Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c40.s11: § 9. Criticism of the Lālsot campaign
Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c40.s11
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§ 9. Criticism of the Lālsot campaign
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The battle of Tunga has been universally acclaimed by the Rajputs as "an entire victory." Tactically it has no right to that name: the Rajputs delivered successive charges on the Maratha force in the field and failed to dislodge them; all their attacks were repulsed, and at the end of the day each side returned to its camp in the rear, as was the usual practice. The day after the battle the Maratha army reappeared on the same field, and even advanced up to gunshot of the Jaipur camp, but none on the opposite side ventured to stir out of their shelter. That is not the sign of a victory. Nor could the Rajputs boast of having taken a single Maratha gun, and their own casualty list was much heavier than that of the Marathas.
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And yet it was not a victory for Mahadji either. He had failed to crush the enemy in the field, or to rout them out of their camp. He had not captured any enemy gun. Therefore his offensive must be adjudged a failure. If he was forced to beat a hurried but marvellously well-conducted and safe retreat four days after the battle, it was due not to the threats of the enemy,, but to treachery and dissension in his own ranks and the utter failure of his provisions. Not a single Rajput general barred his retreat or appeared near enough to exchange blows with his rearguard. The Maratha despatch-writers and Mahadji himself boasted that on the field his army had been victorious. That in one sense they had been; but the impartial historian must say that, as at Sheriffmuir, so here too "none wan."
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Considered in its strategy, the Lalsot campaign as a whole was a failure for Mahadji; and the failure was due to his lack of a single clear objective steadily pursued, and his blunder in concentrating every available soldier for the field fight, which left his line of communication with Kerauli fatally unprotected and made it impossible for him to spare an adequate escort for the vitally necessary grain convoys. He was truly starved out of Rajputana. For this failure he alone was to blame. He had begun the campaign in the expectation that time was on his side and that the Rajput confederacy would automatically break up if he kept facing it long enough. But such a waiting game presupposed that during that interval of inaction the food supply of his own camp would be assured and his communications with his base near Agra kept open. He had no doubt of the result in an actual clash of arms with the raw feudal levies opposed to him, but how was he to meet his incomparably larger army bill and keep up his munition supply in that distant and backward country? On this point he made a miscalculation and he paid the price of his mistake by one full year of loss of power and fame. Indeed, his clearness of vision, unfailing sense of reality and practical skill seem to have deserted him from the commencement of May 1787, otherwise how could such a veteran leader forget that a modern army marches on its stomach?
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§ 10. Mutiny of Sindhia's Hindustani troops; his critical position.
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On the day of the battle Mahadji Sindhia was up and doing for twenty-one hours without a respite, and it was only at one o'clock of the next morning, after all his troops had come back to their respective positions and his generals had reported that all was quiet on the front, that he could lay his head down to sleep. Daylight brought no relief to the anxieties of the chieftain, but rather added to them. True, there was no fighting on that day (the 29th of July); his army under Rana Khan marched in full equipment to yesterday's battlefield and even two miles further, to the edge of the Jaipur camp; but the Rajputs did not venture to take up the challenge by coming out of their trenches, they merely stood on the defensive. In the evening a letter was received from the Kachhwa Rajah begging for a two days' truce for the funeral of Muhammad Beg Hamadāni and other slain warriors and promising to be ready for fight on the 31st.
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But within Mahadji's own camp the situation now became intolerable. After the battle of Tungā with its heavy casualties in men and horses, his unpaid and starving soldiery could no longer be kept in hand. He had distributed three camel-loads of Rupees and some badges of honour among them as reward, besides Rs. 25,000 for buying sweetmeats. But such a small sum when divided among that vast horde was a mockery,—each soldier getting only the price of two days' rations and no part of his pay at all. All the commandants came to Sindhia and pointed out that it was impossible to keep their men with the colours unless they were paid their arrears. But Sindhia had not the necessary money with him, and would not part with what little he had.
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The inevitable outburst came on the 30th. That day news arrived that a grain convoy of 6,000 pack-oxen and 700 camels coming from the Kerauli side viâ Khush-hal-garh had been cut off by the Rajputs owing to the negligence and cowardice of the escort, a thousand Deccani horse and foot. The Jaipur Rajah's Dāi-bhāi (wet nurse's son) blocked the eastern road from Khush-hal-garh, while Rodā Rām Khawās closed the southern route from Ranthambhor. The coming of provisions to Mahadji's camp now totally ceased. "A Rupee could not buy even four lbs. of flour or six lbs. of dāl. All the troops, especially the sepoy battalions, clamoured for their pay. Mons. Lesteneau came to Mahadji and reported that the Mughalia troops who had previously gone over to the Jaipur side were seducing his sepoys by promising to pay up their dues from the Jaipur treasury. Mahadji at first did not pay heed to his words." [Ibr. iii. 26.]
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But the matter soon passed out of his hands. All the trained sepoy battalions took up arms, placed their officers under arrest, and with guns limbered up threatened to march on Mahadji's tent and extort their dues by force. Rana Khan advised a prompt settlement of their claims, but Sindhia replied, "If I pay the salary of the Telingas today, then the Hindustanis tomorrow and the Deccani horse the next day will ask for their dues. Six* lakhs is what their monthly salary amounts to." But more alarming news came from the Jaipur camp and at last Sindhia bowed to necessity. He offered two months' pay; but it was now too late. The sepoys and gunners replied that their salary was due for eight months and flour was selling at four seers to the Rupee, so that they were too weak from fasting to hold their muskets; that they must be paid all their arrear dues in full and for the future four annas a day in cash, or else they would go over to the Jaipur Rajah. Throughout the 30th and the forenoon of the next day the tumult raged unabated in his camp. Sindhia was utterly distracted; all his attempts to placate the soldiery, even by making his wife security for his good faith, failed. The exasperated sepoys abused and sent back his peace envoys. They refused the jewels that he offered, saying that they could not feed on gems, but wanted cash. Some regiments, however, accepted part payment, such as the gunners (Rs. 2,900), Lesteneau’s battalions (Rs. 1,000) and Murtaza Khan’s sons (Rs. 10,000.) [Akh. 47.]
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∗ *Akh.* SJ. ms. 47, has "sixty lakhs per mensem," evidently a copyist's error for "six lakhs."
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But one body of 7,000 men obstinately refused. They marched off at 3 o’clock in the afternoon of the 31st with all their muskets, 125 pieces of artillery, and all their munition carts, —forming squares and placing their baggage in the centre. When they reached the bank of the Morel and halted, Ismail Beg and Malik Md. Khan advanced from the Jaipur army, welcomed them, paid Rs. 30,000 down and promised one lakh more in two days’ time, and led them across the river to the Rajah’s camp. True, Mahadji thus lost only 7,000 sepoy musketeers and artilleryists, while more than that number of trained Hindustani soldiers still remained under his banners through the personal influence of Lesteneau, Levassoult and Jean Baptiste de la Fontaine. But in the council of war held that evening, all his generals told Sindhia that in future no Hindustani soldier could be trusted and that in such circumstances he must avoid a battle by all means, lest during the engagement with the enemy intestine fighting should break out between the two sections of his army and "the result would be another Panipat." Mahadji decided to wait and see. [*HP. 503.*]
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Shortly after nightfall a loud report of all the guns was heard to proceed from the deserters' camp. The hearts of the Marathas were chilled with the fear that these men were coming with their Rajput allies to deliver a night attack. Mahadji himself rode immediately to the front to reconnoitre, but his spies soon brought the reassuring news that the noise was that of a salute fired by the deserters in honour of the Rajah of Jaipur who had paid them a visit.
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What was Mahadji to do now? An attack by the combined forces of the Rajputs, the Mughalias and the recently deserted sepoys with their superior artillery and overflowing munition-chests, was reasonably expected next morning. Could he meet it with his depleted and partly disloyal forces? All his generals agreed that resistance was hopeless; "the time resembles that of Panipat. If the enemy advance we are sure to perish. They have been emboldened, our own men have been correspondingly disheartened; the paltans and Mughalia troops still with us are unreliable. The Deccani horse in this army is small in number. Grain is selling at four seers to the Rupee, and no provision is coming from outside. Many of our horses have perished, and those that remain have no strength left in them. On the strength of what shall we fight?" [Ibr. iii. 19. HP. 503. Akh. PRC. i.] Hence a retreat was decided upon.
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§ 11. The retreat from Lalsot, 1-9 Aug. 1787.
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Three hours before the dawn of 1st August, the retreat began,* in the same well-planned and orderly manner as during the advance to Tungā, but with the positions reversed: the vanguard under Rānā Khan now became the rearguard; and the main baggage camp with the women and other impedimenta turned its face round and became the front portion of the moving army; Mahadji, as usual, commanded the middle of this long line, keeping constant touch with all the divisions and rendering support and restoring order wherever the need for it arose. If his late march to the enemy's encampment, conducted for successive days without any accident or loss, had been a masterly act of military genius, his present success in leading a dispirited army back to safety from the face of a superior and exultant enemy must excite our highest admiration for his cool calculating generalship, his eternal vigilance and his tireless exertion under appalling difficulties. Leaving the Ramgarh plain on the 1st of August, he grimly held on to his purpose, declined to be drawn into side engagements, and by making long marches daily, arrived in safety near Dig on the 8th day. No other Indian leader of that age could have accomplished such a feat.
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∗ Mahadji's retreat from Lalsot.—Akhbarat, SJ. ms. (best and fullest), 51-73. PRC. i. 137,, 142-144, 151-156. HP. 503. Muna Lal (present), 310-311. Ibr. iii. 31-33.
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This retreat was a movement of unspeakable terror, privation and daily alarms to the rank and file of his army. Throughout the ten days following the battle of Tungā, the phantom of Pānipat kept haunting the memory of every Deccani in his camp. But if Lālsot did not prove a second Pānipat, it was because Mahadji Sindhia was no Sadāshiv Rāo Bhāu and he was better served than that hero of the Chitpavan tragedy.
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It was still three hours to day-break on the 1st of August when Mahadji sent off camel riders to his baggage camp, south of Lālsot village, some eight miles behind the battle front, to warn the women, transport officers and guards there to pack up and begin their march immediately, so as to leave the road unencumbered for the main army coming up from behind. In his own camp near Rāmgarh the news spread quickly that a retreat had been ordered, and the soldiers and camp followers started in feverish haste to make preparations for moving off. Mahadji and Rānā Khan remained behind to stem any Rajput attack and sent the field camp and artillery on towards the base under escort of the light division, after burning some tumbrils which had stuck fast in the mud and abandoning a good deal of baggage for lack of transport*
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When the light division joined the base camp, it was almost dawn, and a busy and confused scene of packing, clamouring and running about for transport opened at once. In the midst of it, a powder chest caught fire, evidently through accident, though a Maratha news-writer reported it as a wilful act of treachery by a Hindustani sepoy. The explosion caused the blaze and roar of a gun fire, killing and wounding ten men and some bullocks. The people in the distant parts of that vast encampment, on hearing the report, shouted out that the North Indian battalions still with Sindhia had turned their guns on their southern comrades. They began to flee in a panic; those whose property was already loaded took it with themselves, those who were not ready fled away for bare life abandoning their baggage. A wild rumour was spread by the fugitives that a disastrous battle had begun and that Mahadji himself had been slain. Seizing this opportunity, the camp ruffians and licensed Pindharis looted one section of the bazar and the area of Afrasiyab Khan’s widow’s halting place.
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∗ Sindhia kept a body of men posted in the pass of Lalsot. Seventeen guns, 10 to 12 thousand horse and the battalions of De Boigne and Lesteneau were left with Rana Khan and Ambaji for guarding the rear. He himself mounted a horse and marched to the rear at three hours before dawn. In the morning he stood on the Dungar [of Lalsot] when spies reported that the Jaipur army had come out for fighting, but Rana Khan, with his troops in battle formation, was retreating step by step. After coming three kos away, he halted and swore, 'If I live I shall reduce Jainagar and Jodhpur to dust.' [Akh. SJ. ms. 52-53.]
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But two hours later, Mahadji himself arrived on the scene. He stopped there for some hours, quickly restored order, and “loading his cooking pots and carpets (abandoned by their bearers) on the camels of his camel-swivel guns, he ordered his soldiers to take as much of the general camp property as they could personally carry and collect and set fire to the rest. . . . The tents also were burnt.” [HP. 503.] Then marching steadily on and keeping strict control over the middle division of his army, he reached two miles beyond Piplai at 3 o’clock in the afternoon, after a strenuous march of 24 miles for himself and 32 miles for his rearmost division, which was brought up in admirable order by Rana Khan, retreating slowly in battle formation with loaded artillery for repelling any enemy attack, and reached the halting ground two hours after dusk without the least loss. The enemy durst not molest its march.
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Next day a serious question arose. News came that the fort of Khush-hal-garh, ahead of them and midway on the road to the friendly State of Kerauli, had been taken by the Jaipur Raja’s foster-brother. The Maratha collector posted there had fled away abandoning the two guns, carpets and other stores that Sindhia had deposited in it, and the enemy now dominated the road to this stronghold. Mahadji, therefore, swerved to the left, *i.e.*, north-eastwards, making Dig his objective. The Rajputs occupied Lalsot and its hill and even reached Piplai the day after the Marathas had left it, but advanced no further, though rumours used to rise daily in the Maratha camp that they were coming. By way of Bāmniwās, Sakrauda, Bhasāwar, and Pathenā, he reached Thun, 14 miles south-west of Dig on the 8th of the month and finally moved on to Siswārā (eight miles nearer to Dig) on the 11th, where he halted in order to gain breathing time and rearrange his affairs.*
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His movement towards Dig, instead of towards his own dominion of Gwalior south of the Chambal, was prompted by his wish to safeguard his family which had been left behind in Dig and his son-in-law, Ladoji Deshmukh, who was stationed at Delhi as his deputy. On the 10th his wife and children joined him at Thun, and next day they departed for Gwalior with a detachment under Apa Khande Rao, accompanied by all the artillery except twelve pieces, the heavy baggage of his army and the females of all the Deccani commanders and troops present in the North. Thus lightening himself, Mahadji turned to his work as a soldier for restoring his power and prestige which had now suffered a total eclipse.
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∗ Mahadji's route—Starts from plain of Ramgarh,—Bamniwas, 4 m. n. of Piplai (1 Aug.)—Wazirpur, 20 m. e. of Bamniwas and 8 m. e. of Udai (2nd)—Sakrauda, 12 m. n. e. of Wazirpur and 2 m. s.w. of Hindaun (3rd)—Talchiri, 12 m. n. of Hindaun (4th)—Bhaswar, 10 m. n. of Talchiri (5th)—Pathena, 7 m. n. of Bhaswar and 26 m. s.w. of Dig (6th)—Khera Medah, 12 m. n. of Pathena (7th)—Thun, 14 m. s.w. of Dig (8th)—Siswara, 8 m. n. e. of Thun (11th) Akh. SJ.ms. and PRC. i.