Later Mughals v2.c18.s2: Sec. 108.—Proceedings of the Imperial Court During Nadir's Invasion.
Later Mughals v2.c18.s2
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Sec. 108.—Proceedings of the Imperial Court During Nadir's Invasion.
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The proceedings of the Dihli Court during Nadir's invasion form a tale of disgraceful inefficiency, amounting to imbecility. The news of the loss of Kabul (19th June 1738) must have reached Dihli in the first week of July, but for several months nothing was done to guard the frontiers. When Nadir crossed the Khaibar Pass (15th Nov.), his motive could no longer be mistaken, and yet for two months afterwards no energetic step was taken to meet a danger now manifest to all. True, on 2nd December 1738 the Emperor had formally given leave to his three highest nobles, Itimad-ud-daulah Qamar-ud-din Khan (the Wazir), Nizam-ul-mulk Asaf Jah (the Wakil or Regent) and Samsam-ud-daulah Khan Dauran (the Amir-ul-umara and Bakhshi or the head of the military department), to set out against the invader, and one *kror* of Rupees had been granted to them for their expenses. They encamped outside Dihli in the Shalimar garden near Sarai Baoli and wasted full one month there.*
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The news of Nadir Shah having crossed the river at Attock must have reached Dihli on 10th January, 1739. Then the imperial army was urged to hurry on. The Court still hoped for much from the stand to be made by Zakariya Khan whom they had refused to reinforce. But when that poor governor proved no match for the world-conqueror, the cry of treachery was raised: the Hindustani party at Court falsely accused the Khan of having disloyally surrendered Lahor fort to the Persians, as he was a man from Khurasan like Nadir himself. [Shakir.]
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∗ Hanway (ii. 360) says that Khan Dauran stopped here owing to the Nizam's jealousy and discord. The Dihli Chronicle says that accountants for their armies were appointed as late as 14th and 20th December,—they took things so leisurely. No doubt this month (2-31 Dec.) was Ramzan or the month of fasting. But Aurangzeb had campaigned in Ramzan.
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At the first bruit of Nadir Shah's invasion, the imperial Court had discovered its incompetence and summoned the Nizam to give it counsel. He was the last survivor of the great age of Aurangzeb, a grey-haired veteran of many fights, a man rich in the experience of life, and an expert in diplomacy. But the Nizam was not given the supreme command and dictatorial authority which such a crisis required, nor did he enjoy the confidence of his master, whose ears were possessed by Khan Dauran and the Hindustani party. This Khan Dauran had a very high opinion of Rajput valour. He caused farmans to be sent summoning to the Emperor's aid his own protegés the Hindu Rajahs, especially Sawai Jai Singh. But Rajputana had been hopelessly alienated since Aurangzeb's time, and Jai Singh and other chieftains were now aiming at political salvation by declaring their independence and calling in the Mahrattas to help in dissolving the Empire. The Rajahs made excuses and delayed coming. Muhammad Shah even appealed to Baji Rao, as we learn from the following letter of the Peshwa to his general Pilaji Jadon:—
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"I shall march to Northern India by regular stages. The Persian sovereign Tahmasp Quli has come to conquer the world. To help Muhammad Shah I am sending the Malwa force under Malhar Rao Holkar, Ranuji Sindhia, and [Udaji] Puar. It is a glory to this monarchy [i.e., the Mahratta State] to help the Emperor of Dihli at such a time." [Raj. vi. No. 130.] But reliance on the Mahrattas, even if seriously contemplated, proved like leaning on a broken reed. No Dakhini force came to the Emperor's assistance at Karnal, or even in time to defend Dihli after the imperial defeat in the field. On the contrary, the Mahratta envoy in the Emperor's camp at Karnal was glad to make his escape by jungle paths on 25th February and seek safety by retreating as far south as Jaipur. Baji Rao himself, in his next letter, is found contemplating the defence of the Narmada line to bar the southward advance of Nadir. A Mahratta defence of Northern India was not to be thought of.
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The imperial forces passed the month of Ramzan [December 1738] outside Dihli in utter idleness. Then came the news of the Persians having crossed at Attock. So, at last, on 10th January 1739, the three nobles began to march towards Lahor, after urging the Emperor with one breath and extreme emphasis that he should join the army in person. On the 18th they reached Panipat, 55 miles north of Dihli.
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On that day (18th January), Muhammad Shah himself issued from Dihli, and on the 27th he reached Panipat, where his generals had been halting for nine days in expectation of his coming! Nadir's capture of Lahor had already been learnt by the Court, and it was found too late to save that city. So, it was decided to encamp and wait for the enemy at Karnal, where there was an abundance of water from Ali Mardan's canal and the extensive plain around supplied opportunities for manœuvring large bodies of cavalry. A halt was also necessary to enable Saadat Khan, the governor of Oudh, to join with his 30,000 horsemen. Reinforcements were also expected from Rajputana.
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The Emperor's advisers, particularly the Nizam, therefore, decided to entrench at Karnal instead of risking a battle. Under the direction of Sad-ud-din Khan, Mir Atash, the camp was enclosed with a mud-wall many miles in circuit. Along this line the guns were ranged side by side; soldiers were posted in the trenches to keep watch day and night. [Anandram, 25; Shakir 40; Chronicle; Siyar, i. 96; Bayan 32, Jauhar-i-samsam in Elliot viii. 74.]