Fall of the Mughal Empire v4.c48.s3: § 3. Advocates of peace in the two rival Maratha camps
Fall of the Mughal Empire v4.c48.s3
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§ 3. Advocates of peace in the two rival Maratha camps
v4.c48.s3.1
Mahadji sincerely wished to live at peace with Holkar, so long as peace was not rendered impossible by others; he avowed a life-long friendship with the Holkar family; Ahalyā Bāi had been his friend in need with her loans, and he would not risk a rupture with the Peshwā by open war on another general of the Puna Government in Hindustan. His policy, equally wise and just, was to settle the Holkar-Sindhia differences peacefully by the superior award of the Peshwā.
v4.c48.s3.2
Holkar's ministers, too, wished to avoid an open trial of strength with the victors of Patan and Mertā. They knew the weakness of their own side. But their captains could not be restrained from committing little mice-like mischiefs, such as plundering small convoys on the way to Sindhia's camp or looting villages within Sindhia's sphere of influence.
v4.c48.s3.3
Small places like Kāmā and other cities on the eastern and southern frontiers of the Alwar State, whose limits had not yet been firmly recognised, became bones of contention between the roving generals of these two Maratha chiefs, as their just rights there had not been clearly defined.
v4.c48.s3.4
Each of the rival camps had its peace party. Mahadji Sindhia regarded an armed rupture with Holkar as a political blunder fatal to his far-ranging ambitious projects. Tukoji Holkar was too fond of drink to stir himself for anything else in the world; “a flask of wine under a shady bough,” by the side of a cool brook or lake, was “Paradise enow” to him, provided that the needed money came regularly either from Ahalyā Bāi or from the tributary States. The older ministers of each,—like Jivvā Dādā under Sindhia and Parāshar Dādāji under Holkar,—favoured peace like their masters. But a rupture could not be averted when the young and hot-headed Gopāl Bhāu, in the pride of his position as Sindhia’s viceroy in the North, over-rode the sober counsels of the patient and diplomatic Jivvā Dādā and adopted a hustling policy towards Holkar’s generals in the disputed areas. I reject as an enemy fabrication the story in the Holkar family chronicle that it was Gopāl Bhāu’s proud ambition to seize Tukoji Holkar and present him in chains as a captive of war before his master. But it cannot be denied that Gopāl Bhāu had no patience with Holkar’s agents and acted in a downright thrustful manner towards them. On Holkar’s side the peace party failed only when Gopāl Bhāu’s unwise attack on Tukoji at Surauli (8 October, 1792) wrecked their policy and left the field open to the young fire-eater Malhar Holkar II.
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§ 4. How the open rupture began in 1792
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In September 1792, Sindhia’s generals began to seize Holkar’s jagirs in the Ganges-Jamuna Doab and the west Mathura district. The war-cloud between these two houses after first gathering in the north-eastern horizon for some-time, soon burst at Kāmā (32 miles north of Bharatpur) and quickly moved from that district west and south, through Alwar into Rajputana proper. Kāmā was now an imperial crownland and Sindhia as the Delhi Emperor’s keeper was entitled to its revenue. But a captain of Holkar’s family named Khush-hāl Kumār Pāgyā, thrust himself into the fort with his contingent and would not leave when politely asked by Gopāl Bhāu to do so. Tukoji sent him reinforcements when Gopal Bhau’s lieutenant Lakhwā Dādā laid siege to Kāmā. After some weeks of fighting, Khush-hāl was murdered by a Rajput whose sister he had abducted, and the leaderless garrison cut their way out with their arms and rejoined Holkar’s camp.
v4.c48.s3.7
The contest next overflowed into the adjoining Alwar territory, where Tukoji Holkar’s nephew Bāpu Rao was out on tribute-collection. Gopāl Bhāu sent him a message to say, “We have to realise ten lakhs from the Mācheri (Alwar) Rajah. Please do not press him for your money until we have collected our dues.” Then the Sindhian generals marched to the scene in full force, and Bāpu Holkar retired to Lālsot in Jaipur territory in order to avoid a battle.
v4.c48.s3.8
Tukoji Holkar himself was then encamped at Bhagwantgarh, on the south side of the Banās river, 13 miles north-west of Sawāi Mādhopur. Here he was visited (on 25 September, 1792) by Daulat-rām Haldiā, the Jaipur diwan, who formed with him a plan for a combined attack on Mahadji Sindhia’s forces in Rajputana. It was settled that Tukoji would move from Bhagwantgarh to Surauli, eleven miles west of it, on the same southern bank of the Banas river (four miles south of Isardā), and begin the war on Sindhia as soon as the Jaipur Rajah got his contingent ready and issued from his capital. The Rajah’s diwan left for Jaipur, with an agent of Tukoji, in order to hasten the war preparations. At this time, one large detachment of Holkar’s army was posted at Lālsot under Bāpu Holkar, to shield the Jaipur capital from the Sindhian advance, and it was planned that he would join his uncle as soon as the projected campaign was opened.
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§ 5. The Brush at Surauli, 8 Oct. 1792
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Sindhia’s generals, Gopāl Bhāu and Jivvā Dādā with De Boigne’s brigade had been advancing from the north-eastern angle of the Jaipur kingdom, conquering Bālāheri, Manpur, Gizgarh and Dāosā. On learning of the new plot hatched against their master, they at once turned sharply southwards, by-passed Bāpu Holkar (leaving him on their right), and swiftly moved down towards Tukoji Holkar’s camp on the Banās river. That chief had reached Surauli on 3rd October, and his general Bāpu could not join him in time for the coming battle. No battle, however, took place; the screen of light horse and Pindhari foragers in Holkar’s service, spread before Tukoji’s camp and, always shrinking from any action, merely tried to envelop Sindhia’s army and interrupt its supplies. Parāshar Dādāji, the minister in charge of Tukoji’s affairs, very wisely took early precautions as Sindhia’s army approached him: he sent away the heavy baggage and camp to the south and even removed Tukoji from the camp, while he himself with a light force stood at Surauli boldly facing the enemy.
v4.c48.s3.11
Here on 8th October 1792, Mahadji Sindhia’s generals, after a rapid march of 20 miles from Nawai (in Jaipur State), surprised and beat up Tukoji Holkar’s camp after a running skirmish for an hour or two, and captured nine pieces of artillery, 400 mares, 200 loaded camels, Holkar’s royal band, kettledrums and flag &c. Tukoji retreated from the field all that night and next day and reached Lakheri (35 miles southwards) on the 9th, and without making any halt there sought greater safety by going next day to Kesorāi Patan (30 miles further south). The victorious generals, Gopal Bhau and Jivvā Dādā, followed him up to Rāmpurā (better known as Aligarh-Rampurā, now in the Tonk State), 10 miles south of Surauli, while a light detachment under Jagu Bāpu was pushed further south in pursuit of the Holkar army.
v4.c48.s3.12
This beating up of a half deserted camp, which does not deserve the name of a battle,—became a turning point in the relations between Holkar and Sindhia. It utterly humiliated Tukoji in the eyes of the public. The family honour of the Holkars was wounded too deeply for Sindhia to be forgiven. A mere servant of their hereditary rival had thrashed and driven out the active head of the house of Holkar! The insult could be wiped out only with blood.
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When the news of it reached Ahalyā Bāi, her anger flamed up; in the picturesque language of the Holkar family chronicle, what was merely the scalding of a finger became an inflammation of the head to her. She promised to spare no money in raising a new army for avenging the insult and declared that she would set out on campaign in person if her officers faltered. Men were recruited at various places and sent in batches to her generals in Rajputana month after month. Tukoji had engaged the French mercenary captain Chevalier Dudrenec to raise trained battalions for him in the manner of De Boigne’s brigades in Sindhia’s service. But owing to Ahalyā Bāi’s parsimony* only four battalions could be formed, each consisting of 400 men (against 540 in a battalion of De Boigne), and from the shortness of the time they were imperfectly drilled. Besides, this force had no artillery at all comparable to De Boigne’s splendid light brass guns, copious supply of munitions, and efficient transport organization.
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The Indore Government’s one need was a pushful General. Bāpu Holkar had been an eye-witness of Patan and Mertā, and therefore knew his own military inferiority and dreaded an open conflict with Sindhia’s New Model army; moreover, he was now in broken health. Parāshar Dādāji, the man of business in charge of Holkar’s army, fully agreed with Bāpu. Tukoji Holkar was quiescent in his cups, and wished for nothing better than to be left alone with his bottles. Their policy was to make a working compromise with Mahadji Sindhia’s generals in Hindustan by mutual agreement and concession. Such an agreement was actually made even after the Surauli affair and it lasted for some four months.
v4.c48.s3.15
Holkar’s power for mischief having been thus neutralised for the time being, and a working compromise effected between the two parties, the Sindhian generals went back northwards to their own work in the Jaipur and Alwar territories. But in the April of next year (1793), the hatching of a second anti-Sindhia coalition by Tukoji Holkar and alarming reports of his armed preparations made the Sindhian generals again hurry to the south of the Banās river. During the six months that had passed since the brush at Surauli, Ahalyā Bāi had been raising new levies and sending them in successive detachments to Tukoji. This chief was now encamped at Jhapāit ghāt, a ferry at a sharp northward re-entrant angle of the Chambal river, 12 miles south of Lākheri city. About 14th April he was reported to be collecting forces, “Gosāin, Bairāgi, Rāngré, Rajput, Minā, Gujar, and Pathāns from Bhupāl, Kurwāi and Sironj as sebandi (militia or irregulars). The Deccani horse raised in Maheshwar (the seat of Ahalyā Bāi) was reaching him” in a continuous stream. His lieutenants were also being called in: Kāshi Rao (his eldest son) and Bāpu Holkar (the guardian of Kāshi) had already reached his camp, while Malhar Holkar (a younger son) was coming up from Maheshwar *via* Kanad, Agar, Bhansodā, and Mehidpur.
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∗ A report from Ahalya Bai’s Court, 26 July 1793, says that the army cost 3 lakhs a month, and the soldiers were 14 months in arrears of pay.