Fall of the Mughal Empire v2.c27.s21: Explanation of Plans of Battle
Fall of the Mughal Empire v2.c27.s21
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Explanation of Plans of Battle
v2.c27.s21.1
Square with one diagonal line—Infantry. Square with 2 diagonal lines crossed—Cavalry. White square—Maratha troops. Half-black square—Durrani troops. Squares with dotted outlines—Former positions. Dotted lines—Lines of advance or retreat, as shown by arrows. Zigzag dotted lines—Najib’s field trenches. Small circles—Broken fugitives. †—artillery
v2.c27.s21.2
| MARATHA ARMY | DURRANI ARMY |
| 1. Ibrahim Gardi (8,000) | 14. Barkhurdar & Amir Beg (3,000) |
| 2. Damaji Gaikwad (2,500) | 15, 16. Dundi & Hafiz Rahmat (14,000) |
| 3. Vittal Shivdev (1,500) | 17. Ahmad Bangash (1,000) |
| 4. Minor captains (2,000) | 18. Camel-swivels (1,000 × 2) |
| 5. Bhau’s banner & position | 19. Kabuli infantry (1,000) |
| 6. Centre (13,5000) | 20. Centre, Shah Wali (15,000) |
| 7. Antaji Manakeshwar (1,000) | 21. Shuja (3,000) |
| 8. Pilaji Jadav’s sons (1,500) | 22. Najib (15,000) |
| 9. Minor captains (2,000) | 23. Shah Pasand (5,000) |
| 10. Jaswant Puar (1,500) | 24. Reserve (Nasrullah) |
| 11. Shamsher Bahadur (1,500) | 25. Civil officers &c. |
| 12. Jankoji Sindhia (7,000) | 26. Slave squadrons of body-guards (3,000) |
| 13. Malhar Holkar (3,000) | 27. Abdali’s tent. |
v2.c27.s21.3
BATTLE OF PANIPAT—10 A. M.
v2.c27.s21.4
cried out in agony, ‘Comrades! our life and honour are perishing. How is Hāfiz Rahmat Khan?’ ”
v2.c27.s21.5
The grim Gardi-Ruhela duel went on for over three hours, at the end of which the twofold odds and Ruhela tenacity began to tell against the sepoys. They lost the superior advantage of their training in the confused breast to breast fighting,* and when at last at half past one in the afternoon three thousand fresh troops from Abdali’s reserve joined the Ruhelas, the scales were hopelessly weighted against the sepoys, and the short black Telingas were overwhelmed by the tall brawny Indo-Afghans; Ibrahim Khan’s battalions were almost annihilated, and only one battalion and a half remained standing out of seven. There was on his side no efficient cavalry ready to take advantage of the first successful thrust of the sepoys and complete their work by a shock charge overwhelming the disorganized Ruhela infantry. Dāmāji Gaikwād who had been ordered to support Ibrahim fought well, receiving three wounds; but his contingent was less than 3,000 strong and not first-rate fighting material, having never before this faced north-Indian foes. O for one hour of Dattāji Sindhia, at the head of his family contingent fully 10,000 strong, in this crisis! The two Gardi battalions told off against the outflanking force of Barkhurdar, boldly charged them and threw the enemy ranks into confusion. But in the end the left attack of the Maratha army entirely died out, and fifteen hundred unwounded men, the remnant of eight thousand French-trained infantry dispersed in flight from a hopelessly lost field. Bussy's pupils had not disgraced their master; they had killed or wounded more than their own number and borne 80 per cent casualties before they were broken.
v2.c27.s21.6
∗ Marshal Saxe wrote, ‘Troops that have fired are undone, if those opposed to them have reserved their fire.’ So far as fire effect is concerned, troops advancing must be at a disadvantage compared with troops standing still. The compensation lies in the moral effect of attack, the threat of hand-to-hand combat. [Lloyd, 155.]