Fall of the Mughal Empire v4.c58.s4: § 5. The lull in the war, 11-21 September
Fall of the Mughal Empire v4.c58.s4
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§ 5. The lull in the war, 11-21 September
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Thus after the daily movements and rapid changes of direction during the last fortnight, came ten quiet days (11-20 September), as the rival hosts receded northwards from the bank of the Godāvari.* During this period all the thirteen battalions and artillery of the two Confederates joined them and the entire Marātha army was assembled in a long line of camps from Bhokardan to Jafarabad. On the English side, too, the last of the anxiously waited for convoys from Mysore, under Major Hill, reached Wellesley on the 18th. The British commander-in-chief, having no longer to watch the Haidarabad road, now felt himself free to strike the decisive blow.
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On the 19th, Wellesley wrote to Stevenson to move eastwards, while he himself would march northwards, so that the two divisions might meet together on the 21st and form a joint plan of action. They approached each other between Jālnā and Badnāpur, on the 21st, when Wellesley rode out to Stevenson's corps and it was settled that the latter should march northwards skirting the western side of the hills separating Badnāpur-Jālnā from Ajantā, while Wellesley would advance along the eastern edge of these hills towards the Badāoli and Lakanwārā passes, and that on the 24th after reaching the open ground at the end, the two generals should turn towards each other and crush the enemy between them. Sindhia was reported to be posted in Bhokardan town and west of it.
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∗ General Wellesley rightly boasted, in a letter of 10th Sept., "I have given the enemy a turn. By a few rapid marches to the southward I have shown them that they could not go alone to Haidarabad, and I have consequently forced them to return to the northward." And again, six days later, "The enemy are quiet to the northward. We are all in tranquillity in this quarter. But I propose to disturb the general tranquillity in a day or two, as soon as I shall be joined by Hill." (Gurwood, ii. 287, 309.)
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Leaving Jālnā on the 21st, Wellesley’s army slowly defiled through the narrow passes and broken country and reached Pangri, 10 air-miles northwards on the 22nd. Next morning the march was resumed, and Nālni, 12 miles onwards, was reached at 11 o’clock. Here he learnt that the enemy were not fourteen miles away to the west of Bhokardan and therefore close to Stevenson, as reported by spies before, but only six miles from Nālni, at Assaye, a good deal east of Bhokardan.
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In addition to gaining this correct knowledge of the enemy’s position, Arthur Wellesley here received news as cheering as that which had greeted Lake on the eve of the battle of Delhi. Collins had bribed a clerk of Daulat Rao Sindhia when living in his camp as Resident, and this traitor had contacted Wellesley at that General’s request. The British Commander heard at Nālni that the Confederated armies were bent on retreat to Ajanta and that there was daily mutiny among their unpaid starving soldiery who were threatening Sindhia’s diwān with violence (dharnā.)*
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§ 6. General Wellesley advances to Assaye, 23rd September
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Hearing that the Maratha cavalry had already moved off the ground and their infantry was about to follow, the British General at once changed his original plan in order to take full advantage of the new situation. He knew that Sindhia’s cavalry force was weak in number and poor in quality, but his strength lay in his trained infantry and guns.† [Gurwood, ii. 285.]
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∗ A. W. to Resident Collins, “You mentioned that you had had a secret communication with one of Sindhia’s munshis. It would be very desirable to renew this communication during the war.” Sup. Des. iv.
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¹⁷⁵ Dharnā in Kharé, 6734. Threat to diwān, Gulgulé D., 15 Oct.
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† The Marāthi despatches speak of the battle of Assaye as a chhāpā or surprise, and admit that when the English attack opened, Sindhia was off his guard (be-fām) and his troops quite unprepared and
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Therefore, if these regular battalions could be crushed, the defeat of Bhonslé would be an easy task, as the victorious English would then be free to invade Bhonslé’s Berar territory and force the Raja to hasten back for its defence. The problem for Wellesley was how to overtake Sindhia’s disciplined infantry before it could run away with its powerful artillery. If he had put the battle off to the 24th as originally planned for the joint attack, then the enemy were sure to have given him the slip in the day’s respite thus gained, or at least concentrated all their forces for presenting a united front. The success of Wellesley’s plan depended entirely on its being a surprise for the Marathas. As he writes, “In all military operations, but particularly in India, *time is everything*.” [MM. v. Mar. War, 328.]
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There was besides, a secret reason for General Wellesley’s confidence in at once hastening with his own small force to give battle to the myriads of the full Maratha army. The far-sighted diplomacy of the Governor General had contrived that Begam Samru’s five battalions, now with Sindhia in the Deccan, would come over to the English as soon as they could separate themselves from him with safety. The shock and confusion of a British attack on one part of the Maratha camp would give the Sardhana contingent this opportunity and cripple Sindhia’s strength for the future, even if the Maratha army was not fully defeated. Pohlmann, who led one full brigade at Assaye, had also made up his mind to desert Sindhia and share the Governor-General’s very liberal promise of bounty.[*] Thus it
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without any plan. Kharé, xiv. 6749, 6734. Gulgulé D., letter of 15 Oct.
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∗ On 18th July Marquess Wellesley sent orders to Col. Scott in the Deccan, to see that “means might be contrived to enable four of Begam Samru’s battalions then with Sindhia in the Deccan, to join General Wellesley.” (MM. iii. 192.) “Colonel Pohlmann received intelligence from General Perron on the 12th Sept. that the English officers [of Sindhia] had gone to the British settlements.” (Arthur W. Sup. D. iv. 207.) The Marāthi despatches report,—“Samru’s [four] battalions could not get ready [to join in the battle]. Our Brigade (i.e., Mahādji’s First Campoo), four battalions of Michel Felose, and one battalion of Samru were on advanced guard duty, and these alone met the English. . . . The five battalions slew many men on the British side. Three battalions of M. Felose abandoned their guns, and one bat. was totally destroyed or wounded.” *Gul. D. and Kharé, xiv. 6720. A. W. in Gur. ii. 434 and 456.*
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happened that Wellington “with his fiery few did *not* clash against the myriads at Assaye,” but only against a small section of the bloated Maratha army; in the actual clash of arms only five battalions of Sindhia stood up against the English.