The History of Bengal (Vol. I: Hindu Period; Vol. II: Muslim Period 1200–1757) v2.c41.s8: IV. The Assam War, 1615,—Disaster
The History of Bengal (Vol. I: Hindu Period; Vol. II: Muslim Period 1200–1757) v2.c41.s8
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IV. The Assam War, 1615,—Disaster
v2.c41.s8.1
The conquest of Kāmrūp had at last brought the Mughal Government into direct contact with the Ahom kingdom. The main factor which led to the first war between them was the political ambition of Qāsim Khan to carry his brother's forward policy in the north-eastern frontier a step further by the conquest of Assam. Though the political issue was predominant, it was complicated by boundary quarrels and trade disputes as suggested by the Ahom and Assamese chronicles. The Mughal boundary in Kāmrūp did not extend east of the Bar Nadi; but the Mughals appear to have often penetrated much further, even as far east as Tejpur, inspite of the protests of the Ahom frontier officers. Further the rich natural resources of Assam, ivory, musk, aloe wood, silk, etc., encouraged much illegal trade, particularly smuggling, which embittered the feelings of both parties and precipitated the war.
v2.c41.s8.2
Sayyid Ābā Baqr, the most faithful of Qāsim Khan's officers, was selected commander, and a force of about 10 to 12 thousand cavalry and infantry, 2000 musketeers, and a fleet of 400 boats in which the war-boats of the vassal Bengal zamindārs predominated, was assembled. Ābā Baqr marched towards Barnagar, the old capital of Kāmrup, and next moved to Hājo, the new headquarters, and established thānahs in the surrounding region. He decided to spend the rains, June—September 1615, at Hājo and reported his activities to Qāsim Khan.
v2.c41.s8.3
The Bengal governor now displayed his habitual impatience and shortsightedness, and pressed Ābā Baqr to proceed forward even during the rains. The latter was compelled to march to Kohhātā (a frontier town on the Bar Nadi, midway between Srighāt and Pāndu, probably the same place as modern Kulhāti near the Chenchā hills between Hājo and Kājali), whence he could not move further owing to heavy rains. The place was extremely unhealthy, and sickness carried away a large number of his men during this enforced halt. About the middle of November, 1615, Sayyid Ābā Baqr, with his ranks much depleted, began the war by a sudden attack on Kājali, the Ahom frontier post on the south-west, which he easily took, capturing a large number of war-boats. The Mughals followed up their success by a series of plundering raids into the interior.
v2.c41.s8.4
These aggressions enraged the Ahom king, and he made earnest efforts to check the further progress of the invaders. He strengthened the defences of his next important stronghold of Samdhārā, at the confluence of the Bharali and the Brahmaputra. He sent his chief officers, the Hāti Baruā, Rājkhawā, and Khārghukā (Khārghariā) Phukan with a large force to hold Samdhārā; Ābā Baqr encamped opposite Samdhārā. He chose a sandy piece of ground for his entrenchments, and did not take the trouble of clearing the jungles around them. He underestimated the strength of the enemy and passed his time in negligence and indolence. His arrogance and haughtiness completely alienated his subordinates. The Ahoms readily took advantage of the blunders of the Mughal commander and prepared for a night attack. At the end of a wintry night (c. middle of January, 1616), three bridges of boats were speedily thrown across the river Bharali, over which the Ahom army 300,000 strong, with 700 war elephants, fell upon the unsuspecting Mughals and easily overpowered them. The Mughal fortified camp was stormed, its arsenal destroyed, its elephants seized, and a large number of officers, including Sayyid Hakim, Sayyid Kāsu, Jamāl Khan Mankali, and Lachmi Rajput, and Sayyid Ābā Baqr, the commander, were killed.
v2.c41.s8.5
The imperial fleet, particularly, the war-boats of the zamindārs fared no better. At first they made a bold stand and fought the Ahom fleet, but the news of the fall of Sayyid Ābā Baqr, and the capture of the fort so much unnerved them that they gave up further resistance and fell an easy prey to the enemy. Almost the whole of the fleet was captured. Of the naval officers, Mīrān Sayyid Masa‘ud, the imperial officer in charge of the zamindārs’ war-boats, Sonā Ghāzi, and Raja Satrajit, alone narrowly escaped in their own boats, while Ilahdād Khan Dakhini, Rāja Rāy, and Narsing Rāy and others were all wounded and captured.
v2.c41.s8.6
Thus the first aggressive war of Qāsim Khan on Assam ended in disaster. The losses in men and material were heavy, but heavier still was the moral loss—loss in military prestige and political power.¹
v2.c41.s8.7
¹ *Baharistan*, 163b, 171a, 174b-175a, 179a, 189a-191a: *Padishah Namah*, Vol. II, 67: *Ahom Buranji from Khunlung and Khunlai*, 521-27 *Purani Asama Buranji*, 80-88: Dr. Wade’s *History of Assam*, 254-259. The *Baharistan* is, to a great extent, corroborated by the Ahom and Assamese chronicles, especially by the *Purani Asama Buranji*.