History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v4.c64.s8: § 9. Akbar's relations with Shambhuji.
History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v4.c64.s8
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§ 9. Akbar's relations with Shambhuji.
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In his obscure village refuge Prince Akbar kept up the pageant of an Emperor as far as his reduced means allowed. He held public Court (darbar-i-am) without subjects, maintained a Chancellor of the Exchequer (diwan) without any revenue, and wrote letters in the imperial style dated in the years of his reign! Mercenary horsemen were constantly joining him, and by the month of August he had collected about 2,000 cavalry in his pay.
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∗ Kavi kalash could not have been the minister of Shambhuji's pleasure as Orme (following Manucci) calls him because Shambhu had already learnt to outrage women in his father's lifetime, and wine-drinking and meat-eating are customary among the Maratha caste to which the Rajah belonged Nor can the failure of Shambhuji's reign, compared with the glorious success of Shivaji's be attributed to this minister, because Moro Pant himself had been unable to induce his young master to achieve anything great It is not contended that Kavi kalash filled the administration with his own men as the other seven pradhans and all the lower officers were men of Maharashtra It is therefore, historically untrue to make Kavi kalash the scapegoat for Shambhu's sins (His unpopularity with the Maratha ministers of the time (and, therefore, with the Maratha historians ever after) was due solely to the fact that he gained the royal favour and they could not) Could he have possibly reformed a character on which Ramdas's teaching produced no effect? Odium theologicum intensified the political hatred felt by the Maratha Brahmans for Kavi kalash, they were vegetarians and Vaishnavas or Shaivas by creed, but he was a Shakta and Tantric worshipper, whose beliefs and rites were abominated by them The mutual jealousy between the priests of these two creeds and their sordid rivalry for the royal patronage are luridly illustrated in the Shiva-abisheka-Kalpataru
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But the rapid increase of Akbar's forces and the assembling of thousands of foreign troopers round him alarmed Shambhuji. At the end of July the Maratha Rajah warned his guest, "If you wish to raise an army, go away to some other kingdom. But if you wish to live in my realm, you must remain in the same condition that you came in." He forbade any more men to join Akbar, but fixed a daily subsistence allowance of 60 hun (Rs. 300) on the prince. [Akh., 16 Aug. 1681.]
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Akbar's frank and friendly attitude during Annaji's conspiracy convinced Shambhuji of his royal guest's sincerity. He now promised to Akbar the co-operation of a strong Maratha army in conquering Mughal Deccan, set about equipping his troops for the proposed war, and finally, after he had gained peace of mind by extinguishing the conspiracy in blood, paid his first visit to Akbar in order personally to cement the alliance and settle the plan of the joint campaign. "On 13th November, 1681, Shambhuji interviewed Prince Akbar at Padishahpur (=Pali), taking the entire army and retinue with him. Durgadas was with Akbar. Great honour was shown to him." [Jedhe S.]
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But nothing came of this long-cherished plan of invading the Mughal empire. Indeed, before the year 1681 closed, Akbar's sole chance of success was gone. The crisis of the Rajput war had ended in June, when the Maharana made a definite peace with the Emperor. The Mughal forces were now free to hunt Akbar down. On 31st July Prince Azam was sent off from Ajmir to the Deccan with a vast force, reaching Burhanpur in September and Aurangabad on 11th November. On 8th September the Emperor himself started from Rajputana for the South and took up his residence at Burhanpur on 13th November. Thus, by the middle of November all the military resources of the empire were concentrated in the Deccan under the Emperor himself, three of his sons and all his best generals, while a strong force under his grandson and the prime minister occupied Rajputana, across the road to Delhi. Aurangizib himself took post at the strategic centre Aurangabad (on 22nd March 1682), while he "secured all the frontiers with strong garrisons,...... the better to keep watch on the doings of Shambhuji Rajah and to give Akbar no opportunity of undertaking any notable enterprise." (Dutch letter from Surat, 31st Jan. 1682, D.R. Vol. 37.) At first he contented himself with following a watchful policy, waiting for Akbar and Shambhuji to show their hands, before choosing his own line of attack.
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§ 10. Aurangzib's strategic dispositions, 1682.
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In addition to meeting internal troubles, Shambhuji was busy during the winter of 1681-82 in attending to his navy and his maritime possessions, and spent the whole month of January 1682 in making a furious attack on Janjira under his own eyes. This was Aurangzib's opportunity. Hasan Ali Khan, who had distinguished himself in the Jat and Rajput wars and risen to high favour, was ordered (on 7th November 1681) to descend from Junnar into North Konkan at the head of 14,000 horse. The Maratha attempt to oppose him when coming down the Nanaghat pass was defeated, and he took possession of Kalian (about 30 Jan. 1682) burning all the Maratha villages on the way and also, by mistake, some nine villages in Portuguese territory. At Kalian he encamped and sent an agent to Bombay to buy some gunpowder and other munitions from the English. Many battles were fought with the Marathas in which the imperialists (especially the Bundela contingent under Dalpat Rao) distinguished themselves. (Dil. 172; Bomb. to Co. 4 Feb. in F.R. Surat 108; Surat to Bomb. 24 Feb. 1682, in Vol. 90.) In May next Hasan Ali withdrew from the province, in order to save his horses from the effect of the heavy rainfall of the west coast.
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Early in 1682 Khan-i-Jahan was ordered to make Bahadurgarh his base, and leaving his baggge there to hasten wherever he heard of Maratha bands roving. In the course of one of these expeditions he sacked Shivapur, a town midway between Puna and Shirwal. (Dil. 173; M.A. 216.)
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The news of Hasan Ali's victories recalled Shambhuji, to his great mortification, from the unfinished siege of Janjira. Leaving 10,000 men there to keep up the attack, he returned to Raigarh (Feb.) and made defensive arrangements. Five thousand men were posted to guard the fords near the mouth of the Pen river and arrest the southward advance of the Mughals, while the low country from Chaul to Nagothna was defended by 15,000 men. East of the Ghats 20,000 horse were distributed between Satara and Phonda to face the southern division of the Mughal grand army. (Orme, 110.)