[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Studies](https://indike.org/pramana/ins) › [General history and culture](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general) › [Shivaji and His Times](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919) › c8 # Shivaji and His Times c8: Chapter IV. Strenuous Warfare, 1660-1664 Shivaji and His Times c8 - **Language:** English ## Contents - [c8.s1 §1. Shaista Khan sent against Shivaji](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s1) — 2 parts - [c8.s2 §2. Shivaji besieged in Panhala fort](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s2) — 8 parts - [c8.s3 § 3. Shaista Khan occupies Puna](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s3) — 5 parts - [c8.s4 §4. Shaista Khan captures Chakan](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s4) — 6 parts - [c8.s5 §5. The fighting in 1661-63 and conquest of Ratnagiri district](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5) — 19 parts - [c8.s6 §6. Shivaji's night-attack on Shaista Khan](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s6) — 13 parts - [c8.s7 §7. Surat described](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s7) — 16 parts - [c8.s8 §10. How money was extorted](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s8) — 2 parts - [c8.s9 §11. Attempt to murder Shivaji](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s9) — 15 parts - [c8.s10 §1. Jai Singh sent against Shivaji](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s10) — 2 parts - [c8.s11 §2. Character of Jai Singh](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s11) — 3 parts - [c8.s12 §3. Jai Singh's anxieties and far-sighted preparations](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s12) — 3 parts - [c8.s13 §4. Coalition of all the enemies of Shivaji](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s13) — 7 parts - [c8.s14 §5. The theatre of war described](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s14) — 3 parts - [c8.s15 §6. Mughals set up outposts](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s15) — 3 parts - [c8.s16 §7. Jai Singh opens the campaign](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s16) — 8 parts - [c8.s17 §8. Purandar described](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s17) — 2 parts - [c8.s18 §9. Mughals open the siege](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s18) — 3 parts - [c8.s19 §10. Capture of Vajragarh](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s19) — 22 parts - [c8.s20 §14. Death of Murar Baji Prabhu](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s20) — 3 parts - [c8.s21 § 15. Shivaji negotiates for submission](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s21) — 5 parts - [c8.s22 §16. Shivaji interviews Jai Singh](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s22) — 17 parts - [c8.s23 §19. Shivaji assists the Mughals in the invasion of Bijapur](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s23) — 20 parts - [c8.s24 § 1. Shivaji's fears and hopes from a journey to the Mughal Court](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s24) — 7 parts - [c8.s25 §2. His arrangements for his absence](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s25) — 2 parts - [c8.s26 § 3. Shivaji's journey to Agra](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s26) — 3 parts - [c8.s27 § 4. Shivaji's interview with Aurangzib](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s27) — 19 parts - [c8.s28 §7. Shivaji's escape from Agra](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s28) — 4 parts - [c8.s29 §8. His escape discovered by the police](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s29) — 12 parts - [c8.s30 §10. Adventures of Shivaji during his flight](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s30) — 50 parts - [c8.s31 §4. Quarrel between Muazzam and Dilir](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s31) — 37 parts - [c8.s32 §7. Raid into Berar and Baglana](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s32) — 11 parts ### Chapter IV. Strenuous Warfare, 1660-1664 ### §1. Shaista Khan sent against Shivaji ### [c8.s1.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s1.1) Among the administrative changes made by Aurangzib at his second coronation (July, 1659) was the posting of Shaista Khan to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, in the place of Prince Muazzam. This able and spirited general had already governed Malwa and the Deccan and had taken a distinguished part in Aurangzib's recent invasion of Golkonda. Chief among the tasks entrusted to him was the suppression of Shivaji. And in discharging this duty he was fortunate enough to secure the hearty co-operation of Bijapur, which forced the Maratha chief to divide his army into two and therefore to be defeated in both the theatres of war. ### [c8.s1.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s1.2) After Shivaji had followed up his victory over Afzal Khan's leaderless army by defeating the combined forces of Rustam-i-Zaman and Fazl Khan, and taking Panhala in the Kolhapur district and many places in Ratnagiri, Ali Adil Shah II. felt it necessary to march in person against the audacious rebel. But just at this time Siddi Jauhar, an Abyssinian slave who had usurped the fief of Karnul and defied the royal authority, wrote to Bijapur offering to make his submission if his position was recognized. The Sultan agreed, gave Jauhar the title of Salabat Khan, and sent him with an army to put down Shiva. Jauhar easily swept away the Maratha resistance in the open, and drove Shivaji into Panhala (2nd March), which he besieged with a force of 15,000 men. ### §2. Shivaji besieged in Panhala fort ### [c8.s2.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s2.1) The siege dragged on for over six months; all the paths of ingress and egress were closed to the garrison. Shivaji found himself in a fatal trap. So, he wrote a secret letter to Jauhar, deceitfully begging his protection and offering to make an alliance with him. In order to negotiate for the terms he asked for a passport. Jauhar, "who was both fool and traitor," swallowed the bait; he assured Shivaji of his protection, gave him a safe conduct, and flattered himself that with Shiva for an ally he would be able to create a kingdom of his own in independence of Adil Shah. Next day Shivaji with only two or three followers visited Jauhar at midnight, and was received in \*darbar\*. After oaths of co-operation had been taken on both sides, Shivaji returned quickly to the fort, and the pretended siege was continued. ### [c8.s2.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s2.2) But there was one determined enemy of Shivaji in the Bijapuri army. Fazl Khan, the son of Afzal, and his chief retainer Siddi Halal, pressed the siege in earnest. A huge fort like Panhala could not, however, be taken by 15,000 men, even if all of them put their heart in the work. Shivaji had made some sorties and broken up the siege-trenches with heavy slaughter, forcing the Bijapuris to remove their camp to a safe distance from the fort. In these night-attacks Kartoji Gujar distinguished himself and won the title of \*Pratap Rao\* and the rank of a general (\*sar-i-naubat.\*) The Bijapuri army was terrified, and Fazl Khan henceforth avoided confronting Shivaji himself and transferred his operations against the neighbouring fort of Pavangarh. Seizing a hillock near it, he mounted guns and began to throw shells into the fort. The Maratha commandant of Pavangarh found his position untenable and pressed Shivaji for relief. ### [c8.s2.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s2.3) Shivaji found that further delay would ruin him by making escape from that fatal trap impossible. With Pavangarh lost, Panhala could be easily starved into surrender. So, one dark night (13th July), leaving a part of his forces to hold Panhala as long as possible, he slipped out of it with the rest of his men, fell on the Bijapuri trenches below Pavangarh, and in the ensuing confusion took the road to Vishalgarh, 27 miles to the west. ### [c8.s2.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s2.4) His escape was soon detected and a strong Bijapuri force under Fazl Khan and Siddi Halal set out in pursuit. The day broke while the fugitives were still at Gajapur, eight miles short of their destination, and it was discovered that the pursuers had kept up with them by marching all night with the aid of Bengal lights (\*mahtabs\*.) Shivaji was hopelessly outnumbered and his escort was worn out. Happily, the road here led through a narrow ravine which a few desperate men could hold against odds. Baji Prabhu, the \*deshpande\* of Hirdas Maval, agreed to defend the mouth of the pass with half the troops till Shivaji should reach Vishalgarh with the other half and signal his safe arrival by gun-fire. The Bijapuris delivered three bloody assaults on the heroic rear-guard, all of which were beaten off. For five hours after dawn, the obstinate struggle was maintained, with a loss of 700 men. Then the signal gun was heard, announcing Shivaji's safe arrival in his asylum. But Baji Prabhu was lying down mortally wounded. The faithful servant had carried out his task, at the cost of his life, and the knowledge cheered his last moments. Karnataki musketeers are said to have at last cleared the pass with their fire, and the remnant of the defending Mavles fled to the hills with the body of their chief. The Bijapuris pushed on to Vishalgarh, but wisely gave up the thought of undertaking a siege in that terrible region. They fell back on Panhala and thence on Bijapur.\* ### [c8.s2.5](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s2.5) When the news of Jauhar’s treacherous coquetting with Shivaji reached the ears of Ali Adil Shah, that king burst into anger, and left his capital (on 5th August) for the Panhala district in order “to punish both the rebels.” He halted at Miraj and sent his vanguard towards Panhala. Jauhar now found that his master could not be befooled any longer. So, he made the Marathas at last give up Panhala to him (on 22nd September), and put an end to the long siege. The fort was soon afterwards handed over by Jauhar to the agents of Adil Shah. ### [c8.s2.6](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s2.6) A month after Shivaji had been forced to quit Panhala in the extreme south of his dominions, his arms met with another disaster in the extreme north. On 15th August, his fort of Chakan, 18 miles north of Puna, was captured by the Mughals. To explain how it happened, we shall have to trace the course of the war in that quarter from its commencement. ### [c8.s2.7](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s2.7) ∗ Siege of Panhala, Foster, X. 251, 370-387; \*Tarikh-i-Ali II\*, 82-93; B. S. 371-376; T. S. 19; Malkaré 37-38; \*Jedhe\* gives the dates thus: “2 March, Shivaji again comes to Panhala and is there besieged by Siddi Jauhar. 13 July, Shivaji descends from Panhala and goes to Khelna, pursued by Jauhar’s forces, Baji Prabhu being slain; 22 Sep., Shivaji cedes Panhala to Jauhar and makes peace with him.” ### [c8.s2.8](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s2.8) I accept the English factory numbers,—15,000 besiegers and five or six thousand besieged,—as against the Marathi exaggeration of eighty thousand Bijapuris and sixty thousand Mavles. \*Dilkasha\*, i. 37, says that Shiva had only 3,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry when besieged in Panhala. Jauhar established his head-quarters at Kolhapur. The English factor Revington tried to sell him some ordnance and ammunition and personally took a mortar and some shells to Jauhar’s camp, early in April. He promised that these shells “would undoubtedly be the chiefest disturbers of the besieged.” But the mortar had not the desired effect at trial, and Jauhar refused to pay for the munitions, though the English traders continued, some at Panhala, others at Kolhapur as late as October 1660. ### § 3. Shaista Khan occupies Puna ### [c8.s3.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s3.1) Early in 1660, Shaista Khan opened the campaign against Shivaji from the north, after arranging for an attack upon the Maratha dominions by the Bijapuris from the south at the same time. Leaving Ahmadnagar with a vast army on 25th February, the Khan marched southwards along the eastern side of the Puna district, methodically capturing and garrisoning all the strongholds that guarded the approaches to Puna on the east and south. ### [c8.s3.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s3.2) The Marathas at first retreated before him without risking a battle. By way of Sonwadi (close to the Dhond railway station) and Supa (16 miles s. w. of Dhond), he reached Baramati (18 miles s. e. of Supa) on 5th April. At the last two places were mud-forts which the enemy had evacuated. He next worked his way westwards up the valley of the Nira river, by way of Hol, reaching Shirwal, 26 miles south of Puna, on 18th April. Like a wise general, Shaista Khan left detachments at all these outposts, to guard his line of communication and hold the forts. A flying column sent from Shirwal sacked the villages round Rajgarh (22 miles due west.) ### [c8.s3.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s3.3) From Shirwal the Mughal army moved along the Nira river 16 miles northwards to Shivapur (near Khed), and thence due eastwards through Garara, arriving at Saswad (13 miles east of Shivapur and 18 miles south-east of Puna) on 1st May. ### [c8.s3.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s3.4) Up to this point the Mughal advance had been unopposed, the Marathas only hovering at a distance to cut off supplies and skirmishing with the foraging parties. They made their first stand near the pass leading from Shivapur to Garara. On 30th April a body of 3,000 Maratha cavalry threatened the Mughal rear-guard under Rao Bhao Singh, but were attacked and routed after a long fight. ### [c8.s3.5](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s3.5) From Saswad a small Mughal detachment raided the villages at the foot of Purandar fort. They were attacked by 3,000 of the enemy, but held their ground by fighting desperately at close quarters, though they lost 50 in killed and wounded. Reinforcements arrived, routed the enemy, and pursued them to the pass which was commanded by the guns of Purandar. The Mughals, flushed with victory, cleared the pass at a gallop, in the teeth of a hot fire from the fort-walls, and dispersed the enemy assembled beyond it. The victors returned to their camp at Saswad in the evening. Thence, after a four days' halt at Rajwah, they entered Puna on 9th May. ### §4. Shaista Khan captures Chakan ### [c8.s4.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s4.1) Shaista Khan had decided to pass the rainy season with his army at Puna, then a small hamlet. But before his arrival there, the enemy had totally destroyed the grain and fodder in the country round Puna and Chakan and removed all traces of habitation. And now the many rivers between Puna and the Mughal frontier being in flood, no provision reached his camp, and his army had to undergo great hardship from scarcity. He, therefore, decided to remove his camp from Puna to Chakan, 18 miles northwards, as being nearer to Ahmadnagar and the Mughal dominion, whence supplies could more easily reach him. (A. N. 584-5.) ### [c8.s4.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s4.2) Chakan is a place of great strategic importance. On the east it is separated from the imperial territory by the shallow upper courses of the Bhima and Ghod rivers only, with no difficult mountain pass to cross. Its possession would have greatly shortened Shaista Khan's line of communication with his base of supplies at Ahmadnagar and also secured his camp against any attack from the north. Moreover, Chakan is only 31 miles due east of the Bhorghat pass and commands the shortest route leading from Ahmadnagar to Konkan. ### [c8.s4.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s4.3) Leaving Puna on 19th June, the Khan arrived in the vicinity of Chakan on the 21st, reconnoitred the fort and distributed the lines of investment among his officers. The fort of Chakan is a square enclosure with bastioned fronts and towers at the four corners. The walls are high, with a ditch 30 ft. deep and 15 ft. wide all around. The only entrance is in the eastern face, and passes through five or six gateways. Beyond the walls there is an outwork of mud with a ditch, the remnant of a very old fortification. (Bom. Gaz. xviii. pt. iii., p. 121; Ind. Antiq. ii. 43, iv. 352.) ### [c8.s4.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s4.4) Shaista Khan, after throwing up defensive earthworks round the positions taken up by the four divisions of his army, began to run trenches towards the fort-walls, construct raised platforms at suitable points, and mount on them large pieces of artillery brought from the Mughal forts in the Deccan. Though the heavy showers of the rainy season hampered his work and the defenders kept up a galling fire, he pressed the siege vigorously. After 54 days of hard labour a mine was carried from his own position in the north to under the tower at the north-eastern corner, and it was exploded at 3 P.M. on 14th August, 1660. The work and its defenders were blown up; the Mughals rushed to the assault, but found to their surprise that behind the breach the enemy had thrown up a high embankment of earth which they held in force and from the shelter of which they assailed the Mughals with rockets, musket-shots, bombs and stones. The storming party was checked with heavy loss, but clung to the blood-stained ground for the night. ### [c8.s4.5](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s4.5) Next morning (15th August) they resumed the attack, scaled the wall, and captured the main fort, putting many of the garrison to the sword and driving the rest into the citadel. In a short time even the last-named work capitulated. But the imperialists had to purchase their victory at a heavy price, losing 268 killed and 600 wounded. \[A. N. 585-588; Tavernier, i. 409 confused.\] ### [c8.s4.6](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s4.6) Firangji Narsala, an old officer of the days of Shahji, had been left by Shiva in charge of Chakan, with orders to hold out as long as he could, but to surrender when driven to extremities, because it was impossible for Shiva, then battling with the Bijapuris near Panhala, to divert any force for the relief of Chakan, 140 miles away in the north. For nearly two months Firangji had defended his post with tireless energy, "incessantly showering shots, bullets and rockets at the besiegers." He had disputed every inch of the ground on the two days of assault. And now, hopeless of aid, he capitulated with honour. Shaista Khan greatly admired the gallant \*qiladar\* and pressed him to enter the imperial service on high pay. But Firangji refused to prove false to his salt, and was allowed to go back to his master with his troops. ### §5. The fighting in 1661-63 and conquest of Ratnagiri district ### [c8.s5.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.1) Shivaji's defeat at Chakan and Panhala was followed by a lull in the war during the last three months of the year 1660, which he spent quietly at Rajgarh, in planning how to compensate himself for these losses in the Desh country by transferring the war to another part of Bijapuri territory, namely Konkan, or the country west of the Sahyadri range, where the government was very weakly exercised by countless petty vassal Rajahs and Bijapuri city-governors. There was in that province no single powerful viceroy with an army of his own, able to unite the local feudatories under one central authority, exact loyal service from them, and thus successfully oppose an invader like Shivaji, who was his own master and could direct all his resources with absolute unity of command and policy. ### [c8.s5.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.2) Shaista Khan, too, on his return to Puna (end of August 1660) after the capture of Chakan, spent the rainy season there in enforced inactivity. Nor was he eager to lay siege to any more Maratha forts, as even the small and comparatively weak castle of Chakan, situated in the plain, had cost him nearly nine hundred men to take it. He employed his time more usefully in inducing Ghalib, the Bijapuri commandant of Parenda, to surrender that fort to Aurangzib for a high price. The terms were approved by the Emperor, and large Mughal forces were detached from Puna to Parenda to take possession of it (20th November), overawe any opposition that might be made at the last moment, and occupy the district around it. ### [c8.s5.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.3) At the beginning of next year (1661), Shaista Khan turned his attention to the Kalian district or North Konkan. Here a small Mughal force, only 3,000 strong, under Ismail, had been operating since April last and had occupied a part of the country, though the important cities and forts (like Kalian) remained unconquered. These gains had been placed under a faujdar named Salabat Khan Deccani, with a contingent of friendly Marathas, among whom Babaji Bhonslé, Raghuji, Shambhuji Kavji and Babaji Ram (or Rana) Honap,—a former deshpande of Puna,—are named. \[A. N. 584; Malkaré, 42.\] ### [c8.s5.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.4) But local levies could effect little, and it was necessary to complete the Mughal conquest of Konkan and extinguish the last traces of Shivaji's power there by pouring into the country large reinforcements of imperial troops under a high commander. The general chosen for this purpose was Kar Talb Khan, an Uzbak, who had attained to the rank of a 4-hazari as early as the battle of Dharmat (1657), and had recently commanded a division in the Parenda district. With him Shaista Khan sent many of his own Rajput and Muslim subordinates and local allies (such as Rai Baghini, the heroic widow of Udaji Ram, the jagirdar of Mahur in Berar.) ### [c8.s5.5](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.5) Marching from Puna by way of Lohgarh, Kar Talb Khan descended into Konkan by a pass a little to the south of the Bhorghat. While his soldiers, encumbered with artillery and baggage, struggled painfully and in alarm through the dense jungles, steep rocks and narrow broken roads on to Umbarkhind (about 15 miles due east of Pen), Shivaji by secret and rapid marches came up with them and cut off their lines of advance and retreat alike. Kar Talb had to offer battle under these adverse conditions and suffered heavy losses. His army seemed doomed to perish from thirst, without the power to move. In despair he gave up all the property in his camp and paid a large ransom to Shivaji and thus bought a safe retreat for his army (3rd February, 1661.) ### [c8.s5.6](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.6) The victorious Shivaji now divided his forces; and while one army under Netaji was detached to act against the Mughals, he himself with the other invaded Bijapuri territory in Konkan, "to avenge the loss of Panhala." The Kalian district having been thus freed from the new enemies, Shivaji left it alone, and marched southwards, easily capturing city after city, till all the coast-strip from Danda-Rajpuri to Kharepatan was commanded by him, and the country further south, as far as Goa, seemed to lie at his mercy, when he would renew the campaign next dry season. His movements were so rapid, the local authorities were so divided and unprepared for defence, that no resistance was offered, but the Rajahs and city-governors fled in consternation before the oncoming flood of Maratha invasion. The wiser among them recognized resistance to him as futile and expectation of support from Bijapur vain, and so made their peace with him by offering him obedience and tribute. ### [c8.s5.7](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.7) Nizampur (22 miles due east of Janjira) was raided, and then the port of Dabhol belonging to a chieftain surnamed Dalvé was captured and placed under an agent of Shivaji (Feb. 1661.) Jaswant Rao, the Rajah of Pallivana, who had loyally helped Jauhar during the Panhala campaign, took refuge with Surya Rao, the Rajah of Prabhavali, (its chief town being Shringarpur.)\* The Muslim governor of Sangameshwar fled away, and so did all the inhabitants who had anything to lose. The town was thrown into the greatest disorder and alarm. Shivaji therefore sent Pilaji Nilkanth and Tanaji Malusaré with a small force to take possession of it, while he ordered Surya Rao to support this detachment. He himself pushed on to Devrukh by way of Chiplun (where he performed the pilgrimage at the shrine of Parashuram and made large gifts to the Brahmans.) His victorious march was continued to Rajapur, which he now sacked for the second time and finally occupied, on 3rd March, \[Ch. 14\],—and even further south to Kharepatan (on the Vaghotan river, 16.33 N.) Most of the cities of the Ratnagiri district saved themselves from plunder by paying him \*chauth\*. ### [c8.s5.8](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.8) ∗ I take it that \*Pallivana\* is the Sanskritized form of \*Palavna\*, a town (giving its name to a district) situated 12 m.n. of Dapoli, while Mandangarh is 5 m.n. of Palavna. The fort of \*Palgarh\* (built by Shivaji) is in the Khed sub-division, 6 m. n. of Khed. \*Sangameshwar\* is a well-known holy city, 10 m.n.w. of Devrukh. \*Shringarpur\* is 8 m.n.e. of Sangameshwar, and is overlooked by \*Prachitgarh\*, 2 m. to its east; the Tivra pass being 4 m. s. of it. \[Degree sheet 47 G.\] \*Prabhavali\* or Pravanvalli is just below Vishalgarh to the s.w. In old records Dabhol and Prabhavali are coupled together, though the two towns are far apart. ### [c8.s5.9](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.9) Meantime, under pressure from his sovereign Adil Shah, the Rajah of Shringarpur had made a night-attack on Shivaji's detachment in Sangameshwar, but had been repulsed by the gallant Tanaji Malusaré. Shivaji now turned back northwards and conquered the Palli-vana State, conciliated and recalled the fugitive population, and restored cultivation and trade. For protecting this conquest, he fortified Chirdurg and named it Mandangarh, and built a second fort, Pálgarh. ### [c8.s5.10](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.10) He was now free to settle accounts with Surya Rao, the Rajah of Shringarpur, who had tried to save himself by promising homage to Shivaji ever since the fall of Javli (1656) and repeatedly broken his faith in fear of his Bijapuri master. Punishment swiftly overtook the double-dealer. Shivaji now invaded Shringarpur by such a rapid march from Palli-vana that Surya Rao was taken entirely by surprise; he had not anticipated the blow and made no preparation for defence; even his captains were enjoying leave home! The Rajah had barely time to escape with his life, while Shivaji entered his city in triumph (29th April.) The rest of the small State was easily occupied and placed under Trimbak Bhaskar as governor, while the neighbouring hill-fort of Pratitgarh (=Prachitgarh) was put in repairs to protect the city.\[\*\] ### [c8.s5.11](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.11) The ferocity and greed of the Maratha troops, no less than their valour and rapidity of movement, had spread the wildest terror among the people of the invaded districts and all who could had fled away from the path of the invaders. Shivaji now very wisely won over Shirke, the minister and virtual ruler of Shringarpur, enlisted him in his own service, afterwards marrying into his family,—made large gifts to the local Brahmans and thus induced the population to return to their homes and usual occupations and submit to the new government. ### [c8.s5.12](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.12) But these successes were chequered by a great defeat. In May 1661 the Mughals wrested Kalian from the Marathas, and though Shivaji mustered an army in Mahad to attempt its recovery, his efforts did not bear fruit and this capital city remained in Mughal hands for nine years more. So, late in June, Shivaji retired to his fort of Wardhangarh, where he spent the entire summer in quiet. The fort of Deiri, in the Pen sub-division, was besieged by a Muslim general named Bulaki, but a Maratha relieving force under Kavji Kodhalkar drove him away after slaying 400 of his men (21 August 1661.) ### [c8.s5.13](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.13) ∗ Several details of this campaign in the Ratnagiri district have been taken from the \*Shiva-bharat\*. The dates are from \*Jedhe S.\* ### [c8.s5.14](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.14) Maratha activities were resumed at the beginning of 1662. Shivaji attacked Namdar Khan, at Mira Dongar (6 miles south-east of Pen), and then raided the rich city of Pen. The Mughal defence was obstinate and Shivaji's forces suffered a heavy loss in killed and wounded. ### [c8.s5.15](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.15) On the whole, throughout the year 1662 and the first quarter of 1663, some Mughal generals (especially Namdar Khan) showed great activity and success in attacking the Marathas, making reprisals into their territory, and spoiling their raids by close pursuit. In March 1663 we find two large and mobile divisions of Mughal horse,—12,000 and 7,000 strong,—posted at Upper Chaul and Rahamatpur respectively for these duties, while Kalian was held by a permanent garrison too large to be easily attacked. ### [c8.s5.16](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.16) The net result of the operations of these two years was that the Mughals kept their grip on the extreme north of Konkan, including the city and district of Kalian,—barring occasional raids into that debatable land the Pen sub-division,—while Shivaji remained master of the southern part, namely the south-eastern corner of the Kolaba district and nearly the whole of the Ratnagiri district, or roughly 18° to 16.30 North latitude. ### [c8.s5.17](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.17) In March 1663, the Mughals gave a long and vigorous chase to Netaji, the Master of the Horse in Shiva's army. He had led his cavalry in a raid into the imperial territory, but a Mughal force of 7,000 horse pursued him so closely that "he was fain to travel 45 or 50 miles a day and yet \[had\] much ado to escape with a small \[part of the\] booty he had got. They left not the pursuit till they came within five leagues of Bijapur." But Rustam-i-Zaman met the Mughals and induced them to give up the pursuit, "by telling them that the country was dangerous for any strange army to march in and also promising to go himself and follow him, by which deceit Netaji got away, though not without loss of 300 horse and himself wounded." (F. R. Surat, vol. 103, Gyffard to Surat, 30 March, and 8 April 1663.) ### [c8.s5.18](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.18) But within a month of meeting with this reverse to him arms, Shivaji dealt a masterly blow at the Mughals, —a blow whose cleverness of design, neatness of execution and completeness of success created in the Mughal Court and camp as much terror of his prowess and belief in his possession of magical powers, as his coup against Afzal Khan had done among the Bijapuris. He surprised and wounded the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan in the heart of his camp, in his very bed-chamber, within the inner ring of his body-guards and female slaves.∗ ### [c8.s5.19](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s5.19) ∗ Night-attack on Shaista Khan: the earliest records are Gyffard to Surat 12 April, 24 May, 1663 (F. R. Surat, vol. 103) containing Shivaji's own version; Bernier, 187; A. N. 819 (only one sentence!); Storia, ii. 104-106; Sabh. 35-37; Dil. 44-46. Khafi Khan (ii. 172-5) reports the narration of his father, a servant of Shaista Khan, but he wrote after 1730. T. S. 19b-20a, . Jedhe. ### §6. Shivaji's night-attack on Shaista Khan ### [c8.s6.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s6.1) Shaista Khan had, as we have seen, occupied Puna in May 1660 and retired there after the capture of Chakan in the following August. He took up his residence in what was then the best house of the future Maratha capital, the unpretentious home of Shivaji's childhood. His harem was with him, and around his mansion lay the quarters of his guards and attendants, the band-room and offices. Further off, across the road leading southwards to Singh-garh lay the camp of his lieutenant, Maharajah Jaswant Singh and his contingent of 10,000 men. ### [c8.s6.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s6.2) The enterprise required no less agility and cunning than bravery and dash. Shivaji picked out a thousand of his bravest and most expert soldiers and took them with him, while two supporting divisions of one thousand each (including cavalry and Mavles) under Netaji Palkar and Moro Pant the \*Peshwa\*, were directed to take post on the two flanks of the vast Mughal encampment, at a mile's distance from its outer side. Babaji Bapuji and Chimnaji Bapuji, of Khed, accompanied Shiva as his body-guards and right-hand men in this enterprise. ### [c8.s6.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s6.3) The Maratha force, lightly equipped, set out from Singh-garh, covered the intervening eleven miles rapidly in the course of the day, and arrived at Puna after night-fall. With 400 picked men Shivaji entered the limits of the camp, replying to the challenge of the Mughal guards that they were Deccani soldiers of the imperial army going to take up their appointed posts. After resting for a few hours in some obscure corner of the camp, the party arrived near the Khan's quarters at midnight. Shiva knew the ins and outs of the city and every nook and corner of the house where he had passed his boyhood and youth. ### [c8.s6.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s6.4) It was the 6th day of Ramzan, the month of fasting for Muslims. The servants of the Nawab's household had mostly fallen asleep after their day's abstinence followed by the heavy meal at night. Some cooks who had risen from their beds to make a fire and prepare the meal which is taken a little before dawn in the month of Ramzan, were despatched by the Marathas without any noise. The wall dividing this outer kitchen from the body-servants' room within the harem once had a small door in it, but the opening had been closed with brick and mud to complete the seclusion of the harem. The Marathas began to take out the bricks and make an opening there. The noise of their pick-axes and the groans of the dying awoke some of the servants, who reported the suspicious noise to the Khan, but that general only rebuked them for disturbing his sleep for a trifle. ### [c8.s6.5](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s6.5) Soon the breach in the wall was large enough for a man to creep through. Shivaji, with his trusty lieutenant Chimnaji Bapuji, was the first to enter the harem, and was followed by 200 of his men. The place was a maze of canvas, screen-wall after screen-wall and enclosure within enclosure. Hacking a way through them with his sword, Shivaji reached the very bed-room of the Khan. The frightened women roused the Nawab, but before he could use his weapons Shivaji was upon him and severed his thumb with one stroke of his sword. It was evidently at this time that the lamps in the room were put out by some wise woman. In the darkness two of the Marathas tumbled into a cistern of water; and the confusion that followed was used by Shaista Khan's slave-girls to carry him away to a place of safety. The Marathas continued their work of slaughter in the darkness for some time, killing and wounding many of the Khan's women, without knowing their sex. ### [c8.s6.6](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s6.6) Meantime the other half of Shivaji's force, the 200 men, evidently under Babaji Bapuji, who had been left outside the harem, had rushed the main guard, slaying the sleepers and the awake and crying in derision, "Is it thus that you keep watch?" They next entered the band-room and ordered the bandsmen, as if from the Khan, to play. The loud noise of the kettle-drums drowned all voices, and the yells of the enemy swelled the confusion. The tumult in the harem, too, now grew so great that the Mughal troops became aware that their general was being attacked. Shouting "The enemy have come," they began to take up their arms. ### [c8.s6.7](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s6.7) Abul Fath, a son of Shaista Khan, had been the first to hasten to his father's rescue without waiting for others; but the brave youth was slain after he had struck down two or three Marathas. Another Mughal captain who lodged just behind the harem enclosure, finding its gate closed from within by the wily Marathas, let himself down inside by means of a rope-ladder; but he was at once attacked and killed. ### [c8.s6.8](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s6.8) Shivaji, finding his enemies fully awakened and arming, delayed no longer, but promptly left the harem, called his men together, and withdrew from the camp by the direct route, while the Mughals, not knowing where their enemies were, fruitlessly searched all their camp. ### [c8.s6.9](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s6.9) This night-attack was a complete success. The retreat from the camp was unmolested and no pursuit was made. During the surprise the Marathas lost only six men killed and forty wounded, while they slew a son and a captain of Shaista Khan's, forty of his attendants and six of his wives and slave-girls, besides wounding two other sons, eight other women and Shaista Khan himself.\* ### [c8.s6.10](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s6.10) ∗ Gyffard at Rajapur wrote to Surat on 12th April 1663: "Yesterday arrived a letter from the Rajah written himself to Ravji \[Pandit\], giving him an account how that he himself with 400 choice men went to Shaista Khan's camp. There, upon some pretence, . . . he got into his tent to salam, and presently slew all the watch, . . . wounded Shaista Khan with his own hand, \[one son was killed outright, two wounded, six women killed, eight more wounded, and 40 persons attending their general left dead in the place.\] After all this Shivaji returns, losing but six men \[killed\] and forty wounded, 10,000 horse under Rajah Jaswant Singh standing still and never offered to pursue him; so it is generally believed it was done with his consent, though Shivaji tells his men his Permisera (\*Parameshwar\*, the great God) bid him do it." The figures for the loss suffered by Shaista Khan given in this letter have been replaced, within square brackets above, by the corrections made in Gyffard's letter of 24th May. ### [c8.s6.11](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s6.11) The daring and cunning of the Maratha hero were rewarded by an immense increase of his prestige. He was taken to be an incarnation of Satan; no place was believed to be proof against his entrance and no feat impossible for him. The whole country talked with astonishment and terror of the almost superhuman deed done by him; and there was bitter humiliation and sorrow in the Emperor's Court and family circle at this disaster to his maternal uncle and the "premier peer" (\*amir-ul-umara\*) of his empire. ### [c8.s6.12](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s6.12) This attack took place on 5th April, 1663. The morning following it, all the imperial officers came to Shaista Khan to condole with him in his loss. Among them was Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who had not raised a finger to defend his chief or to oppose the retreat of his assailant, though he had 10,000 horse under him and lay encamped across the road taken by Shivaji. Shaista Khan, with the polished sneer of a high-bred Mughal courtier, turned to Jaswant and merely remarked, "When the enemy fell upon me, I imagined that you had already died fighting against them!" Indeed, the public, both in the Mughal camp and throughout the Deccan, ascribed Shivaji's exploit to the connivance of Jaswant. Shivaji, however, asserted that this astonishing feat was performed by him under the inspiration of his God and not of any human counsellor. Immediately after his return from it, he wrote to Raoji Rao, his agent at Rajapur, boasting how he had been the chief actor in this business and had himself wounded Shaista Khan. ### [c8.s6.13](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s6.13) The Mughal viceroy, covered with shame and grief, retired to Aurangabad for greater safety. The Emperor heard of the disaster early in May, when on his way to Kashmir, and ascribed it to the viceroy's negligence and incapacity. As a mark of his displeasure, he transferred Shaista Khan to the government of Bengal (1 Dec. 1663), which was then regarded as a penal province, or in Aurangzib's own words, "a hell well stocked with bread," without permitting him even to visit the Emperor on his way to his new charge. The Khan left the Deccan about the middle of January 1664, on being relieved by Prince Muazzam. ### §7. Surat described ### [c8.s7.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s7.1) While this change of governors was going on at Aurangabad, Shivaji performed a feat of even greater audacity than he had ever displayed before. From 6th to 10th January he looted the city of Surat, the richest port of the west coast and "the gateway to the holy places of Arabia" for Indian Muslims, who here embarked for the pilgrimage to Mecca. ### [c8.s7.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s7.2) The fort of Surat stood on the south bank of the Tapti, 12 miles from the sea. It was impregnable to a body of light raiders like Shiva's troopers. But the city close to the fort offered a rich and defenceless prize. It had, at that time, no wall to protect it. Its wealth was boundless. The imperial customs alone yielded a revenue of 12 \*lakhs\* of Rupees a year (in 1666, acc. to Thevenot, v. 81.) ### [c8.s7.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s7.3) The city of Surat covered nearly four square miles, including gardens and open spaces, and had a population of 200,000 souls. The streets were narrow and crooked; the houses of the rich were near the river-side and substantially built; but the town was mainly composed of poor men's huts built of wooden posts and bamboo walls and with floors plastered with mud. "In the greater part of the town scarcely two or three brick-houses were to be seen in a street, and in some parts... not one for many streets together. The whole town was unfortified either by art or nature and its situation was upon a large plain of many miles' extent. They had only made against the chief avenues of the town some weak and ill-built gates \[more for show than for defence.\] In some parts there was a dry ditch easily passable by a footman, with no wall on the inner side. The rest was left so open that scarcely any sign of a ditch was perceivable." (Bom. Gaz., ii. 301, 90-91; Letter from the English chaplain Escaliot to Sir T. Browne, in Ind. Antiq. viii. 256.) ### [c8.s7.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s7.4) Early in the morning of Tuesday, 5th January, 1664, Surat was suddenly alarmed by the news that Shivaji had arrived with an army at Gandavi, 28 miles southwards, and was advancing to plunder the town.\[\*\] At once the people were seized with a panic, and began to flee away with their wives and children, mostly across the river, to save their lives. Rich men found shelter in the fort by bribing its commandant. Later in the day a courier brought the intelligence that Shivaji had come still nearer, and at night it was learnt that he had halted only five miles from Surat. Inayet Khan, the governor of the town—who was quite distinct from the commandant of the fort,—had sent out an agent to treat with Shiva for terms of ransom. But when he heard that the Maratha chief had detained the messenger and was approaching with all speed, he himself fled to the fort, leaving the town at the enemy's mercy. He used to draw from the Treasury the pay of 500 soldiers, but had so long appropriated the money without maintaining a proper force. His cowardice also prevented him from organizing a defence or even from standing at his post. ### [c8.s7.5](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s7.5) ∗ First sack of Surat: The most minute details and graphic accounts are found in the factory records: Log of the Loyal Merchant (Orme MSS. vol. 263, pp. 23-24); F. R. Surat 2 (Surat Consult. 6 Jan., 1664), vol. 86 (Surat to Persia; Surat to Co. 18 and 28 Jan. and 4 April); Dutch Records, vol. 27, Nos. 711 and 719. Letter of Escaliot very valuable. Bernier, 188-190; Storia, ii. 29, 112, 120, 132, iv. 428. Ishwardas 52a. (A.N., K.K., and Tavernier silent.) For a good description of the city and fort, Kaeppelin, 52n, and Carré, i. 16-49. ### [c8.s7.6](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s7.6) The townspeople were sheep worthy of such a shepherd. A population composed mostly of money-loving traders, poor artisans, punctilious fire-worshippers and tender-souled Jains, cannot readily take to war even in self-defence. The richest merchants, though owning millions of Rupees, had not the sense to hire guards for the protection of their wealth, though they might have done so at only a twentieth part of what they were soon to lose through pillage. ### [c8.s7.7](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s7.7) §8. \*Heroic defence of the English at Surat.\* ### [c8.s7.8](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s7.8) The shame of this cowardice in high and low alike was deepened by the contrast afforded by the manly spirit of a handful of foreigners. The English and Dutch merchants resolved to defend their own factories at all costs, though these were open houses, not built to stand an attack. They might have sought safety by escaping to their ships at Swally on the coast, 10 miles west of Surat; but "it was thought more like Englishmen to make ourselves ready to defend our lives and goods to the uttermost than by a flight to leave money, goods, house to merciless people.” ### [c8.s7.9](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s7.9) Sir George Oxenden, the English President, and his Council stood at their posts in Surat, and improvised a defence of the factory. They procured two small brass guns from a merchant in the town and four others from their own vessels. With the armed sailors promptly sent up from the English ships at Swally, they mustered in the factory 150 Englishmen and 60 peons, a total of 210 defenders. Four of the guns were mounted on the roof to scour two broad streets and command the large and lofty house of Haji Said Beg, adjacent to theirs. Two other guns were posted behind the front gate, in which port-holes were cut for firing into the passage leading to the factory. What provisions, water and powder could be got were hurriedly laid in. “Some were set to melt lead and make bullets, others with chisels to cut lead into slugs; no hand idle but all employed to strengthen every place. Captains were appointed and every man quartered and order taken for relieving one another upon necessity. To secure the approaches to the factory, the English went outside and took possession of a temple just under their house, and cleared it of its refugees, and also shut up a mosque on another side, whose windows looked into the outer courtyard of the factory. President Oxenden at the head of his 200 soldiers “drawn out in rank and file, with drum and trumpet,” publicly marched through the town in the morning of the 6th, “declaring that he intended to withstand Shivaji with this handful of men.” ### [c8.s7.10](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s7.10) The Dutch, too, defended their house, though its distance of a mile from the English factory made mutual aid between the two nations impossible. The example of the Europeans also heartened a body of Turkish and Armenian merchants to defend their property in their serai, close to the English factory. ### [c8.s7.11](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s7.11) §9. First loot of Surat, 1664. ### [c8.s7.12](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s7.12) Shivaji had been heard of at Bassein, twenty-four miles north of Bombay, only nine days before. But he had made a forced march to Surat with 4,000 men mounted on choice horses with such speed and secrecy that he was at Surat a day after his approach had been detected. His route lay by the forts of Nar-durg (probably Naldurg, s. w. of Nana Ghat), Mahuli, and Kohaj and then across the zamindaris of Jawhar, Ramnagar and Lakdar(?), north of the Thana district. Two Rajahs had joined him on the way with their contingents in the hope of sharing the plunder, and his army now mustered 10,000. ### [c8.s7.13](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s7.13) At 11 o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, 6th January, 1664, Shivaji arrived at Surat and pitched his tent in a garden a quarter of a mile outside the Burhanpur or eastern gate. The night before he had sent two messengers with a letter requiring the governor and the three most eminent merchants and richest men in the city, viz., Haji Said Beg, Baharji Borah, and Haji Qasim, to come to him in person immediately and make terms, otherwise he threatened the whole town with fire and sword. No answer had been given to the demand, and the Maratha horsemen, immediately after their arrival on the 6th, entered the defenceless and almost deserted city, and after sacking the houses began to set fire to them. A body of Shivaji's musketeers was set "to play upon the castle, with no expectation to take it, but to keep in and frighten the governor and the rest that had got in, as also \[to prevent\] the soldiers of the castle from sallying out upon them whilst the others plundered and fired \[the houses.\]" The garrison kept up a constant fire, but the fort-guns inflicted more damage on the town than on the assailants. Throughout Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday, this work of devastation was continued, every day new fires being raised, so that thousands of houses were consumed to ashes and two-thirds of the town destroyed. As the English chaplain wrote, "Thursday and Friday nights were the most terrible nights for fire. The fire turned the night into day, as before the smoke in the day-time had turned day into night, rising so thick that it darkened the sun like a great cloud." ### [c8.s7.14](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s7.14) Near the Dutch factory stood the grand mansion of Baharji Borah, then "reputed the richest merchant in the world," his property having been estimated at 80 \*lakhs\* of Rupees. The Marathas plundered it at leisure day and night till Friday evening, when having ransacked it and dug up its floor, they set fire to it. From this house they took away 28 seers of large pearls, with many other jewels, rubies, emeralds and "an incredible amount of money." ### [c8.s7.15](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s7.15) Close to the English factory were the lofty residence and extensive warehouses of another very rich merchant, Haji Said Beg, who, too, had fled away to the fort, leaving his property without a defender. All the afternoon and night of Wednesday and till past the noon of Thursday, the Marathas continued to break open his doors and chests and carry off as much money as they could. Entering one of his warehouses they smashed some casks of quicksilver and spilt a great quantity of it on the floor. But in the afternoon of Thursday the brigands left it in a hurry, on being scared by a sortie which the English had made into the street to drive away a party of 25 Maratha horsemen who seemed intent on setting fire to another house in dangerous proximity to the English factory. In this encounter one Maratha trooper was wounded with a bullet, and two Englishmen with arrow and sword, but slightly. ### [c8.s7.16](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s7.16) The English merchants next day put a guard of their own in the house of Said Beg and thus he suffered no further loss. Shivaji was angry with the English at being balked of his prey, and in the afternoon of Friday he sent them a message calling upon them to pay him three \*lakhs\* of Rupees or else let his men freely loot the Haji’s house, and threatening that in case they refused to do either he would come in person, kill every soul in the English factory, and raze their house to the ground. President Oxenden took time to consider the proposal till next morning (Saturday), when he rejected both the demands of Shivaji and boldly defied the Maratha chief to come and do his worst, saying, “We are ready for you and resolved not to go away. But come when you please; and \[as\] you have, as you say, resolved to come, I ask you to come one \*prahar\* sooner than you intend.” To this challenge Shivaji gave no reply. He was surfeited with booty and was too wise to run a needless risk by facing artillery concealed behind defences and served by resolute and disciplined men, for the sake of a few \*lakhs\* more. ### §10. How money was extorted ### [c8.s8.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s8.1) The plunder of Surat yielded him above a \*kror\* of Rupees, the city “not having been so rich \[as then\] in many years before.” The looting was unresisted, and extended over fully four days and nights, and he “scorned to carry away anything but gold, silver, pearls, diamonds and such precious ware." (Log of the Loyal Merchant.) ### [c8.s8.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s8.2) On reaching Surat, Shivaji had publicly declared that he had not come to do any personal hurt to the English or other merchants, but only to revenge himself on Aurangzib for having invaded his country and killed some of his relations. But money was really his sole aim.\* He had to make the most of his four days' free run at Surat and shrank from no cruelty to extort money as quickly as possible. As the English chaplain wrote, "His desire of money is so great that he spares no barbarous cruelty to extort confessions from his prisoners, whips them most cruelly, threatens death and often executes it if they do not produce so much as he thinks they may or desires they should;—at least cuts off one hand, sometimes both." ### §11. Attempt to murder Shivaji ### [c8.s9.1](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s9.1) The cowardly governor Inayet Khan, who had run into the fort in Tuesday night, formed an infamous plot from his safe refuge. On Thursday he sent a young follower of his to Shivaji with pretended terms of peace. These were so manifestly unreasonable that Shiva scornfully asked the envoy, "Your master is now cooped up in his chamber like a woman. Does he think of me too as a woman that he expects me to accept such terms as these?" The young man immediately replied, "We are not women; I have something more to say to you;" and whipping out a concealed dagger he ran full at Shivaji's breast. A Maratha body-guard that stood before the Rajah with a drawn sword, struck off the assassin's hand with one blow. But so great was the force of the desperado's rush that he did not stop but drove the bloody stump of his arm on Shiva's person and the two rolled on the ground together. The blood being seen on Shiva's dress, his followers imagined that he had been murdered, and the cry ran through the camp to kill the prisoners. But the same guardsman clove the assassin's skull; Shiva rose up from the ground and forbade any massacre. Then he ordered the prisoners to be brought before him and cut off the heads of four and the hands of 24 others from among them at his caprice, but spared the rest.\* ### [c8.s9.2](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s9.2) ∗ An old merchant who had brought 40 ox-loads of cloth from near Agra but sold none, tried to propitiate Shivaji by offering it to him. But on his answering that he had no ready money, his right hand was cut off by Shivaji's order, he was driven away, and his cloth burnt by the Marathas. (Letter of Escaliot.) Bernier, 190, for the narrow escape of a Jewish ruby-merchant from the death threatened by Shivaji to extort his wealth. "Mr. Smith was present when he cut off more than 26 hands in one day, and as many heads; whoever he was that was taken and brought before him that could not redeem himself, lost either his hand or his head; and his manner was first to plunder and then to cause the owner of the house to give him something over and above to redeem his house from being burnt, and yet that perfidious villain would fire it afterwards, though he had obliged himself to the contrary." (Surat to Co., 28 Jan.). ### [c8.s9.3](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s9.3) At ten o'clock in the morning of Sunday the 10th, Shivaji suddenly departed from Surat with his army, on hearing that a Mughal force was coming to the relief of the town. That night he encamped twelve miles off and then retreated by rapid marches to Konkan. ### [c8.s9.4](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s9.4) ∗ Mr. Anthony Smith, a servant of the English E. I. Company, was seized on landing at the Dutch jetty and kept a prisoner in the Maratha camp for three days. Along with other prisoners, his right hand was ordered to be cut off, at which he cried out to Shivaji in Hindusthani to cut off his head instead. But on his hat being taken off, he was recognized as an Englishman and spared. On Friday afternoon he was sent to the English factory with a message from Shiva, but President Oxenden detained him there. The Log of the \*Loyal Merchant\* says that he was ransomed for Rs. 350; (also the Eng. President's letter.) ### [c8.s9.5](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s9.5) For some days afterwards the fear of his return prevented the townspeople from coming back to their desolated homes. But the imperial army reached Surat on the 17th and then the cowardly governor ventured to return from the fort. The people hooted at him and flung dirt on him, for which his son in anger shot a poor innocent Hindu trader dead. Sir George Oxenden, the English President, won the people's praise and admiration for having made a gallant stand and saved not only the Company's property, but also the quarter of the town situated round the English factory.\* ### [c8.s9.6](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s9.6) The Emperor showed his sympathy with the afflicted citizens by excusing the custom duties for one year in the case of all the merchants of Surat, and he rewarded the valour of the English and the Dutch traders by granting them a reduction of one-half per cent. from the normal import duties on their merchandise in future. ### [c8.s9.7](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s9.7) §12. Shivaji's doings in 1664. ### [c8.s9.8](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8.s9.8) The year 1664 that lay between the departure of Shaista Khan and the arrival of Jai Singh, was not marked by any Mughal success. The new viceroy, Prince Muazzam, lived at Aurangabad, caring only for pleasure and hunting. His favourite general, Maharajah Jaswant Singh, was posted at Puna. From this place he marched out and besieged Kondana (Nov. 1663.) The Rajputs are proverbially inefficient in sieges, and Jaswant, after wasting six months before the fort, delivered a rash and fruitless assault, in which he lost many hundreds of his soldiers, chiefly owing to a gunpowder explosion. Then he quarrelled with his brother-in-law Bhao Singh Hada, evidently on the question of responsibility for the failure, and the two officers abandoned the siege (28 May 1664) and with their armies retired to Aurangabad to pass the rainy season. The campaign ended in absolutely no gain. (\*Dil.\* 47; \*A. N.\* 867; \*Jedhe.\*) _First 79 of 365 passages. [Read on](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8)_ ## Linked texts (3) - [Indian Antiquary](https://indike.org/pramana/inp.epigraphy.corpora.ia) - [Śivabhārata](https://indike.org/pramana/in.lit.historical.uttarakalina.sivabharata) — Paramānanda, Sanskrit - [Ciṭṇīs bakhar](https://indike.org/pramana/in.darkages.maratha.bakhar.chitnis-bakhar) — Malhār Rāmrāv Ciṭṇīs 1810, Marathi --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8](https://indike.org/pramana/ins.general.sarkar-1919.c8) · Pramāṇa