History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v5.c73.s3: § 3. Aurangzib's successes and policy during 1689.
History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v5.c73.s3
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§ 3. Aurangzib's successes and policy during 1689.
v5.c73.s3.1
When Rajaram fled from Maharashtra (1689), Aurangzib had already won many of the Maratha forts and was rapidly winning others by money or force, as the enemy were paralysed by Shambhuji's misgovernment and subsequent downfall. In the extreme north, Salhir (21 Feb. 1687) and Trimbak (8 Jan. 1689) had been captured, and in the centre Singhgarh (Nov. 1684) and Rajgarh (May 1689), while in North Konkan his able agent Matabar Khan was on the high tide of success, taking fort after fort, as will be described in Chapter LIII. Only the capital Raigarh and the three very important fortresses of Vishalgarh, Satara and Panhala still remained in Maratha possession. Of these Raigarh and Panhala were to fall before the year was over.
v5.c73.s3.2
The Mughals had been holding for some years past the plains of the Nasik and Puna districts, but not the hill-forts within their limits. The first Mughal successes after Shambhuji's fall were the capture of the mountain strongholds in the extreme north-west (the Nasik district) and the descent from them into the Thana district of North Konkan, across the Western Ghats. The inland parts of Central and Southern Konkan remained in Maratha possession.
v5.c73.s3.3
but the coast was mostly subject to Mughal sway, as the Siddi of Janjira with his invincible fleet was now a Mughal admiral, and the Marathas were forced to lose the port of Chaul and even to evacuate the island-depot of Underi. Their navy had to transfer its head-quarters further south to Gheria or Vijaydurg.
v5.c73.s3.4
In the year 1689 many Maratha forts fell easily into Aurangzib's hands,* but it was not then worth his while to lay regular sieges to the numberless other forts in Maharashtra, as will become evident when we consider his position in that year with reference to the entire Deccan and not in respect of the Marathas alone. They were a minor factor at that time and he expected them to be subdued as the natural consequence of the fall of their king and the impending capture of their capital and royal family. The Mughal Emperor had yet to gain his knowledge of the character of the Maratha people and of the people's war. His one aim now was to occupy the rich and boundless dominions of the fallen Adil Shahi and Qutb Shahi kingdoms, and he would take the Maratha forts only if they could be secured easily and cheaply. Therefore, during 1689, 1690 and 1691 Aurangzib was too busy in the plains of the south and the east to divert his resources to the barren hill-forts of the west. Nor had he been yet seized with the obstinate folly of his old age, which made him dash his health, army, treasure and empire itself against the Maratha rock-fortresses,—only to win them after a prodigal waste of time, money and men, and then to lose them to the Marathas when his grand army marched away from the conquest.
v5.c73.s3.5
∗ "The forts captured by the imperialists in 1689 were too many to be named." (M. A. 311.) "In the year 1689 the Mughals took all the forts......Out of these Pratapgarh and Rohira Rajgarh and Torna in the Wai subdivision were recovered by Ramchandra and Shankaraji in 1690." (Zedhe Shakavali.)
v5.c73.s3.6
At the beginning of February 1689 came the capture of Shambhuji. Aurangzib spent the next ten months (3 March—18th December 1689) at Koregaon, 12 miles north-east of Puna. During this period Zulfiqar Khan brought to a successful end his siege of Raigarh by capturing it (19th October) with Shambhuji's entire family.
v5.c73.s3.7
But the effect of the capture of the Maratha capital was nullified by the flight of Rajaram to Jinji, and the Emperor had to depute Zulfiqar Khan, immediately after his return from Raigarh, to follow the Maratha king to the East Coast. The only other important operations of 1689 were the siege and capture of Raichur (10 July—29 November) by Ruhullah Khan, the unsuccessful pursuit of Rajaram by some local Mughal officers in the Bijapur and Bellary districts, and the invasion of Bednur by Jan Nisar Khan to compel the surrender of the fugitive Maratha Rajah, which, however, was frustrated by Santa. [M. A. 329, 331, 333.]