Vakyapadiya 3.1

English (machine translation) 3.1

Language: English

3.1.1

By some, the word has been divided into two kinds, or into four, or into five,
only by analytically abstracting [it] from sentences, like the base, the affix, and so forth.

3.1.2

When word-meanings are analytically abstracted, either the universal or the substance
have been described as the two eternal word-meanings of all words.

3.1.3

In the view of some, through coexistence, the universal is an indicator of power;
when khadira and other [trees] are incapable, a capable one is substituted.

The root bandh- [‘to bind’], whose result is lack of independence, is taught as depending on measure and so forth;
therefore, even when the universal is expressed, that which lacks power is not grasped.

3.1.5

If, however, badhnāti were intended to express mere contact,
then the teaching of measure and so forth would be an indicator that power is the locus [of the action].

3.1.6

Its own universal is first expressed by all words;
then the superimposition of that upon the forms of the universals of the objects [is conceived].

3.1.7

Just as the true nature in a red quality is designated in an astringent dye,
and through contact with what is connected [with it], is apprehended even in clothes and the like,

3.1.8

so, because of the relation between word-sound and meaning, the universal residing in the word-sound
is fit for the function of a universal in designating the universals of objects.

3.1.9

In the single-remainder ellipsis of the word jāti, it is accepted as the universal of universals;
in the expression ‘word-universals’, that universal [inheres] in word-universals.

3.1.10

The word-universal which is in words, distinct in definition from words,
exists as that universal without transcending word-universal-ness.

3.1.11

Even when the universal of the object is expressed, all [words] express a universal,
because word-meanings are established as having activity for their characteristic.

3.1.12

When the word-meaning is the universal, because a universal or a particular like a universal
is required by words, therefore they express a universal.

3.1.13

When the word-meaning has the property of substance, however, all meaning is stated as substance;
from its having the properties of substance as locus, therefore, every meaning is held to be substance.

3.1.14

Either the property of continuation would be the universal in all universals,
[or] the commonality of the property of exclusion is held to be the universal in a particular.

3.1.15

And when space is conceptualized through the difference of the properties of conjoined things,
in those spaces there is commonality even of ether.

3.1.16

Just as pots and the like, which do not [themselves] constitute spaces, have spaces as their relata,
so also ether, which does not constitute a space, has spaces as its relata.

3.1.17

A cognition based on distinct entities continues in conjoined things;
[whereas] in inherent things, the apprehension of difference ceases.

3.1.18

Therefore, the spaces of conjoined things are conceptualized as secondary;
because they are not distinguished from parts, the primary status belongs to inherent things.

3.1.19

That cognition which takes the form of continuation, they know as the configuration;
but some declare that which takes the form of exclusion to be substance.

3.1.20

This proliferation among the natures of existing things—as ‘distinct’ due to external condition,
or again as ‘undifferentiated’—arises only in combined things.

3.1.21

Neither unity nor multiplicity, neither existence nor non-existence
is found in the essential natures of existing things when uncombined.

3.1.22

If it is determined that the condition of being the self of all powers belongs only to one,
then the positing of a difference of self among existing things would be meaningless.

3.1.23

Therefore substance and the other powers, having distinct definitions,
accomplish human purpose when combined, but not in isolation.

3.1.24

Just as the completeness of the sense-organs and the like is inherent in their nature,
so it is perceived also in the combination of relatum and relation.

3.1.25

Nothing is produced which has no universal;
the universal is the promoter of causes toward the manifestation of itself.

3.1.26

Setting foot on causes, both eternal and non-eternal,
universals repeatedly attain manifestation in certain effects.

3.1.27

Even with regard to an object being produced, the universal is the accomplishing factor;
for the full production of its own substratum, it is the promoter of actions.

3.1.28

In an injunction or a prohibition, brahminhood and the like are the accomplishing factor;
resting upon the individual, the universal of number serves as a differentiator of the universal.

3.1.29

Just as it is only the face reflected by water and the like that is spoken of,
so it is only the universal manifested by substances that is spoken of.

3.1.30

Just as a difference belonging to the sense-organ, without the organ being perceived,
though invisible in the objects of the senses, serves to differentiate cognitions,

3.1.31

so, without the apprehension of their own form, the individuals of some [entities]
become the cause of the differentiations of generic cognition.

3.1.32

Of the two parts, real and unreal, that reside in every existing thing,
that which is real is the universal, while the individuals are remembered as unreal.

3.1.33

Being itself, becoming differentiated in cows and the like through differences in relata,
is called the universal; upon it all words are established.

3.1.34

They declare that to be the meaning of the nominal stem and the meaning of the verbal root;
it is eternal, it is the great Self, it is what suffixes such as -tva and -tal express.

3.1.35

When it has acquired sequence in particulars, it is called action;
when the sequential form is withdrawn, that is called entity.

3.1.36

It alone undergoes six states among the modifications of existing things;
it shines forth in this way in sequence through its own powers.

3.1.37

Sequence also is inherent to its nature, wherein this vision of time
stands as if divided into the form of priority, posteriority, and the like.

3.1.38

When disappearance is accepted, that very thing is the non-existence of entities;
when disappearance has acquired sequence, it is understood that ‘it perishes.’

3.1.39

Fallen from the prior condition and not yet having attained the subsequent state,
in the interval between the two, origination is spoken of due to a substratum of differences.

3.1.40

The substratum, whether mere self-nature, or distinct existing things,
or its own powers, are the causes for the appearance of difference in Being.

3.1.41

In its manifestation in earth and the like, it does not depend on configuration;
because its substratum is unsevered, the universal remains even in a non-eternal substratum.

3.1.42

Some state that every universal has an indestructible substratum, / holding firmly that there is no simultaneity in the dissolution of everything.

3.1.43

For those who see oneness when particulars have dissolved into original matter, / universals, being their own substrata, attain the status of substance.

3.1.44

The entities such as brahminhood reside in all living beings; / tradition also teaches that when manifested, they accomplish their own effects.

3.1.45

Some hold that universals are manifested even in paintings and the like; / but residing in living beings, they are the cause for the attainment of merit and demerit.

3.1.46

However, they consider that the perception of them by those superior to us involves all the sense faculties, / just as in the specific varieties of gems, silver, and the like, by experts through repeated practice.

3.1.47

The reality of distinction which inheres in the fragrance and the like of the night-flowering jasmine, blue lotus, and so forth, / is not expressed by abstract suffixes in worldly usage because of its non-eternality.

3.1.48

Universals such as the man-lion, however, are not expressed by their own words; / another designation, conditioned by parts of similar form, applies to them.

3.1.49

In delimiting the state of a universal, number—or the universal of number itself— / serves as an aid through association, even if there is distance.

3.1.50

Secondary application operates on the linguistic refinement of a word for the accomplishment of the purpose; / it is seen in powers such as number, object, and the like, even when the scriptural statement is the same.

3.1.51

No meaning taking the form of an entity is expressed without number; / therefore, in the mention of everything, number might be unintentional.

3.1.52

Singular number or plural number is unintentionally expressed for some; / for that is used to designate the universal, whereas dual number would be intentionally expressed.

3.1.53

‘If these two were sick, this medicine should be given’— / in such a definition of meaning, the dual number would not be intentionally expressed.

3.1.54

Subordinacy in ritual actions is accepted for number expressed by words like ‘one’; / for it is dependent on the grammatical form, as in ‘he digs with two’.

3.1.55

In ‘he shall sacrifice with an animal’, even though ritual consecration is also possible, / singularity is understood as an accomplishing factor, just like the universal.

3.1.56

However, by means of an indicative mark such as the accusative case, that singularity is intentionally expressed; / and that indicative mark applies to the universal and number when they have a single meaning as their domain.

3.1.57

That is primarily an injunction of the animal, not enjoined elsewhere, / and of its subservience to the action; therefore, it is intentionally expressed.

3.1.58

The cups, however, are enjoined elsewhere, having distinct numbers individually, / endowed with variations such as ‘nine belonging to Prajāpati’ and so forth.

3.1.59

How could the number directed toward the mention of the primary items, / which are understood as subordinate in the wiping, be intentionally expressed?

3.1.60

Neither the fact that there is no injunction elsewhere, nor consecration, nor primacy, / is the cause for the intention to express number; for it is intentionally expressed by effort.

3.1.61

And no distinction in the wiping is applied anywhere to a cup; / and they are enjoined as to be consecrated, therefore it applies to all.

3.1.62

Since the universal is complete in each substratum, if the action / were not accomplished by one animal, then that [addition of another] would indeed take place.

3.1.63

And when the action is accomplished by one, if another animal were to be taken / because of availability, the taking would be useless.

3.1.64

Just as the rite of impregnation is useless in a woman who has already conceived, / so another animal is useless when [the sacrifice] is accomplished by one.

3.1.65

Because the purpose is accomplished with that much, some accept / the non-transgression of singularity, but number is not understood here as a subordinate factor.

3.1.66

However, an indicative mark such as the accusative case merely reiterates the stated rule of interpretation; / number is not understood by it as an accomplishing factor, like the universal.

3.1.67

When number is accepted through positive and negative concomitance, / it is proper that it should be an accomplishing factor, and not an indirect indication of another meaning.

3.1.68

When a word-meaning is an accomplishing factor, its capacity is not lost; / therefore, the function of number's operation is understood by that indicative mark.

3.1.69

Because what was previously unknown is enjoined, primacy is ascertained; / because what is already enjoined is for the sake of another, its subordinate status is understood.

3.1.70

Because wiping is to be enjoined, the cup being enjoined elsewhere, / the number heard in the injunctive sentence is not annulled in indirect indication.

3.1.71

In another injunctive sentence, there is no conflicting number for the animal; / therefore, it is understood as endowed with qualities along with singularity.

3.1.72

A quality that is taught in an action where the connection with a substance is already known, / is understood as requiring that [action] only through the substance.

3.1.73

Just as some quality in a substance is characterized by capacity, / so the locus of a quality is similarly obtained as characterized by capacity.

3.1.74

When the two have separate requirements, the relation that is understood / is not impaired, and nothing else that is unstated needs to be assumed.

3.1.75

The connection with the action is conveyed by the direct scriptural statement for both; / but the restriction between the locus and the located is established by the sentence.

3.1.76

In that case, in the absence of substance and quality, each would be optional; / for the connection obtained through direct statement is stronger than that characterized by the sentence.

3.1.77

When, however, a universal or a power is taught with respect to an action, / then substance and quality are brought into proximity there by capacity.

3.1.78

Though universals and qualities are equal in subordination to the action, / qualities can be substituted, but not universals such as goat.

3.1.79

Universals are closer to the capacity of the individual, not so qualities; / the substance is directly connected with the action, therefore a quality is subject to option.

3.1.80

Some accept an option on equal terms in the absence of either; / therefore, it may be a goat without that quality, or a ram with that quality.

3.1.81

The operation of a universal is observed as having a number residing in it; / leaving aside a specific number, sometimes it operates on its own.

3.1.82

A generic universal that has become subordinate to another is joined with the number of the substance; / but operating for its own sake, it does not rely on number.

3.1.83

In ‘he shall sacrifice with an animal’, when the word ‘animal’ is meant for the sacrificial action, / the action, being primary, has its purpose accomplished by a single animal.

3.1.84

If one for whom as many are possible were to perform / the immolation of that many, then the primary would be actuated by secondary qualities.

3.1.85

Where, however, the verbal action is heard in the system of cups being wiped, / we do not respect the apprehension of a specific number there.

3.1.86

The mention of oneness made in a sentence dependent on what is being taught, / is clearly seen as an indicative mark, even though the remainder has a distinct number.

3.1.87

Just as a direct statement occurs in the rule of compound or affix, / so it is justified through the rule of interpretation for dependent qualities.

3.1.88

Even with regard to a quality, number is not accepted for the sake of accomplishing another primary factor; / similarly, the agent is understood as unspecified in the action.

3.1.89

When another [word] has obtained applicability, an explicit Vedic statement made to effect a restriction / has fulfilled its purpose in excluding [that other], and therefore number is not intended to be expressed there.

3.1.90

However, with regard to the case-ending prescribed after an aggregate of identical forms, / a single established [form] possessing meaning is expressive of the aggregate.

3.1.91

In the rule enjoining a primary affix or a compound, / when number is intended to be expressed, assistance is in every way established in the subordinate element.

3.1.92

Similarity whose form is non-difference, and powers that are identical with the self— / of these too, expressiveness as synonyms of the universal is described.

3.1.93

Even if one apprehends a staff out of a desire to take up a staff, / from that capacity alone one is not cognized as 'a possessor of a staff.'

3.1.94

The cognition 'he has a desire' does not proceed from the cause of the desire; / therefore, even when capacity is present, cognition depends on another object.

3.1.95

An intrinsic nature, or something designable, or capacity stands / at the end of everything; therefore ordinary usage cannot be established [otherwise].

3.1.96

When, setting aside distinctions, it is grasped by the mind as if single, / then a single cognition operates upon that which has only the nature of an individual.

3.1.97

When it is thought of as if one, interwoven with differentiated forms, / then a cognition grasping a collection arises from many [entities].

3.1.98x

When, upon intention to express together, an aggregate whose division of parts is tied together / is denoted as the basis of a single cognition,

3.1.99x

then in a dvandva compound this [aggregate] is understood as one endowed with division, / because of completion with each action through the distinction of duality and so forth.

3.1.100

Through exclusion of distinction among individuals whose natures are different, / it attains unity upon a single occurrence, and similar nature upon repetition.

3.1.101

Just as an undivided cognition is recognized as 'recurrent', / so the object, though distinct in form, is grasped as the real entity.

3.1.102

And of all identical forms, there are no expressive words / that apply to distinctions, nor is distinction determined.

3.1.103

Because the distinctions residing in cognitions, words, and objects / are difficult to determine, cognition and the rest are viewed as one.

3.1.104

Just as in objects, so in all cognitions there are universals / when connection is perceived, and they establish the object.

3.1.105

Only the universal abiding in the knowable is the benefactor of cognitions; / cognition is never shaped by an alien form as the knowable is.

3.1.106

Just as a light is not illuminated by another light, / so the form of a cognition is not grasped by another cognition.

3.1.107x

Nor could the power of cognition, when determining a universal inherent in itself, / be capable [of doing so] for another entity already known.

3.1.108x

And when cognitions are non-simultaneous, there is no non-apprehension of 'this', / just as memory arises according to perception, and upon perception.

3.1.109

The cognition 'cognition of a pot' is distinct from the cognition of a pot; / that cognition too which is 'pot' falls upon the object.

3.1.110

Because the form of cognition is not grasped under the form of the object, / its own form, separated from the form of the object, is not determined.

Commentaries (2)

Prakīrṇaprakāśa — Helārāja, Sanskrit
Paddhati — Vṛṣabhadeva, Sanskrit

Linked texts (1)

Vākyapadīya — Bhartṛhari (grammarian), Sanskrit