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History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v5.c79: Chapter LVI.

History of Aurangzib, Based on Original Sources v5.c79

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English

Contents

Chapter LVI.

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THE CAPTURE OF WAGINGERA, 1705.

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§ 1. The Berad people and their country.

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The country extending east of Bijapur city, and enclosed by the Bhima and the Krishna rivers, is the home of the Berads, a race of aboriginal Kanarese, also called Dheds, and regarded as one of the lowest in the scale of Hindu castes. They are a virile and hardy people, not much advanced from savagery, but at the same time not toned down like the over-refined upper castes of Hindu society. They eat mutton, beef, pork, domestic fowls, etc., and drink to excess. Dark, muscular, and of middle height, with round faces, flat cheeks, thin lips and lank or frizzled hair, the Berads can bear fatigue and hardship, but have no taste for settled industry or peaceful arts. Their race name in Kanarese means "hunter", and while devoted to field sports of all kinds, they are also adepts in lawless pursuits, and often engage in organized crimes, such as dacoity and cattle-lifting, etc., in which they take a pride. Their religion still consists of primitive superstitions and spirit-worship, though outwardly most of them profess to be Lingayet and some Vaishnav Hindus. Their tribal organization under the heads of families and the judicial authority of their hereditary headmen ensured discipline and solidarity among them, and they supplied the most steady and accurate musketeers of South India in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; Tipu Sultan's famous infantry was mostly composed of these people. According to their own story, the founder of their tribe pleased the god Shiva by his devotion and gained from him the two blessings that his descendants would be sure shots and their lands would grow corn without much labour or water. Hence, the Berads have been good marksmen and they grow only the spring crops which require little water or care.

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Their gallantry in war and contempt for wounds and death were as conspicuous as their skill in making night-attacks and surprises,—which we might naturally expect from such expert cattle-stealers. Indeed, their repeated victories over the regular troops of the Mughal empire in Aurangzib's reign led contemporary Persian historians to call them *Be-dar* (fearless) by a play on their name. [K. K. ii. 524; *Dil.* ii. 150b.]*

§ 2. The Nayak family of Shorapur.

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The cradle-land of the Berads was Mysore, from which they advanced into the Raichur doab and then further north into the country beyond the Krishna and even the Bhima. We are here concerned only with the Berad Nayaks or chieftains of Shorapur, lying in the fork between the Krishna and the Bhima. Their earliest capital was Sagar, some 72 miles east of Bijapur city. When this was lost to the Mughals (1687), the Nayak built a new capital at Wagingera, twelve miles south-west of Sagar. At the close of Aurangzib's reign even this fort was taken from him, and the Nayak removed his seat to Shorapur, on the eastern face of the same hill-mass as Wagingera and four miles from it. Here the last of their princes, though brought up by Colonel Meadows Taylor with fatherly care, joined the Sepoy Mutiny, and when captured and sentenced to confinement shot himself dead (1858). With him the line ended.

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∗ Meadows Taylor's *Story of My Life*, 3rd ed., 144, 210—213. *Bombay Gazetteer*, xxi. 163, xxiii. 91.

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The Berad principality is now included in the Nizam's territory, but in the seventeenth century it was a vassal State of the kings of Bijapur. Pam Nayak,[*] its ruler, had loyally helped his sovereign Adil Shah during Aurangzib's siege of Bijapur (1686), and six years earlier had inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mughal general Dilir Khan. But in November 1687 he had been attacked by an imperial army under Khanazad Khan and forced to give up his kingdom and fort of Sagar and visit Aurangzib's Court at Bijapur, where he died in a few days.

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∗ This name is given variously in M.A.—Padam (p. 239), Pam (490 and 491), and Pid (264, 304 and 305). The Dilkasha calls him Pam (95a).

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The position of the Berad country, midway between Bijapur and Golkonda, and the martial but predatory character of its people made it very necessary for Aurangzib to keep it under his control. Bijapur is only 72 miles west, the rich and holy city of Kulbarga is 50 miles to the north, and the important strategic post of Malkhed (the gate to the Haidarabad kingdom) is some 45 miles north-east of Sagar. The whole of the country bounded by these three towns, and even Bidar (60 miles north-east of Kulbarga) and Raichur (in the south, across the Krishna), lay within easy range of the raids of these unsubdued savages. Having lost their dominion at the surrender of 1687, their chiefs had now no resource left to them except to rebel, build new strongholds among the hills, and rob the Mughal territory around in imitation of the Marathas and afterwards in concert with them. The examples of the profitable defiance of the imperial power set by Dhana Jadav and Santa Ghorpare were not lost upon the Berad leaders. The Kulbarga district was kept in constant disturbance and the roads were closed to caravans by persistent but elusive bands of Berad horsemen for many years after the fall of Sagar. [Akhbarat.]

§ 3. Pidia Nayak's career after 1687.

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Pidia Nayak, the nephew and adopted heir of Pam Nayak,* had waited on Aurangzib as early as 1683 and been given a post in the imperial army. After the Mughal conquest of Sagar and the death of his uncle, he rendered useful service at Ruhullah Khan's siege of Raichur (1689). On the fall of that fort, he went to his home on a week's leave to replenish his equipment and quota of troops. But instead of returning to his post as promised, he busied himself in fortifying Wagingera and raising an army. After the loss of Sagar, the families of the Berad Nayak and his nobles had taken refuge in the village of Wagingera, twelve miles west of it. Their houses stood on a hill which Pidia now enclosed with fortifications and to which he added a walled village on a lower level. He collected twelve thousand excellent musketeers of his tribesmen and steadily increased his artillery and munitions of war. "While outwardly conducting himself as a loyal subject and paying revenue to the Emperor, he gradually collected money and men. By strengthening the defences of the town (Wagingera) and increasing cultivation in its neighbourhood, he acquired power and authority, became the chief ally of the Marathas in robbery and rebellion, and dispossessed Pam Nayak's own son Jagia. The latter appealed to the Emperor for his patrimony, and took from him a sanad of succession, but could not get possession of the zamindari. [M. A. 491-2, K. K. ii. 525-26.]

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∗ *M.A.* says on page 239 that it was Pam (mis-spelt Padam) and on page 491 that it was Pam's nephew Pidia who paid this visit. Pidia is called the *biradarzada pisar-i-khanda* of Pam (page 491). *Dilkasha* (ii. 95b) wrongly calls Pidia the son of Pām.

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§ 4. Early Mughal campaigns against Pidia.

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Pidia's robberies in the Kulbarga district became too serious to be neglected any longer. At last, on 27th May 1691 the Emperor sent his son Kam Bakhsh from Bijapur, in charge of Bahramand Khan, to attack Wagingera. Three weeks later, another high commander Hamid-ud-din Khan, was deputed to the Sagar district, evidently to keep in check the roving field armies of the Berads. Kam Bakhsh spent only two months before Wagingera, during which he dug trenches, mounted guns, and fought almost daily conflicts with the enemy. On 20th July he was sent off to the Madras Karnatak, and the operations against the Berads were entrusted to Ruhullah Khan. [M. A. 339-40, 344, 354-55 ; Dil. ii. 102b]. The latter "could not achieve the task : the Berads twice fell on his entrenchment and destroyed it ; many on the Mughal side were slain, including the celebrated Ranmast Khan.* So Ruhullah Khan opened negotiations with the enemy." This was exactly what Pidia was seeking. It was not in his interests to carry the contest to an extreme. He bribed Ruhullah and lulled him into inactivity. [*Dil.* ii. 103a; *M.A.* 491.]

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∗ Brother of Khizr Khan Pani of Bijapur. He had been created Bahadur Khan in 1683 (M.A. 235). Had defeated Shivaji in 1679.

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After five months Ruhullah was recalled and Azam sent to relieve him (18th December 1691). This prince stayed there for a year, ravaging the country and checking Berad activities. Pidia then submitted, appealed to the prince's mercy, presented him with two lakhs of rupees and made peace with the Emperor by paying an indemnity of seven lakhs and promising to remain as an obedient subject and pay the revenue regularly. But in December 1692 the critical situation at Jinji compelled the Emperor to remove Azam from Sagar to Kadapa in order to support the Karnatak expedition, and Pidia soon afterwards resumed his old brigandage and usurpation of land. When Firuz Jang was sent against him (April 1696),* he "played the same jackal's trick on him" and escaped destruction by promising a tribute of nine lakhs. [*M. A.* 345, 492; *K. K.* ii. 526.]

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§ 5. Aurangzib marches against Pidia Nayak.

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Thereafter for nine years the Emperor was too deeply entangled with the Marathas to attend to the Berads, and Pidia resumed his raids and extension of territory without fear or hindrance.

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∗ *Z. S.* Also *Akhbarat*, year 40, under 6th and 10th May 1696. He captures a *garhi* named Samal or Chamal from these highway robbers.

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At last, towards the close of the year 1704, after the great Maratha forts of Satara and Parli, Panhala and Vishalgarh, Kondana and Torna had all been captured, the Emperor turned to Wagingera, as Pidia was now menacing the city of Bijapur itself. [Dil. ii. 149b.] Arriving before the fort on 8th February 1705, he laid siege to it. Chin Qalich Khan, the subahdar of Bijapur, in whose jagir the Berad country lay, took up his position half-a-mile from the fort with Muhammad Amin Khan, Tarbiyat Khan (Mir Atish), and the officers of the imperial artillery. Aurangzib's tents were pitched two miles from the walls.

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§ 6. Fort and environs of Wagingera described.

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Wagingera* stands on the western crest of the same short range on the eastern extremity of which Shorapur was built in later times. The hill here is about 250 feet high above the plain, and the fort is an irregular pentagon with seven bastions along its length. The fortifications are neither striking nor elaborate. In certain places the natural granite rock rising abruptly from the ground forms the only defence, but on the lower sides of the hill boulders have been utilized by connecting them with a wall 4½ feet thick and composed of large irregular stones cemented together. The denuded tops present the spectacle of strange tors and huge piles of rocks. The old gate, named after Ram, faces the south-east and is eleven feet by nine. But after Aurang-zib's conquest of the place another gate of nearly the same size was built in the western wall by his order, and an inscription records its completion by Hafiz Masaud on 1st Rajab 1117 A. H. (8th October 1705).

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∗ Description based on Dil. ii. 153a; M.A. 499; Meadows Taylor, 123; Framroz Jang's Shorapur. A smaller fort was built on a neighbouring hill 5,000 feet apart, at a later date, by Nishti Irana, but it is now totally in ruins.

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On the plain in the south, facing the fort gate, there is a village called *Talwargera*, enclosed by a mud wall and containing the market for the supply of the garrison. Close to it was *Dhedpura*, a hamlet of grass huts, where the families of the common Berads lived and from which they tilled the surrounding lands. These three were the only inhabited places there; but close to the fort in the east and north were a number of hillocks which would be of great service to besiegers. One of these, called *Lal Tikri* from its red soil, slightly commanded a portion of Wagingera itself and had a very important bearing on the defence of that fort. The Berads had not thought of protecting any of these outlying eminences by redoubt or outpost.

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The strength of Wagingera lay not so much in its natural position or artificial defences, as in the courage and number of its garrison, the deadly accuracy of their musketry fire, and its ample supply of guns, rockets and artillery munitions. In addition to the famous *Kala-piadas* or Berad foot-musketeers, Pidia had engaged some four thousand active cavalry, both Hindu and Muhammadan, including many Sayyids of the Deccan (to the intense abhorrence of the pious Muslim Aurangzib).

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The siege began early in February 1705. Tarbiyat Khan (Chief of Artillery), Chin Qalich Khan, Hamid-ud-din Khan (a favourite of the Emperor and a very experienced fighter) and other officers began to throw up two high platforms and to run covered approaches from a position facing the gate of the fort. Prince Kam Bakhsh's contingent co-operated with them. [*Dil.* ii., 150*b*.] But, for many weeks the Mughals could do nothing. As the Court historian writes, "Every day the enemy sallied forth and attacked the imperialists. Great fights were fought. The big guns from the top of the hill raised the tumult of slaughter; rockets followed each other with vehement force." (*M. A.* 498.) This bombardment continued incessantly and made the advance of the Mughal trenches, or even their maintenance within range of the fort guns, impossible.*

§ 7. Lal Tikri taken and lost by Mughals.

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One morning while the Mughal generals were out reconnoitring for weak points in the defences, they suddenly charged up Lal Tikri, drove away the Berad musketeers on its top and seized the position. But it was impossible for them to dig themselves in on that rocky height. Moreover, its capture was made on a sudden impulse, without any preconcerted plan for sending up a supporting force, sappers and miners and trenching materials, or the co-operation of the other wings of the army in diverting the enemy from this hill. The Berads immediately sent there large bodies of their infantry, who swarmed up the hillside "numberless like ants and locusts," and plied their muskets and hurled stones with deadly accuracy on the imperialists crowded helplessly on the top. The Mughals began to fall back by the way they had come, and even reinforcements, tardily sent by Kam Bakhsh and Asad Khan, failed to restore the battle. The narrow crest and side of Lal Tikri were so much encumbered with dead horses, elephants and men that these fresh troops could not reach the spot; they only added to the crowd and confusion on the hillside. The position had at last to be abandoned after heavy losses.

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∗ History of the seige in *M.A.* 498-506; *Dil.* ii. 153*a*; *K. K.* i. 527-538 (a mere secondary compilation).

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The Emperor disapproved of the plan of making another attempt on Lal Tikri, and ordered his generals to attack Wagingera from some other side. That day, while Chin Qalich and Muhammad Amin were riding out to select suitable places for trenching a cannon ball from the fort killed the horses of both, but the riders were unhurt.

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The Mughal trenches started from a spot between Lal Tikri and the hillock opposite Talwargera, while an outpost was established under Muhammad Amin Khan between Lal Tikri and these trenches, to guard against enemy attacks from that hill. The hillock facing Talwargera* was occupied by Kam Bakhsh's troops and another mound near by was held by Baqar Khan, both being subjected to daily attacks of the enemy, but checking their advance and thus safeguarding the siege trenches. The Mughals now seemed to be fairly on the road to success.

§ 8. Arrival of Marathas.

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But a new enemy now appeared to dash down their hopes and nullify their efforts. On 8th March [acc. to *M. A.*, but 26th acc. to *Akh.*] a Maratha force of five to six thousand horse under Dhana Jadav and Hindu Rao (brother of Santa Ghorparé) arrived near the fort to support their Berad allies, because the families of many Maratha generals had taken refuge there while Aurangzib had been capturing their own strongholds in Maharashtra. The only force that Aurangzib could spare from the siege-trenches to go out and fight the new comers numbered 8,181 men. [Akhbarat 27th March.]

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∗ The hillock occupied "for a time" by Kam Bakhsh's men is called in *M.A.* "the conquered hillock," which Khafi Khan takes to mean Lal Tikri. But we know that the Mughals were dislodged from this Lal Tikri the very day they surprised it, and also that it was in Berad possession when Nusrat Jang arrived there later. So, I take it that Talwargera, the hillock opposite the *peth*, is meant here.

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The first task of the Marathas was to remove their families safely from this fort, whose fall they believed to be certain, as not even the most powerful forts of Shivaji had been able to withstand Aurangzib's assault. [M. A. 500.] While the main body of the new comers kept the imperialists in play by a noisy feint against the siege lines in front of the fort, assisted by a heavy fire from the walls, another body of 2,000 picked troopers brought their women and children out by the back-door of Wagingera, mounted them on swift mares, and escaped, their rear being guarded by a body of infantry that sallied out of the fort.

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Pidia had promised the Marathas a daily subsidy of several thousand rupees as long as they would assist in the defence of his capital, but they advised him to make terms with the Emperor, as resistance to him was vain. The Berad chief, however, continued to subsidise and feed them, and they halted in the neighbourhood, and made frequent attacks on the Mughals. Though no decisive action took place and the Marathas retired from the field every evening, the imperialists suffered much loss and their hearts were shaken.

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The Mughal army itself was now thrown into a state of siege. Its activities ceased and it was confined to its own lines. "Though a strong wall had been raised round the imperial camp, the enemy used to make sorties every night and fire rockets and muskets into the camp, thus reducing the men there to extreme distress, so that no one could step outside. Grain and fodder became extremely scarce in the camp. The Emperor censured his generals, but it had no effect. They were distracted on seeing the enemy's large number and their own dangerous situation.' [Dil. ii. 150b.]

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§ 9. False peace proposals by Pidia Nayak.

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Pidia, as advised by his Maratha allies and also following his old policy, made proposals of submission to the Emperor. Aurangzib appeared to welcome these negotiations, but his real object was to gain time and call up heavy reinforcements from far and near for a supreme effort.

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Abdul Ghani, a glib-tongued lying Kashmiri pedlar, who used to hawk his wares in the camp and secretly in the fort too, one day brought to Hedayet-kesh (the chief of the imperial Intelligence Department) a letter from Pidia proposing peace, and told a story of his having gone near the fort wall to say his evening prayer when some Berads had suddenly seized him and taken him inside, where their chieftain had entrusted him with the letter. Aurangzib failed to detect the enemy's trick and the Kashmiri's worthless character; he gave a favourable reply to the letter and nominated his son Kam Bakhsh as mediator in the negotiations, so that in the official proclamations and histories the credit for gaining Wagingera might be recorded in that prince's name. Pidia next sent his brother Som Singh to the Mughal camp, offering to give up the fort and asking that the zamindari, the headship of the clan, and a *mansab* might be granted to his brother. Muhtasham Khan, an officer then living in the camp without employment and a debtor to the Kashmiri, was requested by Pidia to be sent in to take delivery of Wagingera. He was given a *mansab* by the Emperor and was admitted into the fort with some men [c. 20 March], while Som Singh stayed in the camp and spread the tale that Pidia had turned mad and fled with the Marathas. The Kashmiri next brought a message from the Berad chief's mother repeating this story and begging that Som Singh might now be allowed to return and undertake the management of his estate, while the fort would be vacated in seven days. The Emperor sent Som Singh back with a *mansab*, a robe of honour and an elephant for himself and some jewels for his mother. And Abdul Ghani, the great maker of this glorious treaty, was created a commander of 300 horse! "The fire from the trenches ceased, and the generals were recalled from their posts to the Emperor's camp." [*M. A.* 502.]

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And then the bubble burst. The whole thing was a fraud. Pidia was alive and sane and still within the fort; he refused to surrender it and renewed his attacks. The Emperor almost went mad with rage and shame.

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§ 10. Nusrat Jang's vigorous operations.

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Meanwhile he had summoned his ablest generals from all sides,—Nusrat Jang (the captor of Jinji and Raigarh), Daud Khan Pani (the wild Afghan fighter) and many brave qiladars and faujdars with their choicest troops. Nusrat Jang arrived on 27th March and the others soon afterwards. [Akhbarat.]

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The day after his arrival Nusrat Jang rode out in full force to reconnoitre the fort,—Dalpat Rao's Bundelas forming his Van and Ram Singh Hada's clansmen guarding his rear. After viewing the gate of Wagingera, he went to the side where two mounds were held by the imperialists, and galloped up to the hillock of Lal Tikri from which the Mughals had been dislodged in the early days of the siege. The Berads in a large body offered him battle, firing at him from behind the boulders. Nusrat Jang charged them, climbed the hill, and drove out the enemy, who ran into the village of Talwargera at its foot, and began to ply their muskets from behind its mud wall. Many Rajputs fell in the attack on Lal Tikri and outside the village. Rao Dalpat on his elephant came to the Van and, with the blind impetuosity of a true Rajput, wanted to storm the village, though it was walled round and held by such good shots. But Nusrat Jang turned away the hot-headed Bundela to a neighbouring hillock which was still in the enemy's hands. Here, too, many Rajputs, with only sword and spear, blindly advanced to the very edge of the fort ditch, only to be shot down by the garrison. Fifty Rajputs were slain and more than a hundred wounded in this part of the field; their loss in horses also was very great. "Most of the Rajputs now turned aside to pick up their dead and wounded brethren, and Dalpat was left with a very slender force, but he bravely went to the right wing of the Khan where the fighting was then hottest. The enemy fled from the second mound too and hid in the village of Dhedpura. On this day twenty-one bullets and one rocket hit Dalpat Rao's elephant. The historian Bhimsen, sitting behind him on the same elephant, was struck by some musket shots, but his armour saved him. Even the driver of the elephant was wounded, though clad in steel. The banners of Nusrat Jang were pitted with shot-holes like a crocodile's hide, and two of his elephant drivers were wounded and one killed. Similarly, there were heavy casualties in the centre and rear of the Mughal general's force." [Dil. ii. 152a.]* Jamshid Khan of Bijapur was killed by a cannon ball, but Nusrat Jang kept hold of the position he had gained with so much blood near the wall. Hamid-ud-din Khan, Tarbiyat Khan and other officers were pushed up by the Emperor to strengthen the point won here, while Chin Qalich Khan guarded the line of communications from behind some hillocks between Lal Tikri and the Emperor's camp.

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∗ The battle is thus described in *Akh.* "Spies report that the Berads, having issued from the fort, had occupied different points of the [now deserted] outposts of Sultan Husain [Kam Bakhsh's lieutenant], Md. Baqar and others. So, Nusrat Jang, on 31st March, after placing Dalpat in his Van and Ram Singh Hada in his rear-guard,...had gone to the top of a hillock and stood there. He had sent word to Chin

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Next day Nusrat Jang rode to the back of the fort to select a site for his own trenches. A large enemy force attacked him, but was defeated with heavy loss and driven back to the hill by Dalpat Rao. A few days later the Khan captured some wells situated on the skirt of the hill whence the enemy used to draw their water; he then strengthened the position in front of the gate by entrenching and mounting guns on the two hillocks in front of the gate which were now in Mughal hands. Under the protection of walls of bags* and

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Qalich Khan to guard his rear, while he was fighting the Berads in the front. Then N. J. advanced quickly and attacked the Berads with arrows and bullets. The enemy in Sultan Husain's trenches were killed. Then N. J. hastened against the Berad forces near the fort, who fled pursued by him to the fort-gate. Just then Dhana and Hindu Rao came to the rescue of the Berads, and there was a severe fight at close quarters. About 400 Berads were slain or wounded. The Marathas fled. The Mughals too lost heavily...Then N. J. came back to his own quarters and sent a message to the Emperor that he would try to force the fort gate the next day."

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∗ M.A. 503 (the text is obscure.)

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head-covers his men advanced and made a lodgement close to the fort wall. The Berads now offered submission with greater earnestness than before, but Nusrat Jang, without heeding their words, delivered an assault on Talwargera on 27th April. His own contingent under Daud Khan, Dalpat Rao, and Ram Singh Hada, with imperial troops under Hamid-ud-din, Tarbiyat and some other generals, formed two parallel columns of attack, while he stood on horseback to support them from behind. The imperialists eagerly charged on foot. The enemy fought while fleeing, but could not stop the onset. The Mughals entered the peth (walled village), slaying all who resisted, and the rest fled. The village was thereafter firmly held in the teeth of a hot fire from the fort above it.

§ 11. Berads evacuate Wagingera.

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The Berads now found that further struggle was hopeless. Stationing a body of musketeers to keep firing on the Mughals outside the front gate all the day, Pidia fled out of the back-door at night, "with the Maratha companions of his day of adversity."

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When night came and the sound of musketry from within died down, some Mughal soldiers entered the fort to find out the true state of things. They saw the place entirely deserted. Then began the wild scene of confusion, rapine and burning which is always witnessed whenever an enemy fort is entered by soldiers and camp followers in the absence of any commanding officer and a strong police guard. The few imperialists who were first within Wagingera set fire to the houses.*

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The flames were visible for miles around, proclaiming the fall of the enemy's stronghold. Daud Khan and some other nobles verified the fact of Pidia's flight; they did not remain in the fort that night, but went to Nusrat Jang's tents to congratulate him on the final success of his operations.

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It was well that they went outside. For, at the news of the fort being vacated, there was a wild rush of camp followers, common soldiers and all the ruffians of the camp, in the hope of plunder before the Government agents should come and attach the property. The fire from the burning roofs spread to a powder magazine, and there was a terrible explosion. "Many people were blown up into the air, and their corpses could not be found. After two or three days, a second magazine exploded." [Dil. ii. 153a.]

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Wagingera was captured, but its chieftain had escaped and lived to give trouble to the victors.† Thus, all Aurangzib's labours for these three months were lost. Nusrat Jang and his lieutenant Dalpat Rao were suspected by the Emperor of collusive help in the flight of Pidia, and they fell into disgrace, getting rewards quite inadequate for such a glorious feat and being soon afterwards sent away to a distance to punish rebels and guard the road.*

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∗ *Dilkasha* (eye-witness). But *M. A.* says that the Berad rearguard of musketeers set fire to their houses and property in the evening, before leaving the fort. (Unlikely.)

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† We may summarise here the further history of the Berads: In 1706 Pidia and Hindu Rao captured Penu-konda

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The siege of Wagingera was the last military undertaking of the great Emperor Aurangzib, with all the resources of the empire of Delhi at his command. It supplies the most graphic illustration of the utter decline and weakness of the great State which Akbar had founded and Shah Jahan had carried to the highest pitch of wealth and splendour. For these two reasons its history has been fully narrated here.

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and made its Mughal qiladar a prisoner. The Berads seized fort Allur, 28 m. from Kulbarga, but Tarbiyat Kh. recovered it. About April 1706 Pidia was chased by Sarafraz Kh., evidently in the Berad country, and Jagia (the present chief of Sagar) who had been loyally helping the imperialists was rewarded. [M. A. 513.] In July 1706 the Marathas again threatened Wagingera, [Ibid, 516] and a force had to be detached to the place under Tarbiyat. In the civil war between Dhana and Hindu Rao (Jan. 1707), Pidia deserted his former ally and joined Dhana in the attack on Sindur. [Dil. 158a.]

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∗ Dil. ii. 153a and b. The official history, however, conceals the fact and represents that the Khan and all his followers were promptly and highly rewarded. [M. A. 505, 506.] But Tarbiyat Khan and the imperial eunuchs even, who, on the showing of this very official history, had done absolutely nothing at the siege, were lavishly rewarded for the fall of Wagingera, while the real captors got only modest promotions and gifts. Nusrat Jang had acquired a bad name at Jinji for collusion with the enemy.

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