to Agni-Soma is prompted by the Vedic Injunction, this constitutes a great difference. From all this it is clear that in the Veda there is nothing ‘untruthful.’

As regards ‘Inconsistency’ (which is the second point urged against the Veda), the Author is going to answer it in the text itself (Verses 14-15 below).—(10)

2.10.4

kratuphalaṃ yaḥ kāmayetānāmayaḥ svargalokaṃmiyāmiti’ | yaccoktaṃ hiṃsāyāṃ lokavedayorna viśeṣa iti tatra śāstrāvagamyo hi tasyā ayaṃ svabhāvo na pratyakṣādigocaraḥ | tatra ca bhedaḥ | rāgalakṣaṇā laukikī hiṃsā, vidhilakṣaṇā'laukikī hiṃsā | vidhilakṣaṇā tvagnīṣomīyasyeti mahānbhedaḥ | tasmānna kiñcidvede'nṛtam | vyāghātaṃ parastātparihariṣyati ślokenaiva |

It is in view of all this that the author states the reason for what he has asserted—‘The detractor of the Veda being an infidel.’ Thus the man, who would set forth arguments in support of the view that ‘the Veda is unauthoritative,’ only by way of a primâ facie statement, would not he an ‘infidel’; because such statement of the arguments would he made only for the purpose of strengthening the final conclusion (that the Veda is authoritative).