Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c37.s3: § 5. Muhammad Shafi's campaigns against the Sikhs, 1780-1781
Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c37.s3
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§ 5. Muhammad Shafi's campaigns against the Sikhs, 1780-1781
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The utter discomfiture of the imperialists in the Patiala campaign of October 1779 was followed by an onrush of the exultant Sikhs into the upper Doab, where there was none to resist them. The imperial Government was paralysed for a time by the Court revolution which raised Mirzā Najaf to the regency and naturally led to a concentration of his forces in the capital (November.) But by the end of the year things had settled down, and in January next his grand-nephew Mirzā Muhammad Shafi was sent to the Doab with a choice force of 10,000 men and a powerful artillery to guard that province and protect the crops. This general's first task was to subdue the local landlords who had used the Sikh incursion to throw off the authority of Government from within the shelter of their mudforts. Shafi advanced from his base at Mirat, *via* Barnawa, and sacked the rebel village of Sup (12 miles north-west of Barnawa) after a stiff fight, on 10th February 1780. He then held his ground, guarding the Mirat district.
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At the end of the rainy season, Zābita Khan was given his *congee* from Delhi (12th October) with pressing orders to assist Shafi in the war with the Sikhs. The two generals united their forces on the 28th of the month, at Tānda, on the eastern bank of the Jamuna, 14 miles south-east of Panipat. The Cis-Satlaj Sikh sardars were constantly engaged in their mutual contests for land and supremacy,—Amar Singh of Patiala fighting Bhai Desu Singh of Kaithal, whose cause Sāhib Singh Khonda supported,—or Sāhib Singh with Duljā Singh and Bhāg Singh attacking Bhangā Singh of Thaneshwar and trying to wrest that fort from him (Nov. 1780.) Both sides had appealed to the imperial general for aid, and Najaf Khan had left it to Shafi to ally himself with one of the parties and fight the other as he deemed it more profitable to the Delhi Government. On 9th November Shafi and Zābita reached Bidauli, 10 miles south-east of Karnal. Here the Sikh sardars, Sāhib Singh and his confederates, met the two generals and discussed terms for their engagement.*
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The allies crossed over to the western bank of the Jamuna and halted at Kunjpura near Karnal. Here the short-tempered Shafi "behaved like a child" (as Najaf Khan told the Maratha ambassador) and imprisoned Gajpat Singh and three other Sikh chiefs in order to squeeze money out of them (c. 8 Dec.) Zābita Khan objected to this policy of coercion towards his hereditary supporters, and, angry with his colleague for his obstinacy, returned to Delhi with his own contingent (10 Dec.) Shafi was thus left alone, and taking advantage of his depleted strength, the Sikhs made an incursion into the Saharanpur district, now vacated by both the Mughal generals. Shafi made a forced march from Kunjpura into the Doab. The Sikh raiding bands joined together near the city of Saharanpur and offered battle in the full confidence of victory and contempt for the imperial forces. But Shafi was not Abdul Ahad; his well-served artillery and trained sepoy musketeers carried destruction into the Sikh ranks. At last the enemy broke and fled back to their homes across the Jamuna. Shafi pursued them so close that in their precipitate flight many of the Sikhs were drowned in the river. Their greatest leader Sāhib Singh Khonda was among the slain.*
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∗ The whole of this narrative of Shafi's Sikh expeditions has been constructed by piecing together the minute information supplied by Br. Mus. Or. 25,020 and 25,021 (Akhbar) with some small additions from DC, Ibrat. ii. 16-17, Muna Lal 227, DY. i. 20, 23, 28, 35, and MD. i. 45, 53. Williams, in Calcutta Review (1870), needs correction. Akh. 20b, "severe battle between Desu S. and Amar S., the latter driven into Patiala fort (c. 14 Feb. 1780.)" 389a.—Internecine fighting among the Sikhs, some have seized much of Kaithal Estate, others are levying contribution in Patiala territory (c. 10 Nov. 1780.) 3a, rival sardars fight for Thaneshwar (c. 15 Sep. 1780).
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On the heels of the vanquished, Shafi returned to the Karnal district. On 6th April his lieutenant Mir Mansur fought a severe battle near Indri (15 miles north of Karnal) and defeated a Sikh host, slaying 150 of their men, including their commander Ratan Singh. They fell back to near Radaur (12 miles north of Indri), while the imperialists planted their outposts at Indri and Husainpur. Lesser encounters frequently took place. Shafi finally pushed on to Sadhaura, 23 miles east of Ambala, in the fork between the Chautang and Mārkanda rivers at the foot of the hills. Here he encamped for some time. His position soon became untenable. While the Sikhs were gathering strength, his appeals to Delhi for men money and munitions remained unheeded. Najaf Khan was a bankrupt and could not meet punctually even the monthly subsistence of the Emperor's household which was the first charge upon the Treasury. Every officer who was asked to go to Shafi's relief demanded money for equipping and feeding his troops before he would move one step. Some forces were, however, sent to guard the Doab in May. Shafi's powder and shot had been exhausted in the recent encounters and yet his supply was not replenished from Delhi except with mere promises. Similar wordy answers met his repeated demands for money to pay his starving soldiers with, till at last they began to make rows in his camp and leave it in hundreds. In fact, Shafi's force was disrupted and he had to look on in utter helplessness. The commander wrote to his chief in bitterness of spirit, "You have spoilt the business of realising money. It is therefore better to disband my force."
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∗ The only authority for this battle is Muna Lal, 277. Williams, in *Calcutta Review*, Vol. 60, p. 35, tells the same story, but among other errors and exaggerated figures (such as that the Sikhs lost upwards of 5,000 men), he gives the date as 15 Aug. and the place as Mirat. It is a recorded fact that shortly after 15 Aug. the Emperor rewarded Shafi with a robe of honour, which reached him on 3rd Sep. For what service was it? Mid-August is not the time for the march of large armies.
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Many imperial captains were paid by assignments on the revenue of the upper Doab; the Sikh raids dried up this source of their income and made it impossible for them to feed and maintain their contingents. It was, therefore, necessary to police this region effectively against the raiders. But that task could be accomplished only with the cooperation of Zabita Khan who had large landed interests there and the addition of whose family forces would give any imperial general detached to the Doab a decisive superiority over the Sikhs. Najaf Khan therefore did his best to court Zabita and send him to the upper Doab to join Shafi and promote the Emperor's cause in unison. But the concert between the two generals on which the success of the enterprise depended, was impossible. The Persian and the Ruhela were too young and too haughty to work in harness together. In addition to this temperamental obstacle, Zabita demanded money for supporting his troops, which the Delhi Government could not pay, and he was not at heart willing to crush the Sikhs who had been his sole allies in the past and might be so again in his hour of need. These internal causes ensured the failure of Najaf Khan's Sikh expedition and he had ultimately to take recourse to a compromise with them.
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By the end of May 1781 Mirzā Najaf had realised the wisdom of making terms with the Sikhs through Zābita, as Shafi had proved himself an impossible agent for dealing with them. In order to release the large imperial army under Shafi for operations in another quarter and to be free from fear about Sikh invasions in the north Delhi region and the Doab, he decided to make money concessions to the Sikhs and turn them into paid servants in the Empire's wars. He therefore released Gajpat Singh, after settling his tribute at six lakhs of Rupees. Gajpat was given his congee at the Delhi Court with a robe of honour and other costly gifts and the title of Maharajah (12th July 1781),—thus founding the house of Jhind. Najaf's parting words to him were, "Let the lands in Sikh possession remain with the Sikhs. Do you and they come and join our army." [*DY.* i. 35. *DC.*] The terms of this pact were that the Sikhs would not raid the imperial territory any more but serve in the Delhi army for pay when called upon, in return for their being now formally confirmed in the possession of their estates, roughly the region north of Panipat, and granted the right of levying blackmail (called *rakhi*, about two annas for every Rupee of the standard land revenue due to the State) in the region from Panipat to the walls of Delhi and the upper Doab. Najaf Khan only repeated what the Sayyid brothers had done 62 years earlier in respect of the Maratha claim to blackmail in Mughal Deccan.
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In June Shafi was ordered to canton for the rainy season at Radaur. But he took post at the ford between Nakum and Tābar on the Jamuna, 8 miles south-east of that place, and finally fell back on his base at Kunjpurā, 21 miles further south. Here he remained in a state of suspended activity till the death of Najaf Khan.
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§ 6. Revolution in Delhi Government's diplomatic policy; anti-English coalition sought to be built up by the Peshwa.
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This reversal of alliances needs explanation. Ever since his undesired seclusion in Allahabad fort, Shah Alam's heart had been growing sorer and sorer against the English. After their treaty with him in 1765 they had promised to escort him to his capital. To his demands for the fulfilment of this promise, the English generals had again and again replied that they would do so when the rainy season was over. Year followed year, but those rains seemed never to come to an end. At last the recluse of Allahabad had taken fortune into his own lands and made his way to his fathers' capital with Maratha help, unaided by a single British officer. Even the districts of Allahabad and Kora,—his own ancient and legitimate territory, which they had left to him in 1765, had been afterwards unceremoniously taken away by them and sold to the Wazir of Oudh. This Wazir, though a servant of his Government and a vassal of his empire, had been protected by British arms in defying his sovereign by refusing to pay the customary fine on succession and the annual surplus revenue of his fertile subahs, and even to share with him the imperial jagirs in Rohilkhand which he had usurped with British aid; and he had persistently defaulted in his duty of attending his lawful sovereign's levee as a functionary bound by his office tenure.
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The English Company had secured from him a grant of the diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, which legitimatized their enjoyment of the revenue of the richest provinces in India; but they had stopped paying him the tribute of 26 lakhs of Rupees a year which was the condition of that grant. At first they accounted for the default by the great famine in Bengal, and afterwards by the troubled condition of English affairs due to the wars in the Deccan. In every letter of excuse written by the English Governor, profuse protestations of loyalty to the Emperor and readiness to please him were made, but not a pice of that tribute was offered. Warren Hastings gave the soothing assurance that he had made a representation about this tribute to his masters in London, and was only waiting for their commands. The poor deluded Shah Alam did not know that the representation was for stopping the tribute altogether, but he felt all the same that he would never see English money again.
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These grievous wrongs could be righted only by force, but where was that force to be found? The sovereign's one hope lay in a loyal and enterprising Peshwa, because no other Power in India could face the English with any chance of success; and therefore the Delhi Court turned to the Peshwa with growing wistfulness but deepening doubt. We see the movements on this diplomatic chess-board almost day to day in the despatches of the Peshwa's envoy (Hinganē) at Delhi and the repetitions of them in Mahadji Sindhia's letters to the Puna Court, throughout 1780 and 1781. But immediately after the Delhi Government had attained to unity of control and accession of strength through Najaf Khan's triumph over Abdul Ahad at the close of 1779, began a period in which the star of Britain rose in unclouded majesty to the ascendant in the Indian firmament. The reverse to Cockburn at Talegaon (January 1779) was wiped off; Goddard captured Ahmadabad on 15th Feb. 1780, Popham scaled the hitherto impregnable fortress of Gwalior on 3rd August, Goddard took Bassein on 11th December, and Camac defeated the last Maratha hope, Mahadji Sindhia, at Sipri on 16th February 1781.
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These far-resounding victories destroyed the chance of every anti-English coalition in India and cowed every Indian Power hostile, in act or feeling, towards them. Mirzā Najaf Khan was not the man to underrate the military strength of the men from beyond the seas; he had faced their bayonets at Undhuā Nālā in 1763 and he had brigaded his horse with their infantry in 1764; he would not drag the Emperor into a war with such a race unless it was undertaken by an allied force so overwhelmingly strong as to make assurance of victory doubly sure.