History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v5.c73.s6: § 6. Prince Muizz-ud-din's fruitless siege of Panhala, 1692-94.
History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v5.c73.s6
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§ 6. Prince Muizz-ud-din's fruitless siege of Panhala, 1692-94.
v5.c73.s6.1
Imperial prestige demanded that the fort should not be left in enemy hands. In October 1692, Prince Muizz-ud-din, the eldest son of Shah Alam, was sent from the Emperor's camp at Galgala (32 miles south-west of Bijapur) to take it. He arrived before Panhala near the end of the month, and with his officer Iftikhar Khan invested its two gates. The jagirdars of the district were ordered to supply provisions to his camp, and in the middle of December he was reinforced by Lutfullah Khan, who became superintendent of his body-guard and in effect his lieutenant.
v5.c73.s6.2
Sixty miles north-west of the Emperor's camp at Galgala lay the fort of Miraj, and midway between Miraj and Panhala, a distance of forty miles, an outpost was set up at Alta to guard the communications. Gradually the investment was tightened. Covered lanes were begun towards the walls, Mughal outposts were set up around it, and in January 1693 four large pieces of artillery were sent to the prince by the Emperor. Muizz-ud-din's position seemed so secure that in August his family was sent to his camp. [M.A. 360.]
v5.c73.s6.3
But, for a year the fort held out, and in October 1693 the scene entirely changed. A vast Maratha army,* under Dhana Jadav, Ramchandra, and Shankaraji, arrived for its relief and encircled the small siege force. The battle began on the 20th and there were daily encounters for some days after. While this contest kept the besiegers engaged, the Marathas outside easily threw fresh troops and provisions into the fort, and in concert with the garrison raided the Mughal trenches with great success. Some guns and wheeled field-pieces (rahkala) were carried off from Saf Shikan Khan's position into the fort. Some imperial officers were slain, several others wounded, and one taken prisoner by the enemy.
v5.c73.s6.4
Meantime, the Emperor had issued urgent orders to hurry up two heavy reinforcements to the prince under the command of Firuz Jang and Khanazad Khan.* The Maratha relieving force heard of their coming (at the end of October) and dispersed from the neighbourhood of Panhala. Dhana made his way north towards Satara; but before reaching that fort he was sighted by Firuz Jang's army on its southward march to the prince's side. The Khan sent his vanguard under his son Chin Qalich Khan and Rustam Khan, who overtook the Marathas near Karad.† A severe battle was fought. The Marathas were defeated and dispersed with heavy slaughter, leaving 30 prisoners and 600 horses in the hands of the victors. The Mughals, too, lost many men.
v5.c73.s6.5
∗ Ten thousand horse and foot, according to Akhbarat (27 Oct.). But Muizz-ud-din's despatch gives eighty thousand cavalry and countless infantry (Insha-i-Madhuram, p. 70). The account in my text is based on the Court-news-letters. I cannot accept Muiz's report of the result of the battle which runs thus:—"In the midst of the fight, a musket-shot hit Parashuram, the chief of cavalry of Ramchandra, in the head, and sent him to hell. The enemy were shaken. Our men charged them with swords and daggers. After a long fight the enemy fled in confusion, many of them were drowned in the river [Krishna]. Numberless of their foot-soldiers were put to the sword. Hillocks of the slain were formed. All the enemy's artillery, 2000 lances, the same number of muskets, and many mares and all other property of the Marathas were captured by us." (Ibid.)
v5.c73.s6.6
† The place where Dhana's force was sighted reads, in my badly written MS. of the Akhbarat, as B-h-l-n, which naturally suggests Phaltan. But Phaltan was too far to the north of Satara and out of Dhana's route. I propose Patan, a sub-division immediately west of Karad (30 m.s. of Satara and 33 m.n. of Panhala).
v5.c73.s6.7
But Dhana Jadav had effectively spoiled the work done by Muizz-ud-din in a year outside Panhala. The fort had been reprovisioned, the siege-works had been destroyed and heavy losses inflicted on the Mughal army. Thereafter, though the prince continued there for four months longer, he could do nothing.
v5.c73.s6.8
∗ Khem Savant (the desai of Kudal and Banda) was also written to, by order of the Emperor, to keep his kinsmen and followers back from their design of coming to the help of the Marathas who were attacking Muizz-ud-din. [Insha-i-Madhu, p. 17.]
v5.c73.s6.9
The siege was practically abandoned; the prince carried on his operations languidly, merely to deceive the Emperor, and opened negotiations with the garrison to secure the fort for a price. When four months had been thus wasted, Aurangzib, on 7th March, 1694, ordered a force of 6,000 men to strengthen the prince, as the siege had now come to a stop. At the same time Muizz-ud-din was authorised to use his own discretion; if the fort was surrendered peacefully he could grant terms, if not he must renew entrenching and lay siege to it a second time.