History of the Khaljis, A.D. 1290–1320 c4: Chapter IV. ‘Alāuddīn’s Expedition to Devagiri
History of the Khaljis, A.D. 1290–1320 c4
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Chapter IV. ‘Alāuddīn’s Expedition to Devagiri
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After making adequate preparations ‘Alāuddīn left Kara for Devagiri with 8,000¹ horse on Saturday the 19th of Rabiul-Akhir 695 (26th February 1296).² He kept his real intentions a secret and gave out that he was marching out to the conquest of Chanderi³—a Rajput fortress in Central India, about a hundred miles north of the Vindhya mountains. Malik ‘Alāulmulk, uncle of Ziyā Baranī, was the prince’s confidant in his project. He was appointed to look after the administration of Kara during the latter’s absence as well as to send fabricated news to the sultan about the movements of the prince. ‘Alāuddīn went as far as Chanderi openly, and therefrom his movements became obscure. From Chanderi he dashed on to Bhilsa. He had taken special care to see that no time was wasted on this march and had scoured all the roads in his last expedition to Bhilsa.⁴ He tackled the Vindhya mountains with great assiduity. Marching through irregular hills and crossing swift flowing rivers⁵ he arrived at Ellichpur.cont His plan from the very start was to return from the expedition as soon as possible. Indeed, in those circumstances the time-factor was of great importance. ‘Alāūddīn could not have stayed in the Deccan longer than warranted by his professed intention of the campaign to Chanderi lest he should have aroused opposition of powerful Hindu kings in the Deccan as well as of the barons at Delhi. He had undertaken the expedition without the king’s permission, and his failure to return to Kara in time would have given a handle to his enemies to misrepresent him. He, therefore, marched straight to Ellichpur without taking rest or disturbing rulers on the way.* At Ellichpur, however, he halted for two days to allow the troops to shake off the fatigue of the long and toilsome journey, and to reorganise his forces for now Devagiri was not far. To lull the suspicions of the neighbouring towns ‘Alāūddīn set a rumour afloat that he was a disaffected nobleman of the court of Jalāluddīn, and had come to seek service with the Raja of Rājmundri in Telingāna, a vassal of the Yadava king.
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¹ With his increased revenues he was enabled to recruit 3 to 4 thousand horse and 2 thousand foot. Baranī p. 222. Ferishtah p. 95.
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² *Khazāin*, p. 5.
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³ At present Chanderi is only a small village lying about 20 miles west of Lalitpur, Jhansi Division. In 1293-5 the town of Chanderi was situated very close to this spot. It is curious indeed that between 1304 and 1307, in ‘Alāuddīn's own times, Chanderi shifted to its present site. *Arch. Sur. Ind. Report* 1924-25, p. 168.
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⁴ Baranī p. 222.
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⁵ Muslim Chroniclers emphasise that ‘Alāuddīn selected a *short route* “through the jungle.” This does not seem to be correct. The points on his march indicate his taking to the then known route to the Decan, which, all the same, lay through numerous jungles.
* Ellichpur lies in Berar. At the time of ‘Alāūddīn’s invasion it was a northern outpost of the Yadava dominions. Throughout the Medieval times it was a flourishing centre of trade and commerce. Ellichpur became the chief military station of Berar under the Mughals. Also see *Chahār Gulshān*, Bankipur Ms. fol. 85.
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¹ † Ferishtah p. 95.
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² ‡Lajaura, Lasaura or Lasaur lies s. w. of Devagiri very close to the latter. Also see the map attached to J. N. Sarkar’s *A short history of Aurangzeb*.
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After a forced march ‘Alāūddīn crossed a pass known as Ghati Lajaura or Lasaura,† about twelve miles west of Devagiri. The valley was governed by Kānhan, a brave Hindu chief who owed allegiance to Ram Chandra. Kānhan summoned his friends and prepared to fight. In his fief there lived two ladies of high rank well versed in the art of warfare.
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When these chivalrous women heard of the invaders they joined Kānhan with a large retinue. In the battle that ensued these 'tigresses' charged the enemy with such fury that he was compelled to fall back some distance. In the second charge, however, the latter advanced with greater determination and the southerners were defeated. The vanquished army retreated precipitately; its rout was complete and its losses heavy.
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'Alāuddīn had, no doubt, won the battle, but he had at the same time seen the mettle of the southerners. Before marching forward to his main objective Devagiri he addressed his officers and men and brought home to them the idea of the rough work that lay ahead. "In a country," said he, "where women do not retreat before us... I do not know what men would do to us on the field of battle."¹⁰ He not only frightened his troops with likely dangers but also tempted them by visualising to them the wealth that they would obtain in plunder and spoliation. The soldiers one and all swore for the second time, to fight and win. This done, 'Alāuddīn proceeded onward.
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¹⁰ *Futūh*, p. 223.
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So far no Muslim army had ventured into the south. Great consternation overtook the king and the inhabitants of the country. To add to Ram Chandra's intrepidation his son
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[^ *]: *Futūh*, pp. 223-24. 'Isāmī wrote about eight years before Baranī finished his history, and at many places the former gives better infomation than the latter. In this expedition particularly 'Isāmī is more to be trusted because:—
(a) He wrote at Devagiri itself.
(b) He wrote after listening to many trustworthy accounts (See Authorities).
(c) His narrative written before Baranī's is quite corroborative of the latter. 'Isāmī seems to be a good connoisseur of facts.
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Singhana Deva¹¹ had marched southwords on an expedition with the choicest contingents of the Maratha forces. This was in accordance with the military traditions of the past.¹² Ferishtah's statement that Singhana was away on a pilgrimage is not plausible, as there was no reason for his taking the best troops of the kingdom with him. Mr. Aiyangar also thinks that when ‘Alāuddīn made his plans he had definite information that the main army of Ram Deva had marched towards the Hoysala frontier under his son.¹³ The old king saw no alternative now—when the enemy was already marching into the city—but to throw reinforcements into the citadel and stand a siege. The fortress of Devagiri is situated on an isolated cone-shapped hill 640 feet high. The steepness and height of the rock required a minimum of defences. But walls, bastions, and a moat cut 50 feet deep into solid rock, made up for the little deficiencies left by nature.¹⁴ But for some time past the Yadavas had felt too powerful to care for their own defence, so that at the time of ‘Alāuddīn's invasion the moat was lying dry and unprotected, and the garrison was short of provisions.¹⁵ Incidently, however, a few merchants from fear of the invading army had left some bags, and these had been seized and put into the fort.
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¹¹ *Deval Rani* pp. 85, 86, has Singhana Deva. Again both Amir Khusrau and ‘Iṣāmī give the name of the second son so Bhilam, (*Futūḥ*, pp. 226, 326). But Sir W. Haig (*Camb. Hist. of India*, vol. III) and some other writers give the names of the two sons as Shanker Deva and Bhīm Deva. Ferishtah's Sankhal or Sankhan and Bhīm are wrong. The correct names are Singhana and Bhillama, so common in the royal geneologies of the Yadavas. Also see Hodivala pp. 372-75.
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¹² *Arch. Sur. India Report*, 1930-34. Part I p. 236. *Futūḥ.* pp. 226-27.
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¹³ Aiyangar p. 77.
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¹⁴ The fortress still stands, peerless in beauty and strength, but the capital of the Yadavas is now only a village ten miles from Aurangabad. Also see Gribble: *History of the Decan*, vol. I, p. 2.
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¹⁵ Ferishtah p. 95. Haig: *Landmarks of the Decan.* p. 12.
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Ram Chandra had retreated into the fort but the lower city, especially the part which was later known as Katakah,¹⁶ was left at the mercy of the invader. It was thoroughly sacked and every single house in it was put to plunder.¹⁷ Influential Brahmans and chief merchants of the city were taken prisoner. 'Alāūddīn also captured thirty to forty elephants and a thousand horse from the stables of the Maratha king.¹⁸ In the meantime the crafty Turk circulated yet another rumour. He declared that his army was only a vanguard of the twenty thousand Imperial horsemen who were following behind. Ill-equipped with men, weapons and provision, Ram chandra could not have stood a siege for long in any case; now he gave up all hope of success. At last he sent messengers with terms for a treaty, accompanied with a few threats. He remained the reckless adventurer that Sing-hana might return any time and it was prudent on his part to leave the city before the latter came. He also pointed out to 'Alāuddīn that his retreat would lie through many Hindu kingdoms and could certainly be cut off. 'Alāuddīn also thought it prudent to accept whatever was offered and make haste for Kara. He patched up a truce, levied a war indemnity, and promised to leave the capital within a fortnight after releasing all the prisoners of war. But the terms of the treaty were yet to be fulfilled when events took a different turn.
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¹⁶ *Futūh.* pp. 226, also 357. Katakah was walled and fortified by Muhammad Tughlaq when he shifted his capital to Daulatabad. There he built three concentric lines of defence: Daulatbad, the seat of the sultan and his army; Katakah; and Devagiri fort itself. In Mughal times Daulatabad came to be known as Ambarkot, Katakah as Mahakot, and Devagiri as Balakot. Ibn Battūtah, vol. IV, p. 46. Stuart Piggot: *Some Ancient Cities of India*, Oxford, pp. 79-85.
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¹⁷ *Futūh.* pp. 227-28.
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¹⁸ Barani p. 223; Ferishtah p. 95.
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*The Battle of Devagiri*
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When Singhana heard of the catastrophe which had befallen the capital, he hurried back to relieve his father in distress. On his arrival within three kos from the capital, he received a message from Ram Chandra saying that a truce had been concluded with the invader, that the enemy was a very tough fighter and that any further attempt of fighting him would bear no better results. Daring and energetic as he was, the youthful prince turned a deaf ear to his father's warning, and marshalled his forces to fight 'Alāuddīn.¹⁹ He sent a threatening message to 'Alāuddīn saying that if he wanted to escape from the dangerous 'whirlpool' in which he had entangled himself, he must hand over all the wealth he had looted and immediately return to the north. 'Alāuddīn, who had only recently dictated terms of treaty to Ram Chandra flew into a rage at this imprudent and impertinent action of his haughty son, and ordered the messengers of Singhana to be paraded between the ranks of his army with their faces blackened.²⁰ He then started preparation for the next encounter.
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¹⁹ 'Isāmī's statement that Singhana submitted without giving a battle is wrong. *Futūh*, pp. 228-30.
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²⁰ Ferishtah p. 96. It was against usage to insult messengers. At a later time when the ambassadors of the Ilkhān sultan Aljaitū of Persia came to India, they also met with insulting treatment at the hands of 'Alāuddīn, Vaṣṣāf denounces the unconstitutional action of the king of Hindustan in strong terms. See Chapter XIII.
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'Alāuddīn left Nuṣrat Khān with a thousand horse to look after the investment of the fort thus making the junction of the father's and the son's forces impossible and himself arrayed the remnant of the army to give battle to Singhaṇa. The Maratha forces outnumbered those of the Muslims and in the battle that ensued they infused terror into the hearts of 'Alā'ī troops. Finding his master in extreme danger Nuṣrat Khān left the fortress, without any orders from 'Alāūddīn, and hurried to join the latter. This tactical action on the part of Nuṣrat turned the tide of the victory on the side of the Muslims as his contingent of one thousand was mistaken by the Marathas for the alleged twenty thousand horse about which 'Alāūddīn had spread a false report. A panic seized the troops of Singhaṇa Deva and they fled pell mell from the field of battle. 'Alāūddīn renewed the siege of the fortress with still greater vigour. He put to death many merchants and Brahmans he had taken prisoner and paraded some of the near relations and nobles of Rām Deva in front of the fortress. Rām Chandra for whom the calamity was as terrible as it was unprecedented consulted his courtiers about calling the neighbouring Hindu Rajas to his aid, but before they could arrive at any decision they discovered that the two or three thousand bags which they had brought into the fortress during the first siege did not contain grain but salt. This discovery broke the nerve of everybody inside the citadel.
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Rām Chandra sued for peace again, but this time 'Alā'uddīn was adamant. He had scented the reason why the Maratha king was so importunate to secure a treaty as quickly as possible and delayed negotiations until the envoys of Rām Chandra confessed that the defenders were almost on the verge of starvation. At last a truce, the terms of which were dictated by the victorious prince, was patched up. 'Alāūddīn was to receive a much larger war indemnity than was agreed to on the previous occasion. According to Ferishtah it consisted of "six hundred *man* of gold, seven *man* of pearls, two *man* of precious stones like rubies, sapphires, diamonds and emeralds, one thousand *man* of silver and four thousand pieces of silk and sundry articles the details of which are beyond comprehension."²¹ The contemporary historian Ziyā Barani does not give any such list. He only says that 'Alāuddīn brought so much wealth from the Deccan that despite the squandering of it by his successors much of it remained till the time of Firoz Tughlaq.²² Amīr Khusrau, another contemporary, describes at length in his exaggerated poetic way, the treasures brought by 'Alāuddīn, but he too does not give any figures.²³ Consequently it is doubtful if Ferishtah derived his exact knowledge of the war indemnity from some reliable source. It may only be a computation of his fertile mind. In short, the exact amount of the wealth cannot be ascertained from the meagre data available.
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²¹ Ferishtah p. 96.
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²² Barani p. 223.
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²³ *Miftāḥul Futūḥ*, Elliot, Vol. III, p. 544.
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Besides the huge war indemnity, Ram Chandra promised to send yearly revenues of Ellichpur province to 'Alāuddīn at Kara. He also gave his daughter in marriage to 'Alāuddīn. Although contemporary historians do not mention this fact, yet 'Isāmī, Vaṣṣāf, Muḥammad Bihāmad Khān and Hajīuddabīr allude to it.²⁴ 'Isāmī even gives the name of the princess as Jahatiapali or Jhatiapali, a word which, however, has no meaning.²⁵ At another place he says that she was the mother of Shihābuddīn 'Umar Khaljī,²⁶ whom Khusrau placed on the throne after 'Alāūddīn's death.
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²⁴ Vaṣṣāf p. 312; *Tārīkh-i-Muḥammadī*, Allahabad University Ms. fol. 122. *Zafarul Vāli* p. 837.
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²⁵ *Futūḥ*, pp. 230-31.
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²⁶ *Futūh.* pp. 335, 344.
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'Alāūddīn on his part released all the prisoners of war and struck tents. He left Devagiri twenty five days after he had entered it full of hopes and fears. On his way back to Kara he stormed the fort of Asirgarh which was then held by Chouhan Rajputs.²⁷ But his main objective had been Devagiri and that kingdom he had been able to reduce to the position of a vassal state, and obtain such an immense treasure as to astound his contemporaries. Brigg's remark on his brilliant achievement is worth quoting. "In the long volumes of history," says he, 'there is scarcely anything to be compared with this exploit, whether we regard the resolution in forming the plan, the boldness of its execution, or the great good fortune that attended its accomplishment.'²⁸
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²⁷ *Arch. Sur. Ind. Report,* 1922-23, p. 46. The fort which is believed to have been mentioned in the Mahabharata consists of three separate line of fortifications known as Asirgarh proper, Kamargarh and Malaigarh.
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²⁸ Briggs' Ferishtah, Vol. I, p. 311.
Cites (2)
- Tārīkh-i Firishta — Muḥammad Qāsim Hindū Shāh Firishta 1606, Persian
- Khazāʾin al-futūḥ — Amīr Khusraw Dihlavī