Later Mughals v2.c17.s3: Sec. 99.—Weak Character of Later Mughals.
Later Mughals v2.c17.s3
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Sec. 99.—Weak Character of Later Mughals.
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The decline of the Mughal nobility was mainly due to the decline in the character of the Emperor, because it is the first duty of a sovereign to choose the right sort of servants and give them opportunities for developing their talent and acquiring experience by instructing and supervising them during their administrative apprenticeship. In his private letters, Aurangzeb frequently complains of the lack of able officers during his reign as compared with the glorious days of Akbar and Shah Jahan : *az na-yabi-e-adam-i-kar ah! ah!* But the following wise saying of the great Wazir Sadullah Khan, which Aurangzeb himself quotes with approval, is a deserved rebuke to such pessimism : "No age is wanting in able men ; it is the business of wise masters to find them out, win them over, and get work done by means of them, without listening to the calumnies of selfish men against them." [Ruqat-i-Alamgiri, No. 46.]
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In fact, the deterioration in the character of the Emperors must be held to be the primary cause of the decline in the character of the nobility and the downfall of the Empire. The suspicious watchfulness of Aurangzeb and the excessive paternal love of his successors kept the Princes at Court or caused them to be over-chaperoned in their provincial Governments, thus preventing the development of any initiative or business capacity among them. The heirs to the throne of Dihli in the 18th century grew up utterly helpless and dependent upon others, without any independence of thought, fearlessness in assuming responsibility, or capacity to decide and act promptly. Their intellect and spirits were dulled and they found diversion only in the society of harem women buffoons and flatterers. When such Princes came to the throne, if they were wise they would leave the entire administration in the hands of able Wazirs,—which provoked factious envy among the other ministers; and if they were foolish, they constantly resorted to intrigue for subverting one too-powerful minister only to fall into the hands of another.
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The *faineant* Emperor could not and would not govern the country himself, and yet he had not the wisdom to choose the right man as his Wazir and give him his full confidence and support. He was easily led away by the whispers of eunuchs and flatterers, and issued orders for the dismissal of old ministers and provincial governors in the vain hope of getting more money or greater servility from their successors.
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Thus the nobles found that career was not open to talent, that loyal and useful service was no security against capricious dismissal and degradation, that their property and family honour were not always safe in such a Court. Their only hope of personal safety and advancement lay in asserting their independence and establishing provincial dynasties of their own. And such a course was also conducive to the good of the people of the province. They could enjoy peace and prosperity only under an independent local dynasty. For, so long as their rulers were sent from the distant imperial Court, every succeeding day a new favourite might beg or buy the viceroyalty, come with a new letter of appointment, and try to oust his predecessor. Whether these attempts succeeded or failed, the result was the same: the province was filled with war and the rumours of war, plunder, the withholding of taxes, and the closing of the roads. The history of Gujarat under Muhammad Shah graphically illustrates the point.
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SEC. 100.—FORMATION OF FACTIONS AT COURT AND ITS EFFECT.
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When Nadir Shah invaded India, the three highest ministers of State were Asaf Jah Nizam-ul-mulk (the *Wakil-i-mutlaq* or Regent Plenipotentiary), Itimad-ud-daulah Qamar-ud-din Khan (the *Wazir* or Chancellor) and Khwaja Asim entitled Samsam-ud-daulah Khan Dauran (the *Amir-ul-umara* and *Bakhshi-ul-mamalik* or Head of the Army). Among the provincial governors the highest (if we exclude the Nizam and the semi-independent subahdar of Bengal) was Saadat Khan Burhan-ul-mulk, the subahdar of Oudh and most prominently in the running for a ministership at Court. Of these, we may leave Khan Dauran out, as he was a carpet knight and Court flatterer, without any administrative capacity or experience. The Nizam had been born in Samarqand and had migrated to India in boyhood to seek his fortune under the Mughal banner. The same was the case with Qamar-ud-din Khan the Wazir, who was his cousin. Saadat Khan was a native of Khurasan and had entered India as an adventurer early in the 18th century. These men could feel no patriotism for India, because India was not their patria. They had nothing at stake in this country, no share in its past history traditions and culture, no hereditary loyalty to its throne. The Mughal Emperor was merely their paymaster, and if they could make better terms with his enemy, they were not such fools as to reject them out of a sentimental love for a land which merely gave them an excellent field for the display of their undoubted talents and promised them a rich reward. It was only in the succeeding generations that their families became rooted in the Indian soil.
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When the Emperor was a sluggard or a fool, he ceased to be the master and guide of the nobility. They then naturally turned to win the controlling authority at Court or in the provinces. This selfish struggle necessarily ranged the nobles in factions, each group or bloc trying to push the fortunes of its members and hinder the success of its rival groups. The Dihli Court under the Later Mughals was divided between the Turani (or Central Asian) and the Hindustani parties,[*]—both Muhammadans, while the Hindu Rajahs sided with the latter. Each faction tried to poison the ears of the Emperor against the other, thwart its plants, stir up its discontented servants, and even engage in active hostility to it when at a distance from the Court. Rebels could not be opposed with all the armed strength of the Empire; they could always count upon secret supporters or at least neutral make-believe opponents in the Imperial Court and camp.
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∗ In the second half of the 18th century the division was between the Irani (Persian Shia) and Turani (Sunni) parties.
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This moral degradation of the nobility was accompanied by the intellectual bankruptcy of the bureaucracy, and indeed of the entire governing classes. There was no far-sighted leader, no clearly thought-out and steadily-pursued scheme of national advancement as under Akbar. No political genius arose to teach the country a new philosophy of life, or to kindle aspirations after a new heaven on earth. They all drifted and dozed in admiration of the wisdom of their ancestors and shook their heads at the growing degeneracy of the moderns.
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The Mughal Empire had aimed merely at being a police Government; and therefore when it could not do its police function well, when it failed to maintain internal order and external peace, it lost its sole reason for existing. The life of the country had hitherto been held together by the Court. Hence, when the throne was filled by puppets, dissolution took place in the bond that held the people together and co-ordinated their efforts and ambitions. Government ceased and anarchy began.
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On the eve of Nadir Shah's invasion, the Jats by their depredations had made the roads near the capital unsafe and hindered trade and traffic The Mahrattas by their regular annual incursions at first and their permanent lodgment in the frontier provinces (Gujarat, Malwa and Bundelkhand) afterwards, bled the Empire to death. The production of wealth was stopped not only as the direct result of their extortion and ravage, but also indirectly through the discouragement of industry and thrift which such insecurity of property creates.
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The frequent civil contests, whether among the Princes and nobles, or between the Government and rebellious subjects, spread a sense of insecurity among the taxpayers. The peasants withheld the land revenue, which was the mainstay of the Government, and the lower officials evaded delivering their collections. The victor in the contest might crush the defaulting ryots and peculating tahsildars and turn them out of house and hold; but by doing so he ruined himself all the same, as his only source of income was gone; he had only swelled the number of desperate homeless roving brigands and reduced the area under tillage.
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The profuse bounty of Nature to this country, its temperate climate which reduces human want, and the abstemious habits of its people, all combined to increase the national income of India throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The huge "annual addition to the national stock" ultimately made its way to the hands of the governing classes,—if we leave out the small portion that was intercepted by the trader and the revenue-farmer. The wealth of Ind was the wonder and envy of other nations. But the Mughal Court and Mughal aristocracy had not the sense to insure this wealth by spending a sufficient portion of it on efficient national defence and the improvement of the people's intellect and character by a wise system of public education. Their wealth only made their weakness fatal to them and tempted the foreign invader by assuring him of a success as easy as the booty was large.
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A Government which could not maintain order at home was still less likely to command respect abroad. The weakness of the Central Government was soonest felt in the frontier provinces: Malwa and Afghanistan were not guarded in strength. The Mahratta occupation of Malwa brought Dihli within striking distance of their arms, and Baji Rao in 1737 insulted the capital, pillaged and burnt its suburbs and returned to his base with perfect immunity. The defencelessness of Afghanistan brought Nadir Shah to India.