Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c41.s2: § 2. Mahadji Sindhia’s changes of policy and measures during the eclipse of his power: estimate of his forces, money and allies
Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c41.s2
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§ 2. Mahadji Sindhia’s changes of policy and measures during the eclipse of his power: estimate of his forces, money and allies
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Having thus briefly surveyed the course of events during Mahadji Sindhia’s loss of control over northern affairs, we shall study his policy and resources during the same troubled period. First of all, from his halting place near Dig he sent off to Malwa the families of his Deccani officers along with his own wives and children and all his heavy artillery, tents and surplus baggage. At the same time he bade his camp-followers and other noncombatants go away wherever they could find their bread, so that quite two-thirds of this vast horde left him [on 11th August. *Akh.* SJ. ms 74.] As for his troops he firmly refused to throw away his good money on the faithless Hindustanis still with him, though he owed them nearly a year's pay; he would spend the money more usefully on the fresh and reliable troops expected from the Deccan. The Hindustanis were offered a small daily subsistence, but the discharge of their arrears was made conditional upon the conquest of Jaipur! Their captains were offered jāgirs instead of money, in full clearance of their dues, but only in the Doab tracts of which he had been recently robbed and which they must reconquer from the usurpers. In fact Mahadji was deliberately working for the departure of these disloyal and useless troops from his army in disgust at his insolvency and the famine prices then raging; he said that their covert treason and passive conduct had led to the failure of his Lālsot campaign, and he would therefore pay cash to none but the Deccanis. [*Akh.*]
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But he also felt that the Deccani troops then with him, though thoroughly loyal, had grown stale by eight years' continuous absence from home and campaigning in north India ever since he had come to Malwa in 1780 to oppose Col. Camac, and that no great work could be got out of them; for that he must wait for the arrival of fresh troops from Maharashtra. For such fresh the *Gesta Romanorum*, the *Legenda Aurea* of Jacobus de Voragine, and the *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais. These were the books that fed the imagination of the Middle Ages, and they were the books that the Church, in its wisdom, provided for the instruction and edification of the faithful.
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But the Church did not merely provide books; it also provided the means of their dissemination. The monastic scriptoria, where monks labored in silence to copy the sacred texts, were the precursors of the printing press. And when the press finally arrived, it was the Church that first harnessed its power, using it to spread the word of God to the corners of the earth. The Gutenberg Bible, the first major book printed in Europe, was a testament to the Church's commitment to the written word.
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Yet, even as the Church championed the spread of knowledge, it also sought to control it. The *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, or List of Prohibited Books, was a tool used by the Church to suppress ideas it deemed dangerous or heretical. This tension between the desire to educate and the need to control would define the Church's relationship with literature for centuries to come.
v3.c41.s2.5
It is a complex history, one that is marked by both enlightenment and suppression. But it is a history that cannot be ignored, for it is the history of the very foundation of Western civilization. The Church, in its role as the guardian of knowledge, has shaped the way we think, the way we write, and the way we understand the world around us.
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the *Gesta Romanorum*, the *Legenda Aurea* of Jacobus de Voragine, and the *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais. These were the books that fed the imagination of the Middle Ages, and they were the books that the Church, in its wisdom, provided for the instruction and edification of the faithful.
v3.c41.s2.7
But the Church did not merely provide books; it also provided the means of their dissemination. The monastic scriptoria, where monks labored in silence to copy the sacred texts, were the precursors of the printing press. And when the press finally arrived, it was the Church that first harnessed its power, using it to spread the word of God to the corners of the earth. The Gutenberg Bible, the first major book printed in Europe, was a testament to the Church's commitment to the written word.
v3.c41.s2.8
Yet, even as the Church championed the spread of knowledge, it also sought to control it. The *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, or List of Prohibited Books, was a tool used by the Church to suppress ideas it deemed dangerous or heretical. This tension between the desire to educate and the need to control would define the Church's relationship with literature for centuries to come.
v3.c41.s2.9
It is a complex history, one that is marked by both enlightenment and suppression. But it is a history that cannot be ignored, for it is the history of the very foundation of Western civilization. The Church, in its role as the guardian of knowledge, has shaped the way we think, the way we write, and the way we understand the world around us.
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and faithful instruments he had written pressingly to the Peshwa, and indeed to every possible helper, including small men like Beni Hazuri, Dhokal Singh and others who were asked to send even a thousand men each. And he was daily scanning the southern horizon for signs of the approach of these reinforcements, like India’s thirsty bird looking out for the rain cloud, as a Marathi letter poetically expresses it.
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But where he had most right to hope, he was most cruelly disappointed. The wise young Peshwa Madhav Rao II felt a generous impulse to support his hard-pressed general in the north and proposed to send a large army there under Hari Pant Phadké, the best Maratha general then in the south. But *his* Peshwa, the cold calculating Nana Fadnis, whispered that Phadké would never consent to serve under Sindhia. Chitpavan Brahmanic pride would not stoop to taking orders from a man of the Maraté caste. The Puna Government had neither the will nor the money necessary for backing Mahadji in his hour of need. Ali Bahadur, an illegitimate grandson of Baji Rao I, was then chosen to lead the proposed reinforcements, which Tukoji Holkar was ordered to join on the way. The man was utterly incompetent and had no heart for his work. Nor, indeed, had any of the Puna soldiers. They remembered how, 28 years before, a gallant army had been sent forth from Maharashtra to retrieve the disaster to a Sindhia in the north and that it had the *Gesta Romanorum*, the *Legenda Aurea* of Jacobus de Voragine, and the *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais. These were the books that fed the imagination of the Middle Ages, and they were the books that the Church, in its wisdom, provided for the instruction and edification of the faithful.
v3.c41.s2.12
But the Church did not merely provide books; it also provided the means of their dissemination. The monastic scriptoria, where monks labored in silence to copy the sacred texts, were the precursors of the printing press. And when the press finally arrived, it was the Church that first harnessed its power, using it to spread the word of God to the corners of the earth. The Gutenberg Bible, the first major book printed in Europe, was a testament to the Church's commitment to the written word.
v3.c41.s2.13
Yet, even as the Church championed the spread of knowledge, it also sought to control it. The *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, or List of Prohibited Books, was a tool used by the Church to suppress ideas it deemed dangerous or heretical. This tension between the desire to educate and the need to control would define the Church's relationship with literature for centuries to come.
v3.c41.s2.14
It is a complex history, one that is marked by both enlightenment and suppression. But it is a history that cannot be ignored, for it is the history of the very foundation of Western civilization. The Church, in its role as the guardian of knowledge, has shaped the way we think, the way we write, and the way we understand the world around us.
v3.c41.s2.15
the *Gesta Romanorum*, the *Legenda Aurea* of Jacobus de Voragine, and the *Speculum Historiale* of Vincent of Beauvais. These were the books that fed the imagination of the Middle Ages, and they were the books that the Church, in its wisdom, provided for the instruction and edification of the faithful.
v3.c41.s2.16
But the Church did not merely provide books; it also provided the means of their dissemination. The monastic scriptoria, where monks labored in silence to copy the sacred texts, were the precursors of the printing press. And when the press finally arrived, it was the Church that first harnessed its power, using it to spread the word of God to the corners of the earth. The Gutenberg Bible, the first major book printed in Europe, was a testament to the Church's commitment to the written word.
v3.c41.s2.17
Yet, even as the Church championed the spread of knowledge, it also sought to control it. The *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, or List of Prohibited Books, was a tool used by the Church to suppress ideas it deemed dangerous or heretical. This tension between the desire to educate and the need to control would define the Church's relationship with literature for centuries to come.
v3.c41.s2.18
It is a complex history, one that is marked by both enlightenment and suppression. But it is a history that cannot be ignored, for it is the history of the very foundation of Western civilization. The Church, in its role as the guardian of knowledge, has shaped the way we think, the way we write, and the way we understand the world around us.
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only fed the vultures and jackals on Panipat's plain, and here was a call from another Sindhia in distress in the same far-off land of evil omen. Their captains were in no greater hurry to go than their politicians were to send them. Ali Bahadur took the auspices for his march by entering his campaigning tents on 8th September, 1787, but he joined Sindhia fully fourteen months later (6th Nov. 1788), at a time when Sindhia had made himself master again unaided by a single horseman in the Peshwa's pay.* The other Puna agent, Tukoji Holkar, proved a positive hindrance and intrigued against Mahadji everywhere on the way.
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Equally complete, but far more straightforward and prompt, was the disappointment that Sindhia met with in his appeal for armed aid to the English, his allies by the treaty of Salbye. Lord Cornwallis clearly informed him of the Court of Directors' order to the Governor General to observe strict neutrality in the quarrels of the native Powers.
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But a body of new Maratha troops which had been raised for him by his devoted agents at Jāmbgāon (about 5,000 men) did join him near Gwalior in March 1788 and these helped to turn the scale against his Mughalia enemies.* De Boigne's two battalions remained faithful and rendered him the most effective service in this period of trial. And so also, but in a lesser degree and less consistently, did Lesteneau with his two battalions, except for the six months (middle of September 1787 to middle of March 1788) during which the latter mercenary parted from Sindhia on failing to obtain pay for his men.
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∗ HP. 509. Sat. i. 126. The causes of the delay at Puna, in Sat. i. 126 and also PRC. i. 203, 204 and ii.
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After the retreat from Lalsot, as throughout the preceding campaign, Mahadji's worst troubles were caused by his want of money. He had exhausted his cash and credit alike, and his seemingly vast dominions in Hindustan were yielding no revenue. This insolvency subjected him to daily humiliations after the retreat from Lalsot. On 14th August, "His funds being exhausted, when the envoys of his soldiers became most insistent for payment, he placed the ornaments of his wives before his court and said, 'This is the jāidād that I have.' Rana Khan remarked, 'What will this quantity amount to?'" [Akh. SJ. ms. 83.]
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But money did gradually reach Sindhia. "His courtiers raised a loan of thirteen lakhs on their personal security for his use." Rānā Khān and other sardars placed their gold and silver ware at his feet, and these were sent to Vrindāvan to be melted into coins. [August 1787. *Akh.* SJ. ms. 83, 86.] So also was the silver plate in Mahadji’s palace of Ujjain which was converted into seven lakhs of Rupees. [*MD.* ii. 154; earlier remittance from Ujjain, in Oct. *Akh.* 243.] The Alwar Rajah furnished seven lakhs (in August 1787),—one lakh being advanced by himself and six lakhs from the local bankers. [*Akh.* 116.] Sindhia had already run into heavy debt to Ahalyā Bāi Holkar during his campaigns in Gohad, and he durst not ask her for any large loan now. Nānā Fadnis by his personal influence induced the Puna bankers to promise Sindhia a loan of five lakhs, but refused another five lakhs which Mahadji had begged from the Peshwa’s Government as a subsidy; and even this bankers’ loan did not reach Sindhia by the end of October. [*HP.* 509.]
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∗ On 8th Feb. 1788, Palmer wrote from Sindhia's camp, "The troops which he ordered from Burhanpur for the protection of Malwa, have totally defeated the Udaipurians. [PRC. i. 202.]
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In January 1788, however, after his vigorous suppression of disorder in Malwa, his actual revenue collection increased to 12 lakhs or more. [*PRC.* i. 196, 201.] Through his agent at Jāmbgāon he received a loan from the Deccan early in March next. [*HP.* 516.]
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Thus in the course of time Mahadji gained financial relief, and in consequence of it a decisive increase of his military strength. But at first he was almost driven mad by bankruptcy and the crowding of enemies on all sides. Of these enemies the most harmful, because of their large forces and strong will, were Ismail Beg Hamadānī at the head of the old Mughalia party and Ghulām Qādir Khan (the son of Zābita Khan) at the head of a Ruhela army assembled from Ghausgarh and Rohilkhand alike. A third enemy, Najaf Quli Khan, contended himself with carving out a principality for himself in the Rewari-Narnol-Kanud region at the expense of the Rao Rajah, but his indolent pleasure-loving character rendered the danger from him to Sindhia's power almost negligible. The Jaipur Rajah, pushed from behind by the Jodhpur commander Bhimrāj Bakhshi, had been the fountain and origin of Sindhia's troubles, but he quickly took a secondary place or sank into quiescence. He had no wish to trouble the Marathas if they did not trouble him by pressing for the arrears of his tribute, —his sole aim being to preserve his own patrimony, which necessarily involved the wresting back of every bit of land robbed from him by his disloyal vassal of Macheri. But beyond his own borders he would not march; he would not molest Mahadji's retreat from Lālsot (which was a welcome riddance to the Kachhwa State); and he had no quarrel with the Peshwā, to whom he appealed, as a family friend since the days of the great Shivaji and Mirzā Rajah Jai Singh I, to stop Sindhia's aggressions. [Akh. SJ. ms. 51. Ibr. iii. 21.]
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§ 3. Sindhia's contest with Ismail Beg: its first stage, Marathas expelled from the North.
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We shall first of all deal with the most decisive contest waged by Mahadji during the eclipse of his power. As soon as the Maratha army fell back from Lālsot, the Jaipur Rajah advanced to his north-eastern frontier and set about reducing the forts of the Narukā Rao Rajah, instead of pursuing Sindhia and driving him altogether beyond the Chambal. At this Ismail Beg and other Mughalia sardars who had joined him were discontented, as their aim was to create large estates for their own selves out of the territory once held by Mirza Najaf Khan as Mir Bakhshi. Moreover, their promised salary could not be paid out of the exhausted Jaipur treasury and a rupture took place when the Rajah tried to take away the artillery of the Telingas who had come over to his side after the battle of Tungā. [Ibr. iii. 21. Akh. 58, 63.]
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Faced with a hopeless future in the Jaipur service, Ismail Beg, Malik Muhammad Khan and other Mughalias left the Rajah's camp and marched away towards Agra, to the immense relief of the Rajputs. In addition to their Mughalia horse they had with them three battalions of sepoys and sixty guns, several of which were of large calibre. Against them Mahadji could only send Rayaji Patil with a party of Maratha light horse but no guns and no trained musketeers. In purging his army of treason near Dig he had got rid of all the Telingas and Hindustani sepoys, except four battalions under De Boigne and Lesteneau, and sent away to Malwa all his large guns, keeping only four of these and some lighter pieces. The lesson of Panipat had not been lost on him; if he chose to follow raiding tactics (*ghanimi*), he must not encumber himself with slow and heavy artillery. His striking force was now composed entirely of Maratha spearmen mounted on ponies. [*Akh.* 88. *HP.* 504.]
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Ismail Beg easily brushed aside the opposition of Rayaji Patil by means of his gun-fire and musketry action (11—15 Sep.) and arrived close to Agra. On the 16th, Lakhwā Dādā Lād, the governor of the fort, made a sortie with his Deccani horse and two battalions of sepoys led by Lesteneau, and gave battle to Ismail Beg Khan, while Rāyāji Patil fell on the Khan's rear and at first gained some success. But Lesteneau's troops had been exasperated by their salary remaining long unpaid and merely evasive replies being given by Mahadji Sindhia to their commandant's entreaty and warning. So, during this engagement they turned their muskets on their Maratha brethren in arms, and Ismail Beg, taking advantage of the confusion, made a vigorous advance. The Hindustani soldiers living in Agra opened the gates of that city to him and he captured it without resistance. The defeated Rāyāji galloped away towards the friendly base of Bharatpur; Lakhwā Dādā was cut off from his charge but contrived to re-enter the fort next day; Lesteneau joined Ismail Beg and was granted some jagirs in the north Agra district in lieu of pay. The fort of Agra, however, successfully defied the Muslims for nine months, under its exceptionally able and enterprising qiladar Lakhwā Dādā, till his master gained the upper hand again in June 1788.*
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The capture of Agra city was a great blow to Mahadji and a great gain to his enemies. Under the late Jat and Maratha rule this place had become the richest and most flourishing city in the Mughal empire and the residence of many rich or noble families as a safer place of refuge than ever-troubled Delhi. The conqueror now squeezed the inmates mercilessly in his pressing need. The city escaped a general sack by paying Rs. 35,000, but the houses of Naubat Rai (Mahadji's manager) and Narayandas (Afrasiyab Khan's diwān) were seized and dug up for treasure, yielding over three lakhs in cash and kind. With this money, Ismail refreshed his famished and ragged troops and began to enlist new men, till a force of over 20,000 was assembled under his banners. [DY. i. 286.]
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For a month and a half after this battle there was a lull on both sides. Sindhia was utterly confounded by the gathering of enemies on all sides, while his own forces numbered less than 15,000, mostly light cavalry with De Boigne’s battalions now fallen to a thousand bayonets or less, and he could see no aid coming from any quarter.
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∗ Ismail Beg captures Agra city.—H.P. 504. PRC. i. 177, 178. DY. i. 286. Ibr. iii. 22. His exactions, G. Ali ii. 258.
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At the end of October, Mahadji was forced into action. His general Ambāji Inglé (with 8,000 horse and foot) had been sent on a raiding campaign into Jaipur territory in order to create a diversion; in this he failed and also in his attempt to wrest Ajmer city which had been captured from the Marathas by the Jodhpur Rajah on 27th August. In the end Ambaji was surprised, severely defeated and forced to flee to his master's side at Alwar, with the loss of his baggage. [Ibr. iii. 53. Akh. 204—237.] Meantime, Ghulām Qādir Khan's audacious attack on Delhi (16th Oct.) drove the Emperor into making frantic appeals to Sindhia to come to his rescue.
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So, leaving Alwar on 28th October, Mahadji arrived between Rewāri and Pataudi (4th Nov.), and here he was brought to a halt for a month. His enemies at Delhi gained complete control over the Emperor and secured an order forbidding him to approach the Court (15th Nov.), and Sindhia could do nothing but wait passively for the longed for reinforcements to arrive. Prince Jawān Bakht (Jahāndār Shāh), eldest son of Shah Alam, left his asylum at Benares to try his hand at recovering his paternal dominions or at carving out a principaplity for himself. He reached Mathura (via Farrukhabad and Jalesar) on 1st November, but after a fruitless journey to Agra for concerted action with Ismail Beg, he broke away from that reluctant ally and went off to Delhi on 8th December. During the prince's alliance with Ismail Beg, Mahadji felt that he must strike a blow for the relief of Agra, or he would be pressed by enemy forces on three sides and expelled beyond the Chambal. Therefore, leaving Rewāri early in December, he moved* towards Sikandra (Agra) where Ismail Beg lay in camp. The Maratha force was inferior to their enemy in number, dispirited by their late reverses, and without any big artillery. But Sindhia made a last desperate attempt: after appealing to his followers' honour, he sent Rana Khan ahead with 10,000 horse. Ismail Beg promptly marched out to the encounter with a strong body of horse and foot and 33 pieces of cannon (on 16th December.) The Maratha horse, vowing to fight bravely, made repeated charges on Hamadani's army and inflicted some loss. But Ismail Beg, forming his men into one dense column, attacked the enemy centre, carrying everything before him by the volume of his fire. At last the Marathas were repulsed with heavy loss; De Boigne's trained battalions, firing well-directed volleys, formed a defensive shield round Mahadji and safely brought him out of the field. But Lakhwā Dādā had profited by this diversion of the besiegers, to sally out and convey much foodstuff from outside into his fort.
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∗ *DY.* i. 235 reports Mahadji Sindhia as present at *Kaul jhil*, 12 *kos* from Agra towards Delhi, on 15th Decr. The only place there with a faintly similar name that I can find in the *Indian Atlas* is *Konrai*, between Dig and Kumbher, with a marsh near it. Campaign in *Ibr.* iii. 70-72.
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The fugitives from the battle of Sikandra retreated to Dholpur, and were rallied there by Sindhia. Ismail Beg came up close behind, and here a second battle was fought on the 20th of the month. The Marathas offered a gallant defence, but were broken by repeated charges led by Ismail in person. and their case became hopeless when a powder-chest exploded. Then, abandoning all further struggle, they drove their horses into the Chambal and crossed over to Sindhia's own dominions. Their camp and all their baggage were plundered, and their post at Dholpur fort was invested by a detachment of the enemy, while Ismail went back to his camp before Agra fort, and Sindhia retreated beyond the Chambal and the Kumari rivers, to 28 miles north of Gwalior.
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The last trace of Maratha authority in Hindustan disappeared after this retreat. Mahadji had now not a single friend north of the Chambal except Ranjit Singh Jat, and no post except two or three which were beleaguered by the enemy.
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One disaster followed another: Ajmer fort* capitulated to Bijay Singh on 24th December without making the least defence. Najaf Quli seized Gokulgarh, Ghulām Qādir captured Khurjā and besieged Mursan and Aligarh, while Anupgir Gosain took Firuzabad.