Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c40.s10: § 8. Battle of Tungā
Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c40.s10
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§ 8. Battle of Tungā
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Rana Khan forded the dry bed of the Morel at Bidākha, passed clear of the ravines that skirt the two sides for a mile after the crossing and drew up his line in the plain beyond, a mile further off. First spread a loose screen of scouts for bringing news of the enemy’s dispositions and movements. Then came the artillery, and behind it the infantry battalions which were to receive the first shock of the enemy’s onset. In the third line were the Maratha horse, held in reserve for supporting any hard-pressed point in the front lines; and with this body stood Rana Khan himself. The last reserve, especially in guns and munitions, was kept under Mahadji himself, two miles behind the battlefront, on the further (i.e., eastern) bank of the Morel. The Maratha artillery, on reaching the battle ground, threw up a line of earthworks before them by digging into the sandy soil and thus their front was protected by an entrenchment about a mile in length. Sindhia’s army stretched west to east; their first line was formed by Khanderao Hari with De Boigne’s two battalions, the Afghan mercenaries under Murtaza Khan Barech, Ghāzi Khan and other captains, and the Nāgā force of Moti-gir Gosain (Left); then came the disloyal and passive Hindustani sepoys of the old Najaf Khani service (Centre); and lastly the two brigades, each nominally six battalions strong, under the faithful Lesteneau and Le Vassoult, together with the Rajput levies of the Macheri Rajah (Right.)
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∗ Battle of Tungā.—*Akhbarat* = *PRC.* i. No. 135 = *HP.* 503 = *Aiti Patra* No. 261. *Ibr.* iii. 21-28. *DY.* i. 224. *PRC.* i. Nos. 136 & 137. *MD.* ii. 147, 150. *Chandra D.* ii. 71.
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The Jaipurians began their advance to the contest about the same time that they saw the Maratha army moving towards them across the Morel. They, too, threw up earth works before their line of guns. On their side the brunt of the battle fell on the Rathor cavalry from Jodhpur (under Bhim Singh Bakhshi) who had vowed in the Rajah's presence not to return alive without victory, and the Mughalia deserters under Muhammad Beg Hamadani, these two generals respectively leading the right and left wings of their army. Their centre was evidently formed by the Kachhwas, who idly kept themselves back, exactly like Mahadji's centre composed of the Hindustanis.
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After the usual light skirmishes between the rival patrols, the battle started about nine in the morning with a mutual cannonade which did more injury to the Marathas, because their guns, dragged from a more distant base and across a wide stony river-bed, were lighter than those of the Rajputs, whose camp was close behind. "As the Jaipur guns were larger their balls reached Sindhia's army, and many men and horses were killed; while Sindhia's shots being fired from smaller pieces, did not touch the enemy . . . . The Jaipur balls were found to weigh from five to fourteen seers." On hearing of it, Mahadji ordered four large guns to be taken to Rana Khan.
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A little before 11 o'clock the distant cannonade ceased, as if by mutual consent. Then a tumultuous shout was heard on the enemy's right, and through the smoke screen burst four thousand Rathor horsemen at the gallop. These desperadoes, after taking a last lingering pull at their pipes of opium, drew their swords and charged the Maratha left with wild cries of “Hān! Hān! Kill them! Kill them!” The Maratha batteries ploughed through their dense ranks, opening bloody lanes at each discharge. But heedless of their comrades who fell, the survivors swept up to the Maratha guns, sabred the gunners, and still advancing fell upon the supporting infantry. Their terrific impact broke the first line of the Maratha left wing; hundreds of Nagas and Afghan troops were slain, and even De Boigne’s sepoys after firing a few volleys were forced back in confusion along with their Maratha comrades. The cool Savoyard led his disordered ranks obliquely to the rear, formed the survivors again and reopened small arm fire, but “the Rathors heeded it not.”
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Rana Khan promptly sent up reinforcements of Maratha horse under Shivaji Vital (Bapu), Rayaji Patil and Khanderao Hari (Apa), who rallied the fugitives and renewed the combat. The bloodiest and most obstinate struggle of the day raged here. The situation at one time became so critical that the sons of Murtaza Khan Barech dismounted and fought on foot, which is the last expedient of Indian warriors when driven to bay. By this time the Rathor charge had spent all its force; no infantry came up from behind to support it and consolidate its gains; and when at last more guns arrived against them from the Maratha reserve, the Rathors were driven back, but not before they had inflicted over 300 casualties, including Ghāzi Khan (brother of Murtaza Khan), Shambhuji Patil, and one jamadar slain and Malhar Rao Pawār, Chimnāji Khanderao (Shivaji Vital’s diwan), the nephew of Shivaji Vital and one jamadar wounded. For this the Rajputs had to pay a heavy price, suffering over one thousand casualties, high officers like Shovārām Bhāndāri and Bhim Singh Bakhshi’s brother-in-law, besides a score of lower officers being slain. [DY. i. 224. MD. ii. 147. PRC. i. 135, 137. HP. 503. Akh.]
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But the greatest loss to the Rajput cause was the death of Muhammad Beg Hamadani, which broke the spine of their offensive power. This general, the most famous Muslim warrior then living in Northern India, had sent his retainers on to attack the Maratha right wing while he stood on an elephant in the shade of a tree watching them from behind. A cannon-ball struck the tree above and rebounding knocked him down to the ground tearing one side of his body open; then the branch broken by the shot fell down crushing him underneath. His advancing troops, ignorant of his fate, shook the Maratha right wing and penetrated to their baggage, but were repulsed by the Deccani horse hurried up from the reserve by Rana Khan.
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The Rathors during the rest of the day made three or four advances as if to fall on the Maratha guns again, but found no opportunity of carrying out the design. The Mughalias, deprived of their chief, did not stir again. After repulsing the first two enemy attacks, Sindhia’s army stood on the defensive, the Maratha portion of it quaking in fear lest at the first successful break through by the Rajputs their treacherous Hindustani comrades should join the enemy and turn their guns upon Mahadji’s own men! But the traitors got no opportunity for doing so, thanks to the successful defence by Rayaji Patil and others. [HP. 503.] In fact, after the first hour’s close tussle, the moves of the Rajputs became spasmodic and lacked vigour; the Maratha line held firmly, their men breathed freely, their wounded were transported to the rear tents in the palkis which had been promptly sent up by the considerate and ever-watchful Mahadji, and their munition supply was replenished by the same alert leader. But there was no further advance on the Maratha side, partly because Hamadani’s death was not known to them until the night, and partly because it began to rain in the afternoon, making that sandy plain difficult for artillery movement, and the Marathas were afraid of the ravines in front, the on-coming darkness and the lack of wells in that tract. So, each side fell back to its camp and resorted to random firing till an hour after sunset in order to guard against a surprise attack in the darkness. Thus the battle of Tunga,—miscalled that of Lalsot,—"though sanguinary, had no decisive result." [De Boigne, Carriere, p. 68.]