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History of the Qaraunah Turks in India c9: Chapter IV. Foreign Policy

History of the Qaraunah Turks in India c9

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Contents

Chapter IV. Foreign Policy

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Muhammad Tughluq was not satisfied with his vast possessions in Hindustan and the Deccan and like some of the great rulers of the middle ages, he wished to conquer distant countries. It was during the early years of his reign that he formed the ambitious design of conquering Khorasan, 'Iraq and Transoxiana. This project of foreign invasion must have been formed before Ibn Batūṭah's arrival in India in 1333 A.D., for he speaks definitely of friendly relations between the rulers of Hind and Khorasan, and says nothing about the Sultan's plans of conquest outside India. The author of the *Majm-al-Fasihi*, who wrote early in the fifteenth century, and who is an independent authority, writes that in 728 A.H. Muhammad Tughluq sent an envoy to the court of Abu Sa'id who reciprocated his friendship and sent with the Indian envoy one Sayyid Azd-al-Din with numerous presents for the Sultan. When the Sayyid presented himself to the Sultan, he ordered him to be taken to the royal treasury where he was permitted to take as much wealth as he desired. But he accepted nothing except a copy of the Quran whereupon the Sultan was immensely pleased and gave him enormous wealth.¹ Now, this account of an independent authority, who had no need to speak in flattering terms of Sultan Muhammad may not be literally true, but it is certainly correct in so far as it suggests friendly relations between the two monarchs. This relationship did not last long, and during the next three or four years, very probably, after the invasion of Tarmāshirīn, Sultan Muhammad began to organise and collect a large army for the invasion of Khorasan. That the scheme was no mad freak of the Sultan is made clear by Barani's account. He was encouraged in his designs by the Khorasani nobles and *amirs* who came to his court, allured by his lavish generosity. Most of these men had entered the Sultan's service, and they sedulously spurred him on to embark upon this enterprise of doubtful utility. Others who had personal grievances to redress, and who had old accounts to settle with the government of Khorasan, made deceitful representations about the condition of their country and the easy nature of the suggested conquest. A large army was needed for the purpose, and Barani writes that 3,70,000 men were enrolled in the Diwan-i-‘arz or muster-master’s office and were paid for one whole year from the treasury.² But as they remained unemployed, it was found difficult to maintain them during the next year, and so they were disbanded. Barani’s statement that there was not sufficient money in the treasury or in the iqtas to support them is not to be literally accepted, for the treasury was not emptied as has been shown before.

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¹ Majm-al-Fasihi, Bankipore MS. f. 209.

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² Barani, Cal. Text, p. 477.

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The project of foreign conquest is mentioned by Barani among these measures of the Sultan’s reign which diminished his treasury and brought distress upon the country. Later writers have condemned the scheme in no uncertain terms and have charged the Sultan with madness. It should be borne in mind that the Sultan had built up a large empire in India, and during the first three years of his reign, he had fully reasserted the authority of Dihli over the distant provinces both in the north and the south. There was nothing inherently absurd in the design which is in keeping with his great genius. A tried general who had bravely grappled with foes of stern stuff in the field of battle, and who had subdued the numerous chiefs and princes all over Hindustan and the Deccan, was not the man to shrink from an enterprise that would have, if materialised, greatly redounded to his glory, and enabled him to rank among the mighty conquerors of the Islamic world. Other rulers before him had cherished similar dreams. ‘Ala-al-Din had wished to play the role of a world-conqueror, but he was asked to desist from such a course by his advisers who brought home to him his limitations.³ But the circumstances in which Muhammad was placed were different. For ‘Ala-al-Din there was sufficient scope in India itself, and he acted wisely in abandoning his scheme of a world conquest. But Muhammad who possessed a vast empire desired a fresh outlet for his ambition and energy.

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The remarkable success which attended the expeditions undertaken within the country itself filled him with pride, and lent encouragement to his seemingly impossible projects. The condition of Persia during the fourteenth century was far from satisfactory. Ghāzān had been followed by a series of weak rulers, who by their insensate policy had greatly undermined the foundations of the power which he had so strenuously laboured to build up. The contemporary ruler of Persia, Abu Sa‘id, a debauched and profligate monarch, was only a minor when he assumed the sceptre, and soon after his accession he was confronted with baronial jealousy and the subterranean attempts of his guardian Amir Chauban to usurp authority. Prince Yassaur, to whom the present Il-Khan’s father Uljaitū had entrusted an important province, was foiled in his attempts to increase his power, and was murdered by his relative Kepak Khan Chaghtai, who cherished feelings of hostility towards him. Amir Chauban’s tutelage galled Abu Sa‘id, and he longed to rid himself of a powerful subordinate who had become the *major domo* of the palace. His victory over the Khan of the Golden Horde in 1325 A.D. only served to heighten his insolence, and the dominant position which he had acquired in the state not only tied the hands of Abu Sa‘id but also kindled feelings of jealousy and resentment among the nobility.

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In the same year the Chaghtai chief Tarmāshirīn who invaded Khorasan was driven beyond the Oxus by Chauban’s son Amir Hasan who encountered him near Ghazni and inflicted a sharp defeat upon him. All this aggravated Chauban’s arrogance, and so great was the resentment felt in the royal seraglio that one day one of his father’s widows Duniyā Khātūn addressed Abu Sa‘id in these words: ‘If I were a man, I would not have allowed Chauban and his son to behave as they are doing.’ When pressed by Abu Sa‘id to be more explicit, the lady complained of the conduct of Chauban’s son Damishq Khwajah who made free with the widows of Uljaitū. Abu Sa‘id was struck with shame and began to devise means to get hold of the culprit in the manner suggested by Duniyā Khātūn. The young man was arrested and put to death by a Mongol nobleman, Misr Khwajah, and a slave Lulu by name, and his house was plundered.⁴ When Chauban resisted Abu Sa‘id’s wish to marry his daughter Baghdad Khātūn, of whom he had become enamoured, he resolved upon his destruction. Knowing the king’s intentions, Chauban consulted his son Hasan and others as to the course which should be adopted. They decided to have recourse to arms in order to save themselves and Chauban put to death Wazir Rukn-al-Din Sa‘in and collected a force of 70,000 men with whom he advanced upon ‘Iraq. At first he marched towards Mashed and then towards Simān, from where he sent the great Shaikh ‘Alai-ad-dowlat to intercede with the Sultan.

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The Shaikh tried in vain to appease the wrath of Abu Sa‘id and his officers who clamoured for his life. Chauban continued his march and reached Kuhar or Kurhā, called Sari Kemash by Abul Fedā and Ibrahimabad by Hamdullah, which was only a day’s journey from the Sultan’s camp. But most of Chauban’s men deserted him and went over to the side of Abu Sa‘id. In despair, he fled to Khorasan and then to Herat, where he sought refuge with Malik Ghiyas-al-Din, but the latter betrayed him, and strangled him to death by the orders of his suzerain.

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³ Barani, Cal. Text, pp. 269-70.

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⁴ Ibn Batūṭah gives a full account of the manner in which the young man was caught and put to death. See Vol. II, pp. 118-19. The murdered man’s head was suspended from the gates of Sultaniya on August 25, 1327 A.D.

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Amir Chauban’s death was a heavy blow to the Ilkhāns whom he had served with rare fidelity. His sons were indignant at the brutal murder of their father, and one of them Timur-tash fled to the Sultan of Egypt to implore his intervention to avenge the death of his father, but Abu Sa‘id forestalled him by informing the ruler of Egypt that the death of Chauban was due to his unbridled exercise of authority. Timur-tash was well received at the Egyptian court, but when Abu Sa‘id insistently demanded his extradition, the Sultan of Egypt imprisoned him, and caused his death by poison on the night of Thursday, August 22, 1328 A.D. Khorasan remained in a state of chronic disorder. Narin Togāi, the ambitious governor of the province wished to extend the sphere of his authority and came into collision with the Malik of Herat, and in the encounters that followed he was repulsed by Shams-al-Din, one of the sons of the Malik, and was compelled to retreat. Mortified by this defeat the governor vented his wrath upon his subjects, and levied a heavy blackmail upon them in order to carry out his nefarious plans. The news of his oppressions and exactions reached Abu Sa‘id, who was filled with rage, and the imperious lady Baghdad Khātūn employed her art to inflame the mind of her husband against one whom she considered to be an accomplice in the murder of her father and brother. The disaffected governor was condemned to death on October 5, 1327 A.D., and his head was suspended from the walls of Sultania. The Khan of Chaghtai, who had not forgotten his defeat of 1326 A.D., derived encouragement from these internal disorders and complications, and towards the end of May, 1328 A.D. he again determined to lead an expedition into Khorasan, but the danger was averted by the promptitude of Abu Sa'id who was capable of energetic action in emergent circumstances. In 1329 A.D. Ghiyas-al-Din, governor of Herat, died and was succeeded by his eldest son Shams-al-Din who died in 1330 A.D. and was succeeded by Hāfiz who was assassinated by his grandees in 1332 A.D. The state of disorder in Herat and Khorasan, accompanied by the scrambles and machinations of parties in which the Sultana Baghdad Khātūn played an important part, added to the difficulties of Abu Sa'id. The Chaghtai prince still looked with greedy eyes on Khorasan, and watched with secret satisfaction the state of disorder that existed in the province.

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Such was the condition of Khorasan when Muhammad planned his expedition, and it was by no means an absurd idea in itself. But there can be no doubt that the scheme was impolitic in the highest degree, for the country had not yet recovered from the effects of his two unfortunate experiments—the transfer of the capital and the introduction of the token currency. Judging from the circumstances which existed at the time, it may be said that the projected expedition was a blunder, and had little chance of success. Though the Sultan was not wanting in physical courage and prowess, he miscalculated the situation, and failed to see the insuperable difficulties placed in his way by man and nature and the vast distances. Between him and Khorasan and 'Iraq lay huge mountains and hostile peoples to contend against whom were needed greater resources than he possessed. To mobilise a huge host through the icy passes of the Hindukush or the Himalaya was an enterprise before which sturdier generals might have quailed, especially when the country was in the throes of a severe famine, and which would have drawn him far away from his points d' appui. The difficulties of transport were equally great, and there was every possibility of the convoys of supplies being robbed by the border tribes. It has been urged in support of the scheme that the Sultan of Egypt who had become an ally of Muhammad Tughluq had promised to detain the Persian forces in the wrong quarter by threatening the western frontiers⁵ It is true, the Sultan of Egypt was an ambitious monarch. To extend the sphere of his influence he exchanged embassies with the Mongols of Kepchak, of Persia, kings of Yemen and Abyssinia.

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⁵ United Provinces Historical Society Journal, Vol. I, Pt. II, p. 19.

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and West Africa, with the emperors of Constantinople and the kings of Bulgaria. But it is difficult to understand why he should promise help against Abu Sa'id when he had established friendly relations with him. Abul Feda who saw with his own eyes the 'Iraqian embassy at the Egyptian court writes that on Sunday Muharram 28, 728 A.H. the Sultans of Egypt and Sham summoned the envoys of Abu Sa'id to their camp. The embassy consisted of three men Arsha Bugha, the leader of the deputation and Ayaji or Abbaji and Barja, who was a son-in-law of Amir Badr-al-Din.⁶ According to D'Ohosson this friendship established in 728 A.H. lasted till the close of Abu Sa'id's reign.⁷ The two monarchs styled each other as brothers, and they frequently exchanged embassies. In 1328 A.D. when an envoy named Timūrbaka went to the Egyptian court to ask for the hand of one of Sultan Nasir's daughters on behalf of Abu Sa'id, the Sultan excused himself on the ground that his daughter was too young, and added that when she was grown up, the request should be granted. These friendly relations lasted for the rest of Abu Sa'id's reign, for in 734 A.H. Yasaur, a Mongol chief, against whom the Ilkhan bore a grudge, was put to death by Sultan Nasir's orders issued at the instance of Abu Sa'id. Ibn Batūtah who is a contemporary writer corroborates the above statement, and says that deep and genuine friendship existed between these two monarchs. Muhammad, in order to secure Sultan Nasir's help, sent an embassy to the Egyptian court in 1331-32 A.D., but it does not seem to have met with any satisfactory response.⁸ Possibly the western ruler felt that the acquisition of a slice of Persian territory on the frontier was a greater advantage than the friendship of the Sultan of Hind, who was certainly inferior to him in position. Tarmāshirīn Khan, the Chaghtai chief, on whose support the Sultan counted had remained on the Khorasan frontier for four years, but it does not appear as Mr. Gardener Brown suggests that he did so ‘to undertake his share of the invasion.’⁹ Tarmāshirīn was a doubtful ally, whose chief motive was to gain the utmost advantage for himself. Besides, his deposition just at this time by his turbulent barons who were disappointed at his dilatory policy, and according to Ibn Batūtah's statement at his non-observance of the *Yasāq*, cut short all his schemes of conquest, and placed him in an unfortunate predicament.¹⁰

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⁶ Abul Feda, Printed Text, pp. 100, 102. Allah. Public Library Edition. Abul Feda writes that on Sunday, 28, in the month of Muharram, 728 A.H. the Sultans of Egypt and Sham (Syria) summoned the ambassadors of Abu Sa'id to their tent and talked to them regarding the extradition of Timurtash. The embassy consisted of Arsha Bugha, a native of Kurd, who was the leader of the deputation and Ayaji and Barja who was a son-in-law of Amir Badr-al-Din Janji. Friendly relations were established between Sultan Nāsir and Abū Sa'id. D'Ohosson, IV, p. 695.

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⁷ D'Ohosson, IV, p. 699. Howorth, The History of the Mongols, pt. III, pp. 616-17.

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⁸ Lanepoole, A History of Egypt, p. 307.

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⁹ Journal U.P. Historical Society, I, pt. II, p. 19. Mr. Gardner Brown follows Lanepoole who says: ‘In 1331-32 A.D. Muhammad Tughluq sent an embassy to Egypt by way of Baghdad probably to induce him to assist in the conquest of Khorasan, which he was to do by detaining the Persian forces on the western frontier by leading a simultaneous attack.’ A History of Egypt, pp. 309-10.

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¹⁰ Ibn Batūtah, III, p. 40. The Yasāq (ياساق) was a manual containing Chingez Khan's rules and regulations meant for the guidance of Mongol chiefs.

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The scheme was unsound in conception and was the result of inadequate knowledge. The frauds and misrepresentations of the Khorasani nobles actuated by selfish motives obscured the subject further, and prevented things from being seen in their true perspective. We read of no attempts made by the Sultan to study the internal condition of ‘Iraq and the adjoining lands and to form an estimate of the resources that should be needed to undertake a task of such magnitude. It was impossible for the Sultan to manage properly such an expedition at a time when the Doab was a prey to famine, and the south still sullen and discontented. Besides, it was not safe to undertake conquest in a foreign country with the aid of a large mercenary army. Mr. Gardner Brown dwells upon the possibility of Persian conquest which, he says, had been attempted before by Mahmud of Ghazni. The analogy is incorrect. Mahmud never acquired a permanent hold on Hindustan nor did he aim at it. It is true he had conquered Khorasan and had received from the Khalifah the usual diploma of investiture with the title of *Yemīn-al-dowlah* (the right hand of the empire) and *Amin-al-millat* (custodian of the faith), but the suzerainty of Ghazni over Khorasan was only nominal. That the conquest of Khorasan was a difficult one for the rulers of Dihli is evidenced by the fact that even Muhammad of Ghor who was certainly more political in his aims than Mahmud confined himself to his dominion in the Afghan hills. Muhammad Tughluq’s circumstances did not favour the consummation of such a grandiose plan. The soldiers of Muhammad Tughluq had hitherto fought in India against the Hindu Rajas and chiefs. They looked upon war with the infidels as a *jihad*, and far other motives than mere love of conquest or territory urged them to fight a outrance against them. But to fight against their co-religionists equally fierce and fanatical in their own native land was an arduous task beyond the capacity of the Dihli armies at this period. Muhammad who had no great generals like ‘Ulugh Khan or Zafar Khan could not reasonably hope to achieve success in such a gigantic enterprise. It was well for him that the impracticable nature of the project dawned upon his mind early enough, and he abandoned it, for if he had persevered with it, he would have sooner precipitated the disruption of his empire.

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In 738 A.H. (1337 A.D.) sometime after the Sultan’s return from the Deccan was undertaken the conquest of Nagarkot which is situated in the Kangra district in the Punjab.¹¹ Luckily the court poet Badr-i-Chach gives us the date of this expedition which is supported by circumstantial evidence. Being situated on a hill, the fort of Nagarkot was deemed impregnable and it had defied renowned conquerors in the past.¹² The chief of the place was a

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¹¹ Badr-i-Chāch gives the date in the following verse:

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¹² Badr-i-Chach speaks of the impregnability of the fort which, he says in his poetical language, Dara and Sikandar had not been able to conquer. The royal army, says the poet, contained 1000 regiments and each regiment contained 1000 banners.

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The conquest of Nagarkot, 738 A.H.

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کشاد حصن نگرکوت را که سنگین بود
شه زمانه بتاريخ او خذوا فيها
ا هـ ل و ا ف ي هـ
۷۳۸ = ا هـ ا ۰ ۸ ا ۴ ۳۰ ۴۰۰ ۳ ا
Qasāid Badr-i-Chāch.
Bankipore MS., No. 140, f. 16.

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هزار کوکبه هر کوکبه هزار نوا
Bankipore MS. f. 16.

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powerful prince who, when he heard of the projected invasion, entrenched himself within the fortress and organised his defence. The Sultan marched with an army of 100,000 warriors to fight the battle of Islam and defeated the infidels. According to Badr-i-Chach, a night attack was ordered, and the walls of the fort were battered down after which the victorious army returned to Dihli. The author of the *Sirat-i-Firuz Shahi* who wrote not long after Muhammad's death in mentioning this expedition says that at the request of the Rai of the place the temple of Jwalamukhi was spared, and the Rai was restored to his former dignity.

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After the conquest of Nagarkot was undertaken what has been wrongly described as the Chinese expedition of Muhammad Tughluq. The *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi* which is copied by Badaoni and Firishta places it in the year 738 A.H. which finds partial corroboration in Badr-i-Chach who assigns the year 738 A.H. to the conquest of Nagarkot. The so-called Chinese expedition, according to all accounts, was a tragic disaster, and it is probable, almost certain, that this expedition was undertaken soon after the conquest of Nagarkot, for if the disaster had happened before, it would have been impossible to mobilise such a huge army into the mountains as is described by Badr-i-Chach. As Sir Wolseley Haig and Mr. Gardner Brown suggest the two expeditions were connected with each other, and were parts of a general plan to extend the protectorate of Dihli over the Himalayan states.13 Much misconception has arisen with regard to this expedition. Modern writers on Indian history following the lead of Firishta have fallen into the error of supposing that the Sultan aimed at the conquest of China, and

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The *Sirat* and the *Shash Fatah Kangra* also describe the fortress as an impregnable one.

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Bankipore MS.

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Elliot, VI, p. 526.

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Cunningham writes that the royal family of Kangra is the oldest in India and their geneology from the time of the founder Susarma Chandra has a much stronger claim to our belief than any one of the long string of names now shown by the more powerful princes of Rajputana.

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*Ancient Geography of India*, edited by Majumdar, pp. 158-59.

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13 J.R.A.S., 1922, p. 348.

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J.U.P. Historical Society, Vol. I, Pt. II, pp. 20-21.

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have therefore condemned it in strong terms.¹⁴ Firishta unequivocally asserts that the Sultan wished to conquer the countries of China and Himachal and the conquest of the latter was meant to facilitate the task of conquering the former. On this point Firishta's text differs from the *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi*, which simply says that the Sultan made an attempt to bring under his control the mountain of Qarājal, which is situated between Hind and China, and it is copied by Badāoni. The *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi* does not mention the conquest of China as the ultimate object of this expedition.¹⁵ But Firishta is not supported by any contemporary writer in suggesting the conquest of China as the objective of this expedition. Both Barani and Ibn Batūtah clearly state that the expedition was aimed against the Qarājal or Qarāchil mountain which lies between the territories of Hind and China, and they are corroborated by the author of the *Masalik* who writes that the people of Qaraj also owned the suzerainty of Muhammad and paid tribute to him.¹⁶ Ibn Batūtah who gives a more detailed account of the expedition than all others

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¹⁴ Firishta, Lucknow Text, p. 135. Briggs, I, p. 416.

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¹⁵ *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi*, MS.

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¹⁶ Barani, Cal. Text, p. 477. Ibn Batūtah, III, p. 325. Masalik, Paris MS.

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This is what he writes :—

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سلطان بفکر تسخیر ولایت چین و هماچل که مابین ولایت چین و هند ست افتاده امرای نامدار و سرداران آزموده کار را با صد هزار سوار کار آمدنی همراه خواهرزاده خود خسرو ملک در سنه ۷۳۸ گسیل فرمود که اول کوهستان هماچل را بتصرف در آوردند -

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تا کوه قراچل که میان ممالک هند و چین حایل شده است ضبط کنند -

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Badaoni's Text has :—

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در سال ثمان و ثلثین و سبعمائنه (۷۳۸) هشتاد هزار سوار با سرداران نامی برائے تسخیر کوه هماچل که میان ولایت چین و هندوستان حایل است و انرا قراچل هم میگویند نامزد فرموده -

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Cal. Text, I, p. 229.

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makes no mention of China. The India Office text of Barani uses both forms Farājal (فراجل) and Qarājal (قراجل) the Bankipore and Calcutta texts have Farājal (فراجل) while Ibn Batūṭah writes Qarāchil (قراچل). All later writers use the forms Qarājal and Qarāchil excepting Nizam-al-Din Ahmad, Amin Ahmad Razi and Firishta who both write Himachal.17 The Qarājal or Qarāchil mountain is obviously the Himalaya, as is clear from the descriptions of it given by Barani and Ibn Batūṭah. Barani says, it is between the countries of Hind and China. Ibn Batūṭah, who is writing about something that he knows, says, it is three months' journey in length, and is situated at a distance of 10 stages from Dihli.18 Later in his narrative, in describing the fief of Amroha, he makes mention of a river which has its source in the Qarāchil mountain. The river in question is the Ramganga which Ibn Batūṭah by mistake calls Sarju. Here, again, the traveller writes that Qarāchil is three months' journey in length, and on the other side of it is the country of Tibet where musk deer is found.19 This description of Qarāchil tallies with that given by him previously, and read along with Barani it leaves no room for doubt that the mountain meant is the Himalaya. It is difficult to point out with exactitude the place at which the royal army entered the mountain, but it appears from Ibn Batūṭah's account that the state against which the expedition was aimed was

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17 Tabqat, Cal. Text, p. 204. Haft Iqlīm A.S.B. MS. و همچنین خواست که کوه هماچل که مابین هند و دیار چین حایل است ضبط نماید - Firishta, Lucknow Text, p. 135.

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18 Ibn Batūṭah, III, p. 325.

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19 Ibid., p. 438.

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Rashid-al-Din, the author of the Jam-ut-tawarikh who completed his work early in the fourteenth century A.D. says regarding the Himalaya:

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"Some other mountains are called Harmakūt, in which the Ganges has its source. These are impassable, and beyond them lies Mahāchīn. To these mountains most of the rivers which lave the cities of India have their origin. Besides these mountains there are others called Qalarchal. They resemble crystal balls, and are always covered with snow, like those of Damavend.

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Elliot's Historians, I, pp. 29-30.

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In another place the same authority writes Harmakat for Himalaya which he says is also the source of the Ganges. Further on he says:

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'This mountain is impassable on account of the exceeding cold, for the snow never melts. On the other side of it lies Mahāchīn, i.e., Great Chin.'

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somewhere in the territory now covered by the Garhwal and Kamayun districts bordering on the Tarai. Colonel Yule writes that Karāchil is doubtless a corruption of the Sanskrit Kuverāchal, a name of mount Kailas where lies the city of Kuvera, the Indian Plutus, and is here used for the Himalaya.²⁰ Two other explanations suggest themselves. Himachal may have become Qarāchil or Qarājal through the carelessness of the scribes and Nizam-al-Din Ahmad, Amin Ahmad Rāzi and Firishta all of whom consulted Barani write Himachal. Kūmāchal is the old name of Kamayun and it is suggested by a distinguished scholar from these hills that the Qarachil of Ibn Batūṭah and Qarajal of Barani may be its Arabicised or Persianised forms. Barani and Ibn Batūṭah both give Qarajal and Qarachil as the names of the mountain which Muhammad Tughluq wished to conquer. Though Qarachil may not be Kūmāchal, it is probable that the country attacked was the Himalayan region now comprised in the Kamayun district, which stretched to the borders of the Tarai. The difficulty is set at rest by Ibn Batūṭah himself who in another place says: ‘The emperor of China solicited permission to rebuild the temples in the Qarachil mountain. In this mountain there is a place called Samhal where the Chinese used to come for pilgrimage. When the Sultan led an attack against the mountain, the city and the temples were ravaged.’²¹ Now modern Sambhal²² is not a place of archæological importance, but Buddhist remains have been discovered to the north of Sambhal

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²⁰ Yule, Cathay and the Way Thither, IV, Second Series, pp. 17-18. Yule, Cathay and the Way Thither, II, pp. 410-11.

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²¹ Ibn Batūṭah, IV, pp. 1-2.

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²² Sambhal is situated in 28° 35' N. and 78° 34' E. at a distance of 23 miles south-west from Moradabad. Moradabad District Gaz., p. 253. Sambul (Thornton's Gaz., IV, p. 368) is also a town in Kashmir twelve miles N.-W. from Srinagar but I do not think that is meant.

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Rennell in his Memoirs of a Map of Hindustan (Introduction, LIII) says that the troops entered by way of Assam, the route formerly taken by Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khilji's troops in the twelfth century. Rennell relies upon Firishta who is a secondary authority in comparison with Ibn Batūṭah. Ibn Batūṭah's account is too detailed to be a mere slip. He distinctly says that the place was nearly 200 miles from Dihli.

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Qarachil does not seem to be a corruption of Kuverachal, the Kailas mountain, as Yule suggests. Rashid and Al-Biruni apply the word to the Himalaya.

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by General Cunningham. This makes it clear that the royal forces entered the mountains somewhere in the north of the Moradabad district. In concluding his account of the expedition Ibn Batūṭah writes that the hill-men made a treaty with the Sultan, because they could not cultivate their lands at the base of the mountain without his permission. This shows that the territory of the mountain Prince extended to the foot of the hills. Mr. Gardner Brown is of opinion that the country attacked was that which is now known as Kūlū to the east of Kangra.²³ The Bamsāvalī of the chiefs of Kūlū informs us that Sikandar Pal, the fifteenth Pal, went to the king of Dihli to seek shelter against the Chinese who had invaded his kingdom. The Raja of Dihli came with an army in person, marched through Kūlū and took Gya Murr Orr (?) and Baltistan together with the country as far as Mansarowar lake.²⁴ This is an indefinite account without any dates, and it would not be right to connect it with Muhammad Tughluq in view of the clear statements of Barani and Ibn Batūṭah. Besides, as Hunter says, authentic history first recognises Kūlū in the fifteenth century when Raja Sudh Singh, whom tradition places 7th in descent from the original founder of the dynasty, ascended the throne²⁵ and early in the 14th century it was not so important as to require a lakh of men from Dihli to subdue it, particularly when the chief of Nagarkot had been conquered the year before. This is in conflict with Ibn Batūṭah who says that the mountain attacked was 200 miles distant from Dihli. Ibn Batūṭah's mention of the Qarāchil mountain along with the hazarah of Amroha,²⁶ and the Ramganga river supports the view that the country attacked was a petty hill state in the Kamayun-Garhwal region not far from the plains. Kamayun was in the fourteenth century under the sway of the rulers of the Chand dynasty who wielded considerable power. It was never subdued thoroughly by the Muhammadans. Indeed, we learn from the *Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi* that the hilly region of Kamayun was the refuge of rebels against the imperial authority. When Khargū, the chief of Katehar, who murdered Sayyid Muhammad of Badaon fled before the arms of Sultan Firuz, he sought refuge in the mountains of Kamayun in the country of the Mahtas who were attacked and defeated by the Sultan.²⁷ We learn from the Muhammadan historians that the Muhammadans encroached upon the lands of hill-men, and consequently Gyan Chand (1374-1419), the ruler of Kamayun, on his accession waited on Sultan Firuz to apply for the grant of the strip of country at the foot of the hills, which had formerly belonged to the Katyuri Rajas.²⁸ The mention of the land at the foot of the mountain is significant.

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²³ Journal, U. P. Historical Society, Vol. I, Pt. II, pp. 20-21. Kūlū lies between lat. 31° 20'-32° 33'. Long., 76° 45'. It is a small state in the North-East of the Punjab consisting of a few rugged valleys on the southern slope of the Himalaya together with the surrounding ridges. Thornton, III, p. 180. Hunter, Imp. Gaz., XVI, pp. 15-16.

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²⁴ Archæological Report for 1907-08, p. 260.

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²⁵ Hunter, Imperial Gaz., XVI, p. 16.

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²⁶ Amroha, a town in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, is situated in 28° 54' N. and 78° 28' E. at a distance of 19 miles West-North-West from Moradabad. Moradabad Gaz., p. 175.

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²⁷ Tarikh-i-Mubarak Shahi, MS.

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²⁸ Atkinson, N.W. P. Gazetteer, Himalayan Districts, Vol. II, pp. 520-21. Almora Gaz., p. 167.

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What was the purpose of the expedition? Barani tells us that it was intended as a preliminary step to the conquest of Khorasan and Transoxiana so that the passage for troops and horses might be rendered easier.²⁹ Barani's knowledge of the geography of the countries with which he had no direct concern was limited like that of many other mediaeval scholars. Being a man of the class of 'Ulama who had never taken part in any campaign, he had no idea of the position of countries outside India. It is not clear why the Sultan should bring under his sway as a preparatory measure for the conquest of Khorasan and Transoxiana the Qarājal mountain, for there is no Qarājal mountain inhabited by the infidels along the route to these countries unless he chose to traverse through inhospitable and highly difficult regions. Further, why should he who was well-acquainted with history, abandon the traditional known route through the passes in the Hindu Kush which had been followed by India's invaders from time immemorial? The Mughals had come through these passes, and it was a fact known to the Sultan. If the Sultan had wished to conquer China or Western Tibet, this statement of Barani might have been intelligible, for the Qarājal is a barrier between these countries and Hindustan.

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Sir Wolseley Haig is inclined to think that the expedition was a disastrous attempt to conquer Western Tibet, but no contemporary writer mentions the conquest of China or Tibet as the object of this campaign.³⁰ Besides, the Sultan would not be so foolish as to attempt to cross the impassable barrier of the Himalayas. Ibn Batūtah who was then in India and an eye-witness of the disastrous expedition clearly says that it was some Hindu hill chieftain who was compelled to pay tribute to the Sultan. Yahya bin Ahmad who is Barani's immediate successor simply states that the Sultan made an attempt to bring under his control the mountain of Qarājal.³¹ He does not entirely depend upon Barani for information, and therefore his omission to say that the expedition was intended as a preparatory step to the conquest of Khorasan and Transoxiana is significant. Probably the other authorities on which he relied suggested to him this omission. Hajji-ad-Dabīr who follows Barani writes that the mountain of Qarajil, situated between Hind and China, was an obstacle to easy march to Khorasan.³² He mentions an additional motive, not mentioned by any other historian which he borrows from Husām Khan that the Sultan was desirous of admitting into his haram by means of marriage ( نکاح ) the women of Qarachal, who were noted for their beauty and other womanly accomplishments.³³ We would have was hailed with delight at Dihli, and the troops were ordered to stay in the hills to consolidate their success.

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But unfortunately the rainy season set in; sickness broke out in the royal camp, and death took a dreadful toll of life. The troops were completely demoralised, and it became difficult to obtain supplies of provisions from Dihli. The hill tribes took advantage of the difficulties of the imperialists, and when the latter retreated through the narrow and difficult passes with their numbers thinned by disease and famine, the wily mountaineers out-flanked the wings of the army, and attacked it. The royal baggage was plundered, and the infuriated Hindus felled trees from the mountain tops so that the soldiers of the royal force were flung head-long into the abyss under their crushing weight, and many lives were lost. For seven days the army suffered heavily owing to the want of provisions. All communication posts were dismantled, and the garrison was driven away by the enemy. Only ten horsemen, according to Barani and three according to Ibn Batūṭah, survived to tell the story of that gruesome tragedy, which was largely due to miscalculation and defective strategy.³⁶ When the royal forces reached the low country, they found it inundated by rain, and men and beasts alike had to suffer great privations, particularly because no succour was available from any quarter. The retreat was disastrous, and seriously affected the military strength of the Sultan, for he was never afterwards able to collect such a large force to fight against his foes.

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At last, he made peace with the mountain chief who agreed to pay tribute, when he saw that it was impossible for his subjects to cultivate the low lands at the foot of the hills without acknowledging the authority of the Sultan of Dihli. The object of the expedition was achieved through a tremendous sacrifice. The military strength of the empire suffered considerably, and revolts and disturbances occurred throughout the vast dominions of the Sultan.

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²⁹ Barani writes :— اندیشه ضبط کوه قراجل بوده است و سلطان محمد را در خطر گذشت که چون پیش نهاد هایی ضبط خراسان و ماوراءالنهر در کار شده است کوه قراجل که در راه نزديك ميان ممالك هند و ممالك چين حايل و حجاب شده . . .

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³⁰ J.R.A.S., 1922, p. 348. There are three passes leading from the Kamayun and British Garhwal territory into Nari or Western Tibet namely, the Mānā Pass, the Niti Pass and the Untadhurā Pass, but it is difficult to believe that the Sultan wished to conquer Tibet, particularly when no contemporary writer mentions it. Towards the Kūlū side there is the Shipki Pass, but it is useless to labour the point further, for a conquest of Western Tibet was never intended. Sherring, Western Tibet and the British Borderland, p. 149.

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³¹ T. M., MS.

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³² Arabic History of Gujarat, Vol. III, p. 877.

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³³ Ibid., p. 877

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³⁶ Barani, Cal. Text, p. 478

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Was the expedition aimed against China? We do not know Firishta's authority for saying that the expedition was aimed against

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Ibn Batūṭah, III, p. 327.

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He says only three men survived the disaster. Two of these were commander Nukbiah and Badr-al-Din Daulat Shah. The name of the third is not mentioned by Ibn Batūṭah.

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the Chinese empire.³⁷ No contemporary writer even casually suggests that the Sultan meditated the conquest of China. Even Nizam-al-Din, though he calls the expedition an absurd project, does not say that it was directed against China.³⁸ Firishta further adds that the Sultan wished to obtain the great wealth of the empire of China. It is true, that the condition of the Chinese empire at that time justifies such a view. The Mongol government after the death of Qubla Khan had degenerated. The patriotic Chinese detested foreign domination which rested upon brute force, and in the provinces of the empire a movement in favour of independence was clearly discernible. In 1329 A.D. when Ton Timour ascended the throne through the murder of his brother he found himself confronted with an extremely difficult situation. National risings occurred in the south-western provinces and these were followed by similar disorders in Yunān and the adjoining parts of Szchuen, where the rebels defied the existing authority, and drove away the Mughal troops who were sent to reduce them to order.³⁹ After Timour's death in 1332 A.D., when the sceptre passed to Toghan Timour who assumed the title of Shunti, the forces of disorder began to assert themselves with redoubled violence. Shunti was a cruel and whimsical despot, and during his reign the prestige of the Mongol government declined. In the second year of his reign, a famine occurred which swept away no less than 13 million human beings, and the sufferings of the people became unbearable. The decline of political power marched *pari passu* with the degradation of the character of the governing race, and the weak and vacillating emperor found it impossible to overcome the rooted antipathy of the natives to foreign rule. Such a disturbed state of the kingdom might have opened a fresh field of conquest to a warlike oriental monarch, but whether the Sultan of Hind could have at this time successfully planned an expedition against China, is more than

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³⁷ Firishta, Lucknow Text, p. 135.

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³⁸ Tabqāt, Cal. Text, p. 204.

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³⁹ There were rebellions at Cheng Chin in Kwantung and at Hoei Chau in Kwantung and in Honan. Severe penalties were inflicted upon the Chinese by the government. Howorth, History of the Mongols, Pt. I, p. 312.

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و آخرین از اندیشههائی فاسد او این بود که خواست که کوه
هماچل را که ما بین ممالک هند و دیار چین حایل است ضبط نماید -

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problematical. After the fiasco of the Persian expedition Muhammad must have grown wiser, and prudence and policy alike dictated the abandonment of any such grandiose plan, if it was ever entertained. Besides, if the conquest of Persia was impossible, the conquest of China was far more so. Separated from India by an impassable barrier of huge mountains, which are for the most part of the year covered with snow, it was impossible for the invading army of Hindustan to maintain itself in that difficult country. Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khilji's precedent cannot be cited to prove the possibility of the Chinese conquest, for that was only an attempt to raid a distant portion of the empire. Probably, as Rennell says, he had not crossed the Assam valley, when he was forced to retire, and it was then that he realised the futility of his plan.⁴⁰ The real object of the expedition was to extend the sovereignty of Dihli over a hill state and not to replenish, as Firishta says, the empty coffers of the state by robbing the great wealth of China. It was a necessary move. Muhammad had placed strong guards on the frontiers of his vast dominions; towards the north-west Bahram Aiba had been defeated, and his attempt at independence foiled; the governor of Bengal in the north-east was a feudatory of Dihli; the south had been subdued, and the Sultan maintained a vigilant watch over the unruly chiefs and princes in that hostile country. But the northern frontier was not yet safe. The fort of Nagarkot had been reduced, and the Sultan wished to complete the line of his northern frontier by conquering the hill states which were independent or wavered in allegiance, and were not altogether unwilling to own the suzerainty of China.

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⁴⁰ Rennell, Memoirs (Introduction LIII).

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Modern historians have stigmatised the attempt as a mad scheme without comprehending its real import.⁴¹ The disaster which befell the troops has blinded them to the urgency and importance of the measure. Suffering in such a climate was inevitable, and in fairness to the Sultan, it must be said that he was powerless against nature. What was due to nature is unjustly ascribed to the Sultan. No writer except Ibn Batūṭah has said anything about the results of this campaign, while others have contented themselves with a bare mention of the tragic calamity which befell the troops. But Ibn Batūṭah clearly says that the object of the expedition was achieved, and the hill chieftain acknowledged the supremacy of Dihli.

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⁴¹ Even the judicious Elphinstone was led to follow Firishta's error. He writes: "His next undertaking was to conquer China and fill his exhausted coffers with the plunder of that rich monarchy. With this view he sent an army of 100,000 men through the Himalaya mountains, but when the passage was effected, the Indians found a powerful Chinese army assembled on the frontier with which theirs reduced in numbers and exhausted by fatigue was unable to cope."

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An important act of Muhammad Tughluq's administration in which Ibn Batūṭah was concerned was the dispatch of an embassy to China in 742 A.H. (1341 A.D.). Relations had existed between China and India for centuries in the past. When Buddhism was the prevailing religion in India, Chinese pilgrims and monks used to come in large numbers to visit the Buddhist shrines but such intercourse ceased with the decline of Buddhism in the tenth century A.D. No attempt was ever made by Hindu or Buddhist sovereigns to conquer the lands beyond the Himalayas, and the Indian empire even in the hey-day of its glory was confined to the limits of the Indian peninsula, though the lands beyond the Hindu Kush seem to have nominally acknowledged its sway. Later historians have written of the projected 'mad expedition' of Muhammad Tughluq to China noticed before, though no contemporary gives even the barest indication of such an enterprise. The continued intercourse of China with India has done not a little to mislead historians who have confounded an expedition against a hill chieftain with an attempt to invade the vast Mongol empire separated from Hindustan by the impassable barrier of the Himalayas. In the thirteenth century the Chinese soldiers enlisted themselves in the army of the king of Ceylon, and trade relations also existed between the two countries. The emperors of China often sent their officers to Ceylon to collect gems and pearls and drugs, and envoys were sent on one occasion to negotiate the purchase of the sacred alms-dish of Buddha.⁴²

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⁴² Yule, Marco Polo, II, pp. 254, 259, 264.

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But there is no indication of warlike relations between the two countries through the long vista of centuries. On the contrary here is clear evidence to show that Muhammad's relations with China were of a definitely friendly character. Towards the close of Jamadal-Sani, 742 A.H. (December 1341 A.D.), the Mongol emperor Shunti or Toghan Timour sent an embassy to the court of Muhammad Tughluq to obtain permission to rebuild the Buddhist temples in the Qarachil or Himalaya mountain.⁴³ In this mountainous region there was a city, called Samhal by Ibn Batūṭah, which the Chinese pilgrims used to visit. During the Qarajal or Qarachil expedition, of which mention has been made before, the Sultan's forces had devastated the place and its temples.⁴⁴ The Chinese mission brought valuable presents which consisted of 100 slaves, both male and female, 500 pieces of *Kinkhob* of which 100 were made of the fabric of *Zaytan* and 100 of *Khimsa*, five *mans* of musk, five robes studded with jewels, five quivers of cloth of gold and five swords. Muhammad Tughluq reciprocated the mission and selected Ibn Batūṭah, who was at that time in Sindh as his envoy. Perhaps his choice was determined by the fact that Ibn Batūṭah was a man who had considerable experience of travelling in foreign countries. He was to convey to the Chinese emperor the message that the reconstruction of the temples could not be permitted according to the laws of Islam unless he paid Jeziya or poll-tax which was enjoined on all non-believers, but if the emperor agreed to do so, permission would be granted. Ibn Batūṭah gives a schedule of the presents which he carried to the Mongol emperor of Cathay.⁴⁵ These gifts far exceeded in value and magnificence those of the Chinese ruler, and consisted of 100 Hindu slaves, 100 slave girls, accomplished in song and dance, 100 pieces of a cotton fabric called *bairami* of matchless beauty priced at 100 *dinars* per piece; 100 pieces of silk called *juz* of variegated tints; 104 pieces of *Salahiyah* (صلاحية) 100 pieces of *Shirinbāf*, 100 pieces of *Shanbāf*, 500 pieces of *muraz*, a kind of woollen fabric of various colours; 100 pieces of *Katan Rumi* (كتان رومي) 100 gowns without sleeves; a tent and six pavilions, four golden candle-sticks and four embroidered with silver, four gold basins and six of silver, and ten dresses of honour embroidered; ten caps one of which was embroidered with jewels, 10 quivers one of which was studded with pearls, and 10 swords the scabbard of one of which was inlaid with pearls and jewels, 10 gloves embroidered with pearls and 15 young slaves.⁴⁶

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⁴³ Ibn Batūṭah, IV, p. 1. The Khan exchanged embassies with the king of the Franks and the Pope. He sent an embassy to Avignon in 1333 A.D. consisting of Andrew Frank and 15 other persons. Howorth, History of the Mongols, Pt. I, p. 314.

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⁴⁴ Ibn Batūṭah, IV, p. 2.

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⁴⁵ Ibn Batūṭah, IV, pp. 2-4.

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⁴⁶ Ibn Batūṭah, IV, p. 295. This is the modern Peking. Ibn Batūṭah writes that when he arrived at Khan Balāq the Khan had gone on an expedition against his rebellious cousin Firūz. He was overpowered by the latter who himself became Khan. Ibn Batūṭah says, in this state of confusion he was advised by Shaikh Burhān-al-Din and others to leave the country.

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Ibn Batūṭah started on his voyage on Safar, 17, 743 A.H. (July 22, 1342 A.D.), an auspicious day according to Indian custom, and was accompanied by Amir Zahir-al-Din Zinjani, a man noted for his learning and the slave Kafur, Sharabdar (keeper of drinks) to the Sultan. The party was escorted to the sea by Amir Muhammad harvi at the head of one thousand horsemen, and was joined by the Chinese envoy Tursi with a hundred servants who formed his suite. After a long and adventurous journey Ibn Batūṭah reached Khan Balaq, the capital of the Mongol Khans.⁴⁷ From China he came back to Kolam where he reached in the month of Ramzan, 747 A.H. Then he went to Calicut whence he intended to go to Dihli but did not do so for fear of the Sultan. Soon after he started on his homeward voyage and reached his native land towards the close of the year 755 A.H.

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⁴⁷ Ibn Batūṭah, IV, pp. 303-4.

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