Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c39.s5: § 9. Campaign against the Khichis of Rāghogarh
Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c39.s5
- Language
- English
§ 9. Campaign against the Khichis of Rāghogarh
v3.c39.s5.1
The whole of the year 1785 was a period of anxiety and distraction to Mahadji. As Hingané wrote on 15th October, “Our troops are entangled at four places: Rāmgarh (= Aligarh), Rāghogarh, Jaipur and the Pānipat district.” Of these the Raghogarh business had to be immediately attended to for assuring a vital line of communications.
v3.c39.s5.2
The great road from Agra to the South runs, about 150 miles south of Gwalior, through Sironj, the capital of the Ahir country. Forty miles north west of Sironj is Rāghogarh, where the Emperor Akbar had created a small State for a Khichi Chauhan prince. In the next century this family extended its sway from the Betwā river beyond Sironj in the east, to the Andheri (a tributary of the Pārvati river) in the west, by subduing the numberless petty local chieftains.
v3.c39.s5.3
With the coming of the Marathas into Malwa in the second quarter of the 18th century began a conflict between them which ended in the Khichis becoming tributaries to the new overlords of that province. The tribute, as usual, fell into arrears, and in 1760 we even find the Khichis rising in the rear of the Maratha army during Sadāshiv Bhāu's march to Pānipat. With the expansion of Maratha rule over Malwa, a shorter route to the Deccan was opened, leaving the royal highway at Shivapuri, 65 miles s.w. of Gwalior, and turning south-westwards to Ujjain and Indore. This road traversed the Khichi country, entering it near the Gunā railway station,—only a few miles south of which is Bajrang-garh, the later capital of Khichi-wada. The Marathas were bound to keep order there.
v3.c39.s5.4
The Khichi Rajah (who had taken the title of Rānā) had ceded Chhabrā (30 miles west of Gunā) and Gugar in lieu of tribute to Holkar. But in 1784 he demanded the restoration of these lands, promising to pay the tribute in cash. Ahalyā Bāi, the regent of Holkar's State, asked for the full clearance of arrears before relinquishing the two districts. The Rānā then forcibly seized these two towns and some other Maratha posts there (March 1785). On hearing of this, Mahadji Sindhia detached Khandoji Inglé (the brother of Ambāji) and Muhammad Beg Hamadāni from Agra with a strong force against him (April.) They recovered Gugar, Chhabrā and some smaller places, and reached Raghogarh, where they took the village (peth) and laid siege to the fort (early June.) The Rānā Balwant Singh (son of Balbhadra) sent his brother to negotiate with Sindhia directly; but near Mathura this agent was attacked and imprisoned by order of Mahadji (June. HP. 407.) Balwant resumed the offensive, defeated some Maratha bodies dispersed for plunder, and forced the invaders to fall back (early July.) The news of these reverses roused Mahadji, who pushed up reinforcements from all sides and raised the invaders' strength to 40,000 men. Balwant then left the open field and shut himself up in Raghogarh (August 1785); the inefficient siege of that fort by the Marathas dragged on for several months. At the end of next winter the Maratha generals, being eager to end the business and go elsewhere and also distracted by their mutual quarrels, clinched their long negotiations with the Rānā and agreed to let him go away from his fort with life and honour (Feb. 1786.) Mahadji was highly incensed on hearing of this poor result of an expedition on which he had spent lakhs of Rupees. He superseded the generals there, and sent Ambāji Inglé with orders to kill or imprison Balwant and confiscate his entire State. This was promptly done. Maratha rule was established in the Khichi country, Balwant was fettered and confined in Gwalior, while his wife and two of his sons were sent as captives to Bhilsā, and all his property confiscated.
v3.c39.s5.5
The expeditionary force returned to Mahadji’s side in April.
v3.c39.s5.6
This attempt to extinguish a two hundred years old Rajput State produced bitter fruits in the end. Though Balwant Singh was kept in prison, one of his sons Jai Singh remained free, and by carrying on a ceaseless guerilla war in the company of local Robin Hoods and with the secret backing of the Muslim Nawab of Bhopal, he made the Deccan road more unsafe than before and covered Sindhia with humiliation by capturing one of his wives.*
v3.c39.s5.7
§ 10. The Gosains Umrao-gir and Himmat Bahadur: their early history.
v3.c39.s5.8
By March 1786, Mahadji Sindhia had freed himself from most of the entanglements that had beset him in the first year of his regency; but just at this time a perpetual thorn was planted on his eastern flank which defied all his efforts to remove it and long continued to embolden his enemies elsewhere. We have met with the Nāgā Gosāin (or Hindu fighting abbot) Rājendra-gir in Safdar Jang’s wars with the Bangash (1750) and Imad-ul-mulk (1753.) This monk had adopted as his successors two Brahman boys who had been sold to him by their widowed mother during a famine. These were Umrāo-gir and Anup-gir (the latter being entitled Himmat Bahadur.) They continued after his death to command the Nāgā force in the Oudh service. On behalf of Shujā-ud-daulah, Himmat Bahadur waged war against Hindupat, Rajah of Bundelkhand, but was signally defeated (1762.) He also fought on his master's side on the disastrous field of Buxar (1764), which turned Shujā into a landless fugitive. Then the Gosāins sought for their livelihood by joining Jawāhir Singh Jat (Ch. 23 § 16), but faithlessly deserted him for Raghunāth Dādā's side (at the end of Dec. 1766.) Next year, when the Marathas retired from their north Indian enterprises, the Gosāins came back to Shujā, who had been now restored and strengthened by his English alliance and was entering on a career of annexation. But after Shujā's death (1775) his son Asafuddaulah had to reduce his army in order to fill the gaping void of his debt to the English. The Gosains being again turned out of employment, joined Najaf Khan at the siege of Dig (1776) and continued to work under him and his successors till Mahadji's rise to the regency of Delhi. [Imad., 64, 87, 102, 143.]
v3.c39.s5.9
∗ Raghogarh campaigns.—MD. ii. 94, 98, 101, 105, 114, 139, 124. DY. i. 134, 151, 182. HP. 412, 407. Aiti. Tip. vi. 41. Satara i. 101. Selections from Asiatic Journal, pp. 599-600.
v3.c39.s5.10
Himmat Bahadur lacked personal courage and bore a low character for his faithlessness and love of secret intrigue. He had risen very high in Najaf Khan's favour and become that regent's principal adviser and agent in dealing with the Hindu princes. After Najaf’s death, he took Afrāsiyāb’s side in the struggle for the regency, and hence during Afrāsiyāb’s period of power (Oct. 1783—Oct. 1784), Himmat Bahadur was all in all as the manager of the new regent’s policy and foreign relations. Working hand in glove with Nārāyandās, the diwan of Afrāsiyāb’s private estates and household, Himmat Bahadur became the real power behind the throne, without holding any office of State. He bore a deadly hostility to Mirzā Md. Shafi and also to Md. Beg Hamadāni, because these two blocked his patron’s path, and so he contrived the conspiracy for the murder of Shafi (1783). Thereafter, with the object of suppressing the last remaining rival of Afrāsiyāb, he patiently wove his web and induced Mahadji Sindhia to come to Rupbās in support of the Khan.
v3.c39.s5.11
Afrāsiyāb’s unexpected murder merely forced a change of direction on the Gosāin’s selfish plans: he now moved heaven and earth to get Afrāsiyāb’s infant son created Mir Bakhshi, hoping thus to rule the Delhi empire himself as the minor’s *de facto* guardian and pack Mahadji off to the Deccan by paying a small hire for his help! Sindhia who had the greatest contempt for the character of the entire official class of Delhi, and particularly for the Gosāin,—at first professed with masterly tact and diplomacy, to be entirely guided by Himmat Bahadur, because he was as yet without any personal knowledge of the men and affairs of the imperial Government and had to rely on some old officer of it. The Gosāin had hoped that even under Sindhia as regent, he would be all in all in the actual administration and in the southern stranger's relations with the Emperor.
v3.c39.s5.12
But his eyes began to be opened when he was firmly prevented from having pre-audience of the Emperor on the day of Mahadji's first conference with his Sovereign (17 Nov. 1784.) He had fondly hoped to convert the pliant Emperor to his own policy by anticipating Sindhia at his ears. On the contrary, the Emperor privately urged Mahadji to dismiss Himmat Bahādur and his ally Nārāyandās as a pair of rogues. Himmat Bahādur's credit with Sindhia, and therefore his position in Delhi politics, sank lower still when he failed to secure the peaceful surrender of Agra fort by his boasted influence with its commandant. And when he saw himself being more and more ignored by the new regent and place after place coming under Mahadji's control without his assistance, the Gosāin felt that Sindhia had made himself independent of the remnant of the Najaf Khan party. He began to spit venom in his rage and vexation and tried his sole weapon of treachery and intrigue for regaining his ascendancy in the State by spiting Sindhia. He wrote secretly to the qiladar of Aligarh to stiffen his opposition. Last of all, when Afrāsiyāb's family reported that all the dead Khan's fabled wealth had been in the keeping of Narayandas and Himmat Bahadur and yet no part of it could be recovered from these two agents, their downfall became inevitable. Himmat Bahadur's treasonable letters to Jahangir Khan were discovered among the escheated property of the latter and they proved beyond a doubt what Mahadji had long suspected. [Ibr. ii. 153. DY. i. 147. HP. 365, 408.]
v3.c39.s5.13
But Sindhia at first shrank from striking at a Brahman. He called upon Himmat Bahadur to give up all the jagirs he held (worth about 20 lakhs a year for the two brothers together) and leave his camp. For one month after this order, Himmat Bahadur whined before Sindhia, pointing out that he had no place to live in. So, in February 1786 he was assigned the Mot taluq (30 m. north-east of Jhānsi) and another jagir at Vrindāvan for his maintenance, but on condition that he must bear the cost of his contingent (Rs. five lakhs annually) and this force must serve under Sindhia's banners, while Himmat himself would live in monastic retreat at Vrindāvan. [HP. 351, 432, DY. i. 149.]
v3.c39.s5.14
§ 11. The two Gosāins rise against Sindhia in the Doab.
v3.c39.s5.15
After the arrest of Nārāyandās (c. 16 January 1786), Himmat Bahadur grew alarmed about his own safety and gave up attending Sindhia's darbar lest he should share his late colleague's fate. But Mahadji paid him Rs. 20,000 as his subsistence allowance for two months and bade him remove from the camp at Dig to his estate in Vrindāvan alone, leaving all his troops, horses etc. behind, who would be paid by Sindhia after taking their muster. But the Gosāin would not agree to part with his army, his sole defence against attack. So, when Mahadji marched away from Dig towards Jaipur (16th February), he gave Himmat Bahadur leave for Vrindāvan with his contingent, on his promising to go and smooth the transfer of his jagirs to Sindhia's agents. [Ibr. ii. 154. HP. 432.]
v3.c39.s5.16
Kesho Pant, an officer of Ābā Chitnis, had been deputed with letters of authorisation from Himmat Bahadur to take over charge of the Gosains' Doab possessions. He at first gained undisputed delivery of a number of villages, but none of the forts and larger towns. Then Himmat's elder brother Umrao-gir, who had so long been administering the family jagirs there, began to attack the new Maratha posts, in concert with the local zamindars (esp. the Jat owners of Hathras and Mursan); Sindhia's collectors were imprisoned or expelled, and Keso Pant himself was slain and his war equipment plundered. [Ibr. ii. ASB. 474, HP. 415.]
v3.c39.s5.17
Seizing the opportunity of this collapse of the Maratha power in the Doab, Himmat Bahadur crossed over from Vrindāvan (c. 8 March) and joined his brother's rising. They seized the thanah of Firuzabad and applied to the Nawab of Oudh for re-entering his service. From Makanpur, Umraogir went over to Khwājah Almas Ali Khan, the Oudh governor of Etawa. An English brigade which happened to advance from Cawnpur at this time, was rumoured to have made this movement for supporting the rebel brothers in case Mahadji marched against them.
v3.c39.s5.18
This was a most treacherous stab in Sindhia's back, while he was engaged in front with the recalcitrant Rajah of Jaipur in the distant west. The whole of the Doab threatened to be up in arms against the Marathas, with the Nawab Wazir and the English standing behind the rising. Even the newly planted Maratha garrison in Aligarh quaked with fear. Mahadji acted promptly; his scattered detachments in the Doab were hurriedly united under Abhaji (a son of Jaswant Bablé) to strengthen Aligarh. But this force was too small; and Umraogir, after driving out the Maratha collectors of Atrauli, Chharra Bhamauri and other mahals, attacked Abhaji and routed two of his sepoy battalions, capturing their guns. [Ibr. ii. 151 and ASB., 474. HP. 373.]
v3.c39.s5.19
On receiving this alarming news, Mahadji ordered Ambaji Inglé, then returning from the Rāghogarh expedition with the large force set free by the conquest of that State, to reinforce Abhaji. This general sent a detachment of 3,000 horse, two sepoy battalions, and 12 guns under Devji Golé, to attack the Gosāins, but to be careful not to cross the Oudh frontier lest they should provoke a clash with the British troops. At his approach Umrao-gir fled away to Kāsganj on the Ganges, wishing to take refuge in Rohilkhand which was now Oudh territory. Devji gave up the pursuit (end of April) and turned aside to lay siege to the fort near Khurja (in Bulandshahar) which had been usurped by Yaqub Khan.
v3.c39.s5.20
We may here conclude this narrative by saying that the two Gosains remained quiet in their Oudh asylum for a year after, in consequence of Lord Cornwallis's warning to the Nawab Wazir to observe strict neutrality towards Mahadji. But the convulsion of Maratha authority after his retreat from Lalsot in August, 1787, emboldened them to lead forces for disturbing Sindhia's possessions again and adding to his troubles. [PRC. i. 29, 39, and (after Lalsot) 140, 143-176, 210—234. DY. i. 170, 184, Ibr. ASB. ii. 474-476.]
v3.c39.s5.21
§ 12. Bundelkhand adventure, 1785-86.
v3.c39.s5.22
Chhatra Sal, the son of Champat Rai Bundela, had carved out for himself a large kingdom in eastern Bundelkhand during a long life of strenuous warfare. His crowning success was the final expulsion of the imperial viceroy, in alliance with the Marathas in 1729. As the price of this decisive aid, he ceded to his patron, the Peshwa, one-third of his realm with a revenue of 30 lakhs of Rupees. The aged and war-worn chief died on 14th December 1731, leaving the remaining two-thirds of his dominions to his two elder sons, Harde Sah of Panna (revenue 38 lakhs) and Jagat-raj of Banda (revenue 30 lakhs). The younger sons among his numerous progeny (27 sons according to one account, and 52 according to another) received small appanages for their support. The next Peshwa, Balaji Rao, made further acquisitions in western Bundelkhand, yielding 16½ lakhs of Rupees per annum (covering much of the Jhansi district and parts of the Urchha and Datia States),—the whole of which was placed under a Maratha viceroy. Raghunath Hari filled this almost royal post from 1770 to 1794. But with this region we are not concerned here.
v3.c39.s5.23
A war for the throne broke out in Panna at the time of Mahadji's elevation to the regency. On the death of Hindupat, the grandson of Harde Sah (in 1778), his minor son Anurudh had been enthroned by his powerful ministers Beni Chaube (*Huzuri* and *Diwan*) and Khemrāj Chaube (Treasurer and commandant of the stronghold of Kalinjar.) The boy-prince died (in 1780) and the ministers placed on the throne Dhokal Singh the youngest son of Hindupat, setting aside the rights of his elder brother Sarnet Singh. But the two Chaube King-makers, who were brothers, soon quarrelled over the division of power and profit: Khemrāj took up the cause of Sarnet Singh and sheltered him in Kalinjar. Beni, calling Bijai Bahadur of Charkhari to his aid, advanced in force and laid siege to Kalinjar. Sarnet and his patron appealed to Noné Arjun Singh, the Banda regent, and also to Mahadji Sindhia. The Maratha leader seized this chance of enriching himself and sent his general Khanderao Hari (popularly called Apa Khanderao) towards Kalinjar (April 1785.)
v3.c39.s5.24
In Banda, too, there was a minority with disputed succession and ministerial domination. The heritage of Jagat-rāj (who died in 1758) was now divided among his numerous grandsons, two of whom named Guman and Khuman held Banda and Charkhari respectively. There was constant fighting between them as indeed among all the brood of Chhatra Sal, due to earth-hunger. When Guman died childless, his ministers Noné Arjun Singh Pawar, Sardul Singh and Hakim Bu Ali gave the succession to Madhukar Sah, an infant adopted by the late Rajah. Khuman Singh immediately declared the adoption as spurious and claimed the throne on behalf of his own son as next of kin to his dead brother. The ministerial party, paying Mahadji Sindhia Rs. 1,20,000* induced him to undertake the defence of their puppet against his uncle. Thus two dynastic quarrels among near cousins became closely mingled together and drew into their vortex all the other Bundela princelings, whose sole occupation was internecine war for grabbing their kinsmen's lands.
v3.c39.s5.25
∗ *Ibr.* ii. 121. "Noné Arjun and others sent Md. Taqi to Sindhia to beg his aid. He presented a *hundi* for Rs. 1,20,000 on condition of his defending Madhukar Sah." The Poona agent in Mahadji's camp wrote in Aug. 1785 : "Khuman S. sent a wakil to Mahadji asking him to punish the minister of the recently deceased Guman and offered a *nazar*. The Banda Rajah, on hearing of it, sent his wakil and won Sindhia over by promising four lakhs, a
v3.c39.s5.26
Apa Khanderao was Mahadji's viceroy (*sar subahdar*) of Gwalior and Panch Mahal. He was deputed to the Bundela expedition as the scene adjoined his charge. He knew the difficulty of his task and augmented his contingent by new enlistment, especially five trained battalions of sepoys under De Boigne, Taylor, Lesteneau and Rāmru. [*Ibr.* ii. 122-123.] But Khuman Singh forestalled the Maratha general by promptly attacking Arjun near Pandori. He was killed by the second shot fired from the Banda artillery, and the two sides separated after waging a most
v3.c39.s5.27
portion of which was assessed on Khuman. The latter did not pay it, but the Banda Rajah paid his share. Hence Khanderao Hari has been sent there" [*HP.* 411.] Next July the same agent wrote: "Guman Singh's diwan was a strong and masterful man. He sought Mahadji's aid, promising to pay Rs. 50,000 as *nazar* for the *tika* [of his nominee] and bankers' bills for five lakhs for the territory of the Jetpur Rajah Gaj Singh, which Guman and Khuman had conquered, besides douceurs to his ministers (*darbar kharch.*) And so he obtained the *tika* [=recognition of succession] in the name of Madhukar. But Khuman would not pay his share of the money. Sindhia therefore sent a clerk with 100 troopers to realise the amount. Khuman befooled his man for one year without paying anything." [*HP.* 478.]
v3.c39.s5.28
ruthless battle till nightfall. Next day Apa arrived on the scene; Bijay Bahadur, the son of Khuman, retreated to his capital at Charkhari and appealed to the regent of Panna for aid.
v3.c39.s5.29
As soon as Apa crossed the Betwa river and entered Banda territory, most of the Bundela chiefs saw him and offered their adhesion. Beni Huzuri alone kept aloof. Abandoning the siege of Kalinjar, the Panna regent retired to his capital and put it in a posture of defence, blocking the passes by which the invaders must come. By this time it was August, and the monsoon that year was unusually heavy, with floods everywhere. The campaign was therefore stopped by Nature. During the interval, Beni Huzuri continued to negotiate for peace in return for an indemnity, but his offers were insincere and meant only for gaining time. When the rains ceased, Apa laid siege to Panna, heavily defeated a sortie in full force led by Beni, and coming closer to the walls bombarded the fort for five days. The assault was fixed for the 8th of December 1785, but the night before Beni evacuated the fort with Dhokal Singh and all his men under cover of the darkness. [HP. 422.]
v3.c39.s5.30
It was a grand victory but barren of results. Mahadji boasted of this success to his arms, but here his success ended, and indeed the Maratha position grew steadily worse as the campaign was prolonged, Apa's funds were exhausted and his soldiers mutinied for their long unpaid salary, while the Bundelas recovered spirit and unity in the face of a common foe. The Maratha general had much ado to save himself. Even at the time of this conquest, his position is thus described by the British Resident with Sindhia: "Apa had before been involved in such distress that Sindhia had lately sent him the most positive order to conclude a treaty upon any terms he could procure and return with his detachment to Gwalior, as it was utterly impossible for him to afford him any reinforcement." [PRC. i. 21.] But Apa clung to Kalinjar in the hope of getting more tribute and seizing the treasure reputed to be hoarded in that fort. The result was that in six months his position became untenable. As De Boigne wrote from his camp before Kalinjar on 3rd July 1786: "The tributes are not finished with any of the Rajahs. The troops are very much tired of Apa, as no pay is to be got from him,......the troops are starving. Mr. Taylor's troops have been, for eight or ten days, very mutinous for their pay......Good God! What a kind of man [is Apa],......a miser and mean to excess." [PRC. i. 53.]
v3.c39.s5.31
At last Apa Khanderao was so hemmed round by increasing enemy forces that he found it hard to extricate himself and proposed to retreat northwards across the Jamuna into Oudh territory, as his westward path to Gwalior was blocked. "He had, in confidence, dispatched the greatest part of his troops towards Jhansi, whilst he himself remained near Panna, with a small body of horse, not exceeding 2,000, to wait the final execution of the treaty [with the Bundela princes.] The Rajahs had taken advantage of this circumstance by suddenly assembling all their forces (20,000 men) and demanding the restitution of the hostages they had given him as a security for the fulfilment of their engagements.” (Anderson, 18 Nov. 1786.) But with great difficulty he effected his escape with the Bundela hostages to Gwalior shortly after, though the enemy captured several of his captains, including his own brother. [PRC. i. 61, 62.] Thus this huge military expenditure for nineteen months brought nothing in return. [HP. 489.]*
v3.c39.s5.32
∗ Bundelkhand. Narrative constructed from the contemporary reports from Sindhia’s camp, HP. 373, 407, 411, 422, 478, 489. PRC. i. 21, 53, 61-62. Ibr. ii. 121-125. But N. W. P. Gaz., i. 28, 129, 567, has been used cautiously with many corrections; a good deal of it is taken from Pogson’s Boondelas verbatim and embodies incorrect later tradition.