Twilight of the Sultanate c15.s4: Bābur's Invasion of Hindustan
Twilight of the Sultanate c15.s4
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Bābur's Invasion of Hindustan
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Zahīruddīn Muhammad Bābur¹¹⁸ had descended from two mighty empire-builders—Tīmūr on the paternal side and Chingīz Khan on the maternal—fourth in descent from the former and fourteenth generations from the latter. He was born on 14 February, 1483 (6 Muharram, 888 H) at Andijān, capital of Farghānā, his father's fertile kingdom, now a small state in Russian Turkistan. Bābur's grandfather Abū S'ayīd Mirzā, after constant conflicts, had come to possess the Mawārunnehr or Transoxiana, which on his death in A. D. 1469 was divided amongst his sons, one of whom was Bābur's father 'Umar Shaikh Mirzā. 'Umar Shaikh obtained the kingdom of Farghānā. Caution and patience were equally denied to him, and he constantly intrigued and fought against his brothers. His unwisdom invited against him a joint attack by his brother and brother-in-law, Sultan Ahmad Mirzā and Sultan Mahmūd Khan. While their armies lay on the outskirts of Farghānā, 'Umar Shaikh died on 8 June, 1494, when a pigeon cot collapsed with him inside it. Curiously enough his death saved his kingdom. The two uncles of Bābur had hated his father. They bore no grudge against their eleven-year-old nephew, who now became the ruler of Farghānā.
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¹¹⁸ Meaning in Turki the "Tiger". In Arabic Bābur means a "*lion*" and the two should not be confused. V.A. Smith, *Akbar the Great Mogul*, 9, n. 2; Rushbrook Williams, *An Empire Builder of the Sixteenth Century*, 19 n. 1; Steingass, *Persian-English Dictionary*.
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Environment, lineage and tradition had made Bābur a seasoned warrior even at that tender age, and although we know little of his early training in the arts of reading and writing, yet his Memoirs¹¹⁹ leave no doubt that in that field too his education had been excellent.
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¹¹⁹ For the history of Bābur there is no work more authentic than his own Memoirs. They are so interesting and yet so true that they "must be reckoned among the most enthralling and romantic works in the literature of all time". Denison Ross in C.H.I., IV, 20. Also Edwards, *Babur, Diarist and Despot*, 15.
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His early years as ruler were spent in fighting his cousins and other relations. Like his father 'Umar Shaikh, Bābur was ever dreaming of possessing Samarqand, "indissolubly associated with the glory and greatness of Amīr Tīmūr".¹²⁰ In 1497 he defeated his cousin Baisunqar and occupied Samarqand, but the latter invited to his rescue Shaibānī Khan, chief of the Uzbegs. Shaibānī rendered little help to Baisunqar, but himself snatched Samarqand from Bābur, who had to retreat to Tashkent, a virtual fugitive (1501). Bābur was not strong enough to face Shaibānī, and yet he could not sit idle. So he moved south-eastwards and occupied Kabul (1501-2). "We are justified in assuming," writes Sir Denison Ross, "that it was while Bābur was bringing order into his new kingdom... that he was first inspired with his Indian dream".¹²¹ In January, 1505, he marched through the Khyber Pass and arrived at Derā Ghāzī Khan, taking Kohāt and Tabrīlā on the way. He was back in Kabul in May 1505 after this successful campaign in the east.¹²² It is significant that an expedition to India was seriously thought of as early as 1505. For full twenty years thereafter the pendulum of Bābur's desires swung between the east and the west. During this period his chief interest lay in Central Asian politics, but urged by the force of circumstances he had occasions of marching across the Indian frontier.¹²³
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¹²⁰ R. Williams, *op. cit.*, 37.
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¹²¹ C.H.I., IV, 5.
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¹²² On page 5 of the C.H.I., IV, the date of Bābur's return to Kabul is given as May, 1506, while on page 10 it is given as May, 1505. The latter one is correct. Also R. Williams, 82.
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¹²³ B.N. (B), I, 341-43.
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Of the five expeditions to Hindustan referred to by Bābur in his Memoirs,¹²⁴ the first two took place in A. D. 1519. Early in that year he crossed the Indus and Jhelum, and seized Bhīra and Khushāb from 'Alī Khan, son of Daulat Khan Lodī. From Bhīra, Bābur despatched one Mullā Murshid to Delhi asking Ibrāhīm Lodī to surrender to him the West Punjab which he claimed as his ancestral dominion conquered by Tīmūr. In return for this Ibrāhīm was to be left undisturbed in his Empire.¹²⁵ But the envoy was not permitted to proceed beyond Lahore by Daulat Khan Lodī, who stood to lose the Punjab if the proposal was accepted or to bear the brunt of Bābur's attack if it was refused. Indeed Daulat Khan could hardly bear to see his Punjab being bargained between Bābur and Ibrāhīm.¹²⁶ Thus while Bābur's message never reached Delhi, he was forced to return to Kabul where pressing problems required his immediate attention. However, in September the same year he again marched against the Yūsufzaīs through the Khyber Pass. "Apparently this was his second expedition."¹²⁷
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¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 478-79; (L and E), 309.
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¹²⁵ Ferishta, I, 201
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¹²⁶ T.S.A., 89; B.N. (B), II, 451-61.
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¹²⁷ R. Williams, 115-16.
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Bābur's Memoirs here break off for the next five years, but it was in 1520 that he undertook his third expedition to India.¹²⁸ From Kabul he marched straight to Bhīra and thence to Sialkot. Sialkot submitted readily and the town was spared, but Saiyīdpur (Amīnābād) was stormed and its inhabitants massacred. Bābur spent the next two years in the west, fighting Shāh Arghūn, and at last acquired Qandhar towards the end of 1522.¹²⁹ The situation had now completely changed. Shaibānī Khan Uzbeg, the bitterest enemy of Bābur, was now no more.¹³⁰ The Arghūn Sultan was dead and Persia had become a friendly ally. Bābur could now concentrate his attention on Hindustan.
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¹²⁸ B.N. (L and E), 286. Ferishta, I, 201-2 also calls this Bābur's third expedition and places it in 1520 (926 H).
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¹²⁹ Ferishta, I, 201; Erskine, *op. cit.*, I, 335-36.
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¹³⁰ B.N. (B), I, 350 & n.
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It was about this time that "the whole of the eastern provinces from Badaon to Bihar, were in the hands of the rebels... and Rana Sangrām Singh had become unduly strong in the region south-west of Agra".¹³¹ Daulat Khan, 'Ālam Khan and Rana Sāngā knew what Bābur's intentions were, and yet to destroy Ibrāhīm, they encouraged him in his designs on India. Daulat Khan's son Dilāwar met Bābur at Kabul¹³² and suggested that (while Daulat was to be left undisturbed in the Punjab) Ibrāhīm should be deposed and his uncle 'Ālam Khan be set up as the Sultan of Delhi in his stead. 'Ālam Khan, an uncle of Ibrāhīm Lodī, had earlier rebelled against Sikandar Shāh and had fled to Gujarāt.¹³³ In 1524 he was invited by the disgruntled Delhi Amīrs and induced to assume the title of Sultan 'Alāuddīn. 'Ālam Khan's proposal to Bābur (whom he also had gone to meet at Kabul)¹³⁴ was that Bābur should help him secure the throne by defeating Ibrāhīm, and in return for his aid should retain the Punjab.¹³⁵ Probably about this very time Bābur also received an envoy from Rana Sāngā inviting the former to remove Ibrāhīm Lodī from the throne.¹³⁶ Whatever the sequence of these overtures, Bābur knew that India would readily fall since everybody wanted Ibrāhīm to go. And he decided upon his fourth expedition to Hindustan, apparently to support 'Ālam Khan against Ibrāhīm Lodī.
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¹³¹ B.N. (L and E), 287.
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¹³² 'Abdulla says that Dilāwar Khan, after his flight from Agra, went straight to Bābur without even meeting his father. According to Ahmad Yādgār, Daulat Khan sent him to Bābur, while according to Nizāmuddīn and Nihāwandī, Daulat Khan himself went to Bābur at Kabul. T.D., 129; T.S.A., 88; T.A., I, 351; M.R., I, 487.
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¹³³ For 'Ālam Khan's hectic career see *Mirāt-i-Sikandarī*, Eng. Trs., 277; Z.W., I, 120. Nizāmuddīn wrongly calls him the son of Sikandar Lodī. T.A., De, III, 320.
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¹³⁴ Dorn, I, 77; Badaonī, I, 331; M.R., I, 496.
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¹³⁵ Ferishta, I, 203.
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¹³⁶ B.N. (B), II, 529.
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Knowledge of these transactions prompted Ibrāhīm Lodī to make preparations to face the situation. He suspended his operations against the rebels in the east, and sent an army under Bīhar Khan, Mubārak Khan Lodī and Bhīkhan Khan Nūhānī to the Punjab.¹³⁷ Its task was to bring the rebel Daulat Khan to book, as well as to repel any foreign invader. The imperial commanders drove out Daulat Khan from Lahore and occupied it. Meanwhile Bābur, having marched through Khyber and reducing the whole country up to Lahore, stood before it (1524). Ibrāhīm's army, which had recently occupied the city, gave him battle, but it was defeated. Bābur sacked Lahore and then burnt it.¹³⁸ Four days later he marched to Deopalpur, attacked it and put the garrison to the sword.
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¹³⁷ B.N. (L and E), 287; Ferishta, I, 202.
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¹³⁸ On 22 January, 1524 (30 Rabiul Avval, 930 H); B.N. (B), I, 441.
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At Deopalpur, Daulat Khan, who after his defeat by the Delhi army had fled to Multan, came to wait upon Bābur but not in any happy mood. He had sought Ibrāhīm's ruin, but it was his own Punjab that Bābur had now occupied. His disappointment was complete when Bābur assigned to him Jalandhar and Sultanpur, but kept to himself the possession of Lahore. Daulat Khan could never reconcile himself to this arrangement, and began to plan for an attack on Bābur. But, strangely enough, Daulat's own son Dilāwar informed Bābur about Daulat's plans and Bābur punished Daulat Khan severely. However, for the time being he could not further his plans of conquest because of pressing problems at home, and placing Lahore, Sialkot and Kalanaur under his own officers and Deopalpur under 'Ālam Khan, he returned to Kabul.
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Bābur is in a position of vantage in condemning Daulat Khan Lodī's acts of "treachery", for he has convincingly put forward his point of view in his Memoirs. Daulat Khan has left no record of what he must have felt at the loss of Lahore. If he had, he must have declared Bābur's occupation of Lahore as an extremely treacherous act. In view of this, Bābur's repeated assertion of the treacherous conduct of Daulat Khan and other Afghan noblemen (and later on of Rana Sāngā) should be taken only with a pinch of salt.
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No sooner had Bābur left for Kabul, than Daulat Khan emerged from his hilly retreat. He could not depend upon Bābur any more, but had gone too far in his antagonism for Ibrāhīm to join hands with him in spite of a letter from the latter. In that Ibrāhīm had reminded him of the kindness of the Lodī Sultans to the house of Daulat Khan and had reproached him for inviting a foreigner to settle the affairs of the Afghans. But Daulat Khan only clamped the blame for the unhappy situation on Ibrāhīm himself saying: "It is not me, but improper acts of yours that have brought the Mughals into this country".¹³⁹ Disgraced by Bābur, but disowning Ibrāhīm, Daulat Khan began a struggle in isolation to re-establish his position. He defeated his son Dilāwar and seized Sultānpur. He also drove out 'Ālam Khan from Deopalpur, and attacked Sialkot which, however, he failed to take.
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¹³⁹ T.S.A., 92-93.
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'Ālam Khan, after his defeat at the hands of Daulat Khan, went to Bābur at Kabul and returned with instructions for Bābur's officers stationed in the Punjab to help him in securing the throne of Delhi.¹⁴⁰ This development alarmed Daulat Khan, who seduced 'Ālam Khan to his side by promising to make him the Sultan of Delhi without his resorting to any foreign aid. 'Ālam Khan (entitled Sultan 'Alāuddīn) and Daulat Khan now marched with 40,000 horse to attack Delhi.¹⁴¹ They delivered a night attack on the Delhi army led by Ibrāhīm Lodī in person, and routed it. But next morning Ibrāhīm, by sheer courage and efficient handling of the situation, humbled the superior force of the enemy by a surprise attack when the latter was busy in loot and plunder.¹⁴²
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¹⁴⁰ Ferishta, I, 202-3.
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¹⁴¹ T.D., 130-31; T.S.A., 93; T.A., II, 3-4.
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¹⁴² T.A., II, 6; *Makhzan*, 82 (b).
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Such was the situation when Bābur set out, on Friday, 17 November, 1525 (1 Safar, 932 H) "to invade Hindustan".¹⁴³ He seems to have been impatient to do so, for he severely rebuked Humayūn, his eldest son, for his dilatory march.¹⁴⁴ He crossed the Indus on 16 December (1 Rabiul Avval) with a force of twelve thousand men.¹⁴⁵ He crossed the Jhelum and the Beas without meeting any opposition. At Mālkot he was joined by Dilāwar Khan, whose conduct in always joining a foreigner against his own father, to say the least, is inexplicable.¹⁴⁶ Bābur's rapid march and Dilāwar's defection completely paralysed Daulat's plans. Even Ghāzī Khan fled to Delhi to join Ibrāhīm Lodī. Daulat Khan could do nothing except offer an abject submission to Bābur.¹⁴⁷
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¹⁴³ B.N. (B), II, 445; *Ferishta*, I, 203.
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¹⁴⁴ B.N. (B), II, 447.
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¹⁴⁵ T.S.A., 92 has ten thousand horse.
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¹⁴⁶ Bābur later on conferred on him the title of Khan-i-Khānān. He continued to serve under Humayūn and died as a prisoner of Sher Shāh. B.N. (B), II, 457; *Tuzuk-i-Jahāngīrī*, text, 42.
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¹⁴⁷ B.N. (B), II, 458-59; *Ferishta*, I, 203-4.
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With Daulat Khan's submission and 'Ālam Khan's defeat by Ibrāhīm, Bābur had hardly any problems left in the Punjab. He had become its virtual master. As he advanced towards Delhi,¹⁴⁸ many nobles of the Delhi court including Mulla Muhammad Mazhab and Āraīsh Khan sent him letters promising their assistance. 'Ālam Khan, crest-fallen and destitute, also joined his camp. "Perhaps at this time also came proposals from Sangrām Singh the Rajput, that there should be a joint attack upon Ibrāhīm."¹⁴⁹
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¹⁴⁸ On the march Daulat Khan Lodī died at Sultanpur in January, 1526, B.N. (L and E), 299.
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¹⁴⁹ R. Williams, *op. cit.*, 127.
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However, this was only one side of the picture. On the other side all the rulers of Hindustan, especially those of western India, were interested in the outcome of the impending battle between Bābur and Ibrāhīm. Rana Sāngā was sanguine about establishing Rajput supremacy after the battle whether the one lost or the other.
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Prince Bahādur Shāh of Gujarat with 3,000 horse was present as an onlooker, interested in the outcome¹⁵⁰ when the great battle took place, near Panipat. Mahmūd Khaljī of Malwa did not actually mobilise his forces for fear of Mewar and Gujarat, but the fact of the matter was that the kings of Mewar, Gujarat and Malwa had their own plans after the battle of Panipat was over. Besides, it was rightly reported to Bābur that Ibrāhīm Lodī had started with an army of a hundred thousand men to oppose his advance. Indeed, before Bābur arrived at Panipat his forces had had to encounter two advance contingents of the Delhi army, one under Dāūd Khan on 26 February and the other under Hātim Khan on 2 April, 1526, both of which, however, he routed.¹⁵¹
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¹⁵⁰ Abū Turāb, *History of Gujarat*, 3-4. C.H.I., III, 321-22.
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¹⁵¹ B.N. (B) II, 467-68.
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*Battle of Panipat*
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On April 12, 1526, Bābur arrived at Panipat, a small village north-west of Delhi where the fate of India has been thrice decided.¹⁵² His army did not by now perhaps exceed more than 8,000 effectives, the rest having been allocated garrison duties in the Punjab.¹⁵³ This army he so stationed on the open field that his right side was protected by the village of Panipat, and the left was shielded by digging a ditch and constructing a palisade of felled trees and thorny bushes. While this was a good protective device, it was also a veritable trap if Ibrāhīm tried to force his way through it. Thus the only vulnerable point left was the front and in that small space he concentrated his Centre supported by artillery,—guns and matchlocks. Bābur's wide experience of warfare had determined his strategy and he had decided to drive the enemy's forces into a huddled mass upon which Ustād 'Alī and Mustafā, his artillery commanders, could direct their cannonade. To produce such a situation, he collected all his baggage carts and some others from the countryside and these he fastened together by ropes of raw hide, arranging them in an extended line. This line was not continuous and at intervals large gaps were left for the deployment of his cavalry—for 150 to 200 horse to rush forth and manoeuvre—at an opportune moment. The musketeers and artillerymen were provided special shelter by small breastworks constructed in considerable numbers.¹⁵⁴
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¹⁵² In 1526, 1556 and 1761.
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¹⁵³ R. Williams, *op. cit.*, 127-28, 132, thinks that they were even less than 8,000. T.A., II, 14 has "approximately 15,000 horse and foot".
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¹⁵⁴ B.N. (B), II, 468-71.
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Ibrāhīm Lodī too marched out of Delhi and encamped two *kuroh* from Panipat. According to Ahmad Yādgār he held a grand Darbār on the eve of the battle, distributed all his jewellery and much of his treasure among his nobles, and exhorted them to give a good fight to the enemy promising them handsome rewards if success attended his side.¹⁵⁵ Then with a hundred thousand soldiers and one thousand elephants he arrived on the field of Panipat,¹⁵⁶ although his effectives were probably not more than fifty thousand.¹⁵⁷
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¹⁵⁵ T.S.A., 94-95.
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¹⁵⁶ B.N. (B), II, 470; T.D., 134; Ferishta, I, 205; T.A., II, 14.
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¹⁵⁷ T.S.A., 95 has 50,000 horse and 2,000 elephants.
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The two armies lay facing each other for eight days, April 12 to 19, but neither side took the offensive. Feeling convinced that delay would imperil his whole plan, Bābur despatched an advance force on the 19th under Mahdī Khwājā to attack the enemy.¹⁵⁸ The surprise failed, but it helped provoke the adversary into launching an attack. On the morning of 21 April, 1526 (8 Rajjab, 932 H)¹⁵⁹ Ibrāhīm's army advanced to attack. On the opposite side the Turki-Mughal army was drawn up in the traditional formation of Right, Centre, Left and Van, but there were large flanking parties (tūlughmā) for each of the formations. The main Right wing was under the command of prince Humayūn, and the main Left was under Mahdī Khawājā. The Van was led by Khusru Kukoltash and Muhammad 'Alī Jang-Jang. Ustad 'Alī with the heavy pieces was posted on the right of the Centre, and Mustafā with lighter pieces on the left of it. Bābur, of course, was in the Centre.
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¹⁵⁸ B.N. (B), II, 471.
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¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 472; T.D., 134; T.S.A., 95; T.A., II, 15.
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For the first time Ibrāhīm Lodī was face to face with cavalry force supported by artillery. The Lodī monarch must have possessed some knowledge of Bābur's plan of forcing him to attack the Centre where enemy guns would have mowed him down. So he avoided the Centre, pushed his Left Wing forward and "like the Hindus struck like lightning"¹⁶⁰ on Bābur's Right. But as the Afghans pressed on, they found themselves attacking upon a front far shorter than had been anticipated and could not decide whether to attack or to retire, "to halt or not, advance or not". Meanwhile Bābur's flanking parties (*tulughmā*) wheeled round and encircled the Afghans.
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¹⁶⁰ Ferishta, I, 205.
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The battle was now in full swing. The fire of Bābur's musketeers and artillery-men created more consternation than actual destruction,¹⁶¹ but the new weapons did not fail to inspire terror in the hearts of the Indian soldiers. Intermittent fire accompanied by the boom of guns and the rattle of matchlocks from the front, and the attack by arrow and sword on the flanks and from the rear on the jammed mass of the Afghan army, which it had become soon after the battle had begun, decided the day. By noon those of the Afghan army who could extricate themselves were fleeing for life, while the field was strewn with thousands of dead. When the day seemed to be irrevocably lost, Mahmūd Khan suggested to Ibrāhīm to leave the field, but the spirited Afghan would not listen to such advice.¹⁶² He fought to the bitter end and died like a soldier.¹⁶³ Around his body lay five to six thousand of his bravest warriors. The little army of Bābur had slain nearly three times its own number—"a terrible testimony alike to the skill of the leader and to the deadliness of his scientific combination of cavalry and artillery".¹⁶⁴
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¹⁶¹ R. Williams, 136 is not correct in saying: "Ustad 'Alī and Mustafa rained death upon the crowded ranks". After all Bābur's artillery was almost "primitive" judged by our standards. In the attack on Bajour in January, 1519, Bābur's matchlockmen had brought down seven to ten men only "before evening", but the people of the fort were so alarmed that "for fear of the matchlocks, not one of them would venture to show his head. B.N. (L & E), 247. Similarly in the attack on Chanderi in February, 1528 "Ustad 'Alī played his gun *remarkably well*. The first day he discharged it eight times; the second day sixteen times... Another gun, larger than this had been planted, but it burst at the first fire. The matchlockmen continued... shooting and they struck down a number of horses and men. Among others they killed (just) two of the royal slaves, and a number of their horses." B.N. (L & E , 379-80.
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¹⁶² T.S.A., 96-7. Also B.N. (B), II, 474-75.
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¹⁶³ T.S.A., 98; Ferishta, I, 205; T.A., II, 16; M.R., I, 498.
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¹⁶⁴ R. William, 137.
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In the long roll of the Sultans of Delhi, Ibrāhīm Lodī was the only one who died fighting on the field of battle.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, about his bravery there can be no two opinions. In private life too his character was blemishless. He was kindly disposed towards his subjects. Their welfare was ever in his mind. He took a keen interest in the promotion of agriculture. During his reign, crops were abundant, food grains were cheap¹⁶⁶ and the people in general lived happily in the midst of plenty. But his attitude towards his nobles was impolitic and rash. His attempt at absolutism and suppression of independent-minded barons, though perhaps justified, was premature. At least it proved to be unfortunate; the flower of his soldiery perished in the war against Islām Khan. At a time when external danger threatened him from the northwest, he had no supporters left either in the east or the west. However, it must be conceded that even if Ibrāhīm had not quarrelled with his nobles, Bābur would have won the battle of Panipat because, above everything else, Ibrāhīm's fall was due to the new weapons, new strategy and superior generalship of Bābur.
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¹⁶⁵ *Makhzan*, 83 (b). Naturally many legends grew about his heroic death. An eye witness wrote a couplet in Hindi describing the event:
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¹⁶⁶ Vide Chapter 12.
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The battle of Panipat proved to be as decisive as it was sanguine.
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नौसी ऊपर होता बातिया — पानीपत में भारत दिया ।
सातु रजब आवत दावा — बाबर जीता इब्राहिम हारा ।
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(In 932 India was made over at Panipat. On 7 Rajjab Bābur won, Ibrāhīm lost.) The same has been reproduced by Ahmad Yādgār and 'Abdulla in Urdu. Yādgār only changes the date from 7 Rajjab to 4 Rajjab. T.D. has 7 intact. 'Abdulla states on the authority of an eye-witness, 120 years old, that Ibrāhīm did not die on the field of battle. He wheeled round from there with a few followers for the Miyān-i-Doab. While he was crossing the river (Jumna) the witness "saw him" attired in royal robes and seated on a black Iraqi charger, but he did not come out of the water and was drowned at the ford of Birauna. But as Sir Henry Elliot rightly comments: "The old narrator may have witnessed the scene, but who will be the witness for the old narrator". E and D, V, 30 n.
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The Afghan hegemony was broken and the Sultanate of Delhi passed into the hands of the Chaghtaī Turks better known as the Mughals. Without wasting any time Bābur despatched a force under Mahdī Khwājā to occupy Delhi and another under Humayūn to seize Agra. Six days after the battle Bābur's Khutba was read in the congregational mosque at Delhi.¹⁶⁷ When after Panipat he had first arrived in Agra, "there was a strong mutual dislike between my people and the men of the place", writes he. "The peasantry and soldiers of the country avoided and fled from my men."¹⁶⁸ That was but natural. Nay, the contemporaries of Daulat Khan Lodī would have even cursed him for the welcome he had extended to a foreigner to invade India. But we at a distance of more than four hundred years share in the welcome. The twilight of the Sultanate had ended with Ibrāhīm; the night of people's suspicion and fear was not long, and the Mughal rule ushered a new dawn in India which brightened as time advanced.
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¹⁶⁷ B.N. (B), II, 476. The power of Rana Sangrām Singh was destroyed at the battle of Kanuah, March, 1527, and of the remnant Afghans at that of Ghagra, May, 1529.
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¹⁶⁸ B.N. (L & E), 335; (B), II, 523.
Cites (1)
- Tārīkh-i Firishta — Muḥammad Qāsim Hindū Shāh Firishta 1606, Persian