Fall of the Mughal Empire v1.c8.s2: § 2. Independent governors of Bengal subah
Fall of the Mughal Empire v1.c8.s2
- Language
- English
§ 2. Independent governors of Bengal subah
v1.c8.s2.1
At the time of Aurangzib’s death (1707), Murshid Quli Khān (surnamed Jafar Khān Nasiri, Nāsir Jang, Mutaman-ul-mulk) was deputy governor (*nāib nāzim*) of Bengal and Orissā, as well as *diwān* or revenue chief of these two provinces. The absence of the governor, Prince Azim-ush-shān, at the imperial Court during the next four years made Murshid Quli the virtual ruler of Bengal. Farrukh-siyar on his accession (1713) made him the substantive governor of Bengal in addition to his *diwān*-ship. In 1719 the full governorship of Orissā was conferred upon him. [Siyar, ii. 8, Riyāz, 250-252, 273-276.] Murshid Quli’s strong, honest and efficient administration, love of justice, and strict enforcement of peace and order greatly increased the wealth and happiness of the people and fostered the growth of trade in the country. When he died (30th June, 1727) he was succeeded by his son-in-law Shujā-ud-din Muhammad Khān (surnamed Shujā-ud-daulah, Asad Jang) in the rule of the two provinces, to which Bihār was added by the Emperor about 1733. Shujā also enjoyed a peaceful and prosperous reign.
v1.c8.s2.2
On the death of Shujā (13th March, 1739), his son, Sarāfrāz Khān (entitled Alā-ud-daulah Haidar Jang) became *subahdār* of Bengal, Bihār and Orissā. But this youthful ruler's excessive licentiousness, which (as so often happens in the East) he indulged in under the cloak of constant devotion to religious practices and resort to the society of theologians, caused a rapid decline in the administration. The evil was aggravated by the new Nawāb's jealous hostility to Alivardi Khān and his elder brother Hāji Ahmad, who had been the ablest and best-equipped officers during the last two reigns. Alivardi, knowing that his life and honour would be attacked by his worthless master whenever he could be caught at a disadvantage, decided to strike the first blow in self-defence. With remarkable skill and courage, he led an expedition from Patna (where he was deputy governor) into Bengal, defeated and slew Sarāfrāz at the battle of Gheriā (10th April 1740), and made himself Nawāb of the three provinces, afterwards securing the recognition of his act of might from the Emperor by profuse bribery. This act of usurpation opened the flood-gate of trouble on Bengal by encouraging in others the desire to imitate his illegal violence and open defiance of the imperial Government. [*Siyar*, ii. 101—105.]
v1.c8.s2.3
§ 3. How Alivardi won and lost Orissa and won it again in 1741.
v1.c8.s2.4
Rustam Jang (originally named Murshid Quli), the son-in-law of Shujā and deputy governor of Orissā, was goaded on by his wife Dardāna Begam to avenge her half-brother Sarāfrāz’s death. He refused to acknowledge the authority of the successful regicide in Bengal, declared his own independence, and in the ensuing cold weather marched from Katak to Balesar with the object of conquering Bengal. Alivardi advanced from his capital to meet the danger. For some weeks the two armies lay facing each other in their trenches near Balesar, with occasional skirmishes between their patrols. At last, on 3rd March, 1741, a battle was precipitated by Rustam’s impetuous son-in-law, Bāqar Ali, who left his impregnable trenches and numerous artillery behind him and attacked Alivardi on the plain of Fulwāri (four miles north of Balesar town), but was routed after a severe fight. Rustam Jang fled to Masulipatam in a friend's ship then happily lying at anchor off the port. Alivardi occupied Katak and installed his son-in-law Said Ahmad (surnamed Mahām-ud-daulah Saulat Jang) as deputy governor there. [*Siyar*, ii. 107-109.]
v1.c8.s2.5
But in August, Bāqar Ali, after hiring Marātha helpers from the Karnātak, returned to Orissā, captured Katak by a sudden attack, made its worthless and unpopular governor and his entire family prisoners, and seized the government of the province. Alivardi, in great distress, collected a strong force, marched into Orissā again, defeated Bāqar Ali on the bank of the Mahānadi,* rescued his son-in-law, and drove Bāqar Ali and his Marātha allies into flight to the Deccan (early in December, 1741). [*Siyar*, ii. 111—114; *Riyāz*, 327—338.]
v1.c8.s2.6
Meantime, in another corner of his dominions his local deputy had sent an expedition to bring the refractory Rājah of the jungly district of Rāmgarh (modern Hazāribāgh) under subjection. The zamindār who was thus antagonised naturally offered no opposition to the Marāthas of Nāgpur on their way to invade Bengal through his territory. [Siyar, ii. 116.]
v1.c8.s2.7
∗ At a place called Riāpur in Bengal letter of 23rd December, 1741 and Ghāt Choprā in *Riyāz*, 335. The Nizām's reception of the fugitive Rustam Jang and his family (*Hadiqat-ul-ālam*, ii. 173.)
v1.c8.s2.8
§ 4. First Maratha incursion, 1742.
v1.c8.s2.9
After recovering Katak from Bāqar Ali, the Nawāb passed two or three months there restoring the administration and making the necessary arrangements, and then he set out on his return to Bengal. On the way he halted near Balesar to send detachments into the Mayurbhanj country to punish its Rājah for his unfriendly attitude during the recent war. While thus delayed, the Nawāb heard at Jaygarh that Raghuji Bhonslé had sent his prime minister, Bhāskar Rām Kolhatkar, with a strong force to invade Bengal and collect *chauth* from the province. Further on the way, at Mubārak Manzil,* he learnt that the Marāthas had already passed through Pachet and entered the Bardwān district. By a forced march of one night and day the Nawāb arrived at Bardwān and encamped outside that town on the bank of the Rāni's tank (15th April, 1742). [Siyar, ii. 116-117.]
v1.c8.s2.10
∗ Its modern name is *Shāhin-bandi*, in the Arāmbāgh sub-division of the Hughli district, as proved by Mr. Md. Anzam in the *Prabasi* magazine, (Asharh, 1338, p. 382).
v1.c8.s2.11
¹ Bhāskar Rāo's force is estimated by Grant Duff (ii. 11) on the basis of Marātha records as 10,000 to 12,000. *Siyar* (ii. 117) gives "25,000, which rumour swelled to 40,000." Chandarnagar factory letter based on rumour gives 80,000!
v1.c8.s2.12
² My history of the Marātha incursions is mainly based upon *Siyar*, ii. 116—190, with some additions from Salimullah's *Tārikh-i-Bangāla* (I.O.L. MS., 2995 used, as F. Gladwin's trans. entitled *Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal* is shorter and gives wrong variants and mistranslations.) Important additions and corrections have been made from the Marathi records (S.P.D.) and the English and French factory letters. The contemporary
v1.c8.s2.13
Early next morning he was astonished to discover that during the preceding night the Marātha light horse had completely encircled his camp. Their march had been so swift and secret that the Nawāb's spies had failed to get any news of their position and line of advance till it was too late.
v1.c8.s2.14
Alivardi was now in a situation of extreme peril. After his reconquest of Orissā, as he had no enemy in view, he had sent back most of his troops to Murshidābād in advance of himself. At this time he had only 3,000 to 4,000 cavalry and 4,000 to 5,000 foot musketeers with him. The Marātha horde immediately hemmed this small force round and effectually cut off its food supply, without venturing on any pitched battle. The daily skirmishes of his foraging parties with the
v1.c8.s2.15
sources written by Bengalis are the Mahārāshtra Purān by Gangārām (ends with 1744) and the Chitra-champu (in 1744) by Vāneshwar. Riyāz-us-salātin (340-362) gives some useful details of its own, but more often repeats Salimullah, and is much too brief.
v1.c8.s2.16
enemy could produce no decision nor clear a way for his escape. A week passed in this way. Bhāskar himself took post at Bardwān with 14 of his captains to continue the investment of the Nawāb's camp, while his other ten captains with their contingents roamed over the country plundering the villages far and wide. The result was that not only could no grain-dealer reach the Bengal camp but all the sources of grain supply around Bardwān were also destroyed. Alivardi at last realised that to remain stationary in his encampment was to court death by starvation.
v1.c8.s2.17
From Bardwān (north of the Dāmodar river) the old Mughal road proceeds north-east to Katwā, 35 miles off. On this road, 21 miles from Bardwān, is a half way station at Nigun-sarāi, from which Katwā is only 14 miles distant. At Katwā the old course of the Ganges, called Bhāgirathi or the river of Murshidābād and Calcutta, is crossed and the road runs 40 miles northwards to Murshidābād, the capital of Bengal under the later Mughal dynasty. Eleven miles up from Katwā, on the eastern bank of the river stands the village of Palāshi (Plassey), the scene of the historic battle which gave Bengal to the English. The entire country is a dead flat alluvial plain.
v1.c8.s2.18
§ 5. Alivardi fights his way to Katwā.
v1.c8.s2.19
Alivardi, therefore, decided to make a night march in light equipment with a select force, surprise the Marātha cordon, and cut his way through it. The success of this plan depended entirely on his being able to move with strict secrecy and superior mobility, and he failed in both respects. When he led his army out of his camp, ordering the countless servants and other non-combatants to remain at Bardwān, they feared that the Nawāb was running away with his escort, abandoning them to the mercy of the invaders without any means of defence. Every one in the camp, therefore, pressed close on the detachment and it soon became a noisy, unwieldy and slow-moving body. The projected surprise entirely failed.
v1.c8.s2.20
In this condition the Bengal column was discovered in the morning and enveloped by the Marātha light horse. By four o'clock in the evening its advance was entirely stopped, and it came to a halt in a muddy rice field. When Alivardi ordered a charge to clear a path in front, the Afghān soldiers who formed the backbone of his army made a mere show of fighting without really engaging the enemy. The reason was that they were discontented with the Nawāb for his not satisfying the greed of their leaders. The Marātha horse circling round forced the stragglers and rearguard to crowd for safety upon their own centre, abandoning the baggage and tents which were slowly coming up from behind. The enemy seized the opportunity, set fire to the tents, looted the property in the camp, and cut down the stragglers, only a few of whom escaped. The column passed all that afternoon and the following night in the rice-field, without food or shelter and unable either to advance or to retreat.
v1.c8.s2.21
Alivardi now became a prisoner in deed. In order to gain time for reinforcements to reach him, he opened negotiations with the Marāthas. But Bhāskar knew the strength of his position; he demanded as the price of peace all the Nawāb's elephants in addition to one *kror* of Rupees. Next night Alivardi made an appeal to the generosity of his Afghāns. He went to their tents in utter humility, unaccompanied by a single attendant or torch-bearer and taking his little grandson Sirāj-ud-daulah by the hand, and placed his honour and the lives of both at the feet of their captains. This move won over Mustafa Khān, their leading general. Roused by Mustafa's eloquent and chivalrous speech, the Afghān soldiers vowed to defend their master to the death.
v1.c8.s2.22
In the morning the Bengal army resumed its march towards Katwā. All its tents, baggage and provisions had been lost, but the artillery still remained and proved very useful in forcing the Marātha spearmen to keep at a respectful distance. In this way, these men, now greatly reduced in number, cut their way to Nigun-sarāi, where a desperate rear-guard action was fought to check the enemy and Musāhib Khān fell. Next day Katwā was reached. During this march, whenever the Bengal army halted, the pursuing Marāthas used to halt likewise, just beyond the range of the jizails, while their roving bands plundered and burnt the villages for ten miles on each side of the road at every stage. Fighting daily on empty stomachs in this manner, the Nawāb and his army reached Katwā with their bare lives. This small town had been previously sacked and burnt by the Marāthas; but the famished Bengal troops were glad to appease their hunger with the half burnt rice that they could rake up among the ashes of the houses. Soon provisions, artillery and fresh troops reached Katwā from Murshidābād, and the Nawāb’s army was restored to strength and comfort. [Siyar, ii. 117—121.]
v1.c8.s2.23
§ 6. Mir Habib, his career and character.
v1.c8.s2.24
In the retreat from Bardwān Mir Habib, an officer of the Nawāb, had been captured by the enemy. This man at once transferred his services to them and proved their most useful ally and the greatest scourge of Bengal. His local knowledge, ability and persistence alone gave to the Marātha invasion of these three eastern provinces its long-drawn relentless and desolating character. Mir Habib was a native of Shiraz in Persia. Emigrating to Hughli he at first earned a scanty living by hawking from house to house such goods as he could get on credit from the merchants of his own country settled at that port. Though an absolutely illiterate man, his ready wit, extreme suavity of speech, and perfect command of the Persian language (which was his mother tongue) soon enabled him to make his way into the highest circle of society. The pedlar discarded his original profession and blossomed forth into the chief confidant and deputy (nāib) of Rustam Jang, rising as his master rose in the service of successive Nawābs. When Rustam Jang was appointed governor of Dacca, Habib by his attention to details and strict economy effected large savings in the expenditure of the Government flotilla, artillery and military departments. At the same time he enriched his master by unauthorised encroachment on private trade and a predatory incursion into Tipperā, till he was raised to the peerage. During Rustam Jang's governorship of Orissā, Habib as his agent (nāib) ran the entire administration and distinguished himself by ably managing the public business, keeping the zamindars under control, and greatly increasing his master's income. His ability and tireless activity were only equalled by his boundless ambition, implacable enmity to Alivardi Khān, and utter lack of moral scruple or generous sentiment. [Riyāz, 299-303.]
v1.c8.s2.25
§ 7. Maratha dash upon Murshidabad, May 6, 1742.
v1.c8.s2.26
It was now the beginning of May (1742), in which month the heavy rains begin in Bengal and quickly render the roads unfit for passage and the rivers too deep to be forded. Bhāskar, therefore, wanted to retire in haste to Nāgpur through the uplands of Birbhum. But Mir Habib pointed out that the rich and defenceless capital of Bengal would prove an easy prey if the Marāthas made a lightning raid on it during the Nawāb's absence. He took this task on himself, as he know all about the city and his wives and children were living there in charge of his brother.
v1.c8.s2.27
With 700 well-mounted Marātha horsemen, Mir Habib made a night march from Katwā and reached Dāhāpārā, opposite Murshidabad, in the morning of 6th May, burnt its bāzār, and then crossed over at the ferry of Hājiganj, to the city of Murshidābād, which had no wall around it. The city, denuded of troops, could make no defence, mainly owing to the cowardice of its governor Hāji Ahmad, the elder brother of the Nawāb. The greatest alarm and confusion raged in the capital of Bengal throughout that day and night. Hāji Ahmad fled to the fort, leaving the city to its fate. The Marāthas plundered from the house of Fathchand (surnamed Jagat Seth or the Chief Banker) in the suburbs nearly three lakhs of Rupees, and also several other richmen's mansions without the least check, and in the evening recrossed the river to Tirathkonā (west of Murshidābād), where they halted for the night.
v1.c8.s2.28
But Alivardi had, immediately on hearing of this movement of the Marāthas, hurried up from Katwā on their heels and arrived at his capital in the morning of the 7th. The raiders then beat a hasty retreat to Katwā, after sacking and setting fire to Tirathkonā and the villages around it.
v1.c8.s2.29
Early in May, after the Nawāb had cleared his capital of the enemy, the Marāthas retired to Katwā and then set out on their return home in order to avoid the monsoon rains of Bengal. But Mir Habib brought them back from the way (Birbhum) with reproaches for their lack of spirit and holding out alluring hopes of plunder. So, from the month of June, Katwā became their head quarters and Mir Habib their chief adviser and centre of all affairs (*madār-ul-mahām*). The districts west of the Ganges now passed into their hands. "They set up outposts in many places and occupied the country from Rājmahal to Medinipur and Jalesar. All rich and respectable people abandoned their homes and migrated to the eastern side of the Ganges in order to save their family honour." [Salimullah, 120a; Siyar, ii. 121-122; Eng. F.R.]
Linked texts (1)
- Mahārāṣṭrapurāṇ — Gaṅgārām, Bengali