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The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India: A History of the Establishment and Progress of the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi, 1206–1290 A.D. c15: Chapter XI

The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India: A History of the Establishment and Progress of the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi, 1206–1290 A.D. c15

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Contents

Chapter XI

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From what has been said above in connection with the central government it will have been noticed that the Memeluke state had of necessity to be a decentralised system. It was a loose structure, made up of military commands, and not all of them were set up under one single direction or within a given time To these commands wide latitude of action had to be conceded, for it was to the single-handed initiative of men like Bakhtiyar that the Turkish state owed its territorial expansion and also preservation from the by no means passive Hindu powers. The continuity of the occupation process, spreading, as we have seen, over generations, permitted little governmental planning.

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Implicit in such circumstances was, therefore, the nature of provincial administration which functioned under the Memlukes. Limited as the state's manpower was, the setting up of a uniform civil administration over all parts of its dominions was out of the question. Familiarity with the details and problems of day-to-day administration could not be expected of the newly-arrived Turks, even were such officers available in their ranks and could be spared from military work. Retention of the existing governmental machinery in the form of vassal states and the employment of non-Muslims for such essential civil work, as the assessment and collection of the land-revenue in villages directly within the military area, were thus unavoidable. Direct annexation of territories requiring large civil and mili-

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*Laissez faire* in local government.

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tary personnel to administer them was mostly sought to be avoided. The ruling class congregated in military stations and capital cities, and non-Muslim penetration of the rural area was extremely slow and was confined to missionaries. Except the martial classess, and that usually in course of hostilities, and a few traders, the non-Muslim population in the countryside hardly came into governmental contact with the sovereign people whose purpose of administration, in the early years at least, turned on the smooth and regular collection of the land revenue. It is to be noted however, that this character of the administration wore out as the century progressed. *Laissez faire* in local administration was one of the principles whose early abandonment featured the Khalji regime, which thus summed up a tendency that had been progressively making itself felt throughout the century.

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A study of this earliest form of Indo-Muslim government must therefore begin with a consideration of the status and power of the vassal ruler to whom the paramount power entrusted the ordinary administration over the major part of the kingdom. Very little however can be gleaned on this point from the chronicles in which only his hostile behaviour provided an occasion for mentioning the feudatory chief. The most important condition of his vassalage was, it is certain, the undertaking to pay the tribute regularly. This tribute represented, it may be assumed, both the land-revenue and perhaps also the *jaziah*, realizable from his dominions. His sovereignty was curtailed to provide for the inclusion, in his coins, the suzerain's name, whose omission, at any rate, was considered a clear proof of the repudiation of vassalage. In the majority of cases the right of having an independent coinage appears

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Vassal rulers.

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to have been entirely taken away, for among the 13th century coins so far discovered, not many instances are found of such a modified vassalage. The name of Iltutmish (written *Sama-sorala-deva*, i.e. Shamsuddin) is included, evidently as a suzerain, in a few coins of a Chauhana prince of Ranthambhor whose name was read by Thomas as Chaharadeva. From an inscription of another prince, Jaitra Singh, dated 1215, acknowledging the overlordship of Vallanadeva of Ranthambhor, but also mentioning Iltutmish of ‘Joginipur’¹, it seems that the suzerainty was to be acknowledged in epigraphs also. If the Assam king’s offer to have the *khutba* read in his capital in the name of the Muslim conqueror, Yuzbak, in 1255², can be taken as illustrating the prevailing conditions of vassalage, the vassal was also required to give this symbolic expression to Muslim suzerainty, but this would depend on the existence of a Muslim colony in the Hindu state. In the details of administration, the vassal ruler appears to have enjoyed complete independence, subject, obviously, to his obligation to respect his suzerain’s edicts. The privilege of having his own modified coinage probably carried with it the right to levy customs duty on his own frontiers. Ordinarily, the vassal was his own master in the matter of assessment and collection of land-revenue, administration of justice and observance of religious practices. In the matter of revenue assessment, however, the standard set for the administered areas was expected to be followed in his dominions also, but this could hardly be a condition of vassalage. Much depended on the prestige and strength of the king whose suzerainty had, in fact, to be periodically enforced on the point of sword.

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¹ For citations, see *supra* pp. 98-99.

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² Minhaj, p. 264-5.

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The chronicles generally use the words iqta and wilayat to indicate a division of the kingdom. The former, which means, literally, a portion, is used much more frequently, seemingly with a technical meaning, on the exact determination of which depends a clear understanding of the nature of the local administration¹. The word iqta, meaning an administrative division, appears to have been used early in Central Asian states² from which the Turks borrowed it. It is needless to point out that Raverty’s translation of the word as ‘fief’—which at once suggests a feudal system in which the tenants-in-chief of the king were virtual sovereigns in their own domains—is misleading. A careful study of the chronicles will show that the so-called ‘fief-holders’ (muqtis) were subject to greater control than the term ‘fief’ implies. And yet considerable latitude was allowed to them in military affairs, which would be unthinkable for modern bureaucratic governors.

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¹ Both the words are used in a synonymous sense. See Barani, p. 96. also p. 430 where Balban, in advising his son Bughra Khan, muqti of Lakhnauti, drew a distinction between Iqlimdari (kingdom) and Wilayat-dari, the last word having been evidently used for muqti-ship; see also Moreland: Agrarian System of Moslem India, Appendix B.

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² See, for example, Siyasat Namah, p. 28. Ibnul Asir frequently uses it in his account of the Seljuq Kingdom; X (Thornberg) pp. 178, 274; see also en-Nessawi, p. 79.

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Towards the end of the 12th century, Nizamul-Mulk laid down the following rules for the guidance of the muqti³. “They (the muqtis) should know that their right over the subjects is only to take the rightful amount of money or perquisite (mal-i-haqq) in a peaceful manner....the life, property and the family of the subject should be immune from any harm, the muqtis have no right over them; if the subject desires to make a direct appeal to the Sultan, the *muqti* should not prevent him. Every *muqti* who violates these laws should be dismissed and punished....the *muqtis* and *walis* are so many superintendents over them as the king is superintendent over other *muqtis*.....After three or four years, the *amils* and the *muqtis* should be transferred so that they may not be too strong." There is no mention, however, of their rights and liabilities in other matters of government such as army, revenue and justice, but there are instances in Seljuq and also in Khwarizmi history showing that the *muqti* had his own contingents equipped and maintaned out of the revenue of his province, the rest of which went to the central government¹.

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³ Siyasat Namah, p. 37.

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¹ Ibnul Asir (Cairo), X, pp. 127, 152, 176, 192: also Gibb, *Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades*, p. 34.

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This system in many of its details was followed in India, where also such military governorships were fairly well-practised. The *muqti* was appointed by the Sultan, and could be transferred and dismissed at will. Usually he maintained a body of troops consisting of both infantry and horsemen, out of his own provincial revenues, and was responsible not only for the defence of his province, but also for the maintenance of law and order. His troops could be requisitioned by the central government. Although it is not recorded that he, as a rule, despatched the surplus revenue of his province after deducting the expenses of the army and the administration, yet instances are not rare to warrant such a supposition. The *muqti* of Lahore and Multan was directed by Muizzuddin in 501/1204 A.D. to despatch the arrears of revenue to enable him to make prepara-

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The *muqti* in India tions for his campaign in Transoxiana¹. According to Barani, Prince Muhammad, Balban’s eldest son and viceroy of Sind, used to bring the revenue of his province personally to his father every year². If we may take instances from the Khalji and Tughlaq period we may cite the instance of Alauddin, the *muqti* of Karra and Awadh, who asked Firoz Khalji for permission to utilise the surplus revenue (*fawazil*) of his province in purchasing horses and employing troops for an advance on Chanderi³. That the *muqti* or *wali* was responsible for the accounts of his provincial revenue to the Finance Ministry (*diwan-i-wazarat*) seems clear from the order of Ghiyasuddin Tughluq to his newly appointed officers: “If you desire that you may not be taken to task by the *diwan-i-wazarat*....you should not be avaricious; take little from the *iqta* and with this defray your expenses and pay your troops, and do not take a single farthing from the pay of the troops”. A close audit of the account of the *muqti* is also implied in the following passage: “Those (*muqtis*) who embezzle the money and tamper with the accounts and exact more than the specified share from the *iqta*, would be punished with chains and imprisonment”⁴.

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¹ Alfi, f. 497 b. Also *Jamiut-twarikh*, quoted by Raverty, *trans. Tab. Nas*, p. 482, note.

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² Barani, p. 59; see also pp. 108-9.

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³ *Ibid*, p. 220-21.

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⁴ *Ibid*, p. 431.

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Although there is no record of the amount of his remuneration or salary (*mawajib*) as such, he must have had a definite share out of the revenues. The fact that in several instances⁵ the *muqti* attempted to extend his province not only by conquering Hindu territories, but also by annexing part or whole of other adjacent *iqtas*, and thus increasing his income, suggests that his salary was probably

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⁵ E.g. *ibid*, pp. 269, 177.

Pay and allowances

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fixed in proportion to the entire revenue¹. Except as a punishment, as in the case of Kabir Khan who was recalled from Multan by Iltutmish and placed in charge of the small iqta of Pulwal², or in the case of Kashlu Khan, who, on Balban's dismissal from the court in 651|1253 A.D., was transferred from his extensive iqta of Nagaur to Karra³, no muqti appears to have been transferred from a larger to a smaller iqta. It is important to note that, although the muqti was assigned a fixed share in the revenue, his financial position was different from that of the assignee (iqtadar) who had no financial liability to the central exchequer. This is clear from the position of the two thousand Shamsi iqtadars who were assigned the revenue of the villages as their pay for personal service in the army⁴. To this category also belonged the iqta of Bakhtiyar granted to him by the muqti of Awadh⁵. Other assignments for services of a non-military character were those made to the qazis of the realm as well as to the amir-i-dad of the city.

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¹ What this proportion was, it is impossible to ascertain. Ghiyasuddin Tughluq, early in the 14th century, asked his revenue minister not to punish the "maliks and amirs" if they appropriated "half-tenth or half-eleventh or one-tenth or one-fifteenth of the revenue of the iqta or wilayat,—besides the customary perquisites of the office; Barani, p. 431. The wording here indicates that while the perquisite—whatever its value may have been—was his usual remuneration, the Tughluq king was prepared to allow the muqti an extra percentage at the rate mentioned. Perhaps it was a revival of an earlier practice, suspended by the Khalji centralization. Ibn Battuta observes that Muhammad b. Tughluq's governors receive 1/20 off the revenue as commission. Rahlah, Def. et Sang. III, p. 117.

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² Minhaj, p. 234.

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³ Ibid, p. 270.

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⁴ Barani, p. 61-63. This was their mawajib. Cf. Moreland, Agrarian System of Moslem India, p. 27.

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⁵ Minhaj, p. 147; the muqti of Budaun had previously paid him in cash.

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Mention has been made of the muqti's responsibilities for the civil and military administration of the province. As the conquest was in the nature of a military occupation, the maintenance and command of the provincial troops was the primary Duties.

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duty of the *muqti*. He enjoyed considerable freedom of action in the matter of fighting against the Hindus and also against foreign invaders. He was expected to join the royal forces with his contingents whenever required to do so, and failure was consideredd an act of rebellion. Although every *muqti* was liable to military service, only those in the neighbourhood of Delhi were generally ordered to be present.

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From a passage in Barani, the Tughluq central government appears to have fixed the strength, pay, and equipment of the provincial army, which the *muqti* was not allowed to alter¹; but it is doubtful if this was a continuation of the earlier system. For the 13th century autonomy would hardly square with this limitation on his action. Before Alauddin's centralization, no such detailed interference with his army administration was in evidence. Balban instructed Bughra Khan, the *muqti* of Samana and Sunam, to double the existing number of the provincial force by new recruitment and also to raise their pay². He also impressed on him the necessity of keeping himself informed about every detail of his military affairs. "Consider no expense for the army as too much and let your muster-master (*ariz*) engage himself always in maintaining the old and recruiting new troops and keeping himself informed about every expenditure in his department"³. The strength of the provincial contingent is nowhere indicated but it must have varied according to the revenue of the province. The *muqti* also had his muster-master (ariz) who was representedd at the central government by his naib¹.

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¹ Barani, p. 431.

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² Barani, p. 80.

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³ *Ibid*, p. 101-2.

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¹ Barani, p. 116.

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It does not appear that the judicial organisation of the province was under his control, or that he had any judicial function to perform. Apart from his general duties of maintaining law and order, which incidentally, was ordinarily limited to the chief cities and fortresses, and could be performed by the kotwal appointed by him, his duties were confined, besides what has been described above, to the raising of the king’s share of the revenue from the peasants, and the Hindu chiefs. We have little information respecting the existence of Muslim peasants at this period, but in the cities there were owners of land who were liable to the payment of kharaj. Hindus formed the bulk of the peasantry and in most of the provinces they paid the revenue through their village headmen, called muqaddam and chaudhuri². Some of the tributary Hindu chiefs were under the muqti while others paid directly to the diwan-i-wazarat.

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² Barani, p. 106.

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The muqti was generally a resident in the province but in some cases, particularly in provinces nearer the capital, there were absentee governors who ruled through deputies (naibs), sometimes appointed by the central government³. Hindu Khan ruled Uch through his naib after he returned to court in the reign of Bahram⁴; Balban, who held the office of amir-i-hajib and later, that of the naib-i-mamlikat, which required his constant presence at the court, must have administered his iqta of Hansi and Siwalikh through such a deputy. At his dismissal in 1253

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³ E.g. the naib of Kanouj was appointed by Iltutmish; Barani, p. 33.

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⁴ Minhaj, p. 399.

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Hansi was placed in charge of the infant son of Mahmud¹ and in this case a *naib* was clearly a necessity. In larger provinces, the *muqti* himself appointed his deputy over important cities and outpost. Probably to this class of deputy governorship should belong the *iqtas* of Narangoi held by Ali Mardan, and Ganguri held by Husamuddin Iwaz in Bengal². The *muqti* obviously had power to assign land to his officers as in the case of Bakhtiyar who received a military *iqta* from the governor of Awadh. Balban advised Bughra Khan to give *iqtas* to trusted and loyal officers. That the *muqti* could also make free grant of land like the Sultan, is proved by Minhaj receiving villages from Balban which produced an income of "thirty thousand *jitals*"³.

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¹ *Ibid*, p. 217.

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² *Ibid*, p. 157-58.

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³ Minhaj, pp. 214 and 295.

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There is little detailed information as to the *muqti's* subordinate staff, but since he was a miniature king, the reproduction of the Sultan's main departments in his province may perhaps be presumed. At the head of his secretariat stood the *dabir*; he had also a confidential adviser⁴. It does not appear that he had any prime minister or *wazir*, so called; Ainul Mulk Ashari, who is said to have been detailed as *wazir* to prince Firoz on his appointment to Budaun, was most probably only a tutor or guardian (*atabek*)⁵. Lesser officers, described as *mutasarrif*, *karkun* and *amil*, formed his administrative and fiscal staff⁶, controlled by his own revenue department over which the central *diwan-i-wazarat* could, at best, claim only auditing authority. The incident recorded by Barani of Iltutmish once appointing, on the wazir's recommendation, the clerk (khwaja) of the iqta of Kanouj, only illustrates a tendency rather than normal practice¹. Over the judiciary and the barid organization in the province the muqti, however, had little control.

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⁴ *Ibid*, p. 243; he was actually called *katkhuda*; see also *Ijaz i-Khusravi*, f. 106 b.

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⁵ Minhaj, p. 174.

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⁶ For the mention of a *mushrif* under the *muqti* of Kol. see *Fawadul Fawaid*, ff. 56-5. The salary of these subordinate officers was paid in cash but those attached to the revenue work appear to have been allowed a commission of 1/2 or 1 p.c. of the collected revenue; Barani, p. 430.

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¹ Barani, p. 36. Balban also is reported to have appointed the mutasarrif of Amroha, ibid, f. 38.

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Extensive as the iqta system was, it was by no means exclusive. We hear ocasionally of Khalisah areas, comprising cities and districts, which were governed by amir or shahnah instead of the muqti.

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*Khalisah.* Latterly, the term came to have a purely fiscal connotation, but in the 13th century its administrative organization also was different. Raverty translated the term as ‘crown-land’ but Moreland, more correctly, rendered it as ‘reserve area”, in which no assignment was given, the kharaj being collected directly by the central revenue ministry². Such an area was Bhatinda in the first half of the century when it was in charge of a shahnah³. Since the revenue was collected by the king's fiscal staff and was all credited to the central exchequer, the superintendent was most probably remunerated by a fixed salary. Under the same system was the territory in the immediate neighbourhood of Delhi, the area described as the havali-i-Dehli and also known as Harianah⁴, for it does not appear as part of any iqta. Its administrative officer is nowhere mentioned, but the diwan-i-wazarat directly supervised the fiscal staff. Bhatinda was later converted into an ordinary iqta⁵.

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² Moreland: op. cit. p. 29.

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³ Minhaj, pp. 188, 250, 251.

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⁴ See Moreland: op. cit. p. 23, for its approximate boundary. For Harianah, see EIM, 1913-14, p. 38.

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⁵ Minhaj, p. 277.

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Different from the *iqta* organization was also the newly conquered areas and fortresses. Gwalior was always under an *amir*, evidently a military officer¹.

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¹ Iltutmish’s first appointment was as the *amir* of Gwalior; Minhaj, p. 169. Among the officers appointed there on its reconquest in 1231, there is no *muqti* mentioned, but only the *amir-i-dad*, *kotwal* and the *qazi*; *ibid*, p. 175. Malik Tyasai, when he held charge of the fortress, was called *shahnah* and not *muqti*; *ibid*, p. 240.

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Military districts. The case of Karra on the Ganges near Allahabad, may be cited as an example of a military division being eventually converted into a civil administrative unit. During Iltutmish’s reign it formed the military charge of an *amir*, but by the time of Mahmud, it had attained the status of an ordinary *iqta*².

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² Minhaj, p. 177 and 217, also see Raverty’s note, p. 626.

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The chronicles mention no smaller administrative unit below the *iqta* as comprising rural areas. Barani occasionally mentions *parganahs* and *foujdars*, but no adequate evidence is forthcoming to enable us to consider these as representing subdivisional organizations. Early in the next century, we hear of the *shiqq* and the *sadi* but to ascribe them inferentially to the Mameluke governmental arrangement would require more contemporary evidence than is at present available.

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Smaller divisions.

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