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Fall of the Mughal Empire v1.c12.s2: § 4. How the Marātha Government agreed to support Madho Singh

Fall of the Mughal Empire v1.c12.s2

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§ 4. How the Marātha Government agreed to support Madho Singh

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But even at home danger sought him out. He was overwhelmed by a Marātha force acting for his younger brother, only a few months after his return from the Panjab campaign.

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The tangled web of Kachhwa-Maratha diplomacy can be now unloosened and laid out in clear outlines with the help of the contemporary Marathi letters, though some self-inconsistency naturally occurs in them as the terms demanded and offered varied from time to time. We have seen how Ishwari Singh shortly after his accession had to patch up a peace with the Mahārānā by promising to give his younger brother an appanage of 24 lakhs of Rupees a year (1743), and that in February 1745 he had bought the help of some Marātha generals in Northern India (notably Ramchandra Baba) and routed the Maharana's forces, and then refused to fulfil his promise. Next, Malhar Holkar had been bribed by Madho Singh to espouse his cause and detach a force from his contingent to support Madho Singh in 1747, but the attempt had ended in utter failure at Rajmahal (March.) This victory made Ishwari Singh inordinately proud and his brother could expect nothing from him thereafter. So, the Maharana's envoy had gone to Punā and entreated the Marātha Court to exact from Ishwari Singh the fulfilment of his first promise, offering Shāhu a tribute of ten lakhs or more for this service.

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The Peshwa had been originally Ishwari Singh’s supporter. But he now (7th March 1747) instructed Rāmchandra Bābā to press Ishwari Singh to cede to Mādho Singh 24 *lakhs* worth of territory, if the latter prince paid a subsidy of 15 *lakhs*, on the ground that “thus both the princes would be preserved and our interests would be served.” Rāmchandra Bābā rightly protested against this line of action as futile and lacking any foundation on reality. He urged, “We shall get no money out of it. Our king took up Ishwari Singh’s cause and by his order I went and helped him. If you now turn against Ishwari Singh, we shall lose all credit [for sincerity] among the public.”

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Despairing of getting help for his nephew from the Peshwā, the Maharana tried to gain the support of the imperial Court and also began to collect Rāthor and Hādā allies for the purpose. He completely won Malhar Holkar over, who again and again pressed Madho Singh’s cause on the Peshwa with passionate partisanship and even gave a personal guarantee for the payment of Madho Singh’s promised tribute. Thus Malhar and his diwān Rāmchandra Bābā were moving at cross-purposes. The Peshwa strongly deprecated such a conflict of policy in the Marātha camp in Hindustan as destructive of the Maratha position and interests there, and urged unity of action in future. [*Aitihāsik Patr.* ii. 68 and 76.] He very wisely ordered Holkar and Rāmchandra Bābā to try every possible means of accommodating this family quarrel by persuading Ishwari Singh to cede the promised territory to his younger brother, instead of letting this fratricidal contest run its fatal course.

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When the demand of 24 lakhs worth of territory for Mādho was placed before Ishwari Singh, he was rightly indignant at the Peshwā's partisanship of his rival and especially at his intervention in a domestic dispute of the Kachhwā royalty, and wrote in reply, "There is a unique and hereditary friendship between the Peshwā and myself. Bālāji Rāo cannot imagine how thick my father was with his and what services he rendered to Bāji Rāo. Even now I do not deviate from the Peshwā's request. But this question is one of inheritance of ancestral property. We are Rajahs and must follow our hereditary usage. It is a case of territory; how can I oblige him in this? I had previously given Mādho Singh what Malhar had pressed me to give him on the ground of service to the State. He now asks for more. How can I give him without fighting? How can I bring down upon myself the name of a coward and an unworthy son by dividing my entire kingdom with a younger brother? The Peshwā and Malhar want more territory to be given to Mādho Singh than before; but it cannot be done. God alone gives kingdoms. He exchanged turbans [with Malhar], the fruit of which pact he has witnessed by this time." [S. P. D. ii. 11, xxvii. 26 and 18-19, xxi. 17.]

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In May 1748, the Peshwā entered Jaipur territory. Madho Singh and other Rajput chiefs joined him, thus swelling his forces to an enormous host. Ishwari Singh lay crushed under the disgrace of his flight from the field of Mānupur; his country was utterly devastated by the Maratha soldiery; and the Peshwā was now high in favour at the imperial Court, so that the Jaipur Rajah had not a single friend anywhere. He therefore assumed a very submissive attitude and sent his minister Keshavdas to the Peshwā to beg for peace. The Marātha demanded a contribution of 50 lakhs of Rupees, while Ishwari Singh could not rise above half that sum. The Marātha even proposed to divide the Jaipur State into two equal halves to be held by the two brothers. To this Ishwari Singh could not possibly agree, and so war ensued. On condition of being secured the four mahals of Tonk, Todā, Mālpurā (including Fāgi) and Barwāda in Newāi from Ishwari Singh as his appanage, Mādho Singh agreed to pay the Marātha Rājah a *nazar* of 10 *lakhs* of Rupees. Malhar gave his king a written undertaking for the amount, payable in four instalments during 1749-50, this Maratha general being allowed to occupy that territory till the payment was completed [29th April 1748. Vad, iii. pp. 140-141. S. P. D. xxvii. 30, 26, 18, 19; ii. 11; xxi. 17.]

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§ 5. *Battle of Bagru, August 1748.*

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In July 1748 a Marātha army under Malhar Holkar and Gangādhar Tātyā entered Jaipur territory near Uniārā, wrested Tonk, Todā and Mālpurā, and gave these places to Mādho Singh. As they advanced by way of Piplod, Fāgi and Ladānā, some Kachhwā vassals waited on Mādho Singh and did him homage, and several other petty Rājput chiefs joined him, besides the two Hadas Ummed and Durjan Sāl. None seemed able to resist this confederacy of seven States, till they reached Bagru (23 miles east of Sambhar town.) Here Ishwari Singh himself faced them. The battle began on 1st August with an artillery duel, then the soldiers grappled at close quarters. Finally a heavy shower of rain put an end to the fighting for that day. The night was spent by general and private alike in the greatest hardship. Next morning the battle was renewed, with heavy slaughter but no decisive result. On the third day Gangādhar Tātyā fell upon the guns of the Jaipur rear-guard and drove nails into their port-holes. But Suraj Mal Jat, an ally of Ishwari Singh, made a counter-attack and drove the Marāthas back. In the van the Jāts maintained a bloody even fight with Holkar's division.

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The battle raged for six days, frequently amidst showers of rain, which however did not suspend it. During this period a convoy of provisions coming to the Jaipur army was intercepted by the Marāthas, who cut off the noses and ears of the porters. A Marātha detachment of 5000 horse under Gangādhar blocked the road to Jaipur in the rear of Ishwari Singh and plundered his country up to the Sambhar lake. Ishwari Singh took refuge in the fort of Bagru, amidst the greatest hardship. Terms were thereafter quickly settled through the exertions of Keshav-dās (the son of Rajah Ayā Mal) who bribed Gangādhar Tātyā to soften the obstinacy of Malhar Rao. Ishwari Singh agreed to give five parganas to his brother and to restore Bundi to Ummed Singh. On 9th August, Ishwari Singh met Holkar and his captains as well as Ummed Singh, and they swore to mutual friendship. Then the Marāthas and their associates began a retreat on the 10th, and Ishwari Singh set out for his capital on the following day.*

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The year 1749 passed uneventfully for Jaipur, but the first half of the next year was clouded by the invasion of Rajputana by the imperial Paymaster Salābat Khān on behalf of Bakht Singh, the claimant to the throne of Jodhpur, the history of which will be narrated a little later in connection with Mārwār affairs. In September 1750, Ishwari Singh was besought by Sāmant Singh, the chief of Rupnagar, to help him in recovering that city from his younger brother Bahādur Singh who had seized it. The two allies went to Rupnagar, where Sāmant Singh begged for more troops and artillery to lay siege to it. But he was unable to pay the war expenses and Ishwari Singh came back to his capital, leaving only two or three hundred horsemen under his captain Kripā-rām (a baniā) with Sāmant Singh. Sāmant occupied the environs, while Bahādur Singh (secretly backed by Bakht Singh) held the capital. [S. P. D. ii. 17, 23.]

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∗ *Vam. Bh.* 3493-3525. *Sujān Charita*, ii. Jang. Tod, (ii. Haravati, ch. 4) is more than usually imaginative in saying that from the field of Bagru, "Ishwari Singh retreated to the castle of Bagru . . . where after a siege of ten days he was forced to sign a deed for the surrender of Bundi to Ummed . . . Rajah Ishwari could not survive his disgrace and terminated his existence by poison . . . while rejoicings were making [at Bundi] to celebrate the installation of Ummed." As a matter of fact, Ishwari Singh committed suicide two years and four months after the battle of Bagru. No Marathi record of this battle has been found.

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§ 6. *Maratha invasion of Jaipur; suicide of Ishwari Singh.*

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At the end of 1750 Jaipur received a new and most disastrous visitation of the Marāthas and saw a revolution in its affairs. In 1745 Ishwari Singh had outbid his rivals and hired the Marātha generals (excepting Holkar) to aid him in his struggle with the Mahārānā and Mādho Singh. At Bagru (1747) he had promised a vast indemnity to buy off Malhar. These amounts fell into arrear and, as the Marātha collector complained, his dunning produced no effect; "this Government pays no heed to the matter, it is merely putting off payment from day to day." [S. P. D. ii. 15.] At the same time confusion seized the internal administration of Jaipur. Ishwari Singh, never very remarkable for intelligence or spirit, now became half-witted. The able ministers who had so long maintained the power and prosperity of the State were gone one by one. Rajah Ayā Mal Khatri (called Rājāmal or Malji in the Rājasthāni and Marāthi records), the ablest of Jaipur diplomats and the most faithful guardian of his master's interests, died on 9th February, 1747.*

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∗ Ayā Mal was a master of Persian and edited a collection of

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"Ishwari Singh and high and low alike in the city of Jaipur were grieved at his death. Nay, all Hindustan mourned for him," as a Maratha agent reported. [S. P. D., ii. 1.] His son Keshav-das succeeded him as minister but, on a false charge of holding treasonable correspondence which was fabricated by his rival Hara-govind Nātāni, he was poisoned by command of his senseless master (c. August 1750.) The other elder statesman, Vidyādhar, was now a bed-ridden invalid. The old chief of artillery, Shivnāth Bhāyā, was thrown into prison with his entire family, wives and children. Ishwari Singh's only counsellors and confidants now were a barber and an elephant-driver! No wonder we find a Marātha observer reporting in November that the whole country of Jaipur had been convulsed. [S. P. D., ii. 15.]

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The Peshwā, in despair of getting his dues from Jaipur, had instructed his generals to visit that State after settling the affairs of Malwa. The tragic death of the last honest and friendly minister Keshavdas strengthened his resolve to apply force.

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Aurangzib's letters entitled Dastur-ul-aml-i-Agahi, his pen-name being Agahi. On the death of Keshav-das, his soldiers greatly troubled his widow for the arrears of their pay; the Government merely procrastinated, and at last she cleared their dues by selling the robes and utensils of the family. Two sons of Keshav-das, named Harsāhi and Gursāhi were retained in service as bakhshis, while a son-in-law was consoled with a post in the cavalry. [S.P.D., xxi. 34.]

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The late minister's family seem to have appealed to the Marāthas to avenge his murder. Malhar Rāo Holkar started from Khāndesh on 29th September 1750 and marched towards Jaipur, while Jayāppā Sindhia, who had been at first bidden to accompany him, was detained in the Deccan for more than a month. On 19th November, Malhar Holkar and Gangādhar Tātyā (surnamed Chandra-chur) reached the Mukundarā pass and on the 28th Nenvé, which was taken after a siege of three days and made a Maratha outpost for holding the large pargana under it. After a halt of ten days here, the invaders marched to Jaipur, and when they were still two or three days' journey from that city Ishwari Singh's envoys met them with two lakhs of Rupees. Holkar flew into a rage at the smallness of the sum, would listen to no excuse, and ordered the march to be resumed. [S. P. D., xxi 34, ii. 31, 19.]

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The Jaipur wakil in alarm reported to his master that Malhar was coming to avenge the murder of Keshav-das. The old discarded ministers, Haragovind Nātāni and Vidyādhar, went to Ishwari Singh and advised him to assemble his troops and fight Holkar either in the open or from within the walled city. The Rajah disliked this counsel; he called his new favourites, the barber and the elephant-driver, and ordered them to go to the Maratha camp, appease the wrath of Holkar by paying four or five lakhs, and turn him back from the way. They flatly refused to go, saying that they would be killed by Holkar in retaliation for Keshav-das's death, and that their master might slay them there if he wished but should not send them to face the Maratha's fury. The Rajah remained silent and brooded over his fate.

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It was the 12th of December, 1750. Evening came and with it the news that Holkar had arrived within twenty miles of the city. Ishwari Singh ordered his servant to bring a live cobra and some arsenic as needed for preparing a medicine. It was done. At midnight he swallowed the poison and caused the cobra to sting him. Three of his queens and one favourite concubine took poison along with him and all five of them died in the silence and seclusion of that palace chamber. None in the city, not even the ministers of State, heard of the tragedy. Only one valet held the secret of it, while the corpses lay unburnt and unattended for eighteen hours. [S. P. D., ii. 31; Vam. Bh. 3608-3611.]

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Next day, three hours after dawn, Khande Rao Holkar and Gangadhar Tatyā with the Maratha vanguard appeared before Jaipur, while Malhar with the rest of the army encamped at Phalāne-kund, six miles away. Hours passed away without any sign of activity, friendly or hostile, from the defenders of the capital. At last, at noon the minister went to the palace and sent word to the Maharajah, "The troops are coming out. Why are you still sleeping?" Then the valet disclosed that the Maharajah was no more.

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A wild clamour of dismay and lamentation burst from all parts of the masterless city as the news of the tragedy flew around. The old ministers Haragovind and Vidyādhar somehow pacified the people and went out to the Marātha force at the gate, met its two leaders, and also sent news to Malhar, who came up with his troops close to the city in the afternoon. Malhar sent some men to the palace, who verified the news of the king's death. Maratha guards were immediately posted at the city gates and in the palace. The Rajah's corpse lay unburnt till after sunset, when Malhar sent two of his civil officers with a rich pall and the necessary expenses of the funeral from his own pocket, and consigned it to the flames in the palace garden. One more queen and twenty concubines* of Ishwari Singh burnt themselves alive.

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∗ S.P.D., ii. 31 (Baburao Vishnu's letter from Malhar's camp,

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§ 7. Madho Singh becomes king of Jaipur.

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Next day (14th December) a fast courier on a camel was sent to Madho Singh inviting him to come quickly and occupy the vacant throne. Haragovind and Vidyādhar visited Malhar and entreated him hard to spare the State. After four days' discussion they agreed to pay a heavy ransom for the kingdom and capital, and then Malhar recalled the pickets he had posted at various places and set himself to realise the money. Madho Singh arrived on 29th December and was welcomed by Malhar on the way and conducted to the palace, both seated on the same elephant.

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Jayāppā Sindhia arrived on 6th January, 1751 and united forces with Malhar. "The question of ranson (khandani) had been settled before, but now a new demand was made that one-third or at least one-fourth of the territory of Jaipur should be made over to the Marathas by a written deed. This alienated the Rajah and the Rajputs." In the meantime vassals, especially a large contingent of Shekhāwat warriors, had gathered round the new king and Madho Singh’s policy changed: he would no longer remain a dependant of the Marāthas, but planned to free himself from their insatiable greed by means of murder. He invited the Maratha chiefs to a dinner, arranging to poison their food and kill their personal escorts by the same means. He pressed his request again and again. Malhar at first consented, but on Jayappa’s flat refusal, he too declined. Then for some days Madho Singh set Brāhmans to cook sweetmeats for the Maratha soldiers, at the end of which he mixed poison with them. He even poisoned the drinking water, using two maunds of white arsenic for the purpose! “But God preserved our generals. Jayappa and Ummed Singh Hada hindered the crime. So, Madho Singh buried the noxious food in the ground.” His next plan was to invite Tātyā Gangādhar and other Maratha agents to a conference and there murder them. He ordered his porters to let the *pālkis* of these four men come to his palace and then close the city gates to their followers. But it so happened that the Maratha chiefs could not all come to him together and made appointments for each at a different time, and so this plot too failed. [S. P. D. ii. 31, xxvii. 65.]

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²² Jan.) But Vamsha Bhāskar, p. 3615, says that when that licentious youth, Khanderao Holkar, wanted to take to his harem the choicest concubines of Ishwari Singh, they burnt themselves to the number of eleven, on 14th Dec. Vam. Bh. 3612-3616.

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§ 8. Massacre of Marathas in Jaipur city.

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The explosion of Rajput hatred, however, could not be altogether prevented; it burst on 10th January. The Marathas were taking advantage of the helpless condition of the Kachhwā State under a king propped up by their arms. They seemed to have looked upon Jaipur as a city taken by storm. It is not stated anywhere whether their rank and file imitated the licentious conduct of their chief Khande Rao and tried to abduct women from the houses of the citizens. But their domineering airs and garrison manners galled the proud Rajput spirit. On that day some four thousand Marathas had entered the city of Jaipur to see the temples and other sights of this newly built town, unique in India for the regularity and artistic beauty of its construction, and to buy horses, camels and saddlery for which Jaipur was famous. Among the visitors were many of Jayāppā's retainers, including four high captains entitled to ride in pālkis. Suddenly, at noon, a riot broke out and the citizens attacked the unsuspecting Marathas. For nine hours the slaughter and plunder raged from ward to ward of the city. Some fifteen hundred Marathas were slain and about a thousand wounded (many of them mortally), only some seventy of the visitors escaping with life and limb. Many, in leaping down from the city walls, broke their legs or spine and only a few saved themselves in this way. Among the victims were several of Jayāppā’s and Malhar’s high officers and servants, a hundred Brāhmans, Pindhāris, slave girls, and even children. A thousand excellent horses ridden by these men as well as the golden bracelets, pearl necklaces, money and accoutrement that they had on their persons were taken away by the Rajputs.*

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The shock of this blow spread to outside the capital. The Rajputs rose in the villages and killed the couriers of the Marathas wherever they could catch them, so that the roads were closed to them. Two days later (12th January) the Maratha army marched away from the gates of Jaipur to a place some eight miles off. Eight days passed in threats of war, after which (on 19th January) Madho Singh’s wakils waited on the two generals and on his behalf disclaimed all previous knowledge or share in the riot, which they described as a sudden and spontaneous explosion. They pleaded for a compromise, saying that the dead were dead beyond recall. The Maratha leaders, too, felt that with their present forces they were powerless to avenge the massacre. Jaipur city was impregnable to assault, the country was large and peopled by a warlike race. So, they agreed to forgive the past on the following conditions : (1) the restoration of all the horses captured in the city, (2) payment of compensation for the property plundered, and (3) delivery of orders on bankers for the ransom previously agreed upon.* Even then strained feelings and mutual suspicion continued and the Rajah and Malhar refused to see each other. The Maratha generals were being constantly pressed by Safdar Jang’s agent Rajah Ram Narayan present in their camp to hasten to his aid in the Bangash campaign, for which he agreed to pay 50 lakhs of Rupees as soon as the Afghan was defeated. But Mādho Singh put off payment from day to day with smooth promises, and thus more than three weeks were wasted before the Marathas could leave Jaipur territory. Meantime a terrible scarcity raged in their camp; rice sold at four seers, oil at 2 seers, *ghee* at 1½ seers, millet flour at 8 seers, and horse gram at 16 seers for a Rupee. No provision came to them by the regular way of trade; only their foraging parties brought in a little grain by raiding the villages. On 7th February, Malhar was encamped 24 miles east of Jaipur, and a few days afterwards he resumed his march to Agra by regular stages in order to join Safdar Jang. [S. P. D., xxvii. 64 and 65.]

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∗ Baburao Vishnu’s letter of 22nd January. He ascribes the massacre to a deliberate plan of the Rajah, and says, “The four captains of Jayappa riding in palkis were taken for Tatya and other invited chiefs, and under that wrong notion Mādho Singh went away from his darbar to the roof of his palace. His men, acting as preconcerted, closed the city gates and began to massacre the Marathas within . . . 3000 Marathas were slain and 1000 wounded.” [S.P.D. ii. 31.] Vam. Bh. 3622 gives the same figures. But another Maratha agent, Har Bāji Rām, writing from Jaipur on 7th Feb., puts the number of the dead as 1500, while Hari Vittal, writing on 12th Feb., gives the figure of five or six hundred men. [S.P.D., xxvii. 64 and 65.]

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∗ From the collection made in Jaipur, Malhar and Jayāppā were ordered by their Rajah, on 18 June 1751, to pay him annually half a lakh as the nazar of Mādho Singh’s kingdom. [Vad, iii. p. 129.]

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§ 9. Salābat Khan fights Suraj Mal, January 1750.

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The civil war in Jaipur having been ended by the accession of Mādho Singh, we are free to turn to the affairs of Mārwār. Its ruler Abhay Singh died on 21st June 1749; his son Rām Singh ascended his throne, and then the long-dreaded war of succession between Ram Singh and his paternal uncle Bakht Singh (the chieftain of Nāgor) could be averted no longer. It was actually precipitated by the youthful new Maharajah's insane pride, reckless insolence, and haughty challenge to Bakht Singh. The latter had recently risen high in influence at the imperial Court, having been nominated *subahdār* of Gujrat (29 June 1748) in the vain hope of stemming the tide of Maratha aggression there. It was therefore the interest of the Emperor to placate him, and so the Mir Bakhshi Salābat Khan was authorised to give him armed support in wresting the throne of Mārwār, on condition of Bakht Singh helping the imperialists to defend the subahs of Agra and Ajmir (both under the Mir Bakhshi) from Maratha invaders and local rebels and enforce the royal administration there. After making this arrangement at Delhi, Bakht Singh went to his own principality in order to raise troops, while Salābat Khan, taking 18,000 men with him, started for Ajmir, where the two were to unite.

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On the way, the Bakhshi halted at Pataudi (35 miles south-west of Delhi) for the first ten days of the month of fasting (30 Nov.—9 Dec. 1749) and then marched ravaging Mewāt to the little mud-fort of Nimrānā (33 miles s.w. of Pataudi), which belonged to the Jat Rajah. His vanguard took it at the first attack (30th December.) Early next morning his camp and baggage were sent ahead towards Nārnol (17 miles west of Nimrānā), which was the seat of a faujdār attached to the subah of Ajmir. When, a few hours later, Salābat himself mounted to follow, he suddenly changed his plan and, wishing to go to the Agra province and fight the Jats there first, called a council of his officers. They advised him to go to Ajmir first, there strengthen himself by junction with Bakht Singh who was on the way with his levies, train his raw troops for some time, settle the affairs of Ajmir, and then challenge the Jats with a better prospect of success. But the easy capture of Nimrānā had turned Salābat’s head; he would not listen to reason; he recalled his baggage and set his face back towards Agra. The night was spent in Sarāi Sobhāchānd.* In the course of that night an extremely mobile Jat force of 5,000 men under Suraj Mal overtook him by a forced march. Next day (1st January 1750), the Mughal foraging party found the Jats barring their way and summoned reinforcements which reached them two hours before sunset. The soldiers of the Bakhshi’s army, hungry thirsty and inexperienced in war, began to run, one before another, placing their guns in front lest the Jats should capture them at night if planted in the rear. Seeing this disorder, the Jats charged in successive squadrons, firing volleys from their muskets, and causing heavy slaughter. Hakim Khan Kheshgi, the commander of the Bakhshi’s right wing, was shot dead; Ali Rustam Khan, in charge of his vanguard, was wounded. Utter defeat fell on the imperialists. The victorious Jat horse hovered round the camp of Salābat Khan, plundered a part of it, and threw him into helpless terror. The Jat Rajah Badan Singh had at first humbly begged the Bakhshi not to ravage his lands, as he had done no offence against the Emperor but was living as a loyal vassal, and the Bakhshi had haughtily demanded two *krores* of Rupees as the price of his forbearance, saying that Mewāt was his (the Bakhshi’s) *jāgir* and the Jat Rajah had seized some villages there and slain Asad Khan Khānazād his local agent. Now, after a day or two of helpless confinement within his entrenchments, Salābat was forced to sue for peace, which was granted by the Jats on the following terms :—(i) the imperial Government would promise not to cut down *pipal* trees, (ii) nor to hinder the worship of it, while (iii) Suraj Mal undertook to collect 15 *lakhs* of Rupees from the Rājputs as the revenue of the province of Ajmir and pay it into the imperial Exchequer, provided that the Bakhshi took his advice and did not proceed beyond Nārnol.*

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∗ Indian Atlas, Sh. 49 s.w., has Sobapur, 5 miles due east of Narnol and 13m. n.w. of Nimrana.

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∗ Siyar, iii. 38-39; Muz. 28-32; Sujān Charitra, iii Jang. S.P.D., xxi. 26 adds that the Rana of Gohad joined Suraj Mal in the attack upon the Bakhshi, from whom Suraj Mal captured 2 or 3 elephants and the Rana one; and that finally the Jat Rajah agreed to pay

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§ 10. Salabat Khan's Rajput campaign.

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The Bakhshi then turned back to his original course and reached Nārnol, where Bakht Singh joined him. Then the two by a forced march arrived at the Gokla hill near Ajmir. At the first report of the Bakhshi's coming, Rām Singh of Jodhpur had appealed for help to Ishwari Singh of Jaipur. The latter Rajah gladly welcomed this opportunity of being publicly regarded as the superior of every other potentate in Rajasthan and the patron of his former rival, the house of Jodhpur. He met Rām Singh at Jodhpur and decided on war, saying "God is the Giver of victory." Their united forces, 30,000 strong with abundance of artillery, marched from Jodhpur towards Merta, the eastern frontier-fort of Mārwār, and arrived at Pipār in the morning of 4th April, 1750.

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Meantime, Salābat Khan, after resting for some time at Ajmir, had advanced with Bakht Singh by way of Pushkar and Riān of Sher Singh (15 miles south-east of Merta and two miles north of the Sarsuti river) to Merta. From Merta he turned sharply to the south, via Luniāwās (11 m. s. s. w. of Merta), and arriving at noon about 5

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nine lakhs as war-contribution and to send Suraj Mal with 5,000 horse (and a contingent of 200 troopers from Gohad) to serve under the Bakhshi.

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miles on the right hand of Ishwari Singh’s position, halted, (evidently at the village of Raonā, 7 miles east of Pipār, on the road to Merta.) Bakht Singh had tempted Salābat to come so far with the assurance that when he arrived sufficiently near many of Ram Singh’s discontented chiefs would at once come over to Bakht Singh’s side and the Jodhpur Rajah would be compelled by his helpless situation to pay tribute.

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On hearing of the approach of the Mughals, Ishwari Singh advanced towards the enemy in line of battle. Salābat, on his part, prepared for fight and, placing his camp and baggage in the rear, presented a bold front to the two Rajahs. But his own army was a house divided against itself. He could not trust Bakht Singh fully and remarked, "These Rangars (wild Rajputs) are all of the same breed. I cannot be sure what Bakht Singh may do at any time.* Therefore, I must keep him seated on my own elephant." Bakht Singh’s retainers opposed this proposal, which would have left them leaderless and helpless in case he was made prisoner. This internal quarrel prevented any battle being fought that day (4th April), and the armies merely stood facing each other. But this marching and counter-marching and standing in battle array completely exhausted Salābat Khan’s troops; no chief of Rām Singh came over to his side; the noonday sun blazed overhead with not a tree in sight; the water in his camp ran short, and the soldiers began to rob the bhistis who were bringing water in their leather-bags. Salābat Khan, therefore, wrote an autograph letter to Ishwari Singh, “I do not at all desire war. There is only this affair between Bakht Singh and Ram Singh, which you had better settle as arbitrator. In my opinion it would be expedient if you do not allow your vanguard to advance any further. I am encamping [where I am now]; do you encamp at your place. We two have between us 30 to 35 thousand soldiers and large trains of artillery. Where is the gain in our quarrelling about this one man Bakht Singh?” Salābat, thus assumed a tone of lordly superiority and benevolence, made an oblique march to the right hand, and encamped at a distance of four miles from the Jaipur-Jodhpur armies.

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∗ Bakht Singh’s pride in Rathor prestige had once before proved stronger than his self-interest and fidelity to his plighted word. Having invited Sawāi Jai Singh to invade Jodhpur territory, he had, at the ensuing battle of Gangwana (1741), fought most desperately against the invader.

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Ishwari Singh, on his part, saw that by merely taking Rām Singh under his protection he had already gained from him a large sum for his army expenses, and appeared before the Rajputana public as the more powerful of the two Maharajahs. The Bakhshi considered that he had already created a general impression of his power and greatness, and that if he now forced a war on, the Rāthor clan would be turned into bitter enemies of the empire. Rām Singh found that many of his vassals, being of uncertain loyalty, were keeping aloof in their castles, so that the whole brunt of the campaign would fall on his unaided shoulders. All three parties being thus disposed, Salābat’s proposal of a compromise was everywhere welcomed. Rām Singh encamped in front of the Bakhshi, at two or three miles’ distance, while the terms were being discussed.

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In two days, the scanty water in the Bakhshi’s position became totally exhausted, but the two Maharajahs barred his way to the only place where a better supply of water could be had. Salābat in helplessness threw the blame for his untenable situation on Bakht Singh, telling him, “For thy sake, I have been put to this disgrace. Thou hast performed none of thy promises.” And then he ranged his artillery round his own tents as a precaution against his ally! On the 6th of April, the Rajah of Bikānir (the steadfast ally of Bakht) reached the Mughal camp with 2,000 men and pacified the Bakhshi. Ishwari Singh, too, sent a conciliatory message, entreating Salābat Khan as a great man to cherish the humble and not to be impatient. So, the Bakhshi halted, intending to take whatever was paid in cash and a written bond for the balance, and to make Rām Singh give some money to Bakht Singh and finally reduce the imposed tribute at the entreaty of Rām Singh, so as to keep both these Rāthor princes under obligation to him! [S. P. D., ii. 16.]

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But the higgling continued and no mutual agreement was arrived at in ten days, after which the Bakhshi decided to try force. Insolently rejecting Bakht Singh’s advice, Salābat Khan sent his vanguard on to make a direct attack on Rām Singh’s front lines, where all his big artillery was planted. When the Mughals arrived close enough, the Rajputs who had been hitherto perfectly quiet, delivered a sudden volley, killing many of them. The imperialists halted and began an exchange of gun-fire (14th April, 1750.) After four hours’ waste of munition in this kind of indecisive battle, nature asserted her supremacy over man; the summer sun of the Rajput desert proved intolerable; the Mughal soldiers turned frantic with thirst, as the only wells in that region were in their enemy’s possession. “Many of these troopers at noon, in search of water, went up to the Rajput position; the Rajputs very chivalrously gave water to them and their horses till they were sated and then told them,—‘Go back now. There is war between you and us.’ ” [Siyar, iii. 39.]

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The battle ceased of itself. Each party fell back on its camp, the imperialists setting the example. On the two sides taken together some 70 or 80 men only were killed. At first there was loud talk in the camps of pressing the contest to a decision the next day by a charge straight ahead and sword to sword combat. But the Delhi troops were not prepared to face the Mārwār sun again, and next day they did not stir out of their camp at all, merely posting patrols round it.

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Ishwari Singh showed a similar spirit. The night following the battle he held a public consultation with his own followers and those of the Mārwār Rajah. He began with thunder, crying out, “For Rājputs to fight with artillery is to deserve curses and the shame of cowardice. Do you, therefore, gird your loins and make a frontal charge on horseback. God is the Giver of victory.” They replied, “We are your servants, ever at your command. You merely stand behind and see how we fight to-morrow.” But, as the Marātha agent in his camp had shrewdly guessed from the first, all this bluster was a pretence of the Jaipur Rajah for saving his face. After this fire-eating resolution at the public darbār, Ishwari Singh held a secret council with half a dozen of his own leading advisers and those of Rām Singh. In reply to his question, they told him that it was wiser to pay money and make peace than to fight. They had divined their master's pacific intentions and knew that he had already opened negotiations with the Mir Bakhshi through Hari Hakim.

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