Fall of the Mughal Empire v1.c9.s1: § 1. Emperor promises chauth to the Marāthas
Fall of the Mughal Empire v1.c9.s1
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§ 1. Emperor promises chauth to the Marāthas
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The second and third quarters of the year 1746 passed in comparative tranquillity for Bengal and Bihār. In October, after the rains had ceased, active operations were renewed for the recovery of Orissā. But at this time the Nawāb was thrown into great perplexity. Early in November he received a letter from the Emperor Muhammad Shāh announcing that he had agreed to make peace with the Marāthas by promising to Rājah Shāhu 25 lakhs of Rupees as the *chauth* of Bengal and ten lakhs as that of Bihār. These amounts were to be annually transmitted by the *subahdār* from Bengal to Delhi and there handed over to the agents of the Marātha king. People hoped that such a permanent arrangement would save the province from disturbances in future and restore the security of trade. [Chandarnagar letter of 24 November, 1746 cited in Pondichery letter of 31 January, 1747 (N. S.); Calcutta to Company, 30 November, 1746.]
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At the end of this November, Raghunāth Jayārām, a Marātha agent at Murshidābād, demanded the *chauth* for Bihār in the name of the Peshwā,—that for Bengal having been promised to Raghuji by Shāhu. The Nawāb replied, "The Emperor too has sent me a *farmān* about the *chauth* for Bengal, stating that the *chauth* has been assigned to the Peshwā and that his money should be sent to the imperial Court. I am writing to the Peshwā making my own representation [on the points in dispute.] Patna is mine, Bengal too is mine. I ought to act treating both provinces as one. The *chauth* for the two is inseparable." The Marātha envoy objected, saying, "How can the Peshwā's *chauth* and Raghuji's be considered as one and an indivisible thing? The latter is your enemy; entering your realm he has plundered and destroyed ten times the amount of the *chauth*. The Peshwā, on the other hand, has been entirely your friend. He gave you armed help in the past, and since then he has been exerting himself to settle your affairs. He has done his work; you now do yours and regulate your realm. If you fully pay up the subsidy for Bihār, then there will be no delay in despatching your affairs." Alivardi closed the discussion by saying that all his trust was in the Peshwā, and that the business would be done after the Peshwā had considered the representation he was writing to him about the position of his Government. He evaded making any definite promise of payment. [S. P. D., xx. 29 and 49.]
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The inner meaning of the Nawāb’s policy was that he was not prepared to make a separate agreement for the Bihār *chauth* with the Peshwā, when there was no guarantee that the Peshwā on being satisfied as to his own gain would not leave Raghuji a free hand to raid and tax Bengal and Orissā, instead of defending the three provinces together,—which was the Emperor’s object in promising the *chauth*. The black-mail for the entire North-eastern country must be one charge payable to one authority and not two separate amounts payable to two mutually independent enemy chiefs.
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§ 2. *The controversy about chauth.*
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The point at issue between the Nawāb and the Peshwā comes out very clearly in the letters of Hingané, the Marātha envoy at the Court of Delhi, [S. P. D., ii. 4 and 10.] Following the Emperor’s *farmān* to Alivardi on the agreement made with Rājah Shāhu about paying to him the *chauth* for Bengal and Bihār, Hingané wrote to Alivardi : “By order of the Emperor, the Peshwā has settled the terms of peace concerning Bengal with King [Shāhu] and sent word to Raghuji forbidding him to enter the province of Bengal...Write to your officers to remain at their posts in composure of mind and send the imperial revenue in full, as contracted by the Emperor, to Rājah Shāhu through the Peshwā. Then the disturbances in your country will cease.”
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Alivardi replied to the Emperor: “Your Majesty has written to me to the above effect, and I have also received a letter from Bālāji saying that in case Raghuji invades Bengal the Peshwā’s generals [i.e., Holkar and Sindhiā] have been kept ready with their troops on the frontier of Bundelkhand to come to the Patna and Gayā districts for my defence. And yet I have been repeatedly getting letters from Raghuji to inform me that he is coming. Then, what kind of settlement is thus? If a definite agreement has been concluded with Rājah Shāhu, why should Raghuji come at all? And for what reason has Bālāji Rao written thus? Why is not this uncertainty yet removed? So long as this apprehension remains, I, too, cannot afford to disband my army and my realm cannot be cultivated. The districts on the [western] bank of the Ganges have been devastated and not a kauri is being yielded by them. If some five Rupees are realised from this side [of the river], it is spent on my troops. Whence is the revenue coming and from what source can I send it? In this state of things, if Raghuji or his army does not make any incursion this year, then at the end of the year my militia will be sent back to their homes, and whatever revenue is left [after discharging* their dues] I shall send to His Majesty's Court.''
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Alivardi also wrote to the same effect to Hingané: ''When terms have been settled with Rājāh Shāhu, why is there an apprehension of Raghuji coming here? He is the Rājāh's servant; a friendly agreement has been made [with the Rājāh] about this province; now call him back and restrain him. When a man like the Peshwā himself has apprehensions about Raghuji invading Bengal, how can I be expected to disband my army and hope to see my country populated again? Whence can I send the full revenue to the Emperor? Therefore, I am determined to remain prepared for war [with Raghuji.] If he comes, I shall fight him; if he does not come, I shall remit such revenue as may be collected at the end of the year. You should write to your generals that when Raghuji sets out to invade this country, they should come to Bengal by the Rāmgarh, Pachet or Orissā route. What will they do by taking post in the Patna-Gayā districts? When they hear beforehand that Raghuji has issued from Berār and is actually coming to Bengal, and have verified the news, they should march directly to Bengal without waiting to be summoned or written to. Then I shall join them and defeat him.''
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In reply to the objections of Alivardi, the Emperor wrote the following letter of reprimand, under pressure from the Marātha agent at his Court:—"Assuredly Raghuji is not going to Bengal. Why then are you maintaining an army? Disband it and by properly reassuring your subjects cause that country to be populated fully. Why cling to your suspicions? Send the revenue here in full quittance. If there is any deficit in collection, exactly that amout will be debited from Bālāji Rāo's account. His subsidy (*tankhā*) has been assigned upon you, and I have also asked him to realise as my collecting agent (*sazāwal*) whatever surplus remains due to my Government. So, send the full amount quickly.''
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Hingané also reassured the Nawāb in similar terms: "By a hundred thousand paths has the Peshwā confined Raghuji to the Deccan. By 19 routes out of 20 he is prevented from entering Bengal. If ever he sets out by a single [unblocked] path, then as our generals [Holkar and Sindhiā] are posted on the frontier of Bundelkhand, in fear of them he will not go to Bengal. And even if he does go, they will hasten [after him] and chastise him. You remain watchful at your place and send the imperial revenue in full clearance.''
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In short, Alivardi chose the wiser and manlier part of basing the defence of his realm on a strong army under his own control, instead of depending upon a protective force, maintained at his cost, to be sent out by the Peshwā for supporting him in the event of Raghuji's invasion, probably after half the province had been desolated and plundered and his subjects kept in perpetual alarm by the palpably defenceless condition of their ruler.
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§ 3. Policy and plans of Raghuji Bhonsle in 1746.
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We shall now turn to the state of things at the Court of Bhonslé. Raghuji after leaving Bengal and Bihār (in April 1746) came to Nāgpur in September, and was beset by his creditors. Even when he received three *lakhs* of Rupees as the ransom of the deputy governor of Orissā (at the end of next December), he repaid no part of his debt. After the *Dasaharā* (13 Sep. 1746), he marched into Berār at the head of an army reduced to about 2000 *pāgā* and the same number of *silāhdār* horse, while his son Jānoji, who had been nominated to lead an expedition into Bengal, stayed at Nāgpur with only a thousand men under his banners.
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In the meantime, Mir Habib, dreading an attack by the Nawāb of Bengal in the coming cold weather, appealed piteously to Raghuji in October,—"If your army arrives here [at Katak] soon, so much the better. If not, write what I should do." He agreed to pay a subsidy of eleven *lakhs* of Rupees to Raghuji, and Raghuji in return promised to send his troops for the defence of Orissā in the month of Kartik (October). But it was very difficult for Raghuji in his financial distress to fit out an expedition. A news-writer in his camp in Berār reported on 8th December, "Raghuji is enlisting men, but is unable to pay them in cash. He has decided to send a force into Bengal under Jānoji with the contingents of some officers [named here], none of whom has actually more than 100 to 500 men under him. They expect to muster ten thousand, which is very unlikely." [*S. P. D.*, xx. 41 and 44.] Thus, there was delay in the Rājā's reinforcing Mir Habib in Orissā.
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§ 4. Mir Jafar defeats Maratha army at Medinipur, December 1746.
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Mir Jafar, the *Bakhshi* or Army Chief of the Nawāb, though appointed deputy governor of Orissa, could not march out in the middle of 1746 for expelling the Marāthas from that province, as he was forced to halt near the capital for strengthening his army with the new levies ordered by the Nawāb to replace the recently dismissed Afghān contigents of Shamshir Khān and Sardār Khān. At last, his ranks having been brought up to the necessary strength (about 7,500 men) and properly equipped, Mir Jafar marched into the Medinipur district in November, and after one or two minor skirmishes fought a decisive battle with Mir Habib's lieutenant Sayyid Nur, near Medinipur about 12th December 1746. The Sayyid, though reported as killed in an English letter from Balesar written four days after the battle, escaped towards Katak with the broken remnant of his army, but two of his head officers were killed. South of Balesar they were met and rallied by Mir Habib, who was returning after conquering Kanikā and dragging the Rājah of that place and his family into captivity. The general now hastened northwards to retrieve the situation. Arriving at Balesar, about 20th January 1747, Habib encamped two miles from the town, with 8,000 horse and 20,000 foot, and raised batteries along the Barā Bālang river to oppose the advance of the Bengal army. Jānoji, who had just reached Katak with his own army, started northwards in order to reinforce Mir Habib. [Bengal let. 22 Feb. 1747; letter from Pondichery, 31 Jan. 1747 (N.S.) S. P. D., xx. 29.]
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At this news, Mir Jafar, thinking that he was about to be outnumbered and enveloped by the Marāthas, lost heart, and without making any attempt to hold Medinipur, fled precipitately to Bardwān, abandoning some elephants and baggage of his army to the enemy (Feb. 1747.) Thus the year 1747 began with an unexpected reversal of fortune for the Nawāb. [Siyar, ii. 156-157.]
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Just then the Nawāb’s arms were paralysed by treason among his most favoured and trusted generals. Mir Jafar (his *Bakhshi*) and Atāullah (his *faujdār* of Rājmahal) formed a conspiracy to murder the Nawāb one day at their audience with him and then divide the thrones of Bengal and Bihār between themselves. But the secret reached the Nawāb’s ears, and Atāullah was forced to resign and Mir Jafar’s contingent was broken up and taken over by the Nawāb. [Siyar, ii. 157.]
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§ 5. Alivardi’s campaign against Janoji, March 1747.
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Thus Alivardi was left alone to face the united Afghāns and Marāthas. Mustafa Khān, Shamshir Khān, Sardār Khān and other veterans of note were gone with their forces, and now he lost the services of his two best war-experienced kinsmen and generals familiar with his troops.
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But nothing daunted, this old man of seventy-one personally took command of his army, marched out of his camp, and after fighting a severely contested battle near Bardwān (March 1747) defeated Jānoji and the entire Marātha army with heavy loss. Thereafter the Marāthas had not the heart to face him again in the field. They once more tried their old game of slipping past the Nawāb's flank and making a dash upon Murshidābād in his absence. But so quick was Alivardi's return behind them that they were prevented from doing any damage to the capital, though they sacked and burnt some villages near it as usual. So, the baffled raiders fled back to Medinipur, the Murshidābād and Bardwān districts were temporarily cleared of them, and at the approach of the rainy season the Nawāb returned to his capital. [Siyar, ii. 158.]
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During the whole of this year, 1747, the Marāthas remained in undisturbed possession of Orissā up to Medinipur. Their stay in and about Balesar, according to a Calcutta letter of 24 Feb. 1748, "has in a great measure prevented the currency of trade and occasioned a scarcity of all sorts of grain, the country people flying from their habitations upon every trifling rumour of their entering into this province."
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§ 6. *Patna governor enlists Darbhanga Afghans.*
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We have seen how six thousand Afghān troops under Shamshir Khān, Sardār Khān and other generals of that race, had left the Nawāb’s service in June 1746 and gone to their homes in North Bihār. Zainuddin Ahmad Haibat Jang, the governor of Patna, had pressed on Alivardi the bold strategy of offensive which had led to the expulsion of Bhāskar from Katwā in September 1742, and he had also defeated the formidable assault of Mustafa Khān upon Patna city in March 1745 and afterwards (in June) had slain him in battle in the Shāhābād district. These achievements had given him boundless conceit about his own capacity and he dreamt of seizing the throne of the three provinces by overthrowing the aged Alivardi, whose vast wealth and lavish gifts to his other kinsmen Zainuddin had seen with his own eyes in Murshidābād when invited to Sirājud-daulah’s marriage. For such an enterprise there could be no better instrument than these Afghān veterans of many a former war of the Nawab and their generals who enjoyed the highest military repute through the entire province. Moreover, their hearts were sore against Alivardi and they would readily join any scheme for overthrowing him.
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Zainuddin became eager to enlist these Afghāns in his own army. He wrote to Alivardi that so many able-bodied and expert soldiers, fretting idly at home in Dārbhangā with no means of livelihood in sight of them, constituted a formidable menace to the peace of his province. And yet it was beyond the Bihār governor's armed strength to drive them out of the province. The best solution of the problem, therefore, was to keep them out of mischief by taking 3,000 of their men and all their officers into his service, if the Nawāb would meet this additional military expenditure out of the revenue of Bengal. Alivardi grudgingly consented; and Zainuddin sent his agents to Dārbhangā to invite the Afghāns to come to Patna and enter his army.
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They wanted to know the terms of pay and service first, and were moreover not free from the suspicion that this invitation was a ruse of Alivardi to get them into his power and then crush them with ease. To settle the question more quickly and also to reassure their minds, Zainuddin asked them to come to Hājipur, opposite Patna and on their side of the Ganges. Leaving Dārbhangā on 10th December, 1747, they reached Hājipur on the 16th and remained encamped there for a fortnight, while negotiations were being constantly exchanged with the governor in Patna. Zainuddin, blinded by his eagerness to secure these valuable soldiers and make friends with their powerful leaders, visited them in their camp at Hājipur quite unattended, and when early in January 1748 they came over to Patna and halted in Jafar Khān’s garden, he ordered the guards to be removed from their path and also from his palace of *Chihil satun*, in order to leave no ground for suspicion in the minds of the Afghāns.
Linked texts (1)
- Selections from the Peshwa Daftar — Marathi