Later Mughals v1.c9.s15: Sec. 16.—Renewal of Open Quarrel with the Sayyids.
Later Mughals v1.c9.s15
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Sec. 16.—Renewal of Open Quarrel with the Sayyids.
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During Husain Ali Khan's absence, Mir Jumla's power had gone on increasing. Farrukh-siyar had made over his seal to this favourite, and was often heard to say openly: "the word and seal of Mir Jumla are the word and seal of Farrukh-siyar." On his side, Qutb-ul-mulk was immersed in pleasure and found little or no leisure to devote to State affairs. Nor, being a soldier who had come into office without much preparation for civil affairs, was he very competent to deal with the details of administration, for which, moreover, he had no natural taste. Everything was left to his man of business, Ratan Chand, a Hindu of the Baniya caste, and a native of a village near the Sayyids' home at Jansath.* He had been recently created a Rajah with the rank of 2,000 zat. The chief dispute centred upon the question of appointments to office, the fees paid by those receiving appointments being a recognized and most substantial source of emolument. Ratan Chand, in addition to these customary fees, exacted large sums, which were practically bribes or payments for the grant of the appointment. By Mir Jumla's independent action in bringing forward candidates and affixing the seal to their warrants of appointment, without following the usual routine of passing them through the Wazir's office, the emoluments of both the chief minister and of his head officer were considerably curtailed. It is a matter of little wonder, therefore, that Qutb-ul-mulk felt aggrieved at the unusual powers placed in the hands of a rival such as Mir Jumla. This noble was much more accessible than the Wazir, and was not given to the extortionate practices of Ratan Chand. Naturally, men in search of employment or promotion sought his audience-hall rather than that of Qutb-ul-mulk. The Wazir suffered, in this way, both in influence and in income. Moreover, Mir Jumla allowed no opportunity to pass without depreciating the Sayyid brothers, and brought forward arguments of every sort to prove that they were unfitted for the offices that they held. [K. K. 739, Khush-hal 399a.]
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∗ Kamwar Khan 195, Khafi Khan ii. 738, M. U. i. 321, Muhammad Qasim 190.
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∗ My old acquaintance, Rai Bahadur Nihal Chand Agarwal, an Honorary Magistrate of Muzaffarnagar, in a letter of the 1st Dec., 1893, informs me that Ratan Chand was a native of Jansath town, where he had built a handsome house, now in a ruined state, but still in the hands of his impoverished descendants. He belonged to a sub-caste of the Agarwals called Rajah-ki-baradari (i.e., the Rajah's relations), the reference being to Rajah Agar Sen, the reputed founder of the caste, their ancestor having been that Rajah's son by a concubine. The epithet of baqqal (shop-keeper) attached to Ratan Chand's name, is the Persian version of the vernacular caste name baniya or mahajan (trader).
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The quarrel which had broken out in the first weeks of the reign was patched up in the manner already recounted. But no thorough reconciliation had been effected; nor, considering the character of Farrukh-siyar, was any such reconciliation to be expected. The Sayyid brothers could never be certain from day to day that some new plot was not being hatched for their destruction. The Rajputana campaign was the means of unmasking one of these schemes. Secret letters had been, as we have already mentioned, despatched to Rajah Ajit Singh, urging him to strenuous resistance, and inviting him, if he could, to make away with Husain Ali Khan. These letters came into Husain Ali Khan's possession and through them he acquired proof of Farrukh-siyar's double-faced dealings. There are two stories of the manner in which this happened. One, told by Warid, is that when Rajah Ajit Singh was hard-pressed and saw no other way out of the danger, he sent in the original letters for the perusal of the Sayyid. Husain Ali Khan at once entered into negotiations for a peace, in order that he might return to Court without delay to defend his own and his brother's interests. The other version is, that the Rajah made the letters over to his daughter when she started for Court, and that either on the journey or after her arrival at Dihli, when staying in the mansion of the Sayyid, the documents were in some way got at and their contents ascertained. In the interval of Husain Ali Khan's absence, Qutb-ul-mulk had found the greatest difficulty in maintaining his position at Court. All the power was in the hands of Mir Jumla. Every day messages came from Farrukh-siyar, couched in various forms, but all urging him to resign the office of Wazir. Qutb-ul-mulk now wrote letters to his brother enjoining him to return to Dihli with all possible speed. In response to these calls, Husain Ali Khan, as we have seen, reached the capital again on the 5th Rajab 1126 H. (16th July, 1714).*
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∗ Warid fol. 150a, 150b; Siyar text, 23.
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For the next two or three months the breach between the Emperor and the minister, although far from closed, was not sensibly widened. The Sayyids, as was natural, looked on Farrukh-siyar's accession to the throne as the work of their hands, and resented the grant of any share of power to other persons. On the other hand, the small group of Farrukh-siyar's intimates, men who had known him from his childhood and stood on the most familiar terms with him, were aggrieved at their exclusion from a share in the spoil. They felt that they themselves were not strong enough to attack the Sayyids openly; and recourse to other nobles of wealth or experience would do no more than substitute one set of masters for another. Their plan, therefore, was to work upon the weak-minded Farrukh-siyar. "The Sayyids," they said to him, "look upon you as their creation, and think nothing of you or your power. They hold the two chief civil and military offices, their relations and friends have the principal other offices, and the most profitable land assignments (jagirs). Their power will go on increasing, until, should they enter on treasonable projects, there will be no one able to resist them. It would be better to reduce their strength in time. For this purpose, two nobles of position should be brought to the front and placed on an equality with them." If the Sayyids gave way, all would be well; the object sought would have been accomplished. But should they, with the rashness (jahalat) for which the Barha Sayyids were famous, resist the undermining of their power, then the two nobles could oppose force to force. But open fighting should be resorted to only in the last extremity. The two brothers should be caught when unattended and made prisoners, as had been done with Zulfiqar Khan, and if necessary, despatched as he had been. [M. M. 189.]
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Farrukh-siyar, a man of no wisdom, accepted this advice as the perfection of right reasoning, the acme of loyalty to his person. The two men selected to confront the Sayyids were Khan Dauran and Mir Jumla. They were both promoted to the rank of 7,000 horse: they were placed, the former at the head of 5,000 Wala-shahi, and the latter of 5,000 Mughal troopers. Many of their relations were pushed forward into high rank, and counting these men's troops, each of the two nobles had at his command over ten thousand men. Among the signs of this favouritism was the order passed on the 12th Shaban (2nd Sept., 1713), permitting Mir Jumla to entertain 6,000 horsemen, who were to be specially paid from the imperial treasury. These were raised by Amanat Khan, his adopted son, from Mughals born in India, and some seventy lakhs of Rupees for their pay were disbursed from the treasury, the rules as to descriptive rolls of the men and branding of the horses being set aside. No order was issued by Farrukh-siyar without the advice and approval of the above two men. In this exercise of authority Mir Jumla assumed the lead, till at length Qutb-ul-mulk was only the nominal, while he was the real Wazir. The two Sayyids bowed for the time to the Emperor's will, and made no opposition to these usurpations. At length, through the indiscretion of some palace servants, the Sayyids learnt of the plots against their life.* They ceased to appear in darbar and shut themselves up in their houses, taking every possible precaution against a surprise. The Emperor's desire to ruin them became a matter of public rumour, although, when appealed to, the nobles and confidants of the Emperor strenuously denied its truth. [M. M. 190, Kamwar 139.]
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At length, in Zul Qada 1126 H. (7th Nov.-6th Dec. 1714), a son having been born to Husain Ali Khan, he resolved, as the custom was, to present a gift to His Majesty and ask him to name the child. At this time Farrukh-siyar was out on a hunting expedition and his camp was in a grove not far from the city. When the Nawab reached the privy audience-hall, finding the Emperor still in the chapel tent, he took a seat. While he was waiting, a number of his friends confided to him the secret that on that day it was intended to lay violent hands upon him. A number of men were hid in ambush. The Nawab felt his last hour had come and prepared to meet his fate. When his arrival was reported to Farrukh-siyar, an order was sent out for him to come to the oratory. The Nawab betrayed no fear, but walked towards the tent. When the door-keeper, following the rules of the palace, requested him to lay aside his arms, he became inwardly apprehensive and said: "Very well, as it is not convenient to receive me just now, I will make my bow another time." Report of this hesitation was taken to Farrukh-siyar, who came out, staff in hand, and stood outside the chapel tent, and received the Nawab's obeisance there, and replying with some silly, unmeaning compliments, dismissed him to his home. But the countenance of Farrukh-siyar betrayed the real anger and vexation under which he was labouring from the non-success of his plans to seize the Nawab. [M. M. 191, Warid 150b.]
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∗ Or as some say, they were informed by a message from Farrukh-siyar's mother, who considered herself bound by the promises made to the Sayyids at Patna. (Khafi Khan ii. 740). One authority (Ahwal-ul-khawaqin, 77b) makes Lutfullah Khan Sadiq the informant. He is described as "unrivalled in deceit, professing devotion to the sovereign, and yet as thick as could be with the Sayyids." He sent word to the latter privately that he had been present one night in Farrukh-siyar's audience-chamber, when, at the instigation of Mir Jumla and Khan Dauran, the Emperor had spoken harshly of them. There was no time for writing at length; one word was as good as a volume. Let them refrain from attending Court; or if they did attend, let them be very cautious.
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When he reached his house, Husain Ali Khan wrote to the Emperor to the following effect. It was quite clear that distrust of his brother and himself had found entrance into the Emperor's mind, and he was resolved on their overthrow. In that case, what could they do but submit to orders? But honour was a thing dearer than life; they might fall, but in so doing, they would take care not to sacrifice their honour. Let them be removed from rank and office, with leave to return to their homes and there offer their prayers for His Majesty's welfare. On reading the letter Farrukh-siyar took fright and returned to the city at once, in the hope of procuring some reconciliation. It so happened that soon after he reached the palace, a letter arrived from Qutb-ul-mulk to the same effect. Farrukh-siyar's equanimity was still further upset. From this time, the two Sayyids gave up attendance at darbar, and persisted in demanding the acceptance of their resignation of rank and office. Meanwhile they fortified their houses, and after Farrukh-siyar's return to the palace, negotiations went on for nine days. Among the messages they sent was one asking for a grant of several lakhs of dams, payable from the country round their home, to which they would retire; or they offered to recover Balkh and Badakhshan, which might be given them in jagir if they were successful. On the other hand, if they failed they would have earned a name which would survive until the Day of Judgment. If this request, too, was refused, let the plotters against them appear and fight them on the sands of the Jamuna below the palace windows (jharoka), the Emperor becoming spectator and umpire. Power would belong to the survivors. To all these importunities the Emperor's answer was that no plot against them was in existence. [Kamraj 53b, M. M. 193.]
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The conspirators told the Emperor that as the Sayyids were strongly supported by a large army and a numerous following of relations and adherents, their only object in offering to resign was to secure an unopposed withdrawal from the city, where they saw that it was impossible to carry out a successful revolt. Once in their home country, they would be certain to break out into rebellion. From this stage, the quarrel having become public, concealment was no longer possible and the principal nobles were called into consultation by Farrukh-siyar. Finally it was resolved not to interfere openly with the Sayyids, but to appoint a new Wazir, in the hope that their adherents would fall away from them. Most of these had resorted to them with the object of obtaining assignments on the land revenue. Deserted, as they probably would be, by these men, their party would be weakened and their consequence would gradually diminish.
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It is said that the leader in giving this advice was Muhammad Amin Khan, Itimad-ud-daulah. His idea was that, since in length of service, nobility of family, fertility of resource, and ability as a soldier, there was in his opinion no one his equal or rival, the Emperor's choice must fall upon him. And it is quite likely that, if he had been supported and given authority to act, he could have carried the affair to a successful termination. But the Emperor's advisers foresaw that if the present danger were overcome through his aid, and their first enemies removed out of their way, to get rid afterwards of the victor would be a still more arduous enterprize than the one at present before them. They preferred that Mir Jumla should receive the robes of diwan and assume the office of chief minister. Now, as a contemporary writer remarks, Mir Jumla and Khan Dauran, "were only carpet knights (sher-i-qalin) and not true fighters (mard-i-maidan). They talked well, but evaded dealing with the kernel (maghz) of the matter." Mir Jumla, having no real strength of character, knew that he was not fitted to enter the lists as a champion to fight the Sayyids. He therefore made excuses and drew to one side. Who, then, was "to bell the cat"? There remained Khan Dauran. He was in reality a mere braggadocio, a big talker of the kind supposed to be the peculiar product of Hindustan; and he was frightened lest he should ever be called on to take the lead, and lose his life in the attempt to destroy the Sayyids. Therefore he went secretly to Farrukh-siyar and suggested as the best course that Muhammad Amin Khan should be propitiated in every way, and the control of the affair confided to him. When it had been concluded and the Sayyids destroyed, he could be removed from office before he had time to consolidate his power. Overtures ought to be made to him. [M. M. 194, Ahwal 77b.]
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Muhammad Amin Khan, who had learnt the inmost secrets of the plot, and was also disheartened by the shifting moods of Farrukh-siyar, was far from ready to accept the office. He said that he had no wish to be Wazir; he was a plain soldier unaccustomed to such duties. If fighting men were wanted and the Emperor would head the troops in person, he would perform the obligations of a loyal servant and give his life for his master. But in the absence of His Majesty, his own troops and those of his relations were unequal to an attack on the Sayyids. The imperial and Wala-shahi troops had been warned for service under him; but he had no proof of their fighting quality. How could he feel any confidence in them? Besides, they were all of them near death's door from poverty and hunger, having neither good horses nor effective arms. In the Wala-shahi corps they had enlisted many townsmen, who neither respected others nor were themselves respected. Indeed, many low-caste men and mere artisans held commands. He could not rely on such troops. Finding this lack of zeal among his partisans, Farrukh-siyar began to lose heart. The men of the haft chauki, or personal guard, were ordered into the palace; and the unity and firm resolve of the Sayyids having been fully ascertained, it was decided to resume friendly relations with them.
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While all these schemes were in progress, the Sayyids stopped at home and were never seen at darbar. Crowds of their dependents and flatterers continued to attend their audiences. But soon it became known that the Emperor had made up his mind to destroy them, and had transferred the office of Wazir to another. By slow degrees the daily crowd of suppliants grew less and less. Nay, some of the very Barha Sayyids absented themselves, and the two brothers and their adherents fell into great perplexity. If things had gone on like this for three or four days longer, they would have been much reduced in strength: in another week or ten days, the Emperor's end would have been gained. But it was not long before the truth leaked out, as to the differences among his advisers, the want of heart in his troops, and the state of alarm into which he had himself fallen. Once more the Sayyids' mart resumed its former briskness, and the throng at their doors became greater than before.
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The Emperor ordered Islam Khan Mashhadi, formerly head of the artillery, to point some cannon at Husain Ali Khan's mansion, and kill him if possible. This order was not obeyed; and on Mir Jumla's complaint, Islam Khan was sent for. That officer excused himself on the plea of the risk to innocent neighbours, and asked what fault the Sayyid had committed. Farrukh-siyar began to complain of them. Islam Khan then offered his services as intermediary. Having visited them and expressed to them the Emperor's grievances, Husain Ali Khan began with a denial of having thwarted the Emperor in the least. He continued: "The words of the truthful, though somewhat bitter, yield pleasant fruit. As Sadi of Shiraz says: 'Each good deed has its reward, each fault its penalty.' "If they were in fault, let the Emperor himself say so; why should a multitude suffer for the crimes of two men;
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their heads were there, ready for His Majesty's sword. By God Most High! since they were real Sayyids, no word of reproach would escape their lips:—
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We turn not our heads from the sword of the enemy,
Whatever falls on our head is our Destiny."
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This talk frightened Islam Khan so much that he soon asked for leave to go. He hurried back to Farrukh-siyar, and worked on the Emperor's mind till his views were changed. Islam Khan then suggested: "Why not send for them?" and he offered to bring them. Farrukh-siyar said: "Good, I also wish it." Islam Khan reported to the Sayyids that the Emperor had turned round and would like to see them. Husain Ali Khan met this by the objection that though they were loyal, they could not go to Court while Mir Jumla was there; but they were willing to go on active service. Why should they remain at Court when there was no real but only apparent friendship. "Service and submission are from the heart, not from the tongue." [Ahwal 88a-91b.]
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Farrukh-siyar, who was much cast down at the refusal of his friends to act, followed up this negotiation with further attempts to conciliate the Sayyids and offers of doing their will, swearing many oaths that he would never attempt to injure them again. Khwaja Jafar, the holy man, an elder brother of Khan Dauran, Sayyid Husain Khan Barha, Sayyid Shujaat Khan and others, went to and fro repeatedly. At these interviews the Sayyids expatiated, as usual, on their good services and the devotion they had shown, diversified by loud complaints of the Emperor's ingratitude. At length they said that they were convinced that the flames of ill-will had been set alight by the efforts of Mir Jumla and Khan Dauran. So long as those two gentlemen were left at Court they did not feel justified in presenting themselves there, for they would still be afraid of renewed attack. But Khwaja Jafar succeeded in overcoming their objection to Khan Dauran. He entered into a solemn covenant on his brother's behalf, that he would never again act towards the Sayyids contrary to the rules of true friendship. Should the Emperor entertain any such project, he would hinder its execution to the best of his ability.
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If unsuccessful, he would at once warn the Sayyids. On these terms Khan Dauran was forgiven. Mir Jumla was thus left to meet the brunt of their displeasure, and they insisted on his dismissal from Court. [M. M. 198.] It was about this time that two of the Sayyids' uncles, Sayyid Khan Jahan and Asad-ullah Khan, counselled them to retire from Court. Qutb-ul-mulk objected that they were unfit for a saintly, recluse life. Khan Jahan explained that he did not counsel retirement from the world, but retirement from Court. "Say to the Emperor that you do not wish to remain at Court, that soldiers such as you are cannot manage the duties of a Wazir or a Bakhshi; let him send one of you to Bengal, the other to the Dakhin." The brothers thought the proposal a good one, but feared that it would be misrepresented by their enemies. Sayyid Khan Jahan asked, "How so?" They replied that they would be accused of meditating independence. Then another idea was brought forward. Why should they not, in order to obtain the removal of Mir Jumla, propose that one of the two brothers leave Court at the same time as Mir Jumla. All present approved, and a request to this effect was sent to the Emperor through Itibar Khan, a eunuch. Strangely enough Farrukh-siyar had conceived a similar plan, and therefore the offer was at once accepted. [Ahwal 93b.]
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As Farrukh-siyar was by this time in a great fright and held it of the first importance to come to some settlement, he now consented gladly to all their demands. On the 22nd Zul Qada 1126 H. (28th November, 1714), the Emperor's mother visited the house of Qutb-ul-mulk and on her son's behalf renewed his promises, binding herself by oaths in the most solemn form. On the next day Qutb-ul-mulk with all his retinue repaired to the palace. Mir Jumla and Khan Dauran advanced as far as the door of the public audience-hall to receive him. The Nawab reproached them to their faces in the severest language. But the two cowards swallowed the bitter draught as if it had been composed of sugar and honey. Not a word of answer issued from their lips. The Emperor was seated at the window in the Hall of Justice, when Qutb-ul-mulk came in, followed by forty to fifty of his most trusty veterans. His Majesty embraced him affectionately and entered into many excuses for his own doings, the tears standing in his eyes the while. Qutb-ul-mulk also wept, and recounted at length his own and his brother's many acts of loyalty and self-sacrifice, ending with asseverations of their unalterable devotion. Then, in accordance with the demands of the Sayyids, it was agreed that Mir Jumla should be despatched to subah Bihar; while Lutfullah Khan Sadiq, who furnished all the brains that Mir Jumla had, and was believed by the brothers to be at the root of all the mischief, was deprived of his rank. His mansion and gardens were confiscated, but on the request of Qutb-ul-mulk, the rest of his property was left to him. On the 5th Zul Hijja 1126 H. (11th December, 1714), Mir Jumla was conducted to Lahor in the charge of two mace-bearers.*
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On the day appointed for their attendance, just before the Sayyids were received in audience, Lutfullah Khan Sadiq, with effusive signs of joy, had met them in the middle of the great court in front of the public audience chamber, and begun to sound their praises like a hired flatterer. "During their absence the Court, even at noon-tide, had been plunged in the darkness of a long winter night, it seemed as if with them the sun and moon had disappeared" and more in the same strain. Qutb-ul-mulk retorted roughly: "What is the use of all this fulsome talk; if you meant it in your heart, why did you not show it in acts and try to heal the breach?" Lutfullah Khan then informed them that he had noticed a change in the Emperor's purpose, and believed that mischief was intended, for this reason only had he now troubled them. Having planted the seeds of distrust in their hearts, he hurried back to the Emperor and said that from what he had seen, he expected the Sayyids would use force. Farrukh-siyar broke out into anger: "The better I treat these men, the worse they oppose me." Additional guards were posted at the doors. After the usual ceremonies, Qutb-ul-mulk stepped forward and protested their loyalty, and prayed that tale-bearers might no longer be listened to. For instance, a person trusted by His Majesty had just met them in the open court of the audience-hall, and professing to be their friend, had told them that His Majesty meant to treat them harshly. If His Majesty thought them worthy of punishment, let him execute them with his own hand; and they would be happy to become a sacrifice. Farrukh-siyar retorted that a man had just told him the Sayyids intended to use force. The Sayyids rejoined that till one of these men was punished, things would never resume their proper course. The Emperor demanded the same. Explanations followed; this double treachery was brought home to the culprit, and the incident was the principal cause of Lutfullah Khan's sudden disgrace. [Ahwal 72a.]
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∗ Mirza Muhammad 199; Kamwar Khan, 151, has 23rd—Warid, 151a.
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As Nawab Husain Ali Khan would not come to Court until Mir Jumla had left, the latter received his audience of dismissal on the Id-uz-zuha (16th December, 1714). Four days afterwards (20th December, 1714), Husain Ali Khan entered the palace with his men, observing the same precautions as in the case of Qutb-ul-mulk. The Emperor and the Mir Bakhshi exchanged compliments, under which their real sentiments were easily perceived. Some months before this time (12th Ramzan, 1126 H.—20th September, 1714) Husain Ali Khan had obtained in his own favour a grant of the Dakhin subahs, in supersession of Nizam-ul-mulk. He had then no intention of proceeding there in person, but meant to exercise the government through a deputy, Daud Khan, as had been done by Zulfiqar Khan, after fixing the amount of profit to be remitted to him every year. It was now proposed that he should leave Court and take over charge of the Dakhin himself. Owing to fears for his brother's safety and other reasons, he had been very reluctant to leave Dihli. At length, under pressure of circumstances, he consented to take his departure to the South, Khan Dauran Samsam-ud-daulah being appointed his deputy at Court. One writer [M. M. 202] ascribes this change of plan to Husain Ali Khan's disgust with recent events. It should rather be looked on as part of the agreement under which Mir Jumla was sent away. [K. K. 741.]
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On the 17th Zul Hijja (3rd December, 1714), after his own troops had taken charge of the palace gates, Husain Ali Khan’s audience of leave-taking took place; but his first march to Nizam-ud-din Auliya’s tomb was postponed till the 29th Safar (5th March), and his actual departure was not reported till the 30th Rabi I. 1127 H. (4th April, 1715), when he set out by way of Ajmer. At this last audience he had made the significant remark that if in his absence, Mir Jumla were recalled, or his brother were subjected to annoyance, his return to Court might be looked for within twenty days from the occurrence of either event. He took with him power to appoint and remove all officials and exchange the commanders of all forts in the Dakhin. Nay, a common story is that, under compulsion, Farrukh-siyar made over to him the great seal, in order that the warrants of appointment to the forts should not require imperial confirmation. The settlement of these various matters had caused a delay of three or four months, which were spent by Husain Ali Khan at Barahpula.* Hardly was Husain Ali Khan’s back turned before new schemes were contrived, and on the 29th Jamadi I. (3rd May, 1715), Daud Khan, then governor at Ahmadabad in Gujarat, was reappointed to Burhanpur, one of the subahs under charge of Husain Ali Khan. Daud Khan received secret instructions from the Court to resist the Mir Bakhshi to the best of his ability, and if possible to kill him. The reward promised him was succession to the six subahs of the Dakhin. When we come to relate events in the various provinces during this reign, we shall return to the subject. Suffice it to say here that, much to the chagrin of the Court party, Daud Khan was killed in battle near Burhanpur on the 8th Ramzan 1127 H. (6th September, 1715), and Husain Ali Khan was victorious. In the same way, Mir Jumla’s doings at Patna will be told hereafter.†
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† Kamwar Khan,—Report of battle received 10th Shawwal, 1127 H. (8th October, 1715).