History of the Qaraunah Turks in India c11.296

Language: English

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The Deccan proved the Sphinx of the situation. What the Marathas did for Aurangzeb, the Mughal emperor, the Deccan amirs did on a small scale and with far less resources for Muhammad Tughluq. High-spirited and audacious, the Deccan 'Centurions' proved as subtle and elusive as the Marathas of the seventeenth century and their irrepressible sedition wrecked all the plans and schemes of the Sultan. Though no bigoted Islamite like the Puritan 'Alamgir he adopted a policy which created for him enemies in all parts of the empire which was too large and too hastily formed to be held together from Dihli in the 14th century. The dependency of Madura in the far South had separated itself from the empire, and the declaration of independence by Ahsan Shah in 1335 A.D. had greatly diminished the prestige of the imperial government and deprived it of a valuable means of support against the Hindu Rajas of the Deccan. The grand league organised by Kriṣṇa Nāyak in 1342 A.D. marked a turning point in the fortunes of Muhammad Tughluq. Up to this time he had been engaged in suppressing rebellions in the north and had always succeeded, but after 1343 A.D. an ominous situation confronted him. Famine, pestilence, rebellious governors, religious hatred, and national or to be more accurate communal pride—all combined to bring about his overthrow. The successful Hindu revolt in the South necessitated a complete revision of policy, but the Sultan constantly spurned the behests of irksome prudence.

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The 'Centurions' turned against him; the insults of 'Aziz Khummār and the Sultan's own breach of faith severely tried their loyalty and goaded them into rebellion. He utterly failed to comprehend the mentality of these spirited people and had recourse to measures he had been used to adopt in dealing with the milder-mannered races of Hindustan. His lack of diplomacy, his contempt for his enemies, characteristic of all despots blinded by an exaggerated estimate of their own strength, and his feverish anxiety to execute his plans in a ruthless manner account for his failure in dealing with them. When the revolt broke out at Devagiri, he ought to have concentrated all his forces there, for the place was one of great strategic importance. But the Sultan, whose judgment was impaired by an unbroken succession of misfortunes and failures, adopted a wrong plan. The lack of competent generals and advisers further aggravated his difficulties. Among the nobles and officers around him in Gujarat, we find a conspicuous dearth of statesmen and ministers, gifted with foresight, tact and the power of effective organisation. Neither he nor his advisers estimated correctly the formidable power which the ‘Centurions’ at Daulatabad had acquired and the small force, which he called from Dihli with Ahmad Ayāz, proves his inadequate appreciation of the situation.

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Barani clearly says that he abandoned the project of an expedition to Daulatabad, because he did not possess sufficient forces to cope with the rebels.¹⁶² The interests of the empire demanded that the rebels at Daulatabad should have been crushed before attempting anything else, and that would have considerably strengthened the hands of the Sultan. Daulatabad was the key to the Maratha country, and without it the Deccan. The ‘Centurions’ had gathered in large numbers and obtained considerable support in the disaffected country. They had capable leaders whose success was assured, because they thought more of the order to which they belonged and less of their own individual interests. Besides, the Sultan’s inability to take prompt measures to deal with them had enabled them to gather a large army in a country where improvised levies can be had without difficulty in times of disorder. Gujarat was not a stronghold of the *amirs sadah*. Taghī had fled into Sindh, and Barani writes that the Ranas and *muqaddams* of that country had offered submission to the Sultan. To complete the subjugation of Gujarat, he might have left some capable and trusty officers with a strong military force behind. Then, Taghī was not such a formidable enemy. He had been driven from place to place by the royal army, and from his retreat in Sindh it was difficult for him to create serious trouble either in Hindustan or in the Deccan.

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A careful study of these transactions reveals clearly the inefficiency of military generalship. The strength of a state depends not upon the vastness of territories under its control, nor on the numbers that it can put in the field of battle, but upon the morale of the people. Accustomed to the easy life at court, the Musalman had lost his old stamina, and although a few flickering lights were seen, there were no generals of consummate ability like Kafūr and ‘Ulugh Khan. The imperialists lacked initiative and enterprise and too much dependence upon the Sultan rendered their movements overcautious and dilatory. Never was the offensive boldly assumed during the Deccan revolt; every time a diversion was made to deal with a minor and a subsidiary objective, which caused a waste of energy and achieved no substantial results. None was capable of discerning the realities of the situation and none was clear-sighted enough to foresee the consequences of such tactics. Personally strong and capable, the Sultan was not assisted by able men and all his military plans betrayed the limitations of his strategy, lack of unity of command, and more of improvisation than a studied and dexterous manœuvre to counteract the enemy’s designs. Throughout the long struggle the Sultan fought single-handed and pathetically strove to overcome the opposition in all quarters. The provinces sent no help;

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Bengal was cut off from the empire and the northern provinces too were watching with complacency the growth of disorders. The spirit of revolt was rampant throughout the land, and the emperor, beaten and baffled, withdrew from one position to another in desperate fury. At last the curtain fell upon scene in the desert wilds of Sindh and demonstrated to the world that the powerful factor in war is the spirit and not the numerical strength of the men who are called upon to take part in it; this was crushed by the sufferings which they had endured. The Great Napoleon described the Spanish rising as a ‘running sore.’ Muhammad Tughluq found the Deccan revolt a running sore which ultimately ruined him.