History of the Khaljis, A.D. 1290–1320 c10.s3: The Character of Rajputana Campaigns and the Causes of Rajput Defeat
History of the Khaljis, A.D. 1290–1320 c10.s3
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The Character of Rajputana Campaigns and the Causes of Rajput Defeat
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Ever since the sultan had embarked upon the conquest of Ranthambhor in 1300, till the fall of Jalor in 1311, his armies had constantly fought in Rajasthan. It was below the dignity of the sultan to recall his forces once the siege of a fortress had been begun, and the valour of the Rajputs could not brook the insult of giving way to the enemy. The result was that bloody battles were fought before each and every fortress. To enumerate the various wars in Rajputana, then, is to repeat the horrors of blood and slaughter, of gallant fight, of glorious martyrdom. Sometimes before a single citadel the contest prolonged for years, and ended in a general massacre of its population accompanied by the gruesome destruction of the womenfolk in the fire of Jauhar.
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Unluckily the Rajputs who spurned life without freedom, possessed valour without the spirit of union. Individual fortresses offered stubborn resistance; but singly none of them was a match against the sultanate of Delhi. Had even two or three Rajput princes combined against the sultan, they would surely have succeeded in defeating him. But secure in their mountain fortresses, each one of them was content to mind his own affairs and exult in his own pride, while ‘Alāuddīn raided and subdued one kingdom after another. The case of Sevana and Jalor is a glaring example of the callous indifference of the Rajput chieftains towards one another. While the fall of Sevana was imminent the ruler of Jalor, living only about fifty miles from there, was unmoved, with the result that after a couple of years Jalor was also taken in another assault.
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Another reason of the Rajput defeat was their forts. They were generally contructed on the top of some hillock and were designed to protect women, children and cattle when the brave defenders sallied out to encounter a sudden invasion. And although it was difficult for the invaders to ascend step by step the steep cliffs of the hillock, yet the citadel, when subjected to a siege, was always rendered separate and secluded from the plains below. Thus the corns and revenues of outlying districts automatically fell into the hands of the enemy. During investment not all the people of the vicinity escaped in time to seek shelter inside the citadel; a large number of them were left on the plains below. Their distress though made them hate the enemy, did in no way dispose them loyally towards their rulers inside the Citadel.
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The conditions inside the fortress, again, were not very satisfactory. During an investment the crowd far exceeded the number of the normal inhabitants, and there were no special arrangements for extra provisions and vegetables.
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The enemy lying at the base of the hill on which the fort stood, could easily cut off the convoy, and it was always the dearth of provisions that rendered defence impossible. The mighty fortresses of Ranthambhor, Chittor and Jalor—all surrendered to famine. Again, medieval conditions of sanitation were no preventive against outbreak of epidemics. To add to this, caste considerations and orthodoxy reigned supreme. The enemy was alive to these weaknesses of the Hindus and took full advantage. The instance of Ranthambhor is worth repeating. Through the services of some traitor, hides were thrown inside the grain cellars, povisions were threreby rendered "desecrate" and the fortress surrendered.
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The Rajputs were still steeped in their age long traditions of warfare and had little opportunities of developing their military strategy. They had little or no connections with Central Asian countries and were quite ignorant of the revolutionary changes the Mongols had introduced in the art of warfare. Every now and then the sultans of Delhi had to fight the Mongol invaders and were quite conversant with their tactics of ambuscade, comouflage and feigning retreats. They possessed engines of war like *arrada, gargach* and *minjniq*. The Rajput fought with huge elephants, in open engagements. Their government was based on feudal principles and fixed quotas of soldiers were provided by the various dependencies in times of war. During an investment such reinforcements could not always arrive because of enemy activity and the beleagured had to fight single handed.
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Moreover, the resources of a Rajput Raja were limited. His country was barren; there was dearth of crops and of water. His only fortune was the hilly nature of the country. How could the Rajput princes then succeed against the sultans of Delhi who possessed the Punjab and Avadh, the most fertile regions of the country, and who could depend upon an unlimited supply of provisions and reinforcements?
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Then, the Rajput only knew how to die. To him death on the field of battle was the greatest bliss, the greatest honour. Chivalry was crammed into his very marrow; he hated trick and treachery. As to the Turk, bravery was his first, trickery his second, nature. To him death was the greatest misfortune. He wanted to live in this world and enjoy the fruits of victory. So victory he must have, whatever the means he adopted to obtain it. Thus, while the Rajput flung himself into the battle, the Turk moved after calculating the enterprise. The Rajput fought desperately, the Muslim diplomatically. Diplomacy with the Rajputs was zero, with the Muslims it was the very secret of their success.
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But the success of the Sultan in Rajputna was short lived. The Rajputs who had a country to love and an honour to maintain never gave way to 'Alāuddīn's governors. If the day was irrecoverably lost they well knew how to deliver themselves and their families from the insulting invader, and as soon as the deluge of the invasion had ebbed they reclaimed their territories. The result was that 'Alāūddin's hold over Rajputana was precarious. The occupation of Ranthambhor after Ulugh Khan left it not more than six months after its capture, is uncertain. Khizr Khan had to vacate Chittor in 'Alāūddīn's life time. Bardic literature enumerates continual struggles between the Muslims and the Rajputs. Obviously Rajputana had not completely submitted, and one or the other kingdom in that land of born warriors was always successfully defying the authority of the Sultanate of Delhi.