History of the Khaljis, A.D. 1290–1320 c17.s2: Horse Market
History of the Khaljis, A.D. 1290–1320 c17.s2
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Horse Market
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(Rules were also framed to regulate the sale of horses, cattle and slaves. In medieval times cavalry was the most important branch of the army and horses were much valued. In Central Asia, among the Mughals, horse stealing was punished with death. In South India large amount of money was spent by Hindu Rajas to procure horses from countries like Arabia and Qipchāq. (In North India horses of good breed were mostly imported from Arabia, Persia and Afghanistan, but the Mughal activities interrupted the course of trade and the price of horses rose high. But 'Alāuddīn could not allow a high price for any commodity needed by a soldier, and the price of horses was also regulated.) Horses considered fit for military service²⁹ were divided into three grades according to their quality and breed. The price of the best quality horse ranged from 100 to 120 *tankahs*, that of the second from 80 to 90 *tankahs*, and of the third from 65 to 70 *tankahs*. The horses which were not passed as fit for military service by the Divān, and which were known as *tattūs* (ponies) were priced from 10 to 25 *tankahs*. To maintain these low prices 'Alāuddīn had to treat the horse brokers and middlemen very severly. He ordered that no dealer or his agent should be permitted to frequent the market with the intention of buying a horse for reselling it at a higher price. But it was not very easy to bring them under control. *Dallāls* or middlemen are even to-day one of the most cunning and unmanageable section of the *mandi* people. In those days, declares Ziyāuddīn, "brokers and middlemen were a most arrogant, rebellious and audacious class of people." They were wont to take commission both from the purchaser and the seller in every transaction, and had so complicated the business that no transaction could be effected without their mediation. Virtually, they were the "Kings of the market." Consequently it was with some difficulty that the sultan could bring the brokers to book. He instituted very harsh measures to put an end to the nefarious *dallāls*, who for years had earned their livelihood on high bidding and speculation. Those who still persisted in their old ways were incarcerated with life long imprisonment. It was no longer possible for the merchants and brokers to prevaricate or speak lies, and the price of horses fixed by the sultan began to obtain in the city.
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²⁹ Barani p. 313, has insert Persian quotation from note 28. By Dīvān here is meant Dīvān-i-'Arz اسامى is meaningless. It is in all probability اسپهاتی
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'Alāuddīn used to send for inspection after every six weeks or two months horses of every variety to ascertain that each variety was sold at the price specified for it. If any variation was detected the brokers had to suffer penalties and punishments. Fear kept the brokers vigilant and prevented them from trading upon the simplicity of customers. In this way the king was successful in establishing fixed prices for horses of every variety.
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(On lines similar to these were fixed the prices of slaves and cattle.) In medieval times slaves of both sexes, like any other commodity, were sold in the market and the sultan fixed prices for them also. The standard price of a working girl was fixed at from 5 to 12 *tankahs*, and that of a good-looking girl from 20 to 30 and even to 40 *tankahs*. If a very beautiful slave girl of a very high price, say of 100 or 200 *tankahs*, was offered for sale in the market, nobody dared to buy her for fear of the *munhiyāns* (secret police), lest the king should be informed that a particular person was rich enough to pay so high a price for a slave girl. The prices of boys were fixed from 20 to 30 *tankahs*. The slave-boys were classified according to their looks and working capacity. As was the case with the horse market, in the slave market also it was not possible for the dealers and monied men to go about showing or seeing slave boys or girls or tampering with their prices. The punishments inflicted on brokers for contravening the orders of the king were very severe and Barani exaggeratingly, though not untruthfully, says that such penalties were inflicted on the brokers that even life became distasteful to them, and they longed for death.
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Similar regulations were introduced in the cattle market also. A good beast of burden which was sold for 40 *tankahs* in the reign of Muhammad Tughlaq or of Fīrōz, used to be sold for 4 or at the most 5 *tankahs* in the time of 'Alāuddīn. A cow for slaughtering was sold at a *tankah* and a half while a milk cow was sold at 3 to 4 *tankahs*. The price of a cow or buffalo in milk averaged from 10 to 12 *tankahs*.
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So much about the large markets. It has been pointed out before that 'Alāuddīn fixed the price of each and every commodity however trifling.) It was a matter of policy also. It was useless to control the price of foodstuffs if sweets or things prepared from them were not controlled. The prices of different commodities are interconnected. For example, if the prices of wheat, *ghī* and sugar are controlled, and the price of sweets is left uncontrolled, the control is not complete. Thus the prices for *harīsah*, *reorī*, sugar-candy, puddings, vegetables, bread, combs, slippers, shoes, cups, pitchers, goblets, needle, betelnuts and even betel were fixed.
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*Means of enforcing orders.*
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It was not easy to force all these regulations down the throats of tradesman—wholesale dealers as well as retailers, who for long had been enjoying liberal profits. But the state exigency forced the king to see that his orders were faithfully carried out. Upon effective enforcement of his orders depended the efficiency and happiness of his armed forces, the safety of the state against foreign aggressors and the glory of the crown through conquests.
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A schedule of the prices of different commodities was prepared and a reasonable profit was allowed to the seller.³⁸ Since this margin was determined according to the wishes of the king without any consultation with the merchants, it may safely be surmised that it was not very high. The schedule was forwarded to the Divān-i-Riyāsat, whose duty it was to enforce it in the market. Malik Yāqūb; the Divān-i-Riyāsat, or the Inspector General of all the markets in Delhi, appointed *shahnahs* or magistrates for various markets dealing with various commodities. The *shahnahs* had full jurisdiction over their markets and were directly responsible to the king. The status of a *shahnah* was high as can well be imagined from the instance of Malik Qabūl. Each *shahnah* received a copy of the schedule of rates for his market. The superintendents were instructed to enquire from the purchasers what they had paid for a particular ware, and were to note down their statements to verify if the prices charged were not in contravention of the scheduled ones. If the market people were found to be selling things at higher prices they were at once taken to task. The appointment of a *shahnah* for each market was extremely conducive to keeping prices low.
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³⁸ Barani p. 316.
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The powers vested in the market officials were very extensive. They coerced, whipped and tyrannized over the traders in every way. But in short weights were their common habits, and they did all this in spite of the barbarous punishments inflicted upon them for the slightest offence.
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'Alāuddīn ordered most severe punishments for contravention of his orders regarding price-control. Even in these days a fine of a few thousand rupees is levied or rigorous imprisonment for some months is awarded to a shopkeeper who is found to have sold an article for even a few annas above the controlled rate. Six centuries back the traders were perhaps as persistent in their cunning, while the punishments more severe. It was ordered that the Nāzir Yāqūb should ill-treat and administer lashes to guilty traders. In cases of short-weight he used to cut off flesh from the haunches of traders, equal to the deficiency in weight. The harshness of Yāqūb was talked about everywhere among the young and the old. Every day the Nāzir used to inquire about the transactions of the *bazārs* several times, and on the discovery of the slightest discrepancy he whipped the traders mercilessly.³² Notwithstanding his harshness the merchants continued to cheat the customers, and it was found that short-weight trick was commonly practised when little boys came to purchase things in the market. To detect the mischief the sultan used to call young slave-boys from his pigeon houses, give them some *jitals*³³ and send them to the market place, asking one to bring bread, another to bring *halvā*, a third *yakhnī*, a fourth *reorī* a fifth melon, a sixth cucumber and so on, and when these boys returned after their purchases the sultan sent for the Dīvān-i-Riyāsat and had the articles brought by the boys weighed in his presence. If any thing was found to be deficient in weight it was given to the Dīvān-i-Riyāsat, who at once proceeded to the shop from where the articles had been brought. A quantity of flesh equal to the deficiency in weight was cut from the haunches of the fraudulent seller, and he was kicked out of his shop. Such drastic punishments seem to have been meted out only to habitual offenders. The horrible punishments introduced by 'Alāúddīn continued to be awarded for some time, says the historian, till at last the tradesmen became quite submissive and discontinued giving short weights. Not only that, they were so much terrified with these drastic measures that sometimes they gave much more than the actual weight.
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³² Barani p. 318.
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³³ *Ibid.* p. 318 wrongly has *diram* which coin probably then did not exist.
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Now, this was the other extreme. If profiteering and selling short weight and cheating the purchasers in various ways deserved discouragement, the extremely severe punishments which led the shopkeepers to weigh more than the actual quantity indicates a lack of far-sightedness on the part of the king. How long could trade flourish under conditions in which the shopkeepers worked without getting sufficient profits. The market regulations of 'Alāúddīn did not permit enough profit to the tradespeople and consequently lent no encouragement to trade and commerce. The king did not permit even the least flexibility in prices and if hope of gain is lacking there can be no incentive to trade. Moreover, the regulations which hardly benefitted the traders were forced down their throats. Even after giving due consideration to the exaggeration in which Barani is prone to indulge, the facts that such severe penalties were inflicted on brokers in horse, cattle and slave markets, that even life became so distasteful to them and they longed for death, and deficiency in weights was made up by slicing off an equivalent quantity of flesh from the person of shopkeepers, clearly show that the market people must have been disgusted. That there was no encouragement to trade is clearly borne out by the fact that the merchants carrying on trade in food stuffs as well as other commodities were *compelled* to take up their abodes in Delhi. They had to sign agreements making them individually and collectively responsible for one another's good conduct, and the authority of state officials extended even over their wives and children.³⁴ It can well be surmised how the merchants would have chafed under the rigorous regulations of the monarch and how they would have rejoiced to see such a state of affairs come to an end.
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³⁴ Barani pp. 306-7, 310-11.
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Not only trade and commerce but agriculture was also affected. It has been pointed out at length in the preceding chapter how the revenue regulations of the king as well as his economic measures were harmful to agriculturists. Here it may be pointed out once again that these regulations rendered the condition of peasantry almost hopeless. Mr. Moreland thinks that the revenue regulations of the sultan were meant to crush the rich middlemen and not the poor peasants or the "herds" as such. But one fails to understand how the poor peasantry could be happy under the market regulations. It is conceivable that the realization of 50 per cent. of the land produce in kind was not meant to oppress the peasants but to store grain in the capital city. Yet when a husbandman paid half of his hard earned produce in land tax, some portion of the remaining in other sundry duties, and then was compelled to sell his grain at cheap rates to travelling merchants, who on their part were helped by government officials in obtaining their stocks, it does not speak well of the general condition of the peasantry of those days. There is no doubt that the cultivators were relieved of the drudgery of taking their grain into grain markets of big cities lying in the vicinity of their fields, and were saved from falling a victim to the seductions of the profiteering middlemen and speculators, still they could never be happy in selling their grain at a cheap price fixed by the government without having the choice of selecting a market for themselves and trying for a profit. The temptation of making profit, which is the greatest incentive to production, was completely checked by ‘Alāūddīn’s market regulations and the peasants seem to have lived a life of monotony and low standard, if not of squalor. The motive of the sultan may not have been to crush the poor peasants against whom he could possibly have no grudge, but the exigencies of the state required him to take such steps under which the interests of commerce and cultivation were sacrificed to those of the army. A peasant is not always a hoarder; he will not hoard if he is given a fair price for his produce. Just for the sake of safety he stores up some grain as security against bad seasons, but even that was denied to him, and every *man* of available grain was transferred to the Grain Market of Delhi. The stores of the sultan continued to increase so that Ibn Battūṭah ate the rice which had been stored by sultan ‘Alāūddīn. The rice had become dark in colour but had preserved its taste. This fact alone shows that the government had hoarded a large quantity of grain, much above the needs of the state, so much so that it was available even three decades after the death of the king.
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It is obvious that neither agriculture nor trade and commerce could flourish under the regulations of ‘Alāūddīn. But the fostering of agriculture and trade were not his motives either. To him the prime necessity of the state was the maintenance of a huge army, sufficient to repel Mongol invasions as well as to subdue independent chiefs of India. There is no doubt that the benefits of market regulations were enjoyed by the civil as well as the military population of Delhi,—a fact about which Baranī does not forget to make a special mention,³⁸ still the agriculturists of the doāb and of tracts in the vicinity of Delhi, of Jhain and of Bayana, suffered privations for the benefit of the people at the capital. The tradesmen also did not gain much and worked under compulsion. But 'Alāuddīn was not learned enough to philosophise on the benefits of a far distant future and to foster trade, commerce and agriculture. He thought he was called upon to act and he acted vigorously. He invariably sacrificed civil interests to those of military. In the reign of no other king were the Mughal invasions so persistent as in the time of 'Alāuddīn. In the reign of no other king of the sultanate period were conquests made on such a large scale. Under these circumstances if all his reforms and regulations were directed towards the benefit of the army, it is not at all surprising. And how many renowned Turkish kings of India could afford to keep the happiness and prosperity of the peasants and traders above those of the army? Necessity, religious zeal and personal ambition, rendered the glory of conquest much more appealing to them than the glory of making such laws as would make the peasants rich and traders richer. 'Alāuddīn was no exception. It is, therefore, not surprising that he put military necessities above civil ones and raised such a strong and contented army, that, whether at home or in foreign kingdoms, it always defeated its adversaries.
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³⁸ Baranī p. 304.
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The most remarkable feature of the economic regulations is the success with which they were carried out. Appointment of *shahnahs* for the various markets, appointment of *barīds*, and the secret and efficient service of the *munhiyans*, all independent of one another and all responsible to the king, improved the tone of administration. No officer, however highly placed, could neglect his duties or play false, because the sultan was constantly informed about everything through his secret service agents. The Dīvān-i-Riyāsat, inflicted drastic punishments on the *bāzār* people and did not permit any breach of the orders of the government. Coercion, compulsion and terrorization were the methods adopted by the officers with regard to market administration. But the character and conduct of the market people, as described by Baranī, justified to a considerable extent the harsh means the sultan resorted to. If the chronicler is to be believed, 'Alāuddīn had undertaken the economic measures after consulting his trusty and experienced councillors and ministers. He had asked their opinion as to what he should do in order that the means of livelihood might be made exceedingly cheap "without introducing capital punishment, torture and severe coercion." But he had to banish brokers and torture tradespeople to see that his orders were carried out once they had been issued. Had the traders been more honest and the king less severe, perhaps the totures inflicted on the *bāzār* people would have been avoided.
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Except for the traders themselves, the people of Delhi at least benefitted by these regulations. Prices were rendered cheap and stable. In times of scarcity there was no danger of famine in the capital city. The terrible famines of the time of Sultan Jalāluddīn and Muhammad Tughlāq are not heard of in the reign of 'Alāuddīn, because the capital at least was never short of food; and if famine occurred in some isolated or distant part of the country it surely escaped the notice of the contemporary chronicler.
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'Alāuddīn's market regulations died with him. "The rules, the inquiries, the strictness with which the orders were carried out, and the punishments inflicted on the market people came to an end with the death of 'Alāūddīn, and his son Qutbuddīn could not enforce all the thousand regulations of the 'Alāī' reign."²⁶ This was but expected. After the death of 'Alāūddīn there was neither the will of the successor nor was there any necessity of enforcing them. Qutbuddīn was not so fond of conquests as of concubines, and the military traditions of 'Alāūddīn lost their lustre at the hands of his successor. Moreover, the Mughal storm had subsided, and there was no need of maintaining a large force to encounter their incursions. Consequently, there was no need of controlling prices for recruiting a large army on small salary. Market Control was a temporary measure, resorted to in a state of exigency. When that exigency was over the regulations were also permitted to fall in disuse.
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²⁶ Baranī p. 319.
Cites (1)
- Tārīkh-i Fīrūzshāhī — Shams-i Sirāj ʿAfīf, Persian