Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c40.s5: § 9. Sindhia’s march into Jaipur; attempts at compromise
Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c40.s5
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§ 9. Sindhia’s march into Jaipur; attempts at compromise
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Mahadji took prompt action. Leaving Dig on 16th March and making daily marches without a halt, he reached Dāosā on the 24th. This place lies 32 miles east of Jaipur; the advanced division of the Maratha army under Rāyāji, stood near Sangāner, seven miles south of the Kachhwā capital. But seemingly diplomacy had not yet been exhausted. Peace envoys from Jaipur attended Mahadji’s camp discussing the amount of their tribute. But there was a conflict of counsel in his inner circle: the ever-sober Rānā Khan and the practical Rāyāji Pātil pressed him to accept a moderate tribute by way of compromise and retire immediately from Rajputana so as to avoid the increasing summer heat and to overawe his many secret enemies by occupying a more central position like Mathura. But the Rao Rajah and Khush-hali Ram appealed to his vanity by pointing out that after coming to the gates of Jaipur in person he could not, consistently with his dignity, retire with only the small tribute which had been offered to his servants before. The Macheri chief knew that if Sindhia got only a trifle from Jaipur he would try to recoup himself for the heavy expenses of this expedition by seizing Macheri territory. And Khush-hali Ram Bohra knew that with the coming back of his Haldia rival he had lost all his posts and property in Jaipur and could not return there and remain alive. These two therefore fed Mahadji’s ambition and pride by assuring him that at his mere appearance before the gates of Jaipur that city would fall in terror of his arms and that he would be able to annex the whole Kachhwa kingdom to his own dominions which would then stretch in unbroken extent from Ujjain to Delhi and from the Ganges to Ajmir. Faced by these two rival policies, Mahadji Sindhia seemed to have lost for a time his political vision and sense of reality. “He came under unlucky stars and his eyes were clouded by sloth,” as his admirer Khair-ud-din admits. He cried out in exasperation at the Jaipur Rajahs persistent breach of faith that he would “empty the Jaipur capital of its defenders and seize it, as he had done Gwalior and Gohad.” [Ibr. iii. 3, DY. i. 210.] The Rao Rajah and Khush-hali Ram and the other Jaipur refugees, having wormed their way into Mahadji’s confidence, proposed to him to make Mān Singh Rajah of half the Kachhwa kingdom as a Maratha *protegee* and rival to Sawai Pratap Singh. They themselves would act as his regents and recompense Sindhia for his armed aid by giving him bonds for the regular payment of the fixed tribute in future. [DY. i. 201.]
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In another way, too, a peaceful settlement was rendered impossible by the stiffening of the Jaipur attitude, as allies began to gather for the defence of that State. Pratap Singh, through his favourite Rodā Rām (ex-tailor), informed Sindhia, "The arrears of past tribute amount to 12 lakhs. Out of this, take four lakhs down, two lakhs more will be paid in July, and the remaining moiety of six lakhs will be discharged by the assignment of land." But he did not really mean to keep his word; on 7th April his envoys abruptly left the Maratha camp without coming to any settlement or even taking formal leave. [*DY.* 201, 211. *PRC.* i. p. 169.] Mahadji in anger expelled every Jaipur agent and news-writer from his camp and next day made a rapid march westwards to Bhānkri, which is only 13 miles from Jaipur, in order to increase his pressure on the Rajah. His vanguard, under Rayaji, now advanced from his post at Sanganer seven miles south of Jaipur to the gates of that city.
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But this distant demonstration of force produced no result. The tortoise would not move nor even stretch its neck out of its shell. So, Mahadji stooped to invite the Jaipur envoys back to his camp at Bhānkri. They returned on 14th April, but the terms they offered were even more unsatisfactory than before and no Regent of the Empire could accept them with honour: "The Jaipur Rajah offered four lakhs immediately and demanded the surrender of Khush-hali Ram Bohra to him, after which he would clear the balance of the tribute. Mahadji refused to set off against his claims anything on the ground of damage to crops (*pāi-māli*) by his troops, or to surrender the Bohra. Hence a rupture took place.” [Hingane’s despatch, *DY.* i. 220. *PRC.* i. p. 169.]
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CHAPTER XXXV
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THE LALSOT CAMPAIGN, 1787.
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§ 1. Second stage of campaign: Mahadji retires from before Jaipur, May 1787.
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Nothing was now left to Sindhia but to throw his sword into the scale. But even for a trial of arms his relative superiority had vanished during this delay. Thanks to Daulat Ram’s vigorous action, the Jaipur Rajah had had time to assemble his feudal levies, numbering about 20,000. His ally of Jodhpur sent to him 5,000 of the wild Rathor horse, and 5000 mercenary Naga musketeers under his general Bhim Singh. [DY. 201, 200.] Worst of all, the Jaipur diwan was meeting with success in seducing the old Najaf Khani troops, both Mughalia horse and Hindustani sepoys, now under Sindhia’s banners. The allied Rajputs now put a bold face on, and issuing from the capital (1st May) encamped some miles south of it, in order to bar any further Maratha advance. Their Rajah himself joined this camp on the 2nd. “Sindhia became at length convinced that he had grasped at too many objects together, and he secretly acknowledged his indiscretion in having underrated the strength of the Rajput confederacy and overvalued . . . the fame and dread of his power.” [Kirkpatrick in PRC. i. p. 180.] So, he judged it unsafe to remain near Jaipur, and adopted the plan of seizing the forts of the Kachhwa Rajah's vassals and annexing their baronies. [DY. 201, 200, 220.]
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Recalling Rāyāji Pātil from his advanced position near Sangāner, Mahadji (on 5-7 May) fell back from Bhānkri to Sawlia twenty miles southwards. This place is only 20 miles to the west of Lalsot. He publicly declared that in thus falling back his object was to draw the Rajputs into the open country where he would be able to engage them with greater advantage. But the Rajputs were rightly exultant at this movement of their enemy. The strategic march to the rear had exposed the weakness of Mahadji; with all his vast forces and artillery and European-led battalions, he had been forced to retreat without obtaining a single Rupee from their Rajah. The enemy army had by this time swollen to 40,000 men. All the country was up in tumult; outside the Maratha camp the roads could not be traversed in safety; all caravans were being looted on the way. [DY. i. 200. PRC. i. pp. 180-186.]
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By this move Sindhia had interposed himself between the main Jaipur army (now at Sangāner) and the southern districts of that kingdom. He next marched through the latter region, raiding and levying contribution, and seizing forts like Jhālāi, Navai &c., till he reached the Banās river near Sārsop, close to the Bundi frontier. Meantime, his Hindustani and Mughalia troops continued to desert him everyday, though in small numbers. On the 6th of May, two eminent captains, Zulfiqār Ali Khan and Mansur Ali Khan, secretly went over to the enemy with their forces. The climax came on the 25th of that month when the greatest Mughalia general, Muhammad Beg Hamadāni joined the Rajah of Jaipur, to the intense terror and despair of the Maratha army. He was promised Rs. 3000 a day and given a royal welcome by his new master who made him the leader of the defence, as his unquestionable ability and fame deserved. [DY. i. 220, 221. DC.]