New History of the Marathas v2.c28.s1: 4. Dattaji locked at Shukratal
New History of the Marathas v2.c28.s1
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4. Dattaji locked at Shukratal
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how the mistakes of Raghunathrao and Malharrao and incidentally of the Peshwa brought about the ruin of Dattaji Sindia. In November 1758, Dattaji and Jankoji met at Rewari and proceeded to handle the situation of Delhi with which they had no occasion till then to be conversant, nor a first hand acquaintance particularly with the character of Holkar’s proteges Ghazi-ud-din and Najib Khan. This meant that they were called upon single-handed to execute the commitments which had been already made, viz. to restrain Najib Khan, provide for the defence of the Punjab, release the Hindu holy places from Muslim control, and acquire funds to the extent of a crore or two for paying off the Peshwa’s debts. The last item required the extension of Maratha power on the east up to Patna. These were the grand tasks entrusted by the Peshwa to the Sindias and solemnly accepted by them, in colossal ignorance of the circumstances.
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When the Sindias arrived at Delhi, Vithal Shivdev was near Saharanpur seizing the Rohilla possessions. Najib Khan had then collected a large force and was openly defying the Marathas. Arriving at Delhi in December the Sindias were compelled to waste three precious months in arranging the affairs of the Emperor and the Wazir, in which they had to act with unprecedented sternness. The Emperor’s son and heir apparent Ali Gauhar, later known as Shah Alam II, had left Delhi the previous year and was trying to take possession of the eastern territories of Bihar and Bengal, which had now been practically seized by the English East India Company. He invaded Patna in conjunction with the Nawab Shuja-ud-daula of Lucknow in March 1759 but was turned back by Clive’s troops under Col. Knox.
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Dattaji found Ghazi-ud-din utterly worthless for the execution of any useful plan, so that the former paid no attention to him and managed matters independently. He sent his forces to capture Najib Khan but failed. He, therefore, decided first to settle the affairs of the Punjab and then start operations against Najib. With this object he left Delhi on 1st February 1759 and proceeded to the Satlaj where Sadiq Beg and Adina Beg’s widow and son met him. In consultation with them and with the other advisers he posted Sabaji Sindia at Lahore for the protection of the Punjab as Sabaji had already subjugated the territory right up to the Indus. The Peshwa had suggested the name of Naro Shankar for the sole charge of the Punjab and Dattaji also accepted the suggestion, but Naro Shankar was not very enthusiastic on the point and would not accept the commission without express written orders from the Peshwa. Dattaji did indeed realize the necessity of a first class Maratha sardar being permanently posted to Lahore : but this he thought could be later done by the Peshwa himself. Dattaji could not personally remain in Lahore as he had other momentous affairs on hand. There was then no news of any threat from Abdali and things were quiet beyond the frontier.
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After making the best arrangements he could, Dattaji returned from the Punjab in May, crossed the Jamna into the Doab on 1st June and set himself to overcoming Najib Khan. Dattaji was accompanied by Govindpant Bundele, a steady and conciliatory man who had direct intimate dealings with Najib Khan and the other Rohilla Pathans. Many advised Dattaji to ignore Najib Khan and push on. But this was neither advisable nor possible, as Najib Khan at large was the greatest mischief-maker of the day. In the meantime Najib too, with deep treachery at heart, professed readiness to perform whatever Dattaji would ask him to do. A personal visit was arranged between them through the mediation of Govindpant. But the visit proved abortive. Najib Khan came all alone into Dattaji's tent, but before talks could be started, some of his followers rushed in and carried Najib Khan away forcibly, under the supposition that his life was in danger. Whether the whole plan was a prearranged ruse or not cannot be ascertained. Thereafter negotiations began through agents. Najib Khan agreed to help Dattaji in carrying all his troops across the Ganges by means of a bridge of boats which he agreed to construct ; and with this understanding both proceeded to Shukratal,⁷ a place suited to the construction of a bridge, as the river bed there was full of small islets, and the mud banks sufficiently high. It proved a fatal step for Dattaji to have tried to conciliate Najib Khan. He could easily have been attacked and captured, but on the advice of many experienced men on the spot, Dattaji decided to utilise Najib’s services as was suggested by Malharrao. Najib Khan had said when coming out of Dattaji’s tent, “the looks of these Marathas appear wicked : they cannot be trusted.” Jaitsinh Gujar, a zamindar of Shukratal and the environs, was entrusted with the task of constructing the bridge, as he was considered an expert. Najib Khan reached Shukratal at once, while Dattaji followed slowly, to allow time for the construction of the bridge. But the monsoon arrived, the river rose in floods and Najib Khan urged that the operations of the bridge could not be pushed on. Dattaji finished his holy baths on the way at Garhmukteshvar and pushing on encamped at Mirapur about a couple of miles from Najib’s camp, which was pitched in a huge bend of the river.
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⁷ Shukratal on the western bank of the Ganges, 40 miles south of Hardwar, and 16 miles east of the railway station Muzaffarnagar. Beyond the river lay Najib's own residence Najibabad about 20 miles to the east.
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Heavy rains had made the whole place muddy and movement was impossible. Najib utilised this circumstance to his best advantage. He was fully conversant with the situation and the surroundings, the range of rain, the country paths and the prominent people, to which Dattaji was an utter stranger. Najib Khan sent his secret personal agents to Shuja-ud-daula, to Hafiz Rahmat and the other Pathans and also to distant Afghanistan inviting Ahmad Shah Abdali quickly to India and giving him all possible details of the situation at Delhi and Shukratal and of the Sindia’s position. Thus he organized a formidable coalition against the Marathas with such secrecy that Dattaji soon became perplexed. Najib Khan represented to Shuja that to allow Dattaji passage to the east was suicidal, as he would soon wrest from Shuja his two Subahs of Oudh and Allahabad. If on the contrary he would help Najib in his distress and join the Muslim combination, Shuja could become Wazir and restore the prestige of the Mughal Empire. But Shuja knew Najib better than Dattaji, and did not at all put trust in the professions of one who was known to be so unfaithful. Besides in religious matters the Shia Shuja was no friend of the Sunni Najib. However, the only object which Shuja wished to secure was to resist by all possible means the cession of Prayag and Benares to the Marathas. That was indeed a sentimental point, but the surrender of these two places would spell disaster to Muslim prestige throughout India. With this view Shuja sent his two Gosavi captains with about ten thousand men to the Ganges opposite Shukratal to help Najib Khan and safeguard his own position.
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In the meantime Najib Khan entrenched himself at Shukratal so formidably that the Marathas could not easily attack him. He collected troops and within a couple of months as the bridge became ready, instead of its serving Dattaji's purpose, it became a most convenient channel for Najib Khan himself to bring in supplies and maintain communication with the Pathans beyond. Before the end of August Dattaji saw through Najib's game clearly and began counter measures to defeat it. On 15th September Dattaji made a sudden attack on Najib Khan's camp, but it failed, the Marathas lost some men and retired at nightfall. Thereafter skirmishes occurred for nearly two months, but on account of the broken terrain Dattaji could not close with his opponent; ignorant of the latter's schemes he persisted in his efforts, never suspecting that Shah Abdali of Kabul would come upon him suddenly from the north-west. In order to cut off Najib Khan's supplies and support from beyond the river, Dattaji despatched Govindpant Bundele on 21st October with ten thousand troops via Hardwar where there was a ford. The Pant went straight against Najibabad plundering and burning on the way, but was repulsed by Hafiz Rahmat and Dunde Khan who rapidly came upon him in response to Najib's call. Govindpant was forced to beat a hurried retreat. Anupgir Gosavi too crossed the river by the bridge and joined Najib Khan at Shukratal by the end of October. Dattaji besieged the camp of Najib Khan at once. With an efficient army under him and many devoted followers, Dattaji never till the last moment felt daunted.
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Early in 1759 Shah Abdali was reported to be in extreme peril, but he soon recovered his position and was agitated in his mind to learn that the Punjab for which he had toiled for the past several years had been lost to the Marathas, that his son and Jahan Khan had returned after suffering a terrible defeat, and lost their valuables and a large number of fighting men, that the Marathas had planted their flag on Attock and that a rival to him had appeared at Peshawar, in the person of his own cousin Abdur Rahman, with Maratha support. Fully informed of Dattaji's position at Shukratal the Abdali Shah immediately organized his forces, despatched Jahan Khan with a sufficient army to take possession of Lahore in July 1759, just at the moment when Dattaji was persuading Najib Khan to build for him a bridge of boats on the Ganges. The Shah himself took post in Peshawar and stood ready to support Jahan Khan who had advanced into the Punjab. It has already been mentioned that no permanent arrangement had been made by the Peshwa for holding the Punjab. Sabaji Sindia was merely a temporary caretaker, with only slight forces at his command, with which he certainly could not defend a territory extending over more than 300 miles. Short work was done of the many scattered Maratha parties in the outposts of the province and Jahan Khan appeared before Lahore in August. Sabaji maintained his position with great valour and strength, inflicted a crushing defeat upon Jahan Khan, who was severely wounded and lost his son in the action. Jahan Khan's return to Peshawar in discomfiture so roused the fury of the Shah that he immediately came upon Lahore, with all his strength. Sabaji Sindia could not oppose him and retreated in extreme consternation reaching Dattaji's camp at Shukratal on 8th November to tell the sad tale that the Punjab had been lost, that many Marathas in different places had been cut down to the number of about one thousand, that most of the survivors had lost all their belongings and were helplessly fleeing about to save their lives from the merciless Afghans.
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In this dangerous predicament the heroic Dattaji was not at all daunted. He possessed wonderful courage but did not unfortunately combine it with prudence and circumspection. Instead of at once falling back upon Delhi and calling in sufficient aid from different quarters, he attempted alone to oppose the full force of the Afghan King, who was advancing with the fury of a tempest. Dattaji clung to his position at Shukratal for more than a month even after the arrival of Sabaji Sindia and tried to force Najib Khan into surrender.⁸ This proved an impossible task, Najib Khan continued freely getting supplies and men in large numbers from across the Ganges and the news of Abdali's rapid advance heartened Muslim resistance.
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⁸ See Phalke series 3. 190.
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Another evil effect of Abdali's advance was that the Wazir became entirely unnerved. He was in extreme fear of life and suspected that the Emperor would give him up and join the Afghan King. So being out of his wits he had the Emperor Alamgir II murdered on 30th November 1759 along with the former Wazir Intizam-ud-daula and four minor persons, having taken the party out under the pretence of paying a visit to a Muhammadan saint who had arrived in the vicinity. He thereupon raised to the throne a princeling and gave him the name of Shah Jahan Sani. When Ali Gauhar learnt of his father's murder in Bihar he declared himself Emperor on 22nd December, 1759.
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5. Dattaji falls at Barari Ghat.—The news of this diabolical crime reached Abdali at Sarhind on the third day, and so enraged him that he at once proceeded to Delhi to punish the wicked wrongdoer, although he had originally formed no intention this time of proceeding beyond Sarhind. The Marathas had absolutely no hand in the murder, but their general support to Ghazi-ud-din made them responsible for the miserable fate of the Emperor. The whole course of events from now on to the battle of Panipat, took an entirely different turn, rousing feelings of anger and revenge.
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The Peshwa in Poona hardly knew anything about this development. Holkar roved in Rajputana dealing with trivial matters and acted criminally in not running to save the situation in the Punjab, brought about by Najib Khan and Ghazi-ud-din, both helped by Holkar from the beginning.
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As Abdali came rapidly marching upon him in the first week of December, Dattaji was compelled to give up his attempt against Najib Khan. He hurriedly broke up his camp and left Shukratal on 11th December to face Abdali beyond the Jamuna, which he crossed on the 18th, and arriving at Kunjpura he learned that about 40 thousand Afghans under Taimur Shah had reached Ambala. It was quite rash on his part to proceed alone against Abdali's full force, but retreat was a word which Dattaji never knew, and he at once divided his forces into two parties, the light one of twenty-five thousand he led himself against the advancing enemy and the other consisting of heavy baggage, artillery and the camp folowers, were sent back to Delhi under Govindpant Bundele. On 24th December he met the Afghans near Sthaneshwar and had a stiff encounter with them for a couple of hours, in which the two parties remained equally balanced. Dattaji lost about four hundred of his men but held the ground.
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Evidently Abdali avoided an open encounter with Dattaji at this time and waited to be joined by the Rohillas so that he could attack the enemy with success. Therefore Abdali crossed the Jamuna the same night at Buriaghat⁹ and proceeded towards Saharanpur, where Najib Khan joined him. Thereafter the combined armies marched along the eastern bank of the Jamuna towards Delhi. Dattaji at once turned back to save the capital, moving by the opposite bank of that river. By the end of December the two opponents stood parted by the river facing each other some ten miles north of Delhi, Abdali taking his position at Luni and Dattaji at what was known then as Barari-ghat. Ghazi-ud-din, now thoroughly terrified, was assured of safety by Dattaji, who asked him to organize the defence of capital by all means.
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⁹ Buriaghat is about 130 miles north of Bararighat.
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Dattaji was advised by many well-wishers to fall back from Delhi, join Holkar, obtain further reinforcements and then oppose Abdali with a sure chance of success; but he declined to follow such a defeatist course : losing Delhi meant, in his opinion, the loss of so many years of labour and success. He considered himself quite able to hold his own and save Delhi until succours arrived, for which he had sent urgent demands. Malharrao was expected every moment, and why he did not at once move north from Jaipur is a mystery, which can be explained only on the supposition that he wished to benefit himself by the sacrifice of Sindia. Dattaji had about him, devoted veteran men of his own, besides Naro Shankar and Bundele. Dattaji cared rather to prevent the harm and atrocities sure to happen to Delhi in case he gave the place up to Abdali's vengeance.
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On 6th January Dattaji sent away all his camp followers, non-combatants and heavy baggage to Rewari, and prepared to encounter Abdali if he should venture to attack Delhi, remaining entirely on the defensive until Holkar should arrive, and guarding the fords of the river with strict vigilance. It was the height of the cold season in north India. Dattaji did not expect a direct attack either on Delhi or on his camp at Bararighat. The river at this place was divided into two streams of scanty water enclosing between them something like an island overgrown with tall reeds which could easily conceal men and horses. Abdali sent Najib Khan to attempt a crossing at this place on the morning of Thursday, 10th January 1760. The Rohillas came on camels and small elephants with only two light guns on each, all hidden by the tall reeds. Sabaji Sinde was guarding the ghat and resisted the attackers with his few men, after reporting the attack to Dattaji. The latter without knowing either the exact numbers or the concealed guns of the enemy, proceeded rashly to protect the ford with a handful of men wearing only swords and not equipped with any firearms. A deadly combat ensued in the dried bed of the river and Jankoji soon after came up and joined in, but a chance bullet struck Dattaji dead and another wounded Jankoji making him unconscious. The loss on the Maratha side was by no means heavy, certainly less than a 1,000. But the death of Dattaji created a panic and severely damped the Maratha spirit. The army at once dispersed, everybody running to save himself in whatever way seemed possible. Dattaji's head was cut off by Kutb Shah, the reputed Guru of Najib Khan, and presented to the Shah Abdali. Jankoji was removed hurriedly by his followers, who all ran south to Kotputli, in Jaipur State, about 28 miles north-west of Alwar. Here Malharrao Holkar joined the fugitives on 15th January. Najib Khan immediately after raided Dattaji's camp and carried away some plunder and a few Muslim prisoners such as Sadiq Beg's children, Lakshmi Narayan, (Adina Beg's manager), and others, who could not save themselves otherwise. Dattaji's headless body was duly cremated by his followers.
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This terrible news spread all over India like wild fire. Sabaji Sindia who was in charge of the Barari Ghat ford, ran and joined the camp at Kotputli. Poor Ghazi-ud-din sought the shelter of the Jat Rajah. Abdali immediately took possession of Delhi and appointed Yakub Ali Khan as its Governor. He was in great straits regarding money. He had a large army to maintain and Delhi had nothing to offer, having been completely sacked by him two years before. Najib Khan could not pay him anything but begged the Shah to stay on and not to depart immediately, otherwise, he argued, the Marathas would return and destroy him in no time. At his request Abdali sent insistent demands for funds to Shuja-ud-daula, Surajmal Jat, and Madho Sinh Raja of Jaipur; but all returned a negative answer, urging they had no funds to spare. The Jat indeed made a very bold reply, “You must first drive the Marathas away from Delhi, assure us that you are the master there, and then we shall be your willing vassals.” Abdali was not inclined to remain as the Emperor of India. He had his best interests centred in Afghanistan. The Peshwa in the south was preparing a powerful expedition for the relief of Delhi, with which the Abdali Shah was not at all inclined to entangle himself. Ali Gauhar had already declared himself Emperor and was waiting at Allahabad for a favourable turn of events, which would enable him to proceed to Delhi and secure the throne.
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At Kotputli the funeral ceremonies of Dattaji were performed, and the party moved back to Sabalgad on the Chambal where in February Dattaji’s wife Bhagirathibai gave birth to a son. Malharrao Holkar comforted them all as an elderly guardian. They then began measures for recovering their lost position and driving away the invader by employing guerilla tactics in which Holkar was an adept. On 24th January a campaign was commenced. Abdali was watching the Maratha movements, having advanced parties of his men to prevent any Maratha move against Delhi, which he did not leave for some time. During February and March skirmishes took place between the Afghan parties and Holkar’s bodies. The latter while plundering in the Doab suffered a severe defeat near Sikandarabad on 4th March. Full accounts of these occurrences quickly reached the Peshwa at Poona with a united demand that unless a strong and efficient artillery and some commander of outstanding merit appeared in the north, to conduct operations against the Durani Shah, it was not possible to drive him away and recover the lost position.
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CHAPTER XX
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1760, February 13 News of Dattaji’s death reaches the Peshwa.
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1760, March 7-14 Meeting of leaders at Patdur : Bhau Saheb nominated to lead a well prepared expedition to Delhi with Ibrahim Khan’s artillery.
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1760, March 14 Bhau Saheb starts from Patdur.
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1760, April 12 Bhau Saheb reaches the Narmada.
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1760, May 31 Bhau Saheb reaches Gwalior.
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1760, June 27 Sardars meet Bhau Saheb near Agra : also Surajmal Jat. Abdali encamps near Aligarh.
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1760, July 13 River Gambhir crossed by Bhau.
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1760, July 16 Bhau Saheb reaches Mathura.
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1760, July 18 Shuja joins Abdali in his camp.
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1760, August 2 Delhi taken from Abdali’s possession.
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1760, August Abdali moves his camp to the Jamuna opposite Delhi : negotiations conducted for peace.
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1760, Aug.-Sept. Food scarcity in Maratha camp.
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1760, October 7 Bhau Saheb leaves Delhi for Kunjpura.
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1760, October 10 Shah Alam proclaimed Emperor.
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1760, October 17 Kunjpura captured: Qutb Shah put to death.
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1760, October 25 Abdali crosses over at Bagpat to the right side of the Jamuna.
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1760, October 28 Abdali halts at Sonpat.
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1760, October 31 Bhau Saheb returns and forms his camp at Panipat.
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1760, November 4 The two parties face to face at Panipat.
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1760, Nov. 19 and 22 Light actions take place.
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1760, December 7 A severe battle, Balavantrao Mahendale killed.
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1760, December 17 Govindpant Bundele killed in a surprise attack. Abdali’s position highly satisfactory.
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The first of these, the *Gospel of the Hebrews*, was used by the Jewish Christians of Palestine, and was probably a version of the Gospel of Matthew, though it contained some traditions not found in our canonical books. The *Gospel of the Egyptians* was used by the ascetic sects of Egypt, and was marked by a strong tendency towards mysticism and asceticism. The *Gospel of Peter* was used by the Docetists, and taught that Christ did not really suffer, but only appeared to do so.
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These gospels, and others like them, were not accepted by the Church as a whole, and were gradually lost or suppressed. The Church, however, felt the need for a standard collection of writings that would serve as a guide for faith and practice. This led to the formation of the New Testament canon, a process that took several centuries to complete.
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The first step in this process was the collection of the letters of Paul, which were widely circulated among the churches. Then came the four Gospels, which were accepted as the authoritative accounts of the life and teachings of Jesus. The Acts of the Apostles and the other epistles were gradually added, and finally the Book of Revelation.
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By the end of the second century, the core of the New Testament was generally accepted by the Church. The process of canonization was not a formal act of a council, but rather a gradual recognition by the churches of the writings that were most valuable for their life and worship. It was only in the fourth century that the canon was formally closed by the councils of the Church.
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The formation of the New Testament canon was a crucial event in the history of the Church. It provided a standard of faith and practice that helped to unify the Church and to protect it from the influence of heretical sects. It also ensured that the teachings of Jesus and the apostles would be preserved for future generations.