Fall of the Mughal Empire v1.c15.s2: § 2. Abdali's second invasion; loss of the four mahals
Fall of the Mughal Empire v1.c15.s2
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§ 2. Abdali's second invasion; loss of the four mahals
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Muin had not yet been long enough in the Panjab to establish himself fully in power and to gather adequate military strength. The two recent attempts to oust him had, no doubt, been foiled, but they had caused an immense loss of revenue to him and disturbed the country. In this state of weakness, before he could gain breathing time, it was his cruel fate to be called upon to meet a foreign invasion. It was only natural that when such intestine wars were raging in India’s most important frontier province, and selfishness was totally blinding the highest officers of the realm, and greed of money was the sole guiding motive of her foreign mercenary defenders, the enemy beyond the mountain passes could not be asleep. India’s internal condition was cheering news to Ahmad Abdāli, and in the autumn of 1749 he set out to try his luck once more and to imitate the career of Mahmud of Ghazni on the Indian soil.
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Muin collected his forces, advanced northwards to meet the enemy, and made his base at Sadra, 3 miles east of the modern Wazirabad on the Chenāb. From this place the Afghan position was several miles distant.* Scouts and foraging parties from the two sides daily rode into the intervening belt of land, fought skirmishes, and fell back on their own camps in the evening. This kind of desultory warfare continued for months, and the campaign could not be pressed to a decisive issue, as both sides were weak, Abdali’s expedition being really intended to probe the defensive strength of the imperial frontier. But the scene of war was devastated and the continued strain and hardship began to tell upon Muin’s Mughalia troops. So, at last he made peace through the mediation of a holy man, Maulavi Abdullah (about February 1750.) Abdali was promised 14 *lakhs* of Rupees as the annual surplus revenue of the "four mahals"—Siālkot, Pasrur, Gujrāt and Aurangabad,—which Muhammad Shah had assigned to Nādir Shah by treaty. They were, no doubt, to be still governed by the Delhi Emperor's agents and in his name; but the Afghān, all the same, got the first slice of India proper. [*Siyar*, iii. 30; *Muz*. 27; *Bayan* 248-249; *TAh*. 8; *Miskin* 4.]
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∗ Miskīn's topography seems to be confused. He says that Abdali crossed the Chenab and boldly advanced [this must be eastwards, towards Lahor], and that Muin set out from Lahor and on reaching that river encamped at Sodra, whence the enemy was 15 kos distant [5 kos would be more correct.] Where, then was Abdali's camp, westwards beyond the Chenāb, or south-east of the Chenāb and therefore in Muin's rear [unlikely]? This writer (a boy of nine at that time) has evidently reversed the positions of the two armies, when writing from memory 30 years later. Abdali was at Sodra and Muin some 10 or 15 miles east of him and nearer to Lahor.
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§ 3. *Sikh rebels and raiders, their character.*
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For the next two years the Panjāb enjoyed peace from the side of Afghanistan; but its internal condition was no more tranquil or happy than before. The *subahdār* made frequent tours throughout his charge to suppress refractory local chieftains and predatory villagers. The Sikhs were already becoming a thorn in the sides of the established Government. The disintegration of imperial authority presented a golden opportunity to these born rebels. The martial religion of Guru Govind had knit the Sikhs together into organised bands of soldiers, with perfect brotherhood in their ranks and freedom from the distinctions of caste, social gradation, and food which embarrass and divide the Hindus. They were mostly recruited from the sturdy race of Jat peasantry, hardy, strong-limbed, prolific "like ants and locusts," and accustomed to regard highway robbery as a hereditary and honourable profession. The Panjāb breeds excellent horses, for superior to the dwarfish mares ridden by the Marāthas. Each Sikh marauder was "well mounted and armed with a spear, sword and good matchlock," and they acted in bands under petty chieftains of their own, who had the wisdom to combine with others in the pursuit of the same trade. "The Sikh Uhlan's endurance and rapidity of movement were quite commensurate with his rapacity, enabling him to baffle, if not defy, superior numbers . . . . At a pinch, he could march some twenty or thirty miles a day on no better fare than a little parched gram washed down with pure cold water. A tent he despised, baggage in the ordinary sense of the word he had none . . . Besides his weapons, his whole kit consisted of horse-gear, a few of the simplest cooking utensils, and two blankets, one for himself, and another for his faithful steed . . . . Although his tactics mainly resolved themselves into a prolonged series of skirmishes conducted somewhat after the Parthian fashion, yet in the strife of men contending hand to hand, he was terrible, though helpless against good artillery.” [G. R. C. Williams in *Calcutta Review*, No. 119 (1875.)] In this last respect, as well as in the excellent size breed and fleetness of their horses and their universal use of fire arms, the Sikhs far surpassed the Marāthas as fighters.
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The Sikh enemies of the Mughal empire fell into two classes regionally, each with a different history and line of action, namely, cis-Satlaj and trans-Satlaj,—i.e., those living south-east of the Satlaj, between Ludhiana and Karnal, and those whose homes lay north-west of that river, between Ludhiana and Lahor. The former in time developed into territorial magnates,—the Rajahs of Patiala, Kapurthala, Nabha and Jhind, besides smaller chiefs, by first passing through the stage of robbers of the imperial highway from Delhi to Lahor which ran through their homes. The latter were originally rebels defying the civil administration of the governor of Lahor, and supplementing their assertion of independence with the plunder of their weaker neighbours. In the second stage of Sikh expansion, *i.e.*, after 1761, the cis-Satlaj Sikhs became settled in principalities of their own, while the trans-Satlaj or Manjha Sikhs began to cross the river every year and usually without any co-operation from their local brethren, used to blackmail, rob or burn the villages and unwalled cities of the entire country from Delhi to Mirat, Saharanpur and Hardwar. The third stage began with the new invasion of the cis-Satlaj region by Sikhs from beyond that river under Bedi Singh of Una in 1794 and Ranjit Singh in 1806. But these events would bring us to the British period of Indian history.
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§ 4. Revival of Sikh power after 1739; the course of its growth.
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The complete suppression of the false Guru Banda and his band of ferocious fanatics (1713) had effectually crushed the Sikhs as a rebellious and fighting force for one generation. Then the manifest impotence of the Delhi empire revealed by Nadir Shah’s easy and complete triumph over it, tempted these people to raise their heads once more. While Zakariya Khan’s strong and vigilant rule kept peace in the trans-Satlaj region (belonging to his subah of Lahor) up to his death (1745), the cis-Satlaj region, forming part of the subah of Delhi, began to see a revival of disorder and rapine. In 1740 a large body of Jats and Sikhs gathered together, chose a leader whom they styled Daranat Shah, and marched through the Sarhind district, causing a great disturbance and seizing many villages. It was only a force sent from Delhi under Azimullah Khan that could defeat and disperse them. (*Chahar Gulzar*, 373 *a.*)
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The unusually prolonged life and exceptional ability of Ala Singh Jat (in power from 1714 to 1765) enabled him to found the kingdom of Patiala in the Sarhind district on an enduring basis. His success was crowned at the close of his life when he was recognised as the lawful governor of Sarhind (in 1764.) During the intervening period he was the centre of nearly all the lawless risings in this region. The Rai family of Raikot (converted to Islam in the 13th century) were the leading landowners of this district, till they were eclipsed by the house of Patiala in the middle of the 18th century. They first shook off the authority of the Delhi Government about 1740 and, though defeated and driven out in 1741 by a combination of the imperial faujdar of Sarhind and Ala Singh, soon afterwards recovered their patrimony, gained Ludhiana in 1760, and extended their dominions by an amicable settlement of their respective spheres of influence with the Patiala Rajahs and other Sikh chiefs of the district. Ahmad Shah Abdali in 1767 confirmed Amar Singh, the grandson and successor of Ala, as governor of Sarhind with the title of Maharajah, and the whole of this tract up to Ambala city finally fell into the hands of the Sikhs (Phulkian and their Manjha allies), each chief or confederacy (misl) seizing as many villages as they could. (Ludhiana Gazetteer, 22-24.)
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This was the situation as developed by the course of events after 1761 in the cis-Satlaj region, which in the geography of Mughal India was not a part of the Panjab. We are, however, in this chapter concerned with the Sikh risings in the *subah* of Lahor, i.e., in the region from Lahor eastwards to the Satlaj.
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The political change which began in the Panjab after 1745, promoted a new upheaval of the Sikh element. Zakariya Khan had maintained public contentment and order by his strong and vigilant administration, his love of justice and regard for his subjects. His death, followed by the civil war between his sons and the Abdali invasion, ruined the government of the province and its finances. Muin-ul-mulk no doubt came in 1748 as substantive governor, but his forces were inadequate to bring the whole province back to order and restore the normal administration completely. He had to maintain a large force of freshly arrived recruits from Central Asia with lavish bounties. His household expenditure was also very heavy on account of his lordly and extravagant style of living, as we see vividly illustrated in the memoirs of his page Tahmasp Miskin.
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“He could refuse nothing to his friends” (Muz. 81.) In consequence his income fell far short of his expenses, and the peasants were subjected to severe exaction and oppression. The Sikhs were known to hold it a religious duty to help one another of the faith to the utmost. So, wherever the villagers underwent oppression, they let their hair and bread grow, cried out *Akāl! Akāl!* and embraced the religion of Guru Govind. The other Sikhs came to their help, and thus their religion spread rapidly through the Panjab. As the peasantry were more and more ruined by their rulers, the number of Sikhs multiplied in proportion. This phenomenon became most manifest after Muin’s death and during the incompetent and changeful regency of his widow Mughlāni Begam. [Siyar, iii. 51.]
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§ 5. Muin’s struggles with the Sikhs.
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Even during Muin’s lifetime small bands of Sikhs had been robbing the country and defying the Government in the region east of Lahor, especially in the Batala and Kalanur districts, and punitive expeditions had to be constantly sent out against them, sometimes under the governor in person. The Sikhs in that age were “helpless against artillery,” and hence Muin very thoughtfully had 990 *jizails* made and employed them against the Sikh brigands. His detachments "ran after these wretches (up to) 28 kos, and slew them whenever they stood up to a fight. Whosoever brought a Sikh's head to Muin received a reward of Rs. ten for each man slain. Any soldier who captured a Sikh's horse could keep it as his own. If his own horse perished in the campaign, another was given to him from the Government stables. (Miskin, 12.)
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One expedition led against the Sikhs by Muin himself towards the close of 1752 is thus described by his page: "When the Nawāb Sāhib (i.e., Muin-ul-mulk) was out on an administrative tour, in the Batālā district, he heard that a large body of Sikhs were causing disturbances in that neighbourhood, stopping the roads and ruining the cultivators. He sent Sayyid Jamiluddin Khan with his bakhshi Ghāzi Beg Khan to punish them. These officers marched to the scene, fought the Sikhs and put them to flight. Nine hundred of the Sikh infantry threw themselves into the small fort of Rāmroti, close to Chak Guru Hargovind, which Jamiluddin immediately invested. After a few days the garrison rushed out sword in hand, fell upon the besiegers, and were all slain. (Miskin, 17.) But this slaughter had no more effect than stamping upon a few hundred white ants. Such conflicts with Sikh bands continued till the very day of Muin's death (3rd November 1753)* and grew more numerous after him.
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§ 6. *Abdali's third invasion; capture of Lahor.*
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While the running sore of scattered Sikh risings was thus ceaselessly draining the lifeblood of the Panjāb Government, the province was again assailed by the Abdāli. The annual tribute for the "four mahals" promised by the treaty of 1750 had not been paid even in part. Abdali wrote to Muin from the frontier saying, "This breach of treaty has made me come. Send me 24 lakhs of Rupees for the three years past and then I shall go away." Muin replied that Nāsir Khan, who had administered the four mahals during the first two years, had run away with all the revenue collected during that time, and that he himself could pay the tribute for the only year that he had held that tract. The Abdali was not to be thus put off. In December 1751, he made his third invasion, with a much larger army than ever before. When he arrived on the bank of the Indus, Muin sent him 9 *lakhs* as the revenue of the four *mahals*. Abdali took the money, but continued his invasion. Muin sent his entire family to the Jammu hills for safety. The richer citizens of Lāhor fled in alarm to Delhi and other places. [*TAh.* 30.]
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∗ His page writes, "Wherever he heard of Sikh risings he sent Khwājah Mirzā with troops to suppress them. The Sikhs who were captured alive were sent to hell by being beaten with wooden mallets . . . At times Adina Beg sent 40 or 50 Sikh captives from the (Jālandar) Doāb district; they were killed with strokes of wooden hammers." (Miskin, 19.) Another fight with the Sikhs at which Miskin was present, during the subahdari of Muin's infant, is described in Miskin, 22-23.
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From his capital Muin-ul-mulk hastily advanced to check the enemy on the way. Crossing the Rāvi he marched by way of Shāhdarā to the Bridge of Shāh Daulā, 22 miles north of Lāhor. Here he lay encamped in a strong position protected by numerous artillery, while the scouts on both sides daily engaged in skirmishes.
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Then the veteran Afghan king made a daring move. Leaving his camp standing some distance in front of Muin’s position, he with a picked light force made a wide detour to the right round the latter’s camp, suddenly arrived in the environs of Lahor, and took post near the shrine of Shāh Balādil. Some houses in the suburbs, outside the walls, were plundered. The Afghān vanguard, reported to be 10,000 horse under their king’s lieutenant Jahān Khan, occupied the Faiz Bakhsh garden.
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Muin, finding his rear turned, hastened back towards Lahor. On reaching the bank of the Ravi at Rajghat, he halted and detached Khwajah Mirza Khan with all his corps of 900 Mughalia troops armed with *jizails* across the river to dislodge the Afghans from the garden, which was effected after a long and stubborn fight.
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Next day, the Afghans marched away towards the Shālāmār gardens. Muin then crossed over to the Lahor side of the Ravi and formed an entrenchment outside the city. The war now entered on the stalemate stage. The Abdali could neither storm Lahor on account of his lack of artillery, nor drive Muin out of his trenches, and Muin too had not a sufficiently large mobile force to enable him to sally out and seek a decision with the Afghans in the open. The patrols on the two sides had frequent brushes. Ahmad every day sent out strong detachments which systematically ravaged the country for forty miles on each hand, so that "no lamp was lighted in any house for a distance of three marches and grain became exceedingly dear." (Miskin, 14.)
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No reinforcement reached the defender of Lahor during these four critical months. The Emperor repeatedly wrote to his wazir about the urgency of the case and the dangerous condition of the frontier province, but Safdar Jang took no action, being more bent upon crushing his private foes and settling his own subah of Oudh. The other nobles were too poor to afford any help. In Muin's own camp divided counsels reigned: Bihkāri Khan advocated peace at any price, Kuramal pressed for battle after distributing the proposed ransom among Muin's own soldiers and thus heartening them for the contest, while Adina Beg and Mumin Khan wavered between war and peace from day to day. [*TAh.* 32o.]
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The war dragged on in this manner for a month and a half.* Then came a catastrophe. The Lahor army's long confinement within its trenches made the place foul and unhealthy, denuded the neighbourhood of grass and trees, and exhausted the wells. At last it was decided to shift the camp some ten miles to a better position with a plentiful supply of good water, grass and fuel. Next morning (5th March 1752), the march began at dawn. Adina Beg led the van, Diwan Kuramal the rear, and Muin himself the centre where all the baggage was placed loaded on carts and transport beasts. But the news of the movement had leaked out, and as soon as this huge multitude of soldiers, camp followers and animals began its slow and ponderous march, it was assailed by the mobile Afghan horse in front and rear. The mounds of old brick vacated by Muin's artillery were immediately occupied by the enemy, who began to command the moving columns with their light swivel-guns, while their swift horsemen hovered around. "The order of the Lahor army fell into confusion."
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∗ According to Husaini, p. 31. But *Siyar* iii. 43, *Muz.* 57 and Miskin 16 say that Muin opposed the Abdali for four months; evidently that period covered the entire campaign from the stand at the Bridge of Shah Daula to the fall of Lahor. Abdali's capture of Lahor.—*TAh.* 30a, 32; Miskin, 13-16. The other sources are later or secondary. *Siyar* iii. 43-44, *Muz.* 57-59, Husaini 31-34, Elliot viii. 167-168. Lahore Gazetteer (1883), 27, places the Abdali's camp near the Shālamār gardens, Muin's entrenchments "a short distance from the suburb of Shāhdara" and the last battle near the village of Mahmud Buti.
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Attacked vigorously in front and rear and threatened on both flanks, Muin sent 300 of his Mughalia *jizail*-men to support Adina Beg and the same number to Kuramal, while he kept Khwajah Mirza with the remaining 300 by his own side. Adina Beg is accused by some contemporary writers of having treacherously neglected to support Kuramal, so that cohesion among the three divisions of Muin's army was lost.* When Kuramal was hastening to his master's defence, a cannon-ball wounded his elephant. As he was changing it for another he was shot down by a bullet, and his troops dispersed in a panic. Thus Muin's rear was entirely uncovered and the exultant enemy attacked his division (the centre.) Here after a heroic resistance, two of his leading officers were wounded. But mercifully the shades of evening now closed on the field of terror confusion and death, and the remnant of the Indian army was saved. Some Afghans entered the city of Lahor pellmell with the fugitives and started plundering. In the thick darkness of that night, neither the citizens nor the soldiers could see anything distinctly, and so every one in his distraction sought safety by flight.
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∗ *Siyar.* (iii. 43), *Muz.* (58), Shakir (78), *Farhat-un-nāzirin* (in Elliot viii. 168.) The last charges Adina Beg with having shot Kuramal from behind.
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Meantime, Muin-ul-mulk had kept his place in the field and said his sunset prayer where he stood. All was not lost, as he still had some 10,000 men within call of him, but without any artillery or ammunition for the jizails. His captains took him with themselves to the Idgah, two miles from his position, in the hope of finding Adina Beg there, but that general had sought his own safety without thinking of his master. Muin had no help now but to grope his way in the darkness and enter the city of Lahor by one of its gates. He put up for the night in the mansion of Mir Amin Khan. Utter confusion raged in the capital of the Panjab during that dreadful night; none knew who else were in the city or who was where.
Linked texts (1)
- Bayān-i wāqiʿ — Khwāja ʿAbd al-Karīm Kashmīrī 1780, Persian