Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v3.c42: Chapter XXXII. Eastern India after the Death of Mir Jumla, 1663—1707

History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v3.c42

Language
English

Contents

Chapter XXXII. Eastern India after the Death of Mir Jumla, 1663—1707

§1. Causes of friction with the Ahoms after the peace.

v3.c42.s1.1

The retreat of Mir Jumla was not followed by the Mughals abandoning that part of Assam which the treaty had given to them; they continued to hold important points in it. Kajali on the south bank and Bansbari on the north bank remained their easternmost posts till 1667. The promised war-indemnity was also paid in full, though not in one year's time as stipulated, because we read of the last instalment being paid as late as May 1667. The Emperor and Dilir Khan corresponded with the Ahom king and his ministers in very friendly terms and presents were exchanged between the two Courts. But the Mughal *faujdar* of Gauhati seems to have been exasperated at the delay in the payment of the balance of the indemnity, and began to dun for it with growing harshness. The Mughal Government also dealt in an ungenerous and grasping way with the Ahom king in money matters. Whenever any of the elephants forming part of the indemnity died on the way to the Court after having been delivered to the Mughal agent, the Assam Government had to bear the loss and pay Rs. 2,000 for it. We know that many such elephants died every year, and thus the Ahoms, with all their sacrifices barely succeeded in clearing the balance of the war-indemnity, but the annual tribute fell into arrears.*

v3.c42.s1.2

Another cause of disagreement was that many subjects of Assam had accompanied the imperial army to Bengal. When Jayadhwaj remonstrated, Mir Jumla replied, "I am not carrying any one away with me by force or under pressure. I have merely not forbidden those who are following me of their own free choice." The Ahoms took this as a violation of the treaty by which each party had undertaken to restore the "captive" subjects of the other. Again, the Ahom king complained that the Mughal officers had encroached on his territory and refused to go back to their frontier as marked in the treaty. It was only by appealing to the Emperor himself that an order was secured for the restoration of the disputed territory to its rightful owner. The Bar Phukan, jealous of the influence of the Burha Gohain, intrigued with the Muslims for a new invasion of Assam; but the conspiracy was detected and eight nobles put to death for participation in it.

v3.c42.s1.3

∗ The terms of the treaty were that the Ahom king should deliver as war-indemnity 20 thousand tolas of gold, one lakh and 20 thousand tolas of silver and 20 elephants immediately, and thereafter a balance of 3 lakh tolas of silver and 90 elephants in three equal instalments, besides 20 elephants as the annual tribute (Fathiyah, 154. But Buranji II (b), 3 and 6 gives figures for gold and silver inconsistent with each other and with the Mughal account). The gold silver and 20 elephants were delivered on 5-9 Jan. 1663 (Fathiyah, 157-158). As for the balance, it was paid thus:—"In Chaitra 1584 Saka (=March 1663) 30 elephants were delivered....In Falgun 1585 (Feb. 1664) 40 elephants were delivered....In Aghan 1586 (Nov. 1664) 13 elephants were delivered....In Kartik 1585 (Oct. 1663) one lakh of Rupees was offered....In the same year in Falgun (Feb. 1664), Rs. 40,000 was paid. In Kartik 1586 (Oct. 1663) Rs. 40,000 was paid; in Bhadra (Aug-Sep.), ten elephants were given; in Jaishtha 1588 (May 1667) one lakh of Rupees and 50 elephants as equivalent to a further sum of one lakh." [Buranji, II. (b), 6-8.] This makes a total of 143 elephants and Rs. 2,80,000, paid to the Mughals. But at least 24 of the elephants are stated to have died and their price, at Rs. 2,000 for each, recovered from the Ahoms! For the correspondence about the indemnity, Buranji II. (b), 11-21.

v3.c42.s1.4

For these reasons the new king Chakradhwaj had been brooding over the injustice and insolence of the Mughals, ever since his accession in November 1663. He had been growing colder and more stiff-necked in his receptions of the Mughal envoys. At last his endurance reached its limit when Sayyid Firuz Khan, the new faujdar of Gauhati, demanded the balance of the indemnity in very provoking terms. Against the advice of his nobles, Chakradhwaj determined on war and made preparations for it.∗

v3.c42.s1.5

∗ For the causes of dispute, (Assamese accompany Mir Jumla) *Fathiyah*, 160 & 162; (Phukan intrigue with Mughals) *Buranji Khunlung* ii. 13-14; (Boundary dispute), *ibid.* 12, 18. *Buranji* II. (b), 10-11, 18; viii. 97. (Dunning for tribute), *Buranji* viii. 97-98.

v3.c42.s1.6

§2. Ahom king renews war and recovers Kamrup.

v3.c42.s1.7

In the meantime he had re-established friendly relations with the Rajah of Kuch Bihar and his lately disloyal vassal princes, and subdued several of the wild tribes along his frontier. A series of forts were built on strategic points along the Brahmaputra to support the intended advance westwards into Kamrup. The gods were propitiated by a grand religious sacrifice, and the augurs found the omens favourable.

v3.c42.s1.8

His plans having been matured, Chakradhwaj sent two armies under his Phukans down the two banks of the Brahmaputra in August 1667. The forts of Bansbari, Kajali, Jaiduar, Itakhali, Shahburj, Pandu and Rangmahal fell in rapid succession, and finally Gauhati itself was captured about the beginning of November. Its fugitive *faujdar* was defeated and taken prisoner on the bank of the Monas. Immense quantities of arms, horses, and other spoils fell into the hands of the victors, and large numbers of Muslims, including several officers, were taken prisoner and massacred. At one blow the Mughal frontier was pushed back to the Monas river. Gauhati became the seat of an Ahom viceroy and was strongly fortified. Forts were also erected at Pandu and Srighat.

v3.c42.s1.9

Next season the Mughals renewed the war, and some fighting took place round Rangamati and the country south of it across the river. Rajah Indraman, an imperial officer, advanced towards Srighat, but was compelled to retreat with failure.*

§3. Long and desultory warfare under Ram Singh.

v3.c42.s2.1

Soon afterwards, the supreme command in Kamrup was transferred to other hands. In December 1667, the Emperor, on hearing of the loss of Gauhati, had appointed Rajah Ram Singh, the son of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh, to recover the imperial prestige in Assam. The Rajah was accompanied by 4,000 troopers in his own pay, besides 1500 gentlemen-troopers (*ahadis*) and 500 artillerymen of the imperial service. Auxiliaries from Kuch Bihar, numbering 15,000 archers, also joined him, but their fighting value was little. The Bengal viceroy was ordered to reinforce him out of his own contingent. On the way through Patna the Rajah took with himself the Sikh guru Tegh Bahadur.

v3.c42.s2.2

Ram Singh† reached Rangamati in February 1669. But from the first his task was hopeless.

v3.c42.s2.3

∗ Ahom capture of Gauhati in 1667, *Buranji Khunlung*, ii. 15-28 (preparations), 28-38 (campaign); viii. 98-101; *A.N.* 1068.

v3.c42.s2.4

† Ram Singh's campaigns in Assam, *Buranji Khunlung* ii. 38—58 (full details of desultory fighting for years), viii. 101—110, *A.N.* 1068-9 (Ram Singh's forces), *M.A.* 97 (Ram Singh promoted, Feb. 1670), 154 (Ram Singh from Assam has audience, 24 June, 1676).

v3.c42.s2.5

Service in Assam was extremely unpopular, and no soldier would go there unless compelled. Indeed, there is reason to believe that Ram Singh was sent to Assam as a punishment for his having secretly helped Shivaji to escape from captivity at Agra. He had only 8,000 troopers round his standards, and his losses were seldom replenished. The Ahoms, being a nation in arms, mustered one hundred thousand when mobilized. Unlike the time of Mir Jumla's invasion, the mastery of the water now belonged to the Ahoms, and the Mughals could do little with their 40 war-vessels on the Brahmaputra.

v3.c42.s2.6

The situation was rendered worse by the insubordination and disloyalty of Rashid Khan, the faujdar of Gauhati. Instead of obeying Ram Singh, as he had been ordered, this man foolishly set up a claim to equality of rank with him. Having lived at Gauhati with viceregal splendour and been all in all in the eyes of the Ahoms, he could not brook to take his orders from Ram Singh. He was even suspected, probably with truth, of being in secret correspondence with the enemy; at all events they found a friend in him. At last Ram Singh had to

v3.c42.s2.7

Akhbarat 12th year, 4, 11, 12, 13th year, 17, 35 (very useful); Macauliffe's Sikh Religion, iv. 348—351, 354—357, (legendary). Aurangzib's real motive in sending Ram Singh to Assam is given by Manucci (ii. 153).

v3.c42.s2.8

expel Rashid Khan from his camp after cutting his tent ropes.

v3.c42.s2.9

From his base at Rangamati, the Rajah advanced along the north Brahmaputra valley. The Ahoms fell back before him, and he reached the Bar Nadi. The Mughals gained a few victories, but no decisive success; and soon the tide of war began to turn against them and they had to fall back westwards to Hajo. Then he laid siege to Gauhati, but all his attempts to take it failed; and after wasting four months he had to retire with heavy loss. A detachment which had advanced into Darrang was cut off by the local Rani. The Ahoms bought the aid of the Nagas, and these wild warriors proved a new danger to the Mughals.

v3.c42.s2.10

In the second half of 1670 the imperial forces suffered three serious defeats. Ram Singh now begged for peace, on condition of a return to the ancient boundary. Both sides were weary of the war. But the death of Chakradhwaj and other causes greatly protracted the negotiations, during which, however, there was a lull in the fighting.

v3.c42.s2.11

The attempts at peace failed. The Ahoms renewed their attacks and the fresh troops that now joined Ram Singh (especially the Bengal *zamindar* Munawwar Khan), bore down his apathy to war. A long course of desultory fighting followed, the general result of which was the success of the Ahoms. So, in March 1671 Ram Singh retired to Rangamati, foiled in his purpose and heartily sick of the war. Here on the Assam border he stayed for some years, but was too weak to attempt an advance again. Finally in 1676 he received permission to leave Bengal, and reached the imperial Court in June. Darrang and Beltala were lost to the Mughals.

§4. Gauhati recovered and lost again.

v3.c42.s3.1

After the death of Chakradhwaj (1670), the Ahom monarchy was greatly weakened by internal troubles. From 1670 to 1681 "in the short space of eleven years there were no less than seven kings, not one of whom died a natural death." The king was a mere puppet; ambitious and unscrupulous nobles usurped the supreme power, fought each other for selfish gain, made and unmade kings. "The patriotic feeling became so weakened that many deserted to the Muhammadans."* In February, 1679 the Bar Phukan, in fear of his rival the Burha Gohain, betrayed Gauhati into the hands of the Mughals. For this "conquest" the Emperor rewarded his son, Muhammad Azam, the viceroy of Bengal.†

v3.c42.s3.2

∗ Buranji viii. 112—121; Khunlung, ii. 64—121, Gait, 166 and 170 (quoted above).

v3.c42.s3.3

† Mughals recover Gauhati, M. A. 173, Buranji viii. 118, Khunlung, ii. 119—121, Gait, 164.

v3.c42.s3.4

But the Mughal triumph was shortlived. In 1681 Gadadhar Singh ascended the Ahom throne and soon retrieved the glory of his house. "The era of weak and incompetent princes, and of unscrupulous and ambitious ministers came to an end; internal corruptions and dissensions ceased, and the Ahoms were once more able to present a united face against their external foes." He easily ousted the Mughals from Gauhati, and took "a vast amount of booty, including gold and silver; elephants, horses and buffaloes; cannon of all sizes; and guns, swords and spears." "This was the last Muhammadan war. Henceforward the Monas was accepted by both sides as the boundary." Kamrup was finally lost to Bengal.∗

v3.c42.s3.5

∗ Gait, 166; Buranji viii. 122-123.

§5. Mughal relations with Kuch Bihar after 1663.

v3.c42.s4.1

We now turn to the history of the other Mongoloid peoples with whom the empire came into conflict after the death of Mir Jumla. At the time of his retreat from Assam (Feb. 1663), the Mughal garrison expelled from Kuch Bihar was waiting under Isfandiyar Beg at Ghoraghat, and another force was left with Askar Khan outside the kingdom with orders to recover it. The death of the Nawab threw the enterprise into delay; the officiating viceroy, Daud Khan, neglected to send up reinforcements, and all that Askar Khan could do was to confirm his possession of the *chakla* of Fathpur outside the wall (*al*) of Kuch Bihar, which had been wrested by the Mughals early in the war.*

v3.c42.s4.2

In March 1664, Shaista Khan, the new governor of Bengal, reached Rajmahal, and announced his design to conquer Kuch Bihar on his way to Dacca. At the news of it, the Koch Rajah made his submission, offering to pay 5½ lakhs of Rupees as indemnity. The terms were accepted, and the Mughal army was ordered to withdraw from the Kuch frontier as soon as two instalments of this money were paid. We know that the tribute reached the imperial Court on 6th December 1665.†

v3.c42.s4.3

† *Fathiyah*, *Continuation*, 121 b; *Akhbarat*, 8th year, 14.

v3.c42.s4.4

Rajah Pran Narayan died in 1666, and thereafter, for nearly half a century, the State was paralysed by civil wars, royal oppression and internal disorder. The Mughals took advantage of it to extend their sway over the southern and eastern portions of the kingdom, conquering much of the present districts of Rangpur and western Kamrup, and forcing the Rajah in 1711 to confirm these gains by treaty.‡ The historian Ishwardas (123a) says that about 1685 Bhawanidas, son of Todar Mal, a deputy of the viceroy of Bengal, seized the capital of Kuch Bihar and expelled the Rajah, but that he perished with his entire army of 4,000 cavalry in a fire and the Rajah then recovered his city. No other authority supports this statement.

v3.c42.s4.5

∗ *Fathiyah*, 80 (why the Mughals were expelled from Kuch Bihar), 168, 170-171 (Mir Jumla's last dispositions for reconquest of Kuch Bihar); *Continuation*, 110 b.

v3.c42.s4.6

‡ H. N. Chaudhuri's *Cooch Behar State*, 238-241. "In 1687 the Mughals under Ibadat Khan occupied the three central *chaklas* of

§6. The Mags of Arrakan wrest Chatgaon from Bengal, 1459.

v3.c42.s5.1

From the Mongoloid peoples in the north-east of Bengal, we now turn to those in the south-east of the province, where the death of Mir Jumla was soon followed by a brilliant success of the highest value, the conquest of CHATGAON by Shaista Khan.

v3.c42.s5.2

The letter appointing Mir Jumla governor of Bengal had ordered him to chastise the rulers of Assam and Arrakan, after settling the affairs of his province. The Emperor's directions were that, after conquering Assam and restoring imperial prestige in that quarter, the army should march to Arrakan and try to rescue the unhappy survivors of the family of Shuja and get authentic news about

v3.c42.s5.3

Fathpur, Qazirhat and Kankina. The officers in charge of these, as well as Tepa, Manthona Jhori and other *parganas* consented to pay tribute to the *subah* of Bengal. Panga and Baikunthpur transferred their allegiance to the Musalmans." (240.) In 1711 the *chaklas* of Boda Patgram and Purbabhag were ceded to the Muslims.

v3.c42.s5.4

the end of that luckless prince.* Mir Jumla had died at the end of the Assam war. And, so, his second and unaccomplished task devolved upon his successor Shaista Khan.

v3.c42.s5.5

The district of Chatgaon was for many centuries the debatable land between the Muslim rulers of Bengal and the Mongoloid chiefs of Arrakan. Early in the 15th century a fugitive Rajah of Arrakan had taken refuge in Bengal and been restored (1430) to the throne by a Muslim army from Gaur. He had promised to be tributary to his patron, and he and his successors for many generations used to add Muslim titles, like Ali Khan, Sikandar Shah and Salim Shah, to their Burmese Pali names and to issue coins stamped with the Muslim confession of faith (*kalima*). But in the very next reign the Arrakanese threw off their political dependence on Bengal, and a little later (1459) they wrested the whole of the Chatgaon district from the Bengal Sultan, Barbak Shah. The decay of the Pathan monarchy and the anarchy attending the long-drawn Mughal conquest of Bengal in Akbar's reign gave the Arrakanese a free hand, and they now consolidated their authority over Chatgaon and even seized parts of the Noakhali and Tippara districts, up to the Meghna river.

v3.c42.s5.6

∗ The *farman* of appointment is given in Ishwardas, 50 *a*; Fathiyah, 25; Bernier, 179 (order to Shaista Khan).

v3.c42.s5.7

Early in the 17th century, Islam Khan, the viceroy of Bengal, recovered from the grasp of the Arrakanese the country east of the Meghna up to the Feni river, which thenceforth formed the eastern boundary of the Mughals. But here their further progress was arrested and during the next half century the Mag ascendency in the rivers and creeks of East Bengal became complete in consequence of Jahangir’s supine administration, the rebellion of his heir Shah Jahan, and the increase of the Arrakanese naval power by the infusion of a foreign element.*

§7. Portuguese pirates of Chatgaon.

v3.c42.s6.1

These were the Portuguese adventurers and their half-caste offspring. As early as 1517 the first Portuguese ship had touched at Arrakan and received an invitation to trade. In 1532 a closer intercourse sprang up: "big ships" of the foreigners began to visit the country, and, though they at first plundered the coast villages, friendlier relations were soon formed. Portuguese soldiers of fortune took service under the local Rajah and rose to great influence and power. The Portuguese traders made some settlements on the coast, especially at Dianga (22 miles south of Chatgaon town) and Syriam, at the mouth of the Pegu river.

v3.c42.s6.2

∗ Early history of Arrakan in Phayre's History of Burma, 77-79, 172. Previous encounters between the Arrakanese and the Mughal governors, Baharistan (best for 1608—1622); Fathiyah, Continuation, 154 b—156 a, 164a, 176 a and b; Stewart's History of Bengal, Sec. vi.

v3.c42.s6.3

But these were private men unauthorized by their sovereign's representative in India. Their main occupation was piracy in the Bay of Bengal, varied by service as mercenary soldiers and private trade in salt and such other commodities. Their power, by reason of its isolation from the Government of their mother country, was easily broken by the local princes, and they failed to found any independent colony in these parts. In 1607 the king of Arrakan took Dianga and massacred the foreign settlers. The most notorious of these pirates, Sebastian Gonzalves Tibao,* seized Sondip and two other islands at the head of the Bay of Bengal and created a reign of terror at the mouths of the Ganges by the range and boldness of his depredations, the ruthless vigour of his rule, his administrative capacity and inborn command over men. But in 1617 the Arrakanese conquered Sondip and Gonzalves disappeared from history. Syriam, too, was wrested from the Portuguese. Thereafter, the Portuguese settlers in Arrakan gave up all attempts at independence and territorial power, and lived on as the obedient instruments of the local Rajah.

v3.c42.s6.4

∗ Career of Sebastian Gonzalves, Campos's History of the Portuguese in Bengal, 81-87, 154-157 (best); Phayre, 174-176. Stewart's Bengal, vi. under Islam Kh. and Qasim Khan. Portuguese intercourse with Arrakan, Phayre, 79, 171-174. D'Anvers, ii. 123.

v3.c42.s6.5

The Burmese are noted for their skill in managing boats and loose formation fighting in jungle and river. Allied to the Portuguese, they became irresistible in our eastern waters. The Mughal soldiers,—Turks, Afghans and Rajputs alike,—were mere landsmen; expert riders, no doubt, but hopelessly inefficient on board ship. The sea was not their element, and they used to run into port for shelter at the least sign of a gale. The swift galleasses of the Arrakanese made raids in the rivers and creeks of Dacca and Bakarganj without meeting with any reprisal or even opposition from the local Mughal officers. After taking Sondip in 1617, the Arrakan king occupied a portion of the Bakarganj district. He sacked the town of Dacca itself in 1625 and for years afterwards continued to levy blackmail from Eastern Bengal. One Mughal viceroy, Khanahzad Khan, retired to Rajmahal in fear of the pirates, leaving the defence of Dacca to his subordinates. (Cont. 176b.)

v3.c42.s6.6

§8. Feringi pirates ravage East Bengal.

v3.c42.s6.7

A contemporary historian, Shihab-ud-din Talish, thus describes the ways of the pirates:— “The Arrakan pirates, both Mag and Feringi, used constantly to come by the water-route and plunder Bengal. They carried off the Hindus and Muslims that they could seize, pierced the palms of their hands, passed thin strips of cane through the holes and threw them huddled together under the decks of their ships. Every morning they flung down some uncooked rice to the captives from above, as we fling grain to fowl. On reaching home the pirates employed some of the hardy men that survived such treatment in tillage and other degrading pursuits. The others were sold to the Dutch, English and French merchants at the ports of the Deccan. Sometimes they brought their captives to the ports of Tamluk and Baleshwar for sale at high prices. Anchoring a short distance from the coast they sent a man ashore with information [about the prisoners]. The local officers, in fear of the pirates committing any depredation or kidnapping there, stood on the shore with a number of followers, and sent a man with money on board. If the terms were satisfactory, the pirates took the ransom and set the captives free with the man. Only the Feringis sold their prisoners. But the Mags employed all whom they had carried off in agriculture and other services, or as domestic servants and concubines."

v3.c42.s6.8

"As they continually practised raids for a long time, Bengal daily became more and more desolate and less and less able to resist them. Not a house was left inhabited on either side of the rivers lying on their track from Chatgaon to Dacca. The district of Bakla (i.e. Bakarganj and part of Dacca), which formerly abounded in houses and cultivated fields and yielded a large revenue as duty on betel-nuts, was swept so clean with their broom of plunder and abduction that none was left to tenant any house or kindle a light in that region."

v3.c42.s6.9

"The sailors of the Bengal flotilla were inspired with such fear of the pirates that whenever a hundred war-boats of the former sighted only four of the latter, the Bengal crew thought themselves lucky if they could save their lives by flight;* and when the distance was too short to permit escape, they—rowers, sepoys, and gunners alike—threw themselves overboard, preferring drowning to captivity."

v3.c42.s6.10

"Many Feringis living at Chatgaon used to visit the imperial dominions for plunder and abduction. Half their booty they gave to the Rajah of Arrakan, and the other half they kept. They were known as the *Harmad* (i.e., *Armada*) and owned a hundred swift *jalia* boats full of war-material.........Latterly the Rajah of Arrakan did not send his own fleet to plunder the Mughal territory, as he considered the Feringi pirates in the light of his servants and shared their booty."

v3.c42.s6.11

"When Shaista Khan asked the Feringi deserters, what salary the Mag king had assigned to them, they replied, ‘Our salary was the Mughal empire. We considered the whole of Bengal as our jagir! We had not to bother ourselves about amlas and amins, but levied our rent all the year round without any difficulty. We have kept the papers of the division of the booty for the last forty years.’”

v3.c42.s6.12

∗ This is supported by Bernier, p. 179.

v3.c42.s6.13

The contemporary European travellers, Bernier and Manucci, give them the lowest possible character: ‘‘These people (says the French doctor) were Christians only in name; the lives led by them were most detestable, massacring or poisoning one another without compunction or remorse, and sometimes assassinating even their priests, who were too often no better than their murderers’’ (p. 174). Manucci knew them to be equally bod, as ‘‘men hard of heart, accustomed to kill even little children without a regret. They boasted among themselves of having reached the very acme of evil-doing. If any one undertook to speak of these men, of their violence and of their barbarous habits, he would find enough to fill several books.’’ (ii. 117.)

v3.c42.s6.14

‘‘In Jahangir’s reign the Mag pirates used to come to Dacca for plunder by the stream which, after leaving the Brahmaputra, passes by Khizirpur and falls into the river of Dacca. Autumn and winter were the season of their raids. After some time this water-route to Dacca was closed by the drying up of the above stream and also some points in the Brahmaputra, and the pirates ceased to visit Dacca town, but plundered the villages only."

v3.c42.s6.15

Their lines of advance are thus clearly indicated by Shihab-ud-din Talish: "When the pirates came from Chatgaon to ravage Bengal, they skirted the imperial frontier post of Bhalua on their right and the island of Sondip on their left and reached the village of Sangramgarh, at the southern apex of the delta of Dacca, [some 36 miles from Dacca] and the then point of junction of the Brahmaputra and the Ganges. From this place they sailed up the Ganges if they wished to plunder Jessore, Hughli and Bhushna, or up the Brahmaputra if Vikrampur, Sonargaon and Dacca were their objective."*

v3.c42.s6.16

A heavy loss was caused to imperial revenue by the depopulation of the riverside areas of East Bengal. Imperial prestige was even more grievously affected. As Shihab-ud-din Talish complains, "In no other part of the Mughal dominions has any neighbouring infidel king the power to oppress and domineer over Muslims, but has to humble himself to save his lands; in Bengal alone the opposite is the case." (Cont., 125 a.) The safety of the province demanded that the nest of pirates should be conquered. Chatgaon was a convenient half-way house between Arrakan and Bengal, and the base of operations of the pirates. The king of Arrakan, therefore, strongly defended this outpost of his dominions. "Every year the Rajah of Arrakan sends to Chatgaon a hundred ships full of soldiers and artillery munitions, with a relieving officer, and then the former officer with the ships sent the previous year returns to Arrakan. There is always some trusted relative or faithful clansman of the Rajah in charge of the Government of Chatgaon." (Ibid., 163 b.)

v3.c42.s6.17

∗ Account of the Feringi pirates, in Fathiyah, Continuation 122 b—125 b, 108 a, 139 a and b, 150 b, 152 a, (translated in my Studies in Mughal India). Bernier, 174-179; A.N. 941.

v3.c42.s6.18

§9. Bengal flotilla created anew by Shaista Khan.

v3.c42.s6.19

At first sight, Shaista Khan's task seemed to be utterly hopeless. The Arrakanese were supreme at sea and had a long and unbroken record of success in keeping foreign invaders out of their land. "Their cannon are beyond computation and their war-vessels exceed the waves of the sea in number." On the other hand, the Mughal flotilla stationed in the eastern waters had now ceased to exist. "During the vice-royalty of Prince Shuja, great administrative confusion was produced by his slackness, and the rent-collectors by their extortion and violence ruined the estates which yielded the maintenance charge of the Bengal navy, 14 lakhs of Rupees a year. Mir Jumla abolished the old system of management and naval organization, but before he could set a new one afoot, he succumbed to disease. Many naval officers and men, too, perished in the Assam expedition, so that at the time of Mir Jumla’s death the Bengal navy (nawwara) was utterly ruined.* Early in 1664 the pirates came to Bagadia, in the Dacca district and defeated Munawwar Khan, a zamindar, who bore the high title of the cruising admiral. The few war-vessels that still belonged to the nawwara were thus lost, and its name alone was left in Bengal.” (Continuation, 112b—122.)

v3.c42.s6.20

But Shaista Khan’s spirit and energy overcame every obstacle : a navy was created anew and manned and equipped for war in a little over a year. Immediately on his arrival in Bengal, (March, 1664) he issued urgent orders to the Inspector of the Fleet to renovate the nawwara, gave him plenary powers, and sent bailiffs to every province to seize the timber and ship-wrights and take them to the great dockyards of Dacca. Boats were also built at the minor ports, such as Hughli, Jessore, Chilmari, Karibari, and Baleshwar. At Dacca, where he arrived in December, “he devoted all his energy to the rebuilding of the flotilla. Not for a moment did he neglect to mature plans for assembling the crew, laying in stores of provisions and needments, and collecting carpenters and ship-building materials. For all posts in the navy expert officers were selected. Through his ceaseless exertions in a short time nearly 300 ships were built and equipped." (Cont., 115b, 137b—138a.)

v3.c42.s6.21

∗ In 1662, during Mir Jumla’s absence in Assam, the pirates carried off from the neighbourhood of Dacca the Mughal ‘cruising admiral’ who was the adopted son of the deputy governor of Dacca, and advanced plundering up to Nazirpur, on the way to Rajmahal.” Fathiyah, Continuation, 125 b.

§10. Conquest of Sondip as a base.

v3.c42.s7.1

A navy having been created, the next step was to secure bases for the coming expedition against Chatgaon. At Dhapa, six miles s. e. of Dacca town, a hundred war-vessels were stationed and 200 more at Sangramgarh* 30 miles further south, the two posts being connected by a military road raised above the flood level. The island of Sondip is a very convenient half-way house between Sangramgarh and Chatgaon, being only six hours' sail of the latter town. It had hitherto been a no-man's land, which the Portuguese pirates and Arrakanese troops had successively occupied and deluged in blood. Its present master was Dilawwar, a run-away captain of the Mughal navy, but a warrior and ruler of remarkable ability.

v3.c42.s7.2

∗ Sangramgarh, "18 kos from Dacca" (Cont. 140 a), and "21 kos from Sripur" (A.N. 944), which last was opposite Chandpur (Cont. 164 a). Daapeka Kella in Rennell's Atlas, Sh. XII.

v3.c42.s7.3

The first Mughal attack on the island was made on 9th November, 1665 by admiral Abul Hasan. Dilawwar, now an old man of eighty, fought with the valour of a youth and the skill of a veteran, but was defeated and driven with two wounds into the jungle in the interior. The Mughals, who had brought no horses with them, withdrew after dismantling both his forts and removing the artillery. Nine days later they returned in full strength. Dilawwar, who had repaired his forts, fought with the same heroism as before, but was vanquished and taken away in chains to Dacca with his family of 92 men women and children, as prisoners of war. There the wounded lion died in his cage in a few days. His grown up sons were kept in confinement, but land was granted for the support of the younger members of his family. A Mughal garrison of a thousand men was put in the island, and it was brought under the imperial civil administration.*

§11. The Feringis of Chatgaon come over to the Mughals.

v3.c42.s8.1

Meantime Shaista Khan had been trying hard to cut off the right arm of the enemy, by winning the Feringis of Chatgaon over. He had sent them tempting offers of service under the Mughals, by means of their brethren trading at Larikol, Tamluk and Hughli. At this time there was some friction between them and their Arrakanese masters. The story of Shaista Khan's intrigue with them* had reached the ears of the Mag king and he planned to lure their families to his capital and massacre the Feringi men at Chatgaon. Just then, some of the Feringis assassinated a great prince of Arrakan, and in fear of punishment the whole colony hurriedly fled from Chatgaon with their families and property in 42 *jalia* boats, and sailed to Farhad Khan, the Mughal commandant of Noakhali (December, 1665), who sent their Chief Captain to Shaista Khan at Dacca. A bounty of Rs. 2,000 and a monthly pay of Rs. 500 were given to the Chief Captain,† and their other leaders were rewarded with similar liberality and enrolled in the imperial service.

v3.c42.s8.2

∗ Sondip : Fathiyah, Cont., 142 b-145 a (description of island), 147 a-150 a (conquest); A.N. 944-946 (conquest). Traditions about Dilawwar, Journal of the Moslem Institute (Calcutta), vol. iii, No. 1 (July, 1907.)

v3.c42.s8.3

† *Fathiyah*, Continuation, 153 *a*. Manucci says that Rs. 50,000 had been paid in advance to the captain through his brother, a merchant of Hughli, named Antonio de Rego, as a bribe for desertion. (ii. 118). The Persian histories call him *Capitao mor*, which is a Portuguese title meaning 'chief captain' and is not a family name.

v3.c42.s8.4

"The coming over of the Feringis gave composure to the hearts of the people of Bengal......The viceroy regarded this event as the commencement of victory." The Chief Captain informed him that the Arrakanese king, secure in the strength of the Feringis, had hitherto neglected the defence and provisioning of Chatgaon and that the place could be easily taken if the Mughals attacked it immediately without giving him time to wake up and send reinforcements from his capital.

v3.c42.s8.5

∗ Winning over of the Feringis.—*Fathiyah*, Cont. 116 *b*, 150 *b*—152 *a*; Bernier, 180—181; *Storia*, ii. 118; *A. N.* 946—947.

§12. Expedition starts against Chatgaon.

v3.c42.s9.1

No time was, therefore, lost on the Mughal side. On 24th December, 1665, the expeditionary force, 6,500 strong, left Dacca under command of Buzurg Ummed Khan, a son of Shaista Khan.[*] The imperial fleet numbered 288 vessels of all kinds,—21 of them being gunboats or *ghurabs*, 157 fast-rowing *kosas*, and 96 *jalias*. The Feringis, with about 40 vessels of their own, acted as auxiliaries.

v3.c42.s9.2

The army and navy were concentrated at Noakhali. The plan of campaign was that the fleet under Ibn Husain should creep along the coast, while the army should march parallel to it, each supporting the other. Farhad Khan, who had won his laurels in the Assam war, led the vanguard, and advanced cutting the jungle along the sea-shore stage by stage and making a way.

v3.c42.s9.3

∗ Mughal conquest of Chatgaon, *Fathiyah, Continuation*, 158 *a*—175 *b* (MS. abruptly ends on 27 Jan. 1666), translated by me in *Studies in Mughal India*. A.N. 947-956; Phayre, 180 (scanty). No detail in Bernier or Manucci.

v3.c42.s9.4

Leaving Noakhali Farhad Khan reached the frontier outpost of Jagdia on 12th January, 1666, crossed the Feni river two days later, and entered the Arrakanese territory.

v3.c42.s9.5

The fleet entered the Kumaria creek only two marches short of Chatgaon, and landed a body of pioneers who began to cut the jungle *forward* in the direction of Chatgaon and *behind* towards the advancing army, which was also clearing a way in its front. The two divisions joined hands on the 21st. Buzurg Ummed Khan brought up the rear several miles behind.* Beyond this point the jungle was very dense and the road very bad, so that Farhad Khan's advance was extremely slow.

§13. Naval battles.

v3.c42.s10.1

On the 23rd, the Mughal admiral sailed out of Kumaria and encountered the enemy's fleet, consisting of 10 *ghurabs* and 45 *jalias*, which had come out of the Kathalia creek to give battle. The Feringis led the Mughal Van, and their onset decided the day. The Mags in the *ghurabs* jumped overboard giving their ships up to capture, while the *jalias* fled. But the defeated force was only the light squardon of the Arrakan navy. Their larger ships,—called *khalus* and *dhums* which carried more guns,—were now discovered in the Hurla creek. Ibn Husain sailed against them, and they too came out into the open sea. The two lines stood facing each other and there was only a distant artillery duel, but no closer action, during the afternoon and night.

v3.c42.s10.2

∗ Talish says that on 21st January, when Farhad Khan joined Ibn Husain in the Khamaria creek, Buzurg Ummed Khan arrived with the main army three *kos* behind. (Cont. 161 *b.*) But *A.N.* (949) says that on that date the Commander-in-Chief was 8 *kos* in the rear of this advanced position, and 20 *kos* from Chatgaon.

v3.c42.s10.3

The second and greater victory was won next morning (24th January), when "the Muslims flying their victorious banners, beating their drums, and sounding their bugles and trumpets, advanced upon the enemy, firing their guns and putting their biggest ships in the front line and their smaller and faster boats in the rear." The enemy again resorted to flight, their light *jalias* taking the bigger gunboats in tow, and retreated into the Karnafuli river, firing on the advancing Mughals. Entering the mouth of the river at 3 P.M., they drew up their ships in line of battle between Chatgaon and an island in mid-stream. On the opposite bank, close to the village of Feringi-bandar, the Arrakanese had erected three bamboo stockades, filled with artillery and musketeers (*Telingas*). These opened fire on the Mughal fleet. But Ibn Husain sent most of his ships up the river and also made an attack by land. The garrison, after a stubborn fight, abandoned the stockades, which the Mughals burnt.

v3.c42.s10.4

Then the Mughals, flushed with victory, "dashed themselves upon the enemy's ships. The Chief Captain and other Feringi pirates, the Nawab's officers and Munawwar Khan *zamindar* came swiftly up from different sides. A great battle was fought. The fort of Chatgaon also opened fire on the Mughals. At last the enemy were vanquished; many of their sailors jumped overboard and escaped by swimming, a few being drowned; the rest were slain or taken prisoner. Several of the Arrakanese ships were sunk by gun-fire or ramming, and the remainder consisting of 135 vessels became the prize of the victors. Thus the Chatgaon squadron of the Arrakanese navy was annihilated at one blow.

§14. Capture of Chatgaon fort.

v3.c42.s11.1

After the victory, the imperial fleet anchored in the river a little below the town. Here many more Feringis joined them. Next day, (25th January) the fort of Chatgaon was besieged. The Arrakanese garrison resisted for a day; but they were hopelessly weakened by the loss of their entire fleet and thrown into despair by the news of the near approach of the Mughal land-forces under Farhad Khan. Early in the morning of the 26th the fort capitulated to Ibn Husain; but the disorderly followers of the zamindar Munawwar Khan who entered first with a view to plunder, set fire to the houses, and much of the town, including two state elephants, was burnt. The Arrakanese also fled from the fort on the other bank of the Karnafuli river, but the fugitives were attacked and plundered by their former slaves, the kidnapped Muslims of Bengal who had been settled here as peasants.

v3.c42.s11.2

Meantime, ever since hearing the news of the advance of the fleet on the 23rd, the army under Farhad Khan had been making strenuous efforts to force a way through the dense jungle towards Chatgaon. At his approach the Mags abandoned their outposts in his way. The Commander-in-Chief himself arrived at Chatgaon on the 26th and made his triumphal entry into the fort the next day. The prize taken was of little money value. It consisted of three elephants, 1026 pieces of cannon made of brass and iron (mostly small pieces, carrying 1 lb. or smaller shot), many matchlocks and camel-swivels (zamburaks), and much ammunition. To this must be added the price of two thousand Mag captives, taken in the entire campaign, and sold into slavery. But the most glorious result of the victory was the release and restoration to home of thousands of Bengal peasants who had been kidnapped by the pirates and held in serfdom. As Shaista Khan very happily put it in his reply to the Emperor's inquiry about the money gain from the newly conquered province, "In truth, its revenue (jama) is the composure (jamait) of the minds of the Muslims [with regard to the pirates]. We can easily imagine how fast cultivation will increase in Bengal, now that Mag violence has been put down." (Cont., 174b.) The fall of Chatgaon caused indescribable joy throughout Bengal. The victors were highly rewarded by the Court. The Nawab gave "wealth beyond measure to the Feringi pirates and one month's pay as bounty to his own officers and the crew of the nawwara." (Cont., 172b.)

v3.c42.s11.3

§15. Later history of Chatgaon in Mughal possession.

v3.c42.s11.4

The new conquest was placed under direct Mughal administration. Chatgaon became the seat of a Mughal faujdar, and the name of the town was changed by imperial order to Islamabad. A detachment under Mir Murtaza took the port of Ramu, some sixty miles further south; but it was soon afterwards evacuated, as the distance of the outpost was too great and the land-route to it too full of difficulties to make its retention easy.

v3.c42.s11.5

In April 1670, the Arrakanese were reported to be planning a raid into Chatgaon. (Akhbarat, 13—17.) But probably nothing came of it, as their country now entered on a long period of internal disorders, the archers of the royal guard massacring the royal family and setting up and pulling down puppet kings. In 1710 this Pretorian corps was suppressed. At the same time the death of Aurangzib was followed by a decline of Mughal power east of the Feni river, and the Arrakanese king plundered Sondip and Hatiya. "But Chatgaon, which the kings of Arrakan had possessed for a century and a quarter was lost, and since that time the Arrakanese have never, except during plundering incursions, held any of the country north of Ramu." (Phayre, 180-181.)

v3.c42.s11.6

Thus, early in the reign of Aurangzib, the Mag power in Chatgaon fell for ever, without a worthy struggle. Such is the fate of nations that prefer ease to manly exertion, the acquisition of wealth to patriotic sacrifice, and leave their national defence in the hands of aliens.