Fall of the Mughal Empire v4.c56.s4: § 5. Perron's duplicity
Fall of the Mughal Empire v4.c56.s4
- Language
- English
§ 5. Perron's duplicity
v4.c56.s4.1
Perron had been waiting to find out the best means of giving up Sindhia's service and returning to Europe with his wealth intact, when he learnt that on 7th August 1803 General Lake had begun his march with the main British army from Cawnpur towards the Maratha frontier near his headquarters at Aligarh. This forced him to make a choice between surrender and war. He had once dreamt of making an advantageous bargain like that of De Boigne in 1796, who then pocketed 1½ lakhs of Rupees by selling his Cavalry Regiment to the British. Perron now opened negotiations with General Lake for his own retirement, but lost all by his half-hearted and hesitating action. The political situation had entirely changed since the time of De Boigne's resignation. Instead of the pacific Sir John Shore, the imperious Marquess Wellesley, in the full flush of his unbroken triumphs, wielded the government of British India. The only terms offered to Perron were the guarantee of his *proved* private property and personal safety, with a little compassionate gift from the English Company.* This put Perron on the same footing as any other European adventurer in the Maratha service who would surrender under the Governor General's proclamation. Wellesley was determined to destroy Sindhia's French-trained battalions and remove all their European officers. He held that such a force if allowed to remain intact would have continued as a standing menace to the security of British India and to the peace of the entire country.
v4.c56.s4.2
∗ Wellesley's instructions to Genl. Lake, 27 July 1803—"An agreement for the security of M. Perron's personal interests and property, accompanied by any reasonable remuneration from the British Government which shall induce him to deliver up the whole of his military resources and power, together with his territorial possessions, and the person of the Mughal [Emperor] into your Excellency's hands." M. Martin, iii. 221.
v4.c56.s4.3
Even before the war broke out, General Lake converted the Governor-General to his own opinion that “the early defeat of Perron in the field” should be the primary object of the war, in view of “the effect which this would produce on the minds of the native princes” who believed the French-trained campoo to be invincible.* Therefore Perron could have averted an armed conflict only by the unconditional surrender of himself and his vast army to the British. But apart from Daulat Rao being the lawful master of these troops, would the sepoys of his campoo have agreed to such a mass-suicide?
v4.c56.s4.4
Perron knew that he could not stand up to the British Indian army, because all the English and Scottish officers under him had resigned, refusing to bear arms against their own country, and he had been, by his own admission, unable to enlist any competent French officers to replace them, so that his only European officers were half-castes from Goa and Pondicherry, whom he knew to be worthless. Besides this, in his private life, Perron was burdened with a sickly wife and a two-year old daughter, the sole remnant of a family of ten children, nine of whom had already fallen victims to the Indian climate in their infancy.†
v4.c56.s4.5
† In a letter to his brother, wr. in March 1803, Perron gives these figures. Martineau is wrong in saying that 8 children had perished in India [Martineau, p. 184 corrected from p. 94.] His wife died on 23rd August 1804 at Chinsura aged 36, after giving birth to an eleventh child (Joseph) on 25th July.
v4.c56.s4.6
Perron was determined in his heart of hearts not to fight the English, and yet with incredible cowardice and treachery, while he was secretly higgling for better terms from General Lake, he publicly made fiery declarations against the English, calling upon his lieutenant, Col. Pedron the commandant of Aligarh fort, to resist General Lake to the utmost, and promising to come himself with “a large army on the plains of Aligarh, . . . to send back the English General as fast, or perhaps faster than he came." [M.M. v. Maratha War Sup. 75-77 = iii. 367-368. Letters to Pedron in As. An. Reg. for 1804, State P. 258-260.]
v4.c56.s4.7
∗ This was proved true by the event. After the flight of Perron from his camp at Koil, Lake wrote to Wellesley, on 29th August: “This day has had a most wonderful effect upon the minds of the natives, who always thought M Perron invincible. It always was (as your Lordship knows) my opinion that the moment Perron was beat, no one would come to him.” MM. iii. 190, 284.
v4.c56.s4.8
One result of Perron's cowardice and duplicity was the massacre of thousands of sepoys—men braver and more honourable than himself—who had trusted him but whom he betrayed by his flight. Another was the draining out of India of an incalculable amount of wealth by the British army as prize-money gained in war.