Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c36.s7: § 11. Sikh disunion and weakness; effect of their rule
Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c36.s7
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§ 11. Sikh disunion and weakness; effect of their rule
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Besides these founders of ruling houses, the Sikh captains who took the title of sardar were beyond count, because any one of them might "command not more than 20 or 30 horsemen" and still be called a sardar. They combined only on the occasion of forays, and even their *misls* were not patriarchally ruled clans, but merely confederacies formed for joint enterprises of profit without any affinity of blood. The Sikh sardars, when not engaged in foreign wars and raids, spent all their energy and resources in ceaseless mutual hostility. As Captain Francklin noted in 1793, the Sikh forces, "from want of union among themselves, are not much to be dreaded by their neighbours. Divided into distinct districts, each chief rules over the portion appropriated to him with uncontrolled sway; and tenacious of his authority, and jealous of his brethren, it seldom happens that this nation makes an united effort . . . The discordant and clashing interests of the respective Sikh chiefs prevent almost the possibility of a general union.” But Warren Hastings in 1784 had predicted the rise of a Ranjit Singh to unite the sect. [Forrest, iii. 1124.]
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∗ In the Ambala district in 1882 the Sikhs held 35 out of its 38 jagirs.
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But in spite of these internal quarrels, Sikh rule was not without a beneficial effect. It did not escape the observation of Polier, who wrote, “In their intestine divisions, there is this difference from what is seen everywhere else, that the husbandman and labourer, in their own districts are perfectly safe and unmolested, let what will happen round about them.” They also gave absolute protection and security to bankers and traders who preferred to seek asylum in their territories in that troubled age.
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Outside their own possessions, the Sikhs used to go forth for exacting blackmail exactly in imitation of the Maratha mulkgiri or chauth-collecting expeditions. “As regularly as the crops were cut, the border Sikh chieftains crossed over [into the imperial territory in the Upper Doab] and levied blackmail from almost every village, in the most systematic manner. Their requisitions were termed rākhi [i.e., price of protection.]* Each of them had a certain well-known beat or circle, well recognised and clearly defined . . . The collections varied with the ability of the people to pay, averaging from two to five Rupees a head. Two or three horsemen generally sufficed to collect them, for 2,000 or 3,000 more were never very far off . . . Refusal was fatal."
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§ 12. Zabita Khan turns Sikh, raids the Doab (1778), is defeated by Afrasiyab and Najaf Quli. His complete submission.
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When in the last fight before Ghausgarh Zābita Khan was cut off from his fort by the advance of Afrāsiyāb Khan's column and driven into the Sikh camp, he found himself possessed of nothing except the clothes he stood in. All his property and treasures, all his wives and sons had been left behind in Ghausgarh, and these passed into the hands of the imperialists in the course of a week. The destitute Ruhela chief and his vanquished Sikh allies fled fast from the Doab and retired to the Sikh settlements in the Karnal district west of the Jamuna. Here Zābita Khan lived for many months after, on the bounty of his former allies. He had no money or follower and no landed possession now; but the Sikhs had enjoyed subsidies from his father year after year, as his munshi Mansukh Rāi reminded them, and they generously took up the cause of the penniless friendless exile. To cement their alliance, Zābita made a public profession of the Sikh religion, being baptised as Dharam Singh. To such a depth had fallen the heir of the champion who had held aloft the banner of Islam in Northern India for thirteen years!*
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∗ Forster reported in 1786 that the rakhi seldom exceeded 4 or 5 p.c. on the produce. (Poona Res. Corr. i. No. 95.) This tax was two annas per Rupee of the fixed revenue [DY. i. 108] in the north of Delhi region.
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The winter of 1777-’78 passed away without Zābita Khan venturing on any attempt to recover his Doab possessions. After the capture of Ghausgarh, Najaf Quli Khan had been placed in charge of that Ruhela stronghold and the government of the Saharanpur district, while Afrāsiyāb Khan had been posted further south in the Doab as governor of Aligarh and the surrounding district. Here the two continued to strengthen their hold for some months after, by suppressing the rebel landlords.
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But by February 1778 Mirzā Najaf Khan had become deeply entangled in a contest with the Rao Rajah of Alwar then in league with the Rajahs of Jaipur and Bharatpur. His position was rendered still more difficult by his jealous rival Abdul Ahad Khan, who swayed the policy of the pliant Emperor and secretly encouraged the Mirzā's enemies and promoted defection among his retainers. Thus was the Rajput resistance stiffened, and a large body of Mughalia horse (under Murād Beg Khan and others) tempted to leave the Mirzā's camp and go to Delhi, where they arrived on 25th March. The Mir Bakhshi's troubles were Zābita Khan's opportunity. In the company of his Sikh allies—who had been pining at missing their annual raid into the Doab this winter,—he crossed into the Doab. His name acted as a rallying cry for the local enemies of the imperial Government and his knowledge and influence helped the progress of the raiders.
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∗ Bihari Lal in *I.H.Q.* (1935), p. 651. Miskin 336-338. *Ibrat.* i. 324-342 (full details of the Doab campaign.) *DC.* G. Ali iii. 130-131.
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They swept through the upper Doab with scarcely any opposition and their advanced detachments penetrated to Sikandrabad and even further south. At Khurja they were repulsed by Afrāsiyāb Khan with his abundant fire arms. They then invested Najaf Quli in Ghausgarh for some time. Afrāsiyāb could not come promptly to the rescue of his colleague, as he had to visit the Court and try to remove the hostility of Abdul Ahad by personal suasion (8-20 April.) But when he at last joined Najaf Quli, the invaders fled away and the two imperial generals crossed the Jamuna on their heels and defeated the Sikhs in a running fight up to Karnal and Budakhera. Then Gajpat Singh, Rajah of Karnal, who was harbouring Zābita, opened peace parleys. But while he and Dalel Singh (of Malodh) favoured submission to the empire, Bāgh Singh (the Thāneshwar chieftain) remained defiant. So, the imperialists marched four miles north of Budakhera and captured the fortified village of Barāgāon* where the Sikh sardars had lodged most of their baggage. Then only did all these chiefs come to terms: they gave their word not to shelter the Emperor's enemies in their territories, nor to raid Mirzā Najaf's jagirs in future. Zābita Khan came over to the Mughal generals and with them crossed back into the Doab at Jhanjhana. Here a letter was received from the Mirzā ratifying the peace with Zābita Khan and promising him a high post with jagirs and the release of his family as soon as he would sue for the Emperor's pardon in person. The three Khans decided to set off for Agra and meet Mirzā Najaf there.
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On their way down the Doab they spent a long time in reducing many refractory Jat and Gujar zamindars and laying heavy fines on them, —at Doghāt (15 miles north-west of Saharanpur), Parichhatgarh (the home of Gulāb Singh Gujar, 14 miles east of Mirat), Rohāna and Sāinpur (the strongholds of Makni Rām Jat, 8 miles north of Muzaffarnagar) and Kutesra (the seat of Sarāpā Gujar, 6 miles west of Rohāna.)
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∗ Budakhera, 4 m. north-east of Karnal city. Barāgāon, 4 m. north of Budakhera.
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The campaign having been brought to a most successful issue, the three generals crossed the Jamuna at Mathura and hastened to Agra, where they met with a most cordial welcome from Mirzā Najaf. Zābita Khan was given back every article of his property seized at Ghausgarh and now stored in Agra fort; his wives and children as well as the families of his officers were freed from captivity, and he received a rescript for his seven mahals in Saharanpur along with the fort of Ghausgarh. In gratitude, the Ruhela chieftain offered the hand of his daughter to his generous patron. (20 Sept. 1778.)
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This settlement finely illustrates the far-sighted statesmanship of Mirzā Najaf. He set up Zābita Khan as a buffer against the Sikhs in the upper Doab and also as his own *protege* and partisan for counteracting the intrigues of Abdul Ahad at Court, so that while he himself was fighting the Jats and the Rajputs west of the Jamuna, his trans-Jamuna possessions in the middle Doab would be safe and he would be free from any anxiety about that quarter. The peace was completed by Zābita Khan’s visit to the Court, where the Emperor pardoned him and gave him a robe of honour and a letter patent for the district of Saharanpur, (30 January, 1779.)
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CHAPTER XXX
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FALL OF ABDUL AHAD KHAN ; EVENTS OF 1778 AND 1779.