Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c40.s9: § 5. Description of Lalsot and the theatre of war
Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c40.s9
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§ 5. Description of Lalsot and the theatre of war
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It is necessary to take here a clear view of the theatre of these operations. Thirty miles south-east of the city of Jaipur stands the large village of Lalsot,* near the end of a long chain of low hills and outcrops that runs north-eastwards for many miles up to the Banganga river (near the modern railway junction of Bandikui) and even beyond it. The entire northern and western sides of the Lalsot district are enclosed, as if held in the tentacles of a gigantic octopus, by countless ravines which roll down to the Morel river, a feeder of the mighty Banas. The eastern side is effectively blocked by the long diagonal chain of the Jawāna hills mentioned above. The south side is comparatively open, and through it runs the road to Kerauli (42 miles east of Lalsot) and Dholpur and Bharatpur, still further off. Lalsot village itself commands the southern mouth of a pass bearing its name, which leads, by a direct but difficult and wild path, to Daosa, 22 miles due north, where the traveller strikes the shortest and most frequented route between Jaipur and Agra. This road runs roughly parallel to the Banganga river and has been followed by the modern railway.
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∗ Survey of India, half inch map, sheet No. 54 B/NW.
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Proceeding from Lalsot through the pass immediately north of it and skirting on his left the mass of hillocks known as *Lalsot-kā-Dungar*, the traveller arrives after three miles at the village of Didwana overlooked by two isolated peaks. Then the level country begins. Turning a little to his left from Didwana, he enters, across two narrow ravines, the wide plain of Ramgarh, named after a village and a fortalice standing four miles north-west of Didwāna.
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From Rāmgarh four miles further to the north-west the path strikes the Morel river at a very easy ford free from ravines and *nālās*, opposite the village and fort of Bidakhā. From Bidakhā the path is skirted by two *nālās* for a mile and thereafter the country stretching north-westwards is an almost unbroken plain, dotted with human habitations for six miles till Tungā village is reached. This Tungā was now the base of the main Rajput army that had come out to seek an encounter with the Southern invaders, —their Rajahs being encamped two miles behind at Madhogarh.
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The battle of 28th July was fought in the plain between Tungā and Bidakhā, some two miles south-east of the former place and therefore fourteen miles from the village of Lālsot after which it is wrongly named. The advancing Marathas had their back to the Morel river which they guarded by their recent conquest of Bidakha fort, and their moving camp lay behind that river to the south-east, near Ramgarh. Further to the south-east the long line was held by the troops guarding Mahadji and the light camps of his fighting generals, and last of all by his stationary base camp, two or three miles south of Lalsot village.
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§ 6. The rival armies' movements and plans during the month before the battle.
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The forward movement of Mahadji Sindhia's army was begun on 23rd June, but the decisive encounter which he was seeking did not take place till more than a month later. To this delay both sides contributed.* Sindhia waited till he should be joined by the unaccountably slow Ambaji Ingle and he also expected to see the Rajput coalition dissolve quickly. He knew that it is impossible to keep a large body of rustic clansmen together for a long time, so that the divergent elements assembled at Jaipur would quarrel and disperse to their homes if kept idle for a sufficiently long time. Nor would the mercenary Hindustani and Mughalia deserters remain loyal to their new employer when he failed to pay them punctually, and the cash resources of the Kachhwa State were very limited. Therefore he ordered Rana Khan to advance most cautiously, sending his artillery and disciplined musketeers ahead, and decline to be drawn into an engagement unless attacked, and every night fall back on his entrenched camp. During the day Mahadji, who had pushed on to Rana Khan's last encampment, would keep observing the country round, seated on a hillock, telescope in hand.
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∗ PRC. i. 124 et seq. Akhbarat. DY. i. 202.
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The Jaipur Rajah, on his part, repressed the ardour of his supporters for a fight, as he was waiting for the junction of helpers from Bikaner, Bundi, Khichiwara and other Rajput centres and particularly for a large body of hired Sindi musketeers who were fondly believed to prove more of a match for Mahadji's French-led sepoy battalions than the Rajput levies mostly armed with the sword and the spear. Nor was he without strong hopes of starving the invaders out, as he had set his vassals to raid the paths of Sindhia's grain supply and his Minas,—those expert hereditary thieves,—to rob the Maratha camp itself every night. This was being done with striking effect and success.
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The Jaipur army had a mortal fear of Sindhia's superior artillery and trained battalions of musketeers, and shrank from a field action. Mahadji's salvation lay in the character of the Jaipur Rajah who had no brain, enterprise or even brute courage. As a British observer, unfriendly to Sindhia, remarked, "The Rajah of Jainagar appears to be a man deficient both in spirit and conduct, . . . a young man immersed in pleasure and exceedingly deficient in judgment, if not also in courage.* The bonds which unite the members of this confederacy are very weak, owing to the jealousy, distrust and even in some degree the opposition of interests, which may be discovered among them." [*PRC.* i. 117, 118.] The Jaipur Rajah's one policy was to avoid a decision by always putting things off to the future. In the daily skirmishes before the great battle, the fighting was done by the Rathors from Jodhpur and the troops of Hamadāni. That Mughal general angrily complained to the Rajah, "If such be the valour of your clansmen that throwing every affair on our shoulders they would stand aloof, then do you entrust all this business to me so that I shall see what I can do. If today [the 13th of July] the Rajputs had bravely exerted themselves, the war would have been decisively ended." The Rajah replied, "The war cannot be decided by skirmishing. On the day of the pitched battle you will witness the valour of the Rajputs." [*Akhbarat.*]
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On 10th July a further advance was made by Rana Khan, who moved three miles nearer to the enemy, *i.e.*, towards the Morel river, while Mahadji stepped into his general's last camp, at Didwana. Contact was now established between the rival outposts and henceforth skirmishes took place almost daily, but these were barren of any result. As Capt. Kirkpatrick reports, "The two armies, although they have somewhat approached each other, continue to be nearly as inactive as ever. Their operations are confined to the picking up of straggling cattle, the intercepting of small supplies of provisions, and the parading of their respective picquets opposite to one another, but always at such a distance as to preclude the effusion of much blood." [PRC. i. p. 204.]
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∗ Col. John Colins, who went to Jaipur to secure the person of the fugitive Wazir Ali (the murderer of Mr. Cherry at Benares), reported to the Gov. General about the Rajah in similar terms.
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On the 13th and 27th of July the fights between the patrols were of a severer character and the casualties were heavy, one sardar of the Deccan horse being slain at each, and the Rajput side getting the worst of it. There was no activity in the Maratha army for four days from the 15th of the month, when Mahadji's little daughter fell ill of anasarca. She died in the night of the 16th and her fond father was stricken down by grief; he told Rana Khan, "Act as you think fit for the next two or three days, but do not ask me, as I am not in a mood to reply to anything." [Akh. DY. i. 240.]
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§ 7. Decision to fight a pitched battle: Maratha advance across the Morel river.
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The mourning over, in the night of the 19th Mahadji received a written challenge from the Jaipur Rajah worded thus: "You are Regent of the Empire and a veteran in war. Come out of the shelter of your guns into the open field, if you dare, and fight a pitched battle with the Rajputs. We shall see to whom God gives the victory." [*Akhbarat. PRC.* i. p. 207.] Sindhia called his generals together and told them, "If, after this, I make terms with the Jaipur Rajah without fighting one battle, I shall not be able to show my face in Hindustan. A man cannot live for ever. Let what will happen, happen." They objected saying that their soldiers would not fight unless their arrears were paid; that up to now they had fed their retainers by selling their own private property and equipment. He offered Rs. 20,000, which was refused as too little.*
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The two sides fixed the 21st for the pitched battle. But when that day dawned the tortoise refused to move, having been dissuaded by his astrologers. But Rana Khan, on his part, pushed on to Bidakha, on the Morel river, which blocked his road to the Jaipur camp, while his vanguard under Ambaji Inglé crossed that river and raided the villages beyond up to two miles of the enemy camp. On the arrival of Rānā Khan in full force (23rd July), the garrison of Bidākha agreed to capitulate with honour. But "when the garrison was coming out, a *pāgā* trooper laid his hand on a Rajput's wife; the Rajput slew the man, fighting began between the two sides, with the loss of 30 to 40 men altogether, and the garrison went back into their fortalice and renewed their opposition. Afterwards, Ram Sevak (the Rao Rajah's agent) conciliated them and evacuated the garhi under his protection." During the day the main Jaipur army made a half-hearted demonstration to save their brethren in Bidakha and then withdrew to their base. Next day there was no movement on either side owing to rain; but Rana Khan dismantled the mudfort of Bidakha in order to remove that menace to his free crossing of the river.
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∗ Mahadji's army bill was Rs. 12½ lakhs a month, and he was already six months in default of payment.
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Thereafter life in the Maratha camp became unbearable owing to the total stoppage of grain supply and the threatened mutiny of all sections of the army in exasperation at Mahadji's failure to pay their dues. Their starved horses were unable to carry any rider. His captains assembled in a council of war, cried out with one voice, "Better to fight and die than to perish from famine." Mahadji agreed to stake his all on one field fight and ordered five lakhs of Rupees to be paid to his soldiers ((25th July) in order to hearten them for the coming battle. A second challenge was received from the Jaipur Rajah on the 26th, "If you wish to seize my kingdom and will not accept tribute, why are you delaying to fight? Come on tomorrow; I on my part, will be ready." The entire Maratha army was informed that their master had taken up the enemy's gauntlet. [*Ibr.* iii. 21.]
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After long prayers and *pujā* at midnight, Mahadji took two hours' sleep, then rose up at 4 o'clock in the morning, issued the orders of the day to his generals, ate the holy communion (*prasād*), and at break of day mounted his horse named *Desh-pujya* and rode forth to Rana Khan's camp, some two miles ahead of his own halting-place. The command for the impending battle had been assigned to Rānā Khān Bhāi, with whom Sindhia kept constant touch by a chain of swift couriers mounted on camels. Rana Khan marched about two miles ahead of his master with all his troops and sent his light division a mile further on. At each step that this army took to the front, Sindhia too advanced the same distance behind it, ascending successive hillocks and observing his troops through a field-glass and sending forth despatch-riders with his fresh instructions. In this methodical way, giving not the least chance for a surprise by the enemy or disorder in his own ranks, the veteran went forth to seek the long-looked-for decision at last.