History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v4.c64.s12: § 18. Shambhuji's war with the Portuguese (concluded.)
History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v4.c64.s12
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§ 18. Shambhuji's war with the Portuguese (concluded.)
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In the northern theatre of this war, "the Portuguese were severely beaten." Kambara, Tulloja (? Tulini) and Kolva were taken by the Peshwa, while Thana and Salsette were in risk of sharing the same fate, (end of November 1683.) Shortly afterwards, Mahim, Quelme (=Kelva), Duntarah (? Dhansar), Sarragom (? Shirgaon), and Supara [Atlas, Sh. 24 S. E.] were captured, and Sabajo burnt; on 22nd December the island of Karinja, only 10 miles south-east of Bombay, was occupied by the Marathas. A month afterwards, the English factors express a fear that "in a short time from Chaul up to Daman in appearance all may be his." (Bomb. to Surat, 28th Nov. and 23rd Dec. 1683 in F.R. Surat 109; Surat to Co., 25th Jan. 1684 in Vol. 91.)
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∗ Karwar to Surat, 26 Nov. 1683. All the Portuguese records, the English F. R. with the sole exception of this Karwar letter, and even Manucci (who was present at Goa at the time) are silent about Shambhuji's occupation of Kumbarju. The only authority for it, in addition to the Karwar letter, is the Jedhe chronicle. From this Pissurlencar [ii. 47n] very plausibly suggests that the incident really refers to the Maratha occupation of Santo Estevao, the Kumbhar-juve (=Kumbarju) of the story being a popular mistake for Jua (the local name of S. Estevao), and the mistake was all the more natural as the two islands are close to each other.
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Shah Alam's invasion of S. Konkan diverted the Maratha forces from that direction and "gave the Portuguese a little breathing time." They "took this opportunity and made peace with the Rajah, the restoration of Karinja being promised to them."
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By the time that Shah Alam occupied Bicholim (5 Jan. 1684) and a Mughal fleet rode into Goa harbour (8 Jan.), Shambhuji hurriedly fled northwards to his capital, leaving Kavi-kalash as his plenipotentiary for concluding a peace with the Portuguese through the mediation of Akbar. These two at first took refuge from the Mughals in the forest of Bhimgarh (27 m. east of Goa) and then at Phonda and settled the terms with the Portuguese envoy, Manuel S. de Albuquerque (about 20 January.)
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The agreement arrived at between the two Powers was—
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(1) That Shambhuji would return all the lands forts &c. which he had seized in Portuguese India, together with the arms, vessels, goods and prisoners taken by his officers before and during the war.
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(2) That the Portuguese would make a similar restitution of their captures.
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(3) That Shambhuji would be paid the gaon-khandi of the district of Bassein and chauth for the province of Daman, on condition of defending the Portuguese possessions and giving free passage to the traders and vessels of the other side through his territory.
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(4) That the Portuguese would not permit ships with materials for the Mughal Emperor to pass within gunshot of their forts.
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(5) That Shambhuji would pardon the desais of his territory who, after joining his enemies, had taken refuge in the Portuguese possessions.
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But this treaty, forced on Shambhuji by a greater fear, was neither ratified nor respected by him. It was a hollow truce. As the English factors of Surat write on 28 March, "There is now a cessation of arms... and we hope there may be a peace, the Portuguese having been soundly banged and all their aldeas (villages) and battec ground (corn-fields) burnt and ruined."
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When Shah Alam's expedition to South Konkan ended in disaster through famine and pestilence (March 1684), the Maratha king* prepared for a second encounter with the Portuguese, wishing "ere long to be master of all their country." He could never forgive the atrocities committed by the Portuguese, such as "burning men alive and destroying pagodas" (mentioned in an English letter, Karwar to Surat, 4 Sep. 1683.) On 10th March his armada brought into Karwar several Portuguese rice-boats they had seized, while his army was gathering near Phonda to make a sudden attack upon Goa. (F.R. Surat 109, Karwar to Surat.) In June the Viceroy visited all his forts, as he was unable to pay the tribute Shambhuji demanded, and a Maratha incursion was to be apprehended. On 19th September the Portuguese attacked and recovered the high hill in Karinja island (crowned with a church) that had been occupied by Shambhuji nine months earlier, and they made prisoners of the entire Maratha garrison in the island. And for some time afterwards Shambhuji and the Portuguese continued to "snarl and snap at each other." (Karwar to Surat, 15 Sep.) However, by October next, a sort of peace was at last patched up, and Karinja island was formally restored to the Portuguese, to the immense relief of the English at Bombay. But languid hostilities with the Portuguese continued till the end of Shambhuji's reign.
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∗ Pissurlencar (il. 63) illustrates how Shambhuji broke his treaty promises in every possible way.
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It was extremely foolish on the part of the Portuguese to have provoked a war with Shambhuji.* They had neither the men nor the money, neither the armament nor (if we may believe their English trade-rivals) the courage adequate to a contest with the Maratha king. The English, on the other hand, kept their heads cool and long followed the delicate and difficult policy of "keeping fair" with Shambhuji, the Siddi and the Mughals alike For example, after the naval battle with Shivaji about Khanderi, they wisely put their dignity in their pocket and made peace with him to avoid ruinous expense and the loss of white troops. The Portuguese Viceroy unwisely rushed into war and lost much in men money and the property of his villagers, besides subjecting Goa to the risk of capture. Aurangzib, on whose friendship and co-operation he relied and who had induced him to attack the Marathas, was a broken reed, as his real aim was to annex Goa after exterminating Shambhuji. (Storia, ii. 260—282; O. C. 5642.) Shambhuji, too, made a great mistake by frittering away his army and resources in a war on the western coast, which could not really benefit him on account of his want of sea-power,—at a time when his great enemy Aurangzib was posted in full force on his eastern flank. The Portuguese war remained an open sore for years and continued to drain the blood of the Maratha State.
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∗ Pissurlencar [ii. 68 et seq.] argues against this view, the gist of his contention being that it was the time-honoured policy of the Portuguese ever since the days of Akbar to remain friendly with the Mughal empire. But this does not explain the Viceroy's open breach with Shambhuji in 1682.