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Fall of the Mughal Empire v2.c26.s3: § 8. Raghunath Rao invades Rajputana, 1757—his failure and sufferings

Fall of the Mughal Empire v2.c26.s3

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§ 8. Raghunath Rao invades Rajputana, 1757—his failure and sufferings

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At the end of this year, 1756, first Malhar Holkar and some weeks later Raghunath Rao were again ordered by the Peshwa to Rajputana to exact the promised but long-delayed tribute. Raghunath reached Indor on 14 February 1757, and on being joined by Malhar there, at first proposed to march on Delhi, which was then being robbed by Ahmad Shah Abdali.

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But such a task was really impossible for him. Apart from his own constitutional lethargy and incapacity, he was severely handicapped by his utter lack of resources and his constant friction with his great lieutenant. The Peshwa had inherited from his dashing father Baji Rao vast territorial claims, but also a crushing legacy of debt, which he had only increased by following a policy of aggressive expansion during 15 years, and he looked to this north-Indian expedition as his only possible means of relief. He had therefore been unable to fit out Raghunath in proper strength. Raghunath’s own force (led by Vital Shivdev) was 4,000 and Malhar’s contingent 2,000, making a total of 6,000 men immediately under his banners. And even counting the scattered detachments of Shamsher Bahadur and Naro Shankar and Antaji’s army (which last was really an imperial service corps), the full Maratha strength in the north did not exceed 16,000 men. But their leader had no money, nor any prospect of getting money soon; the Rajput States were themselves impoverished and merely negotiated to gain time. In consequence, Raghunath and his soldiers were starving. Far from being able to remit tribute to the Peshwa, he constantly begged for funds from Puna, in order to subsist! As he writes, “I am feeding myself only by looting villages. In this country most places are fortified, and not a grain of food can be obtained without fighting. I have no money, and cannot even raise a loan. My soldiers have been fasting for one or two days at a time.” He laid on Malhar the entire blame for the failure to clinch matters with the Rajput Rajahs and hasten the collection of tribute. [Raj. i 52, 67, 71.]

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∗ On 15 October 1756 Antaji writes,—"Before this the Maharao of Kotā [ Durjan Sal ] died childless. On hearing of it Dattaji by rapid marches went to Kotā and secured promise of 40 lakhs as nazar,—20 lakhs were paid down and bonds given for the remaining 20 lakhs. He has come back to Ujjain." SPD. ii. 66. Vamsha Bhaskar, p. 3654-'5 places the death in July and gives 12 lakhs as the succession fine imposed on Ajit S. Hada, the new Rajuh.

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From Indor, through Mewar,—where he took a ransom of one lakh from Jāwad and plundered Ranikheda (March),—Raghunath Rao reached Jaipur territory, and while dunning Mādho Singh for payment, laid siege (April) to the fortalice of Barwada* belonging to the Shekhawats, who were the most stubborn fighters in the Kachhwa kingdom. Raghunath had no siege-materials and was long held up by this garhi. His insane pride and lack of business capacity prolonged the sufferings of his army. The Jaipur minister Kāniram offered to buy him off by paying the same tribute as agreed upon in the past ; but "Raghunath would not listen ; he demands 40 to 50 lakhs in cash and the cession of the 14 lakhs worth of jagir given by the Emperor to Jaipur some years ago as appertaining to fort Ranthambhor, in addition to Rāmpurā-Bhānpurā, Tonk-Todā, and Hinglājgarh. He is determined either to secure these gains by consent, or to remain here for four months and gain territory worth 40 to 50 lakhs by war." [c. 12 April, SPD. xxvii. 152a] Rajah Madho Singh wisely rejected these exorbitant terms and put his capital and other forts in a vigilant and active state of defence. The total Maratha force in that region, including Malhar’s contingent now numbered 13,000. But Jaipur fort had a garrison of 17,000, and the Rajah’s generals patrolled round it in strength day and night. Sanganer was held by Dilel Singh Rajawat, who was strengthened (10 May) with six tumbrils of powder and shot. Madho Singh called his feudatories one by one and made them swear on the sacred *bel* leaf to resist the southern invaders to the death. His determination to fight rather than accept Raghunath’s humiliating terms became manifest to all. [*SPD.* xxi. 121 and 120 ; Raj. i. 71 differs from xxvii. 152*a*.]

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∗ Marked on modern maps under the expressive name of Chauth-ka Barwara, 20 m. w. of Ranthambhor fort and 16 m. n.w. of Sawai Madhopur Rly. station. Raj. i. 63. SPD. xxvii. 155. Jawad, 10 m. n., and Ranikheda, 18 m. n. w. of Neemuch.

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But though there was no actual clash of arms, except for the ineffective siege of Barwada, the strong attitude of Madho Singh, forced Raghunath to lose more than three months and feed his huge army in idleness in Jaipur territory. At last he came to his senses and about 10th July agreed to accept eleven lakhs from Jaipur, six of which was paid down, and shared between Raghunath and Malhar in the proportion of 2 to 1. By this time Raghunath Rao had been reduced to a desperate state of destitution; as he wrote to the Peshwa on 12th July in support of his prayer for a remittance, “I have no money, nor is any loan available. My troops are in debt. Prices here are very high. I am daily getting my food only by sacking the villages.” [Raj. i. 71.]

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Meantime Ahmad Shah had come and gone without Raghunath lifting a finger to defend the holy places of Hindustan or to prevent the foreign invader from carrying away the treasures of the land and leaving it sucked dry for the Marathas who would come after him.*

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Having thus at last settled the Jaipur business, Raghunath and Malhar waited for some days more in Jaipur territory for the arrival of Holkar's wife Gautami Bāi, and on being joined by her left Rajputana at the end of July 1757, and that country enjoyed peace for nearly a year after.

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§ 9. The Sindhias in Rajputana, 1758.

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The tribute of 50 lakhs which Bijay Singh of Marwar had been forced to promise to Dattaji Sindhia (in Feb. 1756), was beyond the resources of that desert land and remained unpaid for years after, keeping a source of friction perpetually open. During Raghunath's march through Rajputana in June 1757, the Marwar ministers had waited on him and begged him to abate these terms and dictate some reasonable compromise between their Rajah and Sindhia. But Marwar had been assigned by the Peshwa as the special hunting-ground of the Sindhia family, and therefore Raghunath did not choose to interfere, even if he could have imposed his will on Dattaji, which was doubtful. [ Raj. i. 66. ]

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∗ Raghunath assumed a despondent tone from the outset. "Our troops are not yet assembled. I have no money. Abdali is strong ; it requires very great resources to chastise him. Send Dattaji Sindhia quickly to me from the Deccan" (Raghunath's letter, 16 Feb.) On 16th Feb. his diwan Sakharam Bapu writes, "The month of Falgun (Feb-March) will be over before my contingent and that of Malhar are mustered. Abdali is a powerful enemy." [Raj. i. 52 and 53.]

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So, Rajputana received another visit from the locust swarms of the south about the middle of 1758. In the July of that year Jankoji Sindhia was pressing Ummed Singh Sisodia of Shāhpurā for his tribute, and he paid a hurried visit to Raghunath Rao, then on his return journey from the Panjab to Maharashtra through eastern Rajputana and Malwa. At the end of that month Jankoji secured a promise of four lakhs from Shāhpurā and went to Kota, where the new Rajah had died. Here he imposed a succession fee on the late Rajah’s successor, and here Malhar soon afterwards joined him (August) and helped to realize the money. The two Maratha generals now came to some sort of settlement of the long-standing rivalry between their families for sharing the Maratha acquisitions in Rajputana and Malwa. Jankoji then passed into Jaipur territory via Mālpurā. Rajah Madho Singh had entered into every anti-Maratha coalition since 1754, and he was now coerced into promising 36 lakhs, payable in four years, the present year’s instalment of 9 lakhs to be enhanced by the addition of a nazar of three lakhs (September.) Since July last Jankoji had been receiving repeated letters from the retreating Raghunath Rao, urging him to leave Rajputana for the present and march to Delhi, where a strong Maratha force was needed for defending their new gains in the Doab and the Panjab, as there were persistent rumours of Abdali's intention to invade India again. Jankoji halted during October and November on the eastern side of the Jaipur kingdom for the coming of his uncle and guardian Dattaji, who had at this time taken post in Rupnagar, "thinking day and night how to lighten the Peshwa's load of debt." At last uncle and nephew united, started for Delhi, and reached Najafgarh on 26 December 1758. *

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The land being clear of the southern invaders, Madho Singh, who received a visit from Suraj Mal at Amber in March 1759 and probably concerted a defensive plan with him, soon afterwards expelled the Maratha outposts from his dominions. [ TALS. 202a. ]

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§ 10. Malhar Holkar's campaign in Rajputana, 1759.

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Soon after parting from Jankoji at Kota, Malhar returned to Indor (September 1758) and had a severe illness. On recovering, he made a journey to Puna, where he arrived in January 1759, after having been detained for some weeks at Sendhwa (midway between the Narmada and the Tapti) by a general Bhil rising in Khandesh. At the Maratha capital his tact and diplomacy removed the Peshwa's recently kindled suspicions about him, and he was sent back to Malwa, reinstated in trust and power. In July he received orders from the Peshwa to go and put pressure on the Maharana of Udaipur, who had not paid a pice of his annual tribute for the last four years, nor the extra contribution laid on him by Jankoji in 1758. The Peshwa's need of money was most pressing and he wrote to his agents in Rajputana not to spare the Maharana's feelings, but to exercise every kind of harshness that was likely to enforce payment from the defaulter. [SPD. xxi. 167, 172.]

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∗ SPD. ii 95, 94, 96. xxvii. 230, 236. Jankoji writes to the Peshwa that he was delayed long near Pushkar by his efforts to collect the promised tribute. ( ii 101.)

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But the main task of Malhar was to realize the heavy contributions laid on the Jaipur Rajah,—namely 12 lakhs for 1758 and 9 lakhs for 1759. This was no easy task, because Jaipur was now the strongest power in Rajputana, and its master, safely sheltered within his strongly fortified capital, could laugh an invasion to scorn. Moreover, as Raghunath had found in 1757, in this kingdom most of the villages had protective walls and a martial population. Thus, the Maratha general could only occupy a portion of the country and try to starve the enemy out by stopping cultivation and commercial traffic. At last, in November the Rajputs came out in a body 4,000 strong, under Jot Singh Nathawat, to attack the Marathas. Malhar had been praying for such an opportunity of fighting in the open. With his superior numbers and artillery, he enveloped the Rajputs at Lakhori and completely crushed them, twenty of their captains being slain. Thereafter the Rajputs ceased to confront him, and merely held their outposts at different places.

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Malhar next laid siege to Barwara, which was defended by Vikramajit and other captains of the Rajawat and Shekhawat clans. Calling up his big guns from Rampurā, he pressed the garrison so hard that they cried for quarter and were allowed to go away with their lives only, and the Marathas occupied this fort renowned for its strength. Their signal success frightened the Rajput chiefs all around; from Uniara, Isarda, Sewarh, and Jhilara envoys came to Malhar’s camp with offers of tribute as the price of peace. His aim was to make them restore the Maratha jagirs in Kota-Bundi lately usurped by them and then to confirm these local chieftains in the possession of their ancestral estates, on condition of their agreeing to pay tribute annually for the rest of the lands they held. But before these arrangements could be completed, he received, on 27th December, an urgent call from Dattaji Sindhia to come at once to his aid, as Abdali had crossed over into the Sarhind district and a decisive trial of strength with him was imminent. So, Malhar abruptly abandoned the Rajput business just at the point of maturing, and set off on 2nd January 1760 for Delhi, by way of Jhilāra (3rd January.)*

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∗ *SPD.* ii. 113, 115, 117 (=xxi. 177). Raj. i. 150. Jhilara seems to be Jhilai, 23 m. n. w. of Barwara and 40 m. s. e. of Jaipur.

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Thus, the Maratha interests in Rajputana remained unsettled and uncared for throughout the entire year 1760, that intervened between Malhar’s departure and the battle of Panipat. It was only after the retreat of the Afghan king from India about the middle of 1761 that the Marathas were able to turn again to Rajputana and settle accounts with the Rajput princes who had been exulting over the debacle of Panipat.

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