History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v3.c49.s12: §13. Guerilla warfare in Marwar.
History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v3.c49.s12
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§13. Guerilla warfare in Marwar.
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But in Marwar the imperial arms met with no better success than in Mewar. The Rathor bands spread over the country, appearing unexpectedly in different quarters and scoring a success wherever a Mughal outpost was weakly held, closing the trade routes, and keeping the land in perpetual turmoil. No great pitched battle was fought, but the Mughal general was distracted by the ever present alarm and the necessity of reinforcing threatened points in time; his divisional commanders were worn out by their ceaseless marches and counter-marches in the vain attempt to clear the country of the elusive Rajput bands and keep the roads open for traffic. All parts of Marwar,—Jhalor and Siwana in the south, Godwar in the east, Nagor in the extreme north, and Didwana and Sambhar in the north-east, were invaded by Ajit's partisans in turn, always by surprise, and some times oftener than once.
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§14. Prince Akbar's campaign in Rajputana.
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On entering Marwar, Akbar's instructions were to make the central position at Sojat secure, then occupy Nadol, the chief town of the Godwar district, from which new base his Van under Tahawwur Khan was to advance eastwards into Mewar by the city of Narlai, force the Deosuri Pass, and invade the Kamalmir region, where the Maharana and the defeated Rathors had taken refuge, and from which they used to make sallies. But it took many months to carry this plan out. So great was the terror inspired by the "death-loving" Rajputs that Tahawwur's troops stopped at Kharwa, on the way to Nadol, refusing to advance (early in August). When, a month later, they did reach Nadol, the same fear and inactivity were again displayed. Therefore, the Commander-in-Chief had to go to the place himself, to drive them forward. After making arrangements for the patrolling of the roads and the supply of provisions, establishing a chain of outposts from Jodhpur to Sojat and thence to Nadol, and organizing bodies of pioneers and water-carriers for the campaign in Mewar, Akbar left Sojat on 21st September, and reached Nadol at the end of the month. But Tahawwur Khan refused to enter the hills, and Akbar had to use compulsion towards his timid lieutenant. On 27th September the Khan advanced towards the mouth of the pass to reconnoitre. The Rajputs under Bhim Singh, the second son of the Maharana, descended from the hills and gave battle, with losses on both sides.[*]
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Then, for more than a month and a half, we have a long spell of delay which is mysterious. As early as the end of May, the Maharana had proposed terms through Tahawwur Khan; Rathor envoys had been visiting the Khan's camp off and on since the beginning of August. Akbar had warned the Emperor not to take these overtures seriously, as they were clearly intended to delay the Mughal invasion.[†] Tahawwur Khan had, however, been instructed to win over to his side as many Rathor and Sisodia nobles as he could, and he was, therefore, constantly holding parley with them. How early he had yielded to Rajput seduction and decided to play the traitor, we do not know. But from September 1680 we notice a suspicious slackening of his activity. He is no longer the brave and dashing officer who, as commander of Akbar's Van in the first Jodhpur campaign and the war in eastern Mewar, had won the Emperor's praise and the title of Padishah Quli Khan. He will not advance unless a sergeant-at-arms is sent to compel him; he pleads the difficulty of the roads, the smallness of his own force, and the enemy's overwhelming numbers.
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∗ The battle has been very graphically described by Ishwardas, 77b-78b. Adab (Nos. 670 and 700) and Tod, i. p. 401, briefly refer to it.
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† Adab, Nos. 662, 716, 723, 724.
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After more than six weeks had been wasted while Akbar sat down at Nadol and Tahawwur Khan at the village of Deosuri near the entrance to the pass, the prince found that his father's patience had been worn out. The Emperor sent him money and reinforcements under the Paymaster Ruhullah Khan with orders to enforce a forward movement of the division. Further delay could not be excused. So, Akbar advanced his base from Nadol to Deosuri (19th November), and from the latter village sent Tahawwur Khan on to force the Jhilwara Pass (22nd). Three thousand musketeers crowned the ridges right and left in long files, while the Khan, at the head of six thousand picked cavalry, dashed into the narrow defile between. The Rajputs offered a stubborn resistance in defence of their stronghold; many were slain on both sides, but the Mughals advanced to Jhilwara, fighting and carrying the barricades across the path. Ammunition, provisions, and baggage were pushed up to them from the rear by Akbar, and the Khan, from his station at Jhilwara, began to ravage the neighbouring country freely. The Mughal advanced position was strengthened in flank and rear by planting outposts at Someshwar in the north and Sadri in the south of it, building a redoubt at Deosuri, and daily patrolling the road from Narlai to the pass. Other outposts under loyal Rajput officers radiated west, north and east, from Nadol as a centre.
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The advance to Jhilwara was made on 22nd November. The next step would have been to push on eight miles south to Kamalmir, the last refuge of the Rana. But during the next five weeks we have again the same suspicious inactivity on Tahawwur Khan's part. Akbar in his despatches to his father weakly complains of his lieutenant's procrastination and defers his own advance till the arrival of fresh reinforcements. But, in truth, the prince's treasonable plot was fully hatched during this period. On 1st January, 1681 he united with the Rajput rebels, issued a manifesto deposing his father, and crowned himself Emperor; and the next day he set out for Ajmir to wrest the Mughal crown from Aurangzib's brows.