History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v4.c60.s4: § 4. Desultory fighting, 1661-63.
History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v4.c60.s4
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§ 4. Desultory fighting, 1661-63.
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Shivaji's defeat at Chakan and Panhala was followed by a lull in the war during the last three months of the year 1660, which he spent quietly at Rajgarh, in planning how to compensate himself for these losses in the Desh country by transferring the war to another part of Bijapuri territory, namely Konkan, or the country west of the Sahyadri range, where the government was very weakly exercised by countless petty vassal Rajahs and Bijapuri city-governors.
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Shaista Khan, too, on his return to Puna (end of August 1660) after the capture of Chakan, spent the rainy season there in enforced inactivity. Nor was he eager to lay siege to any more Maratha forts, as even the small and comparatively weak castle of Chakan, situated in the plain, had cost him nearly nine hundred men to take it. He employed his time more usefully in inducing Ghalib, the Bijapuri commandant of Parenda, to surrender that fort to Aurangzib for a high price. The terms were approved by the Emperor, and large Mughal forces were detached from Puna to Parenda to take possession of it (20th November), overawe any opposition that might be made at the last moment, and occupy the district around it.
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At the beginning of next year (1661), Shaista Khan turned his attention to the Kalian district or North Konkan. Here a small Mughal force, only 3,000 strong, under Ismail, had been operating since April last and had occupied a part of the country, though the important cities and forts (like Kalian) remained unconquered. These gains had been placed under a faujdar named Salabat Khan Deccani, with a contingent of friendly Marathas.
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But local levies could effect little, and it was necessary to complete the Mughal conquest of Konkan and extinguish the last traces of Shivaji's power there by pouring into the country large reinforcements of imperial troops under a high commander. The general chosen for this purpose was Kar Talb Khan, an Uzbak.
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Marching from Puna by way of Lohgarh, Kar Talb Khan descended into Konkan by a pass a little to the south of the Bhorghat. While his soldiers, encumbered with artillery and baggage, struggled painfully and in alarm through the dense jungles, steep rocks and narrow broken roads on to Umbarkhind (about 15 miles due east of Pen), Shivaji by secret and rapid marches came up with them and cut off their lines of advance and retreat alike. Kar Talb had to offer battle under these adverse conditions and suffered heavy losses. His army seemed doomed to perish from thirst, without the power to move. In despair he gave up all the property in his camp and paid a large ransom to Shivaji and thus bought a safe retreat for his army (3rd February, 1661.)
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The victorious Shivaji now divided his forces; and while one army under Netaji was detached to act against the Mughals, he himself with the other invaded Bijapuri territory in Konkan, "to avenge the loss of Panhala." The Kalian district having been thus freed from the new enemies, Shivaji left it alone, and marched southwards, easily capturing city after city, till all the coast-strip from Danda-Rajpuri to Kharepatan was commanded by him.
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But these successes were chequered by a great defeat. In May 1661 the Mughals wrested Kalian from the Marathas and kept hold of it for nine years more. Maratha activities were resumed in 1662. Shivaji attacked Namdar Khan, at Mira Dongar (6 m. s.w. of Pen) and then raided the rich city of Pen. The Mughal defence was obstinate and the Marathas suffered a heavy loss.
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On the whole, throughout the year 1662 and the first quarter of 1663, some Mughal generals (esp. Namdar Khan) showed great activity and success in attacking the Marathas or spoiling their raids by close pursuit. The net result of the operations of these two years was that the Mughals kept their grip on the extreme north of Konkan, while Shivaji remained master of the southern part.
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In March 1663, the Mughals gave a long and vigorous chase to Netaji, the Master of the Horse in Shivaji's army. Netaji got away, though not without the loss of 300 horse and himself wounded.
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§ 5. Shivaji's night-attack on Shaista Khan.
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But within a month of meeting with this reverse to his arms, Shivaji dealt a masterly blow at the Mughals,—a blow whose cleverness of design, neatness of execution and completeness of success created in the Mughal Court and camp as much terror of his prowess and supposed magical powers as his coup against Afzal Khan had done among the Bijapuris. He surprised and wounded the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan in the heart of his camp, in his very bedchamber, within the inner ring of his body-guards and female slaves.
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Shaista Khan had, as we have seen, seized Puna in May 1660 and retired there after the fall of Chakan in August next. He took up his residence in what was then the best house of the future Maratha capital, the unpretentious home of Shivaji's childhood. His harem was with him, and around his mansion lay the quarters of his guards and attendants, the band-room and offices. Further off, across the road leading southwards to Singh-garh lay the camp of his lieutenant, Maharajah Jaswant Singh and his contingent of 10,000 men.
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To surprise him here was an enterprise that required no less agility and cunning than bravery and dash. Shivaji picked out a thousand of his bravest and most expert soldiers and took them with him, while two supporting divisions of one thousand each (including cavalry and Mavlés) under Netaji Palkar and Moro Pant the *Peshwa*, were directed to take post on the two flanks of the vast Mughal encampment, at a mile’s distance from its outer side. Babaji Bapuji and Chimnaji Bapuji, of Khed, accompanied Shivaji as his body-guards and right-hand men in this enterprise.
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The Maratha force, lightly equipped, set out from Singh-garh, covered the intervening eleven miles rapidly in the course of the day, and arrived at Puna after nightfall (Sunday, 5th April, 1663.) With 400 picked men Shivaji entered the limits of the camp, replying to the challenge of the Mughal guards that they were Deccani soldiers of the imperial army going to take up their appointed posts. After resting for a few hours in some obscure corner of the camp, the party arrived near the Khan’s quarters at midnight. Shivaji knew the ins and outs of the city and every nook and corner of the house where he had passed his bodyhood and youth.
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It was the sixth day of *Ramzan*, the month of fasting for Muslims. The servants of the Nawab’s household had mostly fallen asleep after their day’s abstinence followed by the heavy meal at night. Some cooks who had risen from bed to make a fire and prepare the meal which is taken a little before dawn in the month of *Ramzan*, were despatched by the Marathas without any noise. The wall dividing this outer kitchen from the body-servants' room within the harem once had a small door in it, but the opening had been closed with brick and mud to complete the seclusion of the harem. The Marathas began to take out the bricks and make an opening there. The noise of their pick-axes and the groans of the dying awoke some of the servants, who reported the suspicious noise to the Khan, but that general only rebuked them for disturbing his sleep for a trifle.
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Soon the breach in the wall was large enough for a man to creep through. Shivaji, with his trusty lieutenant Chimnaji Bapuji, was the first to enter the harem, and was followed by 200 of his men. The place was a maze of canvas, screen-wall after screen-wall and enclosure within enclosure. Hacking a way through them with his sword, Shivaji reached the very bed-room of the Khan. The frightened women roused the Nawab, but before he could use his weapons Shivaji was upon him and severed his thumb with one stroke of his sword. It was evidently at this time that the lamps in the room were put out by some wise woman. In the darkness two of the Marathas tumbled into a cistern of water; and the confusion that followed was used by Shaista Khan's slave-girls to carry him away to a place of safety. The Marathas continued their work of slaughter in the darkness for some time, killing and wounding eight of the Khan's women, probably without knowing their sex.
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Meantime the other half of Shivaji's force, the 200 men, evidently under Babaji Bapuji, who had been left outside the harem, had rushed the main guard, slaying the sleepers and the awake and crying in derision, "Is it thus that you keep watch?" They next entered the band-room and ordered the bandsmen, as if from the Khan, to play. The loud noise of the kettle-drums drowned all voices, and the yells of the enemy swelled the confusion. The tumult in the harem, too, now became so great that the Mughal troops became aware that their general was being attacked. Shouting "The enemy have come," they began to take up their arms.
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Abul Fath, a son of Shaista Khan, had been the first to hasten to his father's rescue without waiting for others; but the brave youth was slain after he had struck down two or three Marathas. Another Mughal captain who lodged just behind the harem enclosure, finding its gate closed from within by the wily Marathas, let himself down inside by means of a rope-ladder; but he was at once attacked and killed.
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Shivaji, finding his enemies fully awakened and arming, delayed no longer, but promptly left the harem, called his men together, and withdrew from the camp by the direct route, while the Mughals, not knowing where their enemies were, fruitlessly searched all their camp.
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This night-attack was a complete success. The retreat from the camp was unmolested and no pursuit was made. During the surprise the Marathas lost only six men killed and forty wounded, while they slew a son and a captain of Shaista Khan, forty of his attendants and six of his wives and slave-girls, besides wounding two other sons, eight other women and Shaista Khan himself.
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The daring and cunning of the Maratha hero were rewarded by an immense increase of his prestige. He was taken to be an incarnation of Satan; no place was believed to be proof against his entrance and no feat impossible for him. The whole country talked with astonishment and terror of the almost superhuman deed done by him; and there was bitter humiliation and sorrow in the Emperor's Court and family circle at this disaster to his maternal uncle and the "premier peer" (amir-ul-umara) of his empire.
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This attack took place on 5th April, 1663. The morning following it, all the imperial officers came to Shaista Khan to condole with him in his loss. Among them was Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who had not raised a finger to defend his chief or to oppose the retreat of his assailant, though he had 10,000 horse under him and lay encamped across the road taken by Shivaji. Shaista Khan, with the polished sneer of a high-bred Mughal courtier, turned to Jaswant and merely remarked, "When the enemy fell upon me, I imagined that you had already died fighting against them." Indeed, the public, both in the Mughal camp and throughout the Deccan, ascribed Shivaji's exploit to the connivance of Jaswant.
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The Mughal viceroy, covered with shame and grief, retired to Aurangabad for greater safety. The Emperor heard of the disaster early in May, when on the way to Kashmir, and ascribed it to the viceroy's negligence and incapacity. As a mark of his displeasure, he transferred Shaista Khan to the government of Bengal, (1 Dec. 1663) which was then regarded as a penal province, or in Aurangzib's own words, "a hell well stocked with bread," without permitting him even to visit the Emperor on his way to his new charge. The Khan left the Deccan about the middle of January 1664, on being relieved by Prince Muazzam.