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Later Mughals v2.c18.s6: Sec. 112.—Battle of Karnal, 13th February.

Later Mughals v2.c18.s6

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English

Sec. 112.—Battle of Karnal, 13th February.

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When, a little after midday, Saadat Khan's army was seen to come forth to the plain, news of it was at once carried to Nadir. He was highly elated to hear of it. He had been wishing for such a day, as his Court historian remarks, and it had come unexpectedly soon. The Indian army had been drawn out of its strongly entrenched position, and at last a battle of manœuvres was possible in which the Persian general could show his genius.

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Nadir's arrangements were swiftly made, so as not to let the enemy escape through night-fall before his work of destruction was fully done. He left a division to guard his camp; his Centre was placed in charge of his son Nasr-ullah with many noted warriors and a powerful artillery. The vanguard was under his own command. Three thousand of his best troops were formed into three different bodies and placed in ambush. Two small bodies, each consisting of 500 swift horsemen, were sent against Saadat Khan and Khan Dauran in order to draw them further into the field.* Nadir himself, clad in full armour and wearing an ornamented helmet, mounted a fleet horse and marched into the fight with one thousand picked Turkish horsemen of his own clan (the Afshar), to direct the battle. The Persian army was entirely composed of cavalry, and their artillery consisted of jazair, i.e., long muskets or swivel-guns, seven or eight feet in length with a prong to rest on. In addition there were zamburaks or long swivels firing one or two pound balls; "each of these pieces, with its stock, was mounted on a camel, which lay down at command; and from the backs of these animals, trained to this exercise, they charged and fired these guns." [Jahankusha 351; Hanway, ii. 368,153.]

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In order to baffle the elephants, on which the Indians mostly relied for effect, he caused a number of platforms to be made and fixed each across two camels. On these platforms he laid naphtha and a mixture of combustibles with orders to set them on fire during the battle. The elephants were sure to flee away at the sight of the quickly approaching fire and put the Indian army behind them in disorder. [Hanway, ii. 369.]

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The Persian skirmishers had effectively screened their main position where Nadir had stationed 3000 of his best troops, dismounted his swivels and ranged them along the front with their barrels resting on prongs.

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The battle began a little after one o'clock in the afternoon, with a discharge of arrows on both sides. The Persian scouts pretended flight, turning back in their saddles and discharging their bows and muskets while galloping, in the manner of their Parthian ancestors. Saadat Khan gave chase and was thus drawn to the ambush three or four miles east of the imperial camp and the support of its artillery. Suddenly the cavalry screen drew aside in front and Saadat Khan's army was assailed by the discharge of many hundred swivel-guns at point-blank range. [Harcharan.] The bravest of his troopers who rode foremost fell. After standing this murderous fire for a short while, the Indian vanguard fled. [Anandram.] But Saadat Khan maintained his ground for some time longer, amidst a band of devoted followers, who fought to the death. But early in the evening he was forced out of the field, and the fight in the extreme Right of the Mughal army ceased.

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∗ Bayan differs: "Nadir's Right Wing was placed under Tahmasp Quli Jalair, Left under Fath Ali and Lutf Ali Afshar, Centre under Nasr-ullah, and the vanguard, consisting of 4,000 cavalry carrying jazair, under himself."

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The same fate overtook Khan Dauran's division in another part of the field (the Centre), though he made a longer stand. The rapid fire of the Persian swivel-guns carried death into his ranks, without a chance of reply. The masterly tactics of Nadir, aided by the recklessness and utter want of generalship of the Indian chiefs, had separated the three divisions of the imperial army from one another by more than a mile's interval, so that the soldiers of each division merely heard the sound of firing in the other parts of the field, but could learn nothing of the plight of their brethren, much less hasten to their aid. Khan Dauran could not co-operate with his friend Saadat Khan, however much he wished it. The Nizam, though the ablest general on the Indian side, was absolutely inert throughout the day and gave no help to Khan Dauran or Saadat Khan, probably because he hoped (as Abdul Karim suggests) to take the places of these rivals at Court if they perished. The Emperor was imbecile and stood like a wooden figure in the extreme Left. At the points of contact the Indians had a numerical inferiority and were far away from the aid of their heavy artillery. Their generals mounted on tall elephants became targets for the enemy's fire, while the nimble Persian horsemen hovered round beyond the reach of the weapons of the Indians.

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The murderous fire of Nadir's gunners continued for two hours. The Indians fought bravely, but gave up their lives as a vain sacrifice, because (in the words of Abdul Karim) "arrows cannot answer bullets." When the situation became absolutely hopeless and most of their officers had fallen, about 1000 of the bravest soldiers of Khan Dauran dismounted and, in the Indian fashion, tying the skirts of their long coats together fought on foot till they all died. [Bayan.] Khan Dauran himself had been mortally wounded in the face and fallen down unconscious on his howda. But a party of devoted retainers, under his steward Majlis Rai, surrounded his elephant and by desperate fighting brought him back to the camp, near sunset, but only to die. [Anandram.]

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