Fall of the Mughal Empire v4.c56.s13: § 8. Begam Samru secretly won over by the English
Fall of the Mughal Empire v4.c56.s13
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§ 8. Begam Samru secretly won over by the English
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The next step in Wellesley's scheme was to draw the allies and vassals of Sindhia away from his side. This was a very easy task, because Marātha rapacity and want of statesmanship had created a host of enemies among their agents and feudatories in North India. The first and foremost among these was the widowed Begam Samru of Sardhānā. As an imperial fief-holder, her army was legally under the orders of Sindhia, by virtue of his office as the Bakhshi of the Empire. But she was eager to preserve her independent status in relation to Sindhia’s viceroy of Hindustan, and her treasure, both of which had been threatened by Perron and Ambaji Inglé in concert in 1801. Moreover, as a Christian she had long maintained friendly relations with the British. During her love-intrigue with Levassoult (1795) she had tried to flee for refuge in British Indian territory. More recently she had sent to Wellesley an application to be taken under British protection with a guarantee for her jāgir. The only question for the Governor-General was how to save her from Sindhia’s vengeance if she declared for the English or her treasonable correspondence was discovered before Perron’s army had been defeated. Four out of her eight trained battalions (all under European officers) were now attached to Sindhia’s army in the Deccan and therefore surrounded by enemies far from home. The Governor-General therefore wrote to his brother in the Deccan “to contrive means to enable those battalions to join General Wellesley.” The course of the battle of Assaye showed how the contrivance worked.
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§ 9. Ambāji Inglé’s cowardice and treachery
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Among the Sindhian deputies in North India the foremost in wealth and political position and second only in military strength, was Ambāji Inglé. As Mahādji Sindhia’s Agent-General in Mewār for eight years, he had amassed a fortune which was said to have exceeded a krore and a half. He also held the subahdāri of the Sindhian province south of Agra and including the whole of Mālwā, which had an annual revenue of 80 lakhs. After the dismissal of Lakhwā Dādā, (1800), he had been made Daulat Rao’s viceroy of Hindustan. In fact, as the British Resident observed in October 1796, “Ambāji is rather a subsidiary chief than a servant. He maintains in his own immediate pay a force nearly equal to that of Sindhia in Hindustan; he possesses immense personal wealth, and farms about a krore of Sindhia’s revenue, having Gwalior and other strong places in his custody. . . . Thus powerful, he is suspected of entertaining views of independence at the expense of Daulat Rao.”*
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And now, when in July 1801, Perron was appointed Sindhia’s subahdār of Delhi, with all the seven great forts of Hindustan in his hands, Ambāji bitterly resented “the disgraceful and dangerous situation in which the old ministers and principal sardārs of Mahādji have been reduced in consequence of the extraordinary powers vested in Perron—who does what he pleases in the government of the Mahārājā”. In October 1801, when Marquess Wellesley was on a visit to Fathgarh, Ambāji sent a secret agent to meet him with the request that the English chief would prevail on Daulat Rao to restore the old ministers of Sindhia to their former dignities by expelling “the faithless nation” (the French, *daghā-bāz.*) At this time Ambāji begged Resident Collins to grant him an asylum in the Company’s territories, “it being his unalterable resolution to relinquish all employ under Daulat Rao while Frenchmen continued in his service.” (*PRC.* ix. 31.)
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Ambāji had rendered no satisfactory account of his revenue and tribute collection in Sindhia’s districts for many years. As his master was beset by the clamour of his unpaid soldiery and other creditors, Sindhia’s diwāns began to press Ambāji for payment. In August 1799 Sindhia demanded 147 lakhs as his due, and even ordered Perron to seize Ambāji’s person should it be necessary to enforce payment. As the pressure increased, Ambāji became eager to take refuge in Benares (24 June 1802). Thus it came about that when in July 1803, Marquess Wellesley and General Lake were maturing their plans for fomenting desertion among Daulat Rao’s generals, they had good reason for hoping that in view of “the ill terms Ambāji and his brother are on with Sindhia and his Minister (Jādo Bhāskar), if left unmolested, they would remain quiet, and as they formerly wished to form an alliance with the English to guard themselves from the grasping ambition of Sindhia, they might be brought over to our interest.” (PRC. viii. 163. ix. 64. MM. iii. 192.)
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∗ *PRC.* viii, No.
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³⁷ In *ib.* No. 123 (4 March 1799)—“Ambāji collects 80 lakhs out of the annual revenue of Sindhia’s possessions; out of his collection he pays only 22 lakhs into Sindhia’s treasury, the residue being accounted for in the pay of troops, repair of forts, and other charges, for the most part highly exorbitant.” Mewār collection, Tod, i. Mewar, Ch. xvii. Ojha, ii. pp. 683-686.
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Finally, after the war had raged for a month, Ambāji opened secret negotiations with the British for saving his personal estates and wealth by the surrender of his forces. At the end of September 1803, he sent Ināmullah, the news-writer of Resident Collins posted in his camp, as his envoy to General Lake for the express purpose of communicating to the Commander-in-chief his proposals for consolidating his interests with those of the Company. In reply the Governor General empowered Lake, in a letter dated 19th October, “to guarantee Ambāji in the fullest independent possession of such territory as may be assigned to him, without exacting from him any revenue or tribute whatever, except a subsidy proportioned to the military aid which he might contract for”. The British, however insisted on the following conditions; hence no bargain was struck:
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(i) The Rānā of Gohad’s territories which Mahādji had seized and which now lay in Ambāji’s charge, were to be restored to the Rānā.
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(ii) Gwalior fort and the passess leading to the Deccan were to be garrisoned by British troops.
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(iii) No European was to be kept in Ambāji’s service.
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(iv) Ambāji must co-operate with the English forces in the present or any future contest with the Marātha Power. (MM. iii. 192, 409-411.)
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How could such a man fight, heart and soul, against the English in his master's cause? But Ambāji Inglé sank to the lowest depth of cowardice and villainy* when at Lāswāri (1st November 1803), he sent his sepoys on to battle, only to be butchered by the thousand, while he himself remained safe in the rear and made his escape at the first opportunity. If he had made up his mind to come to terms with the English, why did he not make an armistice with General Lake at the outset, and stop any hostile demonstration by his own troops against the approaching British line? On the eve of this battle and even during the noon-tide lull between the first and second stages of the fighting, he higgled to get from Lake better terms for his desertion,—trying to retain as much of his territory and artillery as possible under a British guarantee. He did not form any plan of battle or retreat, and yet he did not keep his army back from opening fire on the English troops. By his selfish treachery and cowardly indecision, he doomed thousands of more honourable men to a futile destruction. It was only fitting, that his reward at the hands of the English was the loss of everything of his own, except a small estate, and that too held subject to Sindhia's will and pleasure!
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As for the allies whom Wellesley planned to secure among Sindhia's minor political dependents, they hardly counted for much. The Rajput Rajas were useless as friends or foes, though they were approached by letters. "The chiefs of Bundelkhand are so divided and torn into factions, that it will be easy to secure one party." The dispossessed Jāt prince of Gohad was set up against his hereditary enemy the House of Sindhia, as we have seen. Lake knew that "The Rajput and Jāt Rajas are disgusted with the Marātha rule. . . . The defeat of Perron would be the signal for a general defection of all these chiefs from the Marātha interests.” Thus the diplomatic isolation of Sindhia was completed. (MM. iii. 192, 228, 229, 243, 409-411.)
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∗ In Lake's despatches the Maratha leader at Laswari is called Abaji, which can easily be a Persian scribe's mistake for Ambaji. Though Ambāji Inglé was in charge of Sindhia's battalions sent to N. India it is not certain that he was personally present at Laswari. G. Duff could not "ascertain who the officer called Abaji was", and suggests that he was "perhaps one of Ambaji Inglé's Karkuns." [iii. 253.]
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§ 10. Governor-General’s proclamations to Sindhia’s troops
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The day after receiving news of Sindhia’s declaration of war, Marquess Wellesley published (on 29th August) two long-prepared proclamations: By the first of them all British subjects were called upon to give up the service of Sindhia, Bhonslé or any other enemy chief and deliver themselves up to the British military officers nearest to them; in return they were promised from the E. I. Co. a provision equal to their actual pay and allowances in the Marātha army. All subjects of France or any other foreigner, European or American, in the service of the hostile Marātha Powers were promised the continuation of their existing pay and allowances if they surrendered to the English. By a supplementary proclamation issued on 16th September, all British subjects continuing in the enemy’s armies after the 1st of November, were threatened with prosecution for treason.
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By the second proclamation of 29th August, all natives of British India or the Oudh Nawāb’s dominions, employed in the military service of the hostile Maratha chiefs were called upon to resign and deliver themselves up to British officers, on promise of employment in the E. I. Co’s. army, or of being given a provision equal to their pay in the Marātha army. (As. An. Reg. for 1804, State papers, p. 276, MM. v. 73.)
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Thus the ground was cut away from under the armed strength of Sindhia by the withdrawal of his European officers—who were the only higher officers in his trained brigades—and also his best infantry, who were Purbiās or men of Oudh and “the Upper Provinces,” while the indigenous Marāthas supplied only the enemy’s cavalry. At the same time, the army of the E. I. Co. was greatly increased by the addition of the large subsidiary forces (under British officers) paid for by Oudh, Mysore, Haidarabad, and the Peshwā's Government, without their cost being thrown on the English Company.
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CHAPTER XLIX
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THE ANGLO-MARATHA WAR OF 1803
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§ 1. General Lake routs Perron's army at Koil, 29th August 1803.
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In the Anglo-Maratha duel for the lordship of India which was fought out in 1803, the decisive fields were only two,—the Gangā-Jamunā Doab, where General Lake was opposed to Perron, and the North-Godavari valley where Arthur Wellesley confronted Daulat Rao Sindhia. All the other theatres of war, such as Gujrat, Orissa and Bundelkhand, were subsidiary to these two, and did not affect the main issue.
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We shall survey Lake's operations first, because be achieved decisive success for the British arms before Arthur Wellesley won his first battle. During the months of June and July 1803, the Governor-General had discussed the war with Lake by correspondence, fully instructed him about his policy and plans, and invested the commander-in-chief with supreme authority in war and diplomacy for every conceivable contingency. Lake's headquarters were at Cawnpur, about 185 miles from Perron's capital Aligarh. Determined to strike the first blow, the British General left Cawnpur on 7th August for the Maratha frontier on the northwest, and on the 25th of that month reached Sikandra-Rao, 160 miles distant, from which Aligarh was only 24 miles in a straight line. Here he next day received a letter from the Governor-General authorising him to attack Sindhia's forces unless in the meantime he should hear from General Wellesley that Sindhia in the Deccan had made peace. But six days before this Lake had received a despatch from Collins reporting the final rupture of the peace in Sindhia's camp on 1st August. The British commander-in-chief now saw his course clear before him, and immediately resumed his march against Perron, reaching Bijegarh next day (the 27th), from which Aligarh was only 14 miles distant. The day following, the grand army arrived at Nanow, from which the dome of the mosque at Koil could be seen, five miles to the northward. That night orders were issued for crossing the frontier and attacking Perron’s camp.
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The British Indian army, like a high-spirited hound so long straining at the leash, sprang forward immediately on being let loose, eager to win glory and wealth by facing danger and death. The boundless enthusiasm and perfect condition of all ranks of Lake’s force comes out most vividly as we read the diary of Lieutenant John Pester, the Quarter-master of his fourth infantry Brigade. (*War and Sport in India, 1802-1806*, ed. by Devenish.)
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A glance at the map of India naturally suggests that the Maratha troops had the great strategic advantage of operating on short inner lines, because Sindhia’s dominions lay in the centre of the country, while the British forces were dispersed along the outer margin of the circle. It should have been easier for the Marathas to concentrate their full strength on any threatened point. But this favour of geography was nullified by the imbecility of the master and the treachery of his servants. The folly and slackness of the leaders left the unfortunate soldiers of the campoo to fight the English in dispersed bodies and to be everywhere defeated in detail. The greatest mischief done by Perron was that he selfishly removed the best and most seasoned battalions of his army far from the expected point of attack by Lake, so that no resistance worthy of the importance of Aligarh fort and arsenal could be offered there at the very outset of the campaign. The moral damage inflicted by his defeat here was incalculable.
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Perron had early notice of Lake’s march upon Aligarh, but he never thought of offering the best possible defence there. On the contrary he detached two of his best brigades to Delhi and seven battalions of another to Agra, thus denuding the Doab frontier of troops. Only two thousand sepoys of a miscellaneous character, militiamen rather than regular soldiers, were left to garrison the vitally important depot of Aligarh. Skinner noticed with grief how Sindhia’s cause was ruined by Perron and other French officers, whose sole aim was to ensure their safe retirement to the British dominions with their personal wealth by throwing their deluded troops into helpless destruction.
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The city of Koil stands a mile south of the fort of Aligarh, whose name it has taken under the British administration. A broad avenue of shady trees joins the city to the fort-gate (south-eastern corner). A low marshy tract cut by this causeway, guards the fort on its southern and eastern faces. Another and more extensive morass stretches east of the avenue. Perron’s troops, almost entirely made up of cavalry, were encamped on the open plain east of the fort with their face to the second marsh lying on their south. Thus the direct dry route for approaching them was through the head of the shady avenue at the northern end of Koil. The fort-guns were trained on this line of advance.
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But General Lake, coming up from the south, sighted Perron’s army about nine in the morning of the 29th of August. Avoiding the trap laid against a frontal attack, he left the town of Koil on his west, swerved to the east, skirting the southern and eastern edges of the big marsh, and struck Perron’s army at its extreme left flank. Already as soon as his manœuvre was seen to develop, Perron’s horsemen had broken up and begun a hurried retreat towards the fort. The only opposition offered to the English came from a high village beyond the extreme left of Perron’s lines, where an outlying picquet of irregular infantry fired random shots from their matchlocks. But the obstacle was quickly overcome, and the village was stormed by the British sepoys. Here Lake’s army suffered their only casualties of the day, less than a dozen men and no officer.
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The English force advanced, the cavalry leading and the infantry following in two lines. No resistance was offered. “General Perron, as some prisoners afterwards reported to the British, was the first to fly.” His deserted horsemen, in their wild flight towards the fort, fell by the hundred from the fire of the galloper guns of Lake’s cavalry. “The enemy were so numerous that every shot did execution,” as Pester noticed. Perron’s entire field army disappeared westwards, without entering the fort.
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The field being clear, the British army moved steadily on to the shady avenue, and there coming within range of the fort-guns, turned south-west and halted west of the town of Koil, beyond the reach of the artillery in Aligarh. Thus Lake had travelled along the entire length of a hairpin loop round the big marsh, without any loss, by keeping out of the range of the enemy’s heavy guns of position.
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The effect of Lake’s victory on the Indian world was electric. In three hours’ time the French military prestige in India had been destroyed and Perron publicly shown to be a coward. His Indian allies and vassals now took heart to abandon his side. The white rats hastened to leave Sindhia’s sinking ship and come over to the British to surrender and share in the Governor-General’s promised bounty to deserters.