A History of the Mahrattas v1.c26: Chapter XIX
A History of the Mahrattas v1.c26
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Chapter XIX
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A.D. 1755.—The civil administration at the Mahratta capital continued under the management of Sewdasheo Chimnajee. The Peishwa remained at Poona for nearly a year, and during that time, by the assistance of the English in the manner hereafter explained, his troops had reduced a part of Angria’s country, including the important fortress of Severndroog. After the monsoon the Mahratta army in the Concan was strengthened, in expectation of further aid from the Presidency of Bombay, but whilst the preparations were going forward the Peishwa’s presence was again required in the Carnatic. Muzuffir Khan, an officer who had commanded M. Bussy’s sepoys and had gone over to the Peishwa in 1752, accompanied the army sent by the Peishwa in the preceding year into the Carnatic, under Mahadajee Punt. Having taken offence at some interference in the muster of his corps, he quitted the Peishwa’s service and proceeded to Seringapatam, but afterwards joined the Nabob of Savanoor. As the Nabob refused to give him up, and was supported by his old allies the Ghorepurays of Gootee and Sondoor, the Peishwa assembled a great army, which was augmented by the junction of Janojee Bhonslay with his contingent of ten thousand horse; the whole force crossed the Kistna, took Bagulkote, and then proceeded to attack Savanoor. The prime minister of Hyderabad, Shah Nuwaz Khan, who was at this time, for a special purpose, in secret league with the Peishwa, observing this formidable assembly of troops on the part of the Mahrattas, with well dissembled alarm collected troops for the avowed purpose of forming an army of observation on the Kistna. Wukeels were in due form sent by the Peishwa to declare his pacific intentions, and to solicit aid against the Nabob of Savanoor, the subject of Sulabut Jung; whose conduct he represented as hostile to both states, and his power, if not instantly crushed, of a nature to threaten the subjugation of the Carnatic. Sulabut Jung and Monsieur Bussy having been brought to accede to an alliance, the Moghul army marched to assist the Mahrattas, then besieging Savanoor.¹ Leaving the combined army engaged in these operations, it is fit to revert to the affairs of the Concan, and the expeditions against Angria; for although, to the Mahrattas, the transactions on the west coast appeared, and comparatively were, insignificant, they acquire an importance, because they explain the first continental acquisitions of the English in Maharashtra, of which the whole population are now subjects of Great Britain, or politically under its control.
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¹ Mahratta MSS., Khuzaneh Amirah.
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(1750.)—Mr. Richard Bourchier,² on the 24th November, 1750, announced to the Peishwa that he had succeeded to the government of Bombay and its dependencies on the 17th of the same month; and from that period a more intimate intercourse commenced between the Mahrattas and the English. They had for some years been mutually desirous of settling Surat and suppressing the depredations of Toolajee Angria. Ballajee Bajee Rao, on the first service he had seen in the year 1740, was impressed with a high idea of the English, from their conduct when they relieved Mannajee Angria at Kolabah. The warfare in the Carnatic had greatly contributed to raise their military reputation, and their fidelity to their master (as Mohummud Ally was termed), whose cause they had once embraced, had much effect in raising their national character in the minds of the natives of India.
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² [Bourchier held the office of President (Governor) until February 28, 1760.]
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Ballajee had early promised to assist Mr. Bourchier in restoring order in Surat, where, from the weakness of the Moghul Government, there were three or four authorities, besides the agents of Dummajee Gaekwar and the English factory. Seedee Musaood, an officer of the Seedee of Jinjeera, who had command of that part of the Seedee’s squadron whose proper duty was to protect the trade of Surat, having part of the revenue assigned for that sole purpose, was a principal cause of the many broils which took place in that city. The English at Bombay had always maintained a friendly intercourse with the Seedees of Jinjeera,¹ because theirs was the only territory in the vicinity from which they could procure beef for supplying their ships. In other parts of the Mahratta coast, cows and bullocks were sacred; for to prey on human flesh would not be more revolting to the feelings of a European, than eating beef to the prejudices of a Hindoo. Seedee Musaood had taken advantage of the distractions in Surat, and the confusion in the government at Jinjeera, virtually to throw off his dependence on all authority; and like most of the African race, who have attained power in India, he was overbearing in his deportment and tyrannical in his behaviour.
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¹ [In 1735 the Bombay Council advanced a loan of Rs. 30,000 to the Sīdī; in 1737 they enlisted Sīdī troops for the defence of Sion fortress; and in 1746 after the declaration of war against France and Spain, Captain Sterling was sent to Janjīra to treat with the Sīdī for the enlistment of two hundred men. A year later Sīdī Masūd was permitted to enlist troops in Bombay, and was supplied by the Company with eight iron guns for his grab (galley). (B.C.G., 1909, ii. 96-7.)]
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The depredations of the pirates on the coast were still continued; for although Sumbhajee Angria was dead, and Mannajee remained in nominal obedience to the Peishwa and generally pacific towards the English, Toolajee, who had succeeded to the territories of his half-brother Sumbhajee, situated between Bancoote and Sawunt Waree, disavowed the Peishwa’s authority, and seized and plundered all ships not bearing his own passport, which he could overpower. The Raja of Kolapoor and the Sawunts of Waree followed a like system; and by the English were indiscriminately termed Malwans²; a name given to them from the fort of Malwan, or Sindeedroog, which commanded the principal fort on their coast, and belonged to the Raja of Kolapoor.
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² [Compare the name ‘Malabars’ given by early English writers (Fryer, p. 68) to the pirates of the Malabar coast, who in turn gave their name to Malabar Hill, Bombay.]
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The war which took place between the Mahrattas and the Moghuls, subsequent to the murder of Nasir Jung, prevented the Peishwa from effecting the settlement in Surat. An agreement was made with the English for their co-operation against that place, through Ramajee Punt, Sur-soobehdar of the Concan, at the time when Rugonath Rao was recalled to assist in the war against Sulabut Jung. This derangement of their plan was a great disappointment to the Bombay Government, after the expectations they had formed, and therefore, that their expensive preparations might not be abandoned without some effort, they entered into an agreement,¹ independent of the Mahrattas, with Nek Alum Khan, Nabob of Baroach; but the scheme proved unsuccessful.
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¹ Bombay Records, November, 1751.
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The occupation of Guzerat, the siege of Ahmedabad, and the Carnatic expeditions, prevented the Peishwa from joining to reduce Surat, or from co-operating in attacking Toolajee Angria, until the beginning of the year 1755. The Mahrattas (1755.) had then a short interval of leisure, and the Presidency of Bombay, when unexpectedly called on in the month of March, although such an expedition was to them in the highest degree desirable, began to start difficulties respecting the lateness of the season, though these objections may have been purposely raised, as they certainly made the Mahrattas more urgent in their application. Ramajee Mahdeo Furnuwees, the Sur-soobehdar of the Concan, was deputed by Ballajee to settle a plan of operations and conclude the agreement. The Council, although they had no King's ship at Bombay, resolved to make the attempt, and Commodore James, of the Company's Marine, was selected for the command of the expedition, which consisted of a forty-four gun ship, a ketch of sixteen guns, and two bomb vessels. Six or seven articles were subscribed by the contracting parties, by which the English were to have the command of the marine, but mutual approbation was necessary in the conduct of all operations. The vessels that might be taken from Angria were to be divided by the captors, but the guns and stores were to belong entirely to the Peishwa. Bancoote with the fort of Himmutgurh, and the sovereignty of the river on which it stands, with five villages, were to be ceded in perpetuity to the English. But the President and Council seem to have considered these stipulations as pledging them too far, and therefore one of the articles guardedly states that the English only engage to keep the sea and prevent Angria's fleet from throwing succours into the northern forts of Severndroog, Anjenweel and Jyegurh.
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The strongest forts which Toolajee Angria possessed were Severndroog and Viziadroog. The latter, as already mentioned, was better known in those days by its Moghul name of Gheriah. On account of the approaching monsoon it was deemed inex-pedient to reduce Gheriah, or any of the forts south of those three specified in the articles. The small squadron under Commodore James sailed from Bombay harbour in the evening of the 22d March. A wanton delay on the part of the Mahratta fleet enabled Angria’s vessels at Severndroog to avoid the English ships. Commodore James, after a fruitless chase as far as Jyegurh, returned to Severndroog, where he commenced operations on the 2d April; stood close under the fortifications, and by noon of the fourth day from the commencement of the attack, was in possession of the four distinct forts of which Severndroog consists, without the loss of a man: an achievement, which from the previous idea entertained of the pirate Angria, and the strength of the fortifications, was matter of surprise even to those who accomplished it. The whole success was justly attributed to the vigour and judgment of Commodore James, and the resolution of his handful of troops and sailors. The Peishwa’s fleet never ventured within gunshot, and Naroo Punt, the Carcoon of Sebundees¹ who commanded, being unaccustomed to the sea, although he had headed several assaults on land, behaved in the most dastardly manner. Shumsher Buhadur, the Peishwa’s half-brother, was sent down from Poona with a body of troops, to reinforce Ramajee Mahdeo, and several of the forts in the neighbourhood of Severndroog surrendered to him. Elated by his success, the Mahrattas pushed on to Rutnaguiry, but the stay of the ships was limited to the end of April, and although subsequently directed, at the Peishwa’s earnest solicitation, to continue till the 15th of May, the season was too far advanced to permit of their acting with effect, owing to the heavy swell which is caused by the setting-in of the southerly winds, about a fortnight before the rains. Commodore James finally returned to Bombay on the 18th May.² Severndroog was punctually made over to the Mahrattas; but Bancoote,¹ by the wish of the English, was not given over till after the ensuing October, when they got possession. The reason of requiring this cession was to obviate that dependence on the Seedee, which has been explained. The Peishwa was assured by Mr. Bourchier that the assistance he desired should be granted at the opening of the season, when the expected arrival of the King’s ships from the opposite coast, under Admiral Watson, would place more powerful means at his disposal.
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¹ [The word is derived from Persian sihbandī (sih, ‘three’), and is supposed to mean ‘three-monthly, or quarterly, payment.’ It was applied to irregular native soldiery, a sort of militia or imperfectly disciplined troops for revenue or police duties. The last official appearance of the title is in the E. I. Register down to July 1869, where it is applied to ‘the Sebundy Corps of Sappers and Miners’ at Darjeeling. (Yule’s Hobson-Jobson, ed. Crooke (1903), p. 805.)]
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² [Commodore James had already returned once after the fall of Suvarndrug on April 27, 1755; but the Home Board having had pressing letters from Nānā (the Pēshwā) and his generals, asking that he should assist them in reducing Ratnāgiri, they reluctantly
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¹ [Bānkot proved serviceable in providing hemp ropes, then in much demand for lashing cotton bales, but was chiefly of value to the English as a place from which European and Muhammadan residents of Bombay might be supplied with beef. (*B.G.*, x. 231.)]
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Before that time, however, the Presidency obtained aid on which they had not calculated, by the arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Clive with a large detachment² of soldiers from Europe. The French establishments in the Deccan had created a jealous alarm in England, and it was there projected to send a force to Bombay, with the view of entering into an alliance with the Mahrattas, which had for its object the expulsion of the French from their districts in the Deccan and from the service of Sulabut Jung. The articles of the truce agreed to by Mr. Saunders and Monsieur Godeheu in the preceding year, on the coast of Coromandel, precluded, in the opinion of the Bombay Government, the employment of this force on its original destination, until accounts should be received from Europe, approving or annulling the articles in question.³ The Madras Presidency were of a contrary opinion, but on this subject their arguments and their whole design certainly more resemble the sophistry and artifice of a Dupleix⁴ than the strong straightforward sense, which
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² [Clive’s detachment consisted of three companies of the King’s Artillery. Clive had gone home to England in 1753. Admiral Watson’s squadron sailed from England in 1754.]
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³ Letters from Mr. Bourchier to Mr. Pigot, 25th September, 1755. Bombay consultations, 21st January, 1756. Letter to the Court of Directors, 31st January, 1756.
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⁴ [For a succinct and careful estimate of Dupleix’s character see *O.H.I.*, pp. 482–3.]
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consented to send him there. Commodore James fired a few shells into the place, but finding it impossible to effect any good, finally returned, in accordance with the orders of the Bombay Council, on the date mentioned by Grant Duff. (*B.C.G.*, ii. 104; Forrest’s *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, Introduction, p. viii.)]
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distinguished the general conduct and deliberations of that government.¹
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¹ Dispatch from the Madras Government to Bombay, 30th November, 1755.
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The Governor of Bombay, in consultation with Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive, resolved to seize the opportunity afforded by the presence of so large an armament, to reduce Toolajee Angria. A commission, consisting of Mr. Hough, one of the members of council, Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive, was invested by the Governor in Council with powers to conclude all necessary arrangements and agreements, according to instructions with which they were furnished. Three ships of the line, one ship of fifty, and another of forty-four guns, with several armed vessels belonging to the Bombay Marine, amounting in all to fourteen sail, proceeded in the month of February on this expedition, having on board eight hundred European soldiers and one thousand native infantry.²
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² [The B.C.G. (1909), ii. 104, states that Admiral Watson’s fleet consisted of 12 men-of-war (6 of the Royal Navy and 6 of the Company’s Marine), 5 bomb-vessels, 4 Marāthā grabs, and 50 gallivats. Aboard were 800 European troops, a company of King’s Artillery, and 600 native troops. The fleet sailed from Bombay on February 7, 1756, and arrived off Gheria on February 11.]
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Since the month of November, a body of the Peishwa’s troops, under Khundoojee Mankur, had been successfully employed against Toolajee Angria, and had, with the exception of Gheriah, reduced the whole of his forts along the coast to the northward of that place. No loss of any importance was sustained by them in the attacks, but at Rajapoor, one of the places which they took, after they had got possession, three hundred men were killed by an accidental explosion, owing to the careless manner in which the Mahrattas expose their gunpowder. When the English armament appeared off Gheriah, Toolajee repaired to the Mahratta camp for the purpose of making the best terms he could: Ramajee Punt³ and Khundoojee Mankur were negotiating for the surrender, which was deemed by the British authorities a violation of the agreement concluded in the preceding year; and therefore, in order to prevent their obtaining possession, Admiral Watson attacked the sea face on the 12th February, whilst Colonel Clive, landing with the troops the same night, invested it on the land side, so as to prevent the Mahrattas from having any communication with the garrison. If the Mahratta authorities intended to possess themselves of Gheriah in the manner alleged, which from several circumstances as well as their known chicane is more than probable, the British authorities might be deemed justifiable in anticipating them; but on this point and their subsequent attempt to keep the fort, the evidence is not so satisfactory as to allow our countrymen the merit of a decision entirely correct, or a disinterestedness wholly unimpeachable. Ramajee Punt had intimated, on the arrival of Admiral Watson, that he was in treaty, and promised to come on board for the purpose of obtaining the sanction of the Commissioners. He did not come at the time appointed, and his Carcoon had the assurance to offer Mr. Hough a bribe of any sum, on condition that he could get the Admiral to suspend operations. The Admiral, therefore, was certainly justified in commencing the attack; but it appears that the property contained in Gheriah was well known, and a committee of ten officers, of which Admirals Watson and Pocoke, Mr. Hough and Colonel Clive were members, had, before they left Bombay harbour, agreed to share the whole prize property, without reference to their allies.¹ If the Mahrattas had intelligence of this proceeding, they had an equal right to anticipate the English. Ramajee Punt, when he found Colonel Clive had occupied a position between him and the fort, perceived what was intended, and endeavoured to get in a few of his men by any means. With this view he made secret overtures to Captain Andrew Buchanan, the officer on picket, offering him a bill on Bombay for eighty thousand rupees, if he would permit him and a few of his people to pass into the fort, an offer which was rejected as became a British officer, but it is a circumstance worthy of notice, as elucidating the character of the times, that the Bombay Government thought common honesty so rare as to present Captain Buchanan with a gold medal, in consideration of his extraordinary good behaviour.
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³ [i.e. Rāmājī Mahādev Farnavīs, the Sar-Subehdār of the Konkan.]
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¹ Copy of their proceedings on the Bombay Records. The other officers who signed these proceedings were Captains Knowles, Latham, Speke, and Harrison, of the navy; Major Chalmers and Captain Skeddy of the military service. [It appears that, under the King's regulations, Clive was only entitled to the same share of the prize as the captain of a ship, but Admiral Watson generously consented to give the Colonel such a part of his share as will make it equal the Rear-Admiral Pocock's' (Pocoke). (B.C.G. (1909), ii. 105.)]
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Gheriah surrendered to Admiral Watson on the evening of the 13th February.¹ During the bombardment, a shell thrown amongst Angria’s fleet, which lay at some distance up the river, burst in the *Restoration*, a vessel Angria had taken from the Bombay Government, set her on fire, and the flames rapidly communicating, his whole fleet, in the course of an hour, was totally destroyed. The captors of Gheriah declared that the Mahrattas had no right to share in the prize property, and divided about ten lacks of rupees, according to the plan agreed upon before they weighed anchor. Toolajee Angria’s family were taken in the fort. Toolajee was also taken, put in irons, and thrown into one of the Peishwa’s hill-forts near Raigurh.
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¹ [The flag in Gheria was struck at 6.25 p.m.; an officer and sixty men marched into the fort and took possession; at 6.36 p.m. the English flag was hoisted. On February 14 Clive marched in with all the land forces, and then dispatched a vessel to Bombay to announce the capture of the fort and the complete destruction of Angria’s fleet. (*Selections from State Records* (1885), p. viii.) The losses on the British side were not more than twenty killed and wounded. About 250 ‘pieces of cannon’ were taken, with much other valuable booty. For full details see Ives, *A Voyage from England to India*, &c., London, 4to. (1773), pp. 83–6.]
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The President and Council on obtaining possession of Gheriah were unwilling to relinquish it. They wished to give back Bancoote in exchange for Gheriah; but this offer the Mahrattas peremptorily refused, and urged their right in the clearest manner to its unreserved surrender, according to the articles of the agreement. The Peishwa, in the course of his representations, made repeated applications to Madras and complaints to the King of England; but to all these remonstrances Mr. Bourchier declared that the articles had been infringed by the Mahrattas, that they had not fixed the limits of the Bancoote cession, that Toolajee Angria had not been delivered up to them, and, worse than all, that the Peishwa had contracted for a supply of goods from the Dutch. This last objection alluded not to the agreement made by Ramajee Punt, but to that settled with the Raja Shao, through the agency of Chimnajee Appa, in 1739; the two first were evasive, the last did not relate to the point in question. Mr. Bourchier even condescended to present five thousand rupees to the Carcoon of Ramajee Punt, in order to induce him to persuade his master to accede to the exchange, and he agreed to waive the question of Toolajee Angria, on the simple assertion of the Mahrattas that he should be well treated and never receive any territory within forty miles of the sea. In one respect they kept their word: Toolajee Angria, after long endurance of rigid captivity in the fort of Wundun near Satara, was removed to the fort of Sholapoor, where he died. Two of his sons made their escape twelve or fourteen years after their capture, and were protected at Bombay during the government of Mr. Crommelin.
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In the early part of these discussions, the Peishwa was employed at Savanoor. When he was urging Sulabut Jung to enter on that expedition, in order to excite the jealousy of Bussy and blind his usual penetration with regard to the design which was in progress, Ballajee Rao wrote to the Presidency of Madras for a supply of European artillery-men and guns. The members of that government were not quite certain who this Ballajee Rao was; ‘but as according to the best information they could obtain, he was said to be the head of all the Mahrattas,’ they agreed to assist him, if he would send a detachment of his army to meet and escort their troops to his camp.¹ The Peishwa’s whole object consisted in the application, and there the matter of course dropped. The army of Sulabut Jung having joined the Mahrattas, Bussy, than whom no Frenchman better knew the art of display, prepared his artillery, and in the face of the two armies, amounting to one hundred thousand men, opened a fire on Savanoor, so heavy and efficacious as to intimidate the garrison and excite the lasting admiration of the besiegers. Prior to this the Peishwa, through the agency of Bulwunt Rao Mendlee,² one of his own officers, had contrived to detach the Ghorepurays from the alliance,³ and Moorar Rao, in consequence, it is said, of his former engagements with the French, procured the interposition of Bussy in his favour with the government of Sulabut Jung,⁴ of which this Mahratta chief was, it will be recollected, a dependant.⁵ The Nabob of Savanoor⁶ was admitted to terms, and on giving up a part of his territory, and making due submission to Sulabut Jung and the Peishwa, a reconciliation took place. Muzuffir Khan was entertained, probably at first secretly, in the service of Sulabut Jung, and Moorar Rao Ghorepuray, with his own and the Sondoore Mahrattas, returned to Gootee in the month of May.
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¹ Letter from the Madras government, 14th April, 1756.
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² One MS. states that Ghorepuray made his peace through the agency of Holkar.
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³ Mahratta MS. supported by a copy of a letter found in the Poona Records, from the Peishwa to Bulwunt Rao Gunput Mendlee, which alludes to his agency on that occasion.
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⁴ Wilks.
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⁵ Upon the surrender of Trichinopoly to Nizam Ool Moolk in 1743, he was confirmed as Jagheerdar of Gootee.
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⁶ [The founder of the Savanūr (Savanoor) family was a Pathān,
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A considerable part of these arrangements was preparatory to the secret scheme contemplated by the Peishwa¹ and Shah Nuwaz Khan, of compelling the French to quit the Deccan. Shortly after the fall of Savanoor it was intimated to M. Bussy that the services of his corps were no longer required by the Soobehdar of the Deccan. This unexpected communication at once laid open to Bussy the extent of the machinations against him, and he took measures for counteracting them with admirable prudence and decision. Few Europeans in India have been placed in greater difficulties than those which were surmounted by M. Bussy on this occasion. His corps consisted of two hundred cavalry and six hundred infantry, all Europeans, five thousand sepoys, and a fine train of artillery, enough to have made the whole army of the Deccan pay dear for their treachery; but Bussy knew the influence of the deserter Muzuffir Khan over some of his oldest sepoys, and had great reason to doubt their fidelity. He was surrounded by a host of enemies, in a part of the country where he was an entire stranger, and he at once adopted a plan which divided his enemies, secured his retreat, and enabled him to recover his power at the court of Sulabut Jung. He accepted his dismissal from the service, demanded passports to Mausulipatam,
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¹ The scheme, if we are to credit the evidence obtained by Mr. Spencer, who was at Poona, as an envoy from Bombay, a few months afterwards, originated with the Mahratta court, and the whole intrigue was managed by Amrut Rao, the Wukeel of Bulwunt Rao Mendlee.
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Abdul Kauf Khān, who obtained in 1680 from Aurangzeb the grant of a jāgīr comprising Bankāpur, Torgal and Azamnagar or Belgaum, with a command of 7,000 horse. In 1730 the family, as deputies of the Nizam, received additional territory, which the Pēshwā seized in 1747. In 1786 Tipū Sultān, with whom the Nawāb was connected by marriage, stripped him of much territory; but the Nawāb, allying himself with the Marāthās, regained a part of it, and obtained from the Pēshwā a pension of Rs. 10,000 a month. The modern Savanūr State, with an area of 70 square miles, forms part of the Dhārwār District, Bombay, and represents the territory which was confirmed in the Nawāb’s possession at the close of the last Marāthā war. (I.G. Bom., 1909, ii. 501.)
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and marched straight to Hyderabad, where, immediately June 14. on his arrival, he occupied some strong buildings and prepared for defence.
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After he quitted the allied camp, his design having been suspected, a detachment was sent in pursuit of him, accompanied by six thousand of Sulabut Jung’s Mahrattas under Ramchundur, the son of Chunderseyn Jadow, and Janojee Nimbalkur (Rao Rumbha) of Kurmulla, but Bussy effected his purpose with little loss. One of his first acts, on discovering the conspiracy, was to write off an account of his situation to Pondicherry and Mausulipatam, where the French authorities used every possible exertion to reinforce him. He also expected a body of six hundred recruits, Arabs and Abyssinians, whom he had enlisted at Surat, but Janojee Nimbalkur, hearing of their approach, intercepted the party and killed fifty of them, before they submitted as prisoners.
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Shah Nuwaz Khan was with Nasir Jung, when he lost his life in the Carnatic, and although he had dissembled his enmity, he was never reconciled to the French. He had a better opinion of the English nation, and at his suggestion an application was made to Madras for a body of troops to assist in expelling Bussy. That Presidency would have taken advantage of an offer which accorded so entirely with their views, but the disastrous account of the capture of Calcutta, on the 20th June, by Shujah-ud-Dowlah,¹ Nabob of Bengal, the grand nephew and successor of Aliverdy Khan, arrived at Madras in July, and obliged the English to send every disposable man to recover their lost settlement and avenge the fate of their murdered countrymen.
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¹ [The Nawāb (Nabob) of Bengal was Sirāj-ud-daula, alias Mīrzā Muhammad, the grandson of Allahvardī Khān. Shujā-ud-daula was the Nawāb Vazīr of Oudh, whose power was broken by the British at the battle of Buxar in 1764. Sirāj-ud-daula succeeded to the Nawābī of Bengal in 1756, when he was about twenty-nine years of age. His capture of Calcutta is notorious for the Black Hole tragedy, and for the death from disease of many of the British who escaped from Calcutta to Falta. Calcutta was recaptured by Clive and Watson in 1757, and Sirāj-ud-daula was finally defeated at the battle of Plassy on June 23 of that year. Before Watson and Clive sailed for Bengal, the Madras government had dispatched a force of 240 men to relieve Calcutta, nearly all of whom died at Falta from the effects of the climate. (O.H.I., pp. 488-9, 491-4, and Add. and Corr. to O.H.I. under heading 488 n.) See footnote on page 426, ante.]
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In the meantime, Bussy maintained his post at Hyderabad against the army of Sulabut Jung, and contrived to secure in his interests Ramchundur Jadow and Janojee Nimbalkur, the principal Mahrattas in the Moghul service. They did not oppose the advancing reinforcements from Mausulipatam, and although great efforts were made to cut them off, the troops joined Bussy in the middle of August.¹
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¹ I have here gone more into events already well known than may appear altogether necessary, but having deviated in some degree from Mr. Orme's account, and considerably from that of Colonel Wilks, where my authority is less clear than, under such difference of opinion, I could wish, I shall submit my reasons to the judgment of the reader. Colonel Wilks states that the Peishwa made overtures to Bussy the day after he quitted the camp, and adduces arguments, which, without evidence, do not appear to me satisfactory on this point. The Madras Presidency were apprehensive that the French might enter Ballajee Rao's service, as appears on the Bombay Records, but on what grounds is no where explained. Colonel Wilks also states that the Peishwa sent a corps to protect Bussy; but the Mahrattas who followed him seem to have been entirely Moghul subjects. There is another point of some importance, as it regards a person whose character has always excited attention. Colonel Wilks mentions that M. Bussy was obliged by circumstances to take post at Hyderabad. If the fact be so it greatly detracts from M. Bussy's reputation. His great merit on that occasion certainly was, as a politician, in exerting the influence he had acquired, to maintain his post, facilitate the march of the reinforcement, and preserve opinion in his favour. If he intended to retreat to Mausulipatam, why was one of his first steps to write off for reinforcements both to Pondicherry and Mausulipatam? Had Bussy continued his march to Mausulipatam he could not have forced his way back to Hyderabad.
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A reconciliation with Sulabut Jung immediately took place, and Bussy for the time attained greater power than ever. Muzuffir Khan was not surrendered to the French, as Bussy desired, but he was dismissed from the service, and shortly after appeared at Poona, where, on making humble apologies to the Peishwa and many promises of future good behaviour, he was again entertained, contrary to the advice of Sewdasheo Chimnajee.²
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² Mahratta MSS.
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The Peishwa returned to Poona on the 20th July, and in a conciliatory letter announces that event to Mr. Bourchier; begs of him to send some gentlemen to Poona, for the purpose of settling several points of importance, but requests that Gheriah may be immediately restored. He also informs the Governor of an unsuccessful attack by the Portuguese upon the fort of Ponda³;
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³ [Ponda was originally seized from the Marāthās in 1741 by the Viceroy of Goa, the Marquis de Lourical, but was subsequently recaptured in 1750. The Portuguese Viceroy who lost his life in 1756
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an attempt made, as afterwards appears, for the purpose of deterring the Mahrattas from the projected conquest of Goa, contemplated by Sewdasheo Rao Bhow. The Portuguese viceroy lost his life at Ponda by the misbehaviour of his troops, but other events prevented the Mahrattas from attacking Goa. Mr. Bourchier, amongst the arguments used to induce the Peishwa to take back Bancoote in exchange for Gheriah, lays great stress on its advantageous situation as a barrier to the Mahrattas against the Portuguese. Ballajee in reply does not conceal his contempt for that nation, and artfully parries the argument by hinting at an effectual method of obviating the necessity of a barrier, by at once assisting to expel them.¹
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¹ Original letters, Bombay records.
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As soon as the weather permitted, Mr. John Spencer, accompanied by Mr. Thomas Byfield, both members of the Bombay Council, proceeded to Poona according to the Peishwa’s request. Although Mr. Spencer was junior to Mr. Byfield, the executive part of the mission was committed to him, and he conducted it with ability. He had a long interview with the Peishwa in the beginning of October, at which Rugonath Rao and Sewdasheo Rao Bhow were present.² By that time the restoration of Bussy’s influence at the Court of Hyderabad was known, and the Peishwa was sincere in a desire he expressed of obtaining the services of a body of English troops. But Mr. Spencer was instructed by the President in Council, who acted upon fresh orders from the Court of Directors, to evade any solicitation of this nature that might be made, and to decline entering upon the engagement for which troops had been sent out in the preceding season; a scheme which was therefore never communicated to the court of Poona. Mr. Spencer told the Peishwa of the application, which the Madras Presidency had received from Sulabut Jung, for a body of English troops to assist in expelling the French, a connection of which Ballajee Rao unreservedly expressed his disapprobation.
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² Mr. Spencer’s report of his mission in the Bombay records.
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Oct. 12.—A treaty was concluded with the Peishwa at Poona on the 12th October. The exclusion of the Dutch from the trade of the Mahratta dominions; the surrender of Gheriah within
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was the Count of Alva. Ponda again fell into the hands of the Portuguese, when Haidar Alī invaded the dominions of the King of Sōnda in 1764.]
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twenty-four days after the departure of Mr. Spencer and Mr. Byfield from Poona; and the cession of ten villages, including Bancoote with the sovereignty of its river, to the East India Company, are the substance of eighteen articles of which the agreement consists. The Peishwa also consents to waive all claims on the Honourable Company up to the date of the treaty; to give Toolajee Angria no territory below the Ghauts; to settle an equivalent with the Seedee for one-fourth of the customs levied by him from the vessels in Bancoote river; and to exact no additional inland duties on English merchandize.¹
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¹ English Records. This treaty was published in the appendix to the 5th Report from the Committee of Secrecy.