Fall of the Mughal Empire v2.c28.s6: § 13. Maratha policy towards Najib and Jat Rajah

Fall of the Mughal Empire v2.c28.s6

Language: English

§ 13. Maratha policy towards Najib and Jat Rajah

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There was a sharp difference of opinion in the Maratha camp as to their policy and plan of war.

∗ As he wrote to the Emperor, "In order to gain time, I have inclined this race (Marathas), more numerous than ants and locusts, by my friendliness and suppleness to remain loyal to your Majesty and have thus preserved the capital Delhi safe and intact." [Ghulam Ali, ii. 258.] At this time Najib was very ill and had

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Ramchandra Ganesh welcomed Najib's offer of co-operation as a godsend, remarking, "We have come to this country after ten years, and if we do not first make friends with Najib, then all the par-Ruhelas and Shuja would join him against us (in self-defence), and he is also very powerful in himself. With such a combination of enemies against us, we shall have to fight a hard fight, the result of which none can foresee. Therefore, we ought to reassure this man, make him our ally, first attack the Jat Rajah, and easily exact a large contribution from him. Whatever was done by Najib against us (in 1759-61) is now a thing of the past." Tukoji Holkar was the hereditary friend of Najib and used to supply him with secret intelligence about the happenings in the Maratha camp and timely reports of Mahadji's intended treachery towards him, or merely Tukoji's own suspicion of such designs. They expected to win over the par-Ruhelas through Najib and thus secure tribute and restitution of territory from them without a blow, so that the undivided forces of the Marathas might be employed to squeeze the friendless Jat Rajah.

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Mahadji Sindhia objected, saying, "We have come here after a long interval in order to take vengeance on this man. If you now make an alliance with him and give him your solemn oath of friendship, how then can we be avenged on him ever after? to be carried about lying down in a litter. [Muna Lal, 107.] Najib and the Marathas in 1770,—Nur. 115a-123.

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All the lands belonging to the Peshwa (in the Doab) have been enjoyed by the Afghans for over ten years. Our prestige has been ruined by that race. The foremost of our enemies is Najib-ud-daulah; especially the *blood of three and a half persons of my family* (viz., Dattaji, Jankoji, and Sabaji slain, and Mahadji himself left half dead and lamed for life) is on his head. And Tukoji is proposing to embrace him! Never mind, I shall write to the Peshwa and take his orders." The Peshwa preferred the demands of political expediency to those of blood feud.

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So, the Marathas sent a written pledge of alliance and friendly assurances to Najib, through Tukoji Holkar, and asked him to capture the Jat possessions in the middle Doab, at the same time that they invaded the Jat kingdom west of the Jamuna. Nawal Singh, the Jat Rajah, issued from Dig and was defeated after a bloody battle with Ramchandra Ganesh near Mathura (4-6 April, 1770.) Najib encamped at Chandausi (5 April), and in two days his men took the fort of Nohjhil, driving out its Jat garrison across the river. He very quickly wrested from the local officers the Jat parganahs of Jewar, Dankaur, Tappal, Dabahi &c., and encamped on the Jamuna east bank opposite Mathura.*

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∗ *SPD.* xxix. 254-262, 246. xxix. 260 dated 16 June, says '20 Jat mahals have been seized by Najib for himself. Many have been looted by the Pindharis.' Nur. 119. *DC.* (imp.)

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§ 14. *Marathas enter Doab, meet Najib ; Mahadji Sindhia unfriendly to him.*

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The Maratha generals, after their victory in the field, shrank from attacking the impregnable Jat forts, and therefore could not drive the vanquished Nawal Singh to submission. They decided, instead, to cross into the Doab and there exact tribute from the par-Ruhelas and divide with Najib the parganahs of the middle Doab that he had recently wrested from Nawal Singh's men. Their whole army, reported to be 70,000 strong, assembled at Mathura. Holkar was the first to cross over to the east bank for meeting Najib. Abdul Ahad Khan acted as mediator and conducted the parley from the Ruhela side (13 April.) The 17th of April was selected as an auspicious day for the meeting, after assurances and oaths of good faith had been exchanged. Najib advanced beyond his artillery lines and welcomed Tukoji Holkar, and took him to his tent with every mark of honour. More consultations were held next day, and on the 19th Najib returned the visit. He rode to Tukoji's tent, who introduced him to Ramchandra Ganesh and then to Mahadji Sindhia. Najib tried to soothe Mahadji Sindhia by offering him commonplace condolences like, "Whatever God wills happens. I did not from my side move against Dattaji Patil, but rather sought his friendship, and he too did not intend fighting.

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But owing to the Divine will it happend in that way. Don't now entertain any idea of revenge in your hearts. Now that I have joined you, I shall repress your enemies." Mahadji remained in sullen silence for some time and then dryly replied, "The will of God has been accomplished. Let us see what He wills in future"! They parted after exchanging the customary presents, "but soreness of heart remained between the two sides, and affectionate speeches were not made."

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After some days of discussion the allies formed their plan of operation. On 25th April, the entire Maratha army crossed over to the east bank of the Jamuna and encamped close to Najib. Najib's men took possession of Shukohabad, Sadabad and other parganahs from Nawal Singh and posted his own collectors and military guards there (c. 3 May.) The ex-wazir Imad-ul-mulk, from his refuge at Mainpuri, joined the Maratha camp at Agra unasked. But there could be no real or hearty co-operation between such an ill-matched pair of confederates. On 10th May, Najib after receiving a secret warning from Tukoji that the other Maratha sardars were planning treachery against him, broke up his camp and marched towards Aligarh. The Marathas fell on his baggage, but could capture nothing. [DC.] Soon afterwards the rainy season put an end to military movements and the Marathas went into cantonments in the Aligarh district. [SPD. xxvii. 214, DC. Nur. 120-121.]

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§ 15. Maratha enterprise in Doab fails.

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Mahadji Sindhia had at the very outset urged that unless tribute was realized from the Jat Rajah, nobody else would pay the Marathas anything, and therefore their army should not enter the Doab before making a settlement with Nawal Singh. This advice was set aside in favour of Tukoji Holkar’s alternative plan of working through Najib and against the Jats. As a Maratha agent complains, “We all gave the counsel to treat the Jat Rajah kindly, take from him whatever cash he readily paid down, and thus relieve the distress of our impoverished army. But instead of doing it, our chiefs have, by Holkar’s advice, sided with Najib Khan and under his guidance attacked the Jat possessions. All our plans, great and small, have been ruined by our alliance with Najib.”

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Throughout the three monsoon months negotiations for tribute went on with the Jat Rajah and the Bangash and Ruhelas, but nothing came of them, as no pressure could be put on these parties and Ramchandra Ganesh made an impossible demand on Nawal Singh. The end of this expedition showed once again that Najib’s shrewd and sure diplomacy was superior to Maratha short-sightedness and vacillation. Their hope of peacefully securing tribute and territory from the Bangash and the trans-Ganges Ruhelas through the backing of Najib, proved illusory. These Afghan chiefs dismissed the Maratha envoys with a scornful refusal, “Najib has usurped Mirat and other mahals, and you have not recovered them. Why then are you asking us to restore our annexations? We shall not give you *chauth* or land unless Najib does the same.” (August 1770.) The result was the utter failure of the Marathas to get a pice and a consequent addition to their army debt. The evil was aggravated by Najib’s double-dealing. Throughout the rainy season he kept writing to the par-Ruhelas in order to stiffen their backs and induce them to form with him and the Jat Rajah a vast anti-Maratha coalition. One of his letters to them was intercepted and revealed his treachery.

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A rupture between two such insincere friends was difficult to prevent. At one conference the exasperated Maratha chiefs held a high tone and taxed Najib with failure to keep his promise and treacherous collusion with his brother Afghans, which had prevented the collection of the Maratha tribute even after six months’ effort. Najib answered haughtily, bidding the Deccanis remember that the lion was not yet dead and that if they desired war with him he was ready for them then and there. He continued, “I cannot bear to live in your camp in dishonour. Don’t you think that you have now a vast army with you and I have only a small force. Even when I am dead and buried in the ground, I can eat you all up with only 10,000 men. I know that Mahadji Patil harbours ill-will towards me in his heart. Go and tell him from me, ‘If you are a man, why don’t you come into the field, but are merely repeating that the blood of three of your family is on my head? Either exact retaliation for it, or become a fourth in addition to the other three. Your behaviour is unworthy of a brave man.' You have seen what I can do, and I have seen your work. Very well. I shall march away this moment." * He was pacified with great difficulty and after profuse apologizing by Anand Rao Narsi.

Linked texts (1)

Selections from the Peshwa Daftar — Marathi