Fall of the Mughal Empire v4.c58.s6: § 8. Assaye,—Wellesley’s plan of battle, why it was upset
Fall of the Mughal Empire v4.c58.s6
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§ 8. Assaye,—Wellesley’s plan of battle, why it was upset
v4.c58.s6.1
Wellesley’s rule of war was never to attack the Marāthas when holding a well-chosen and strongly defended position, but to force them on to move and strike them when thrown into disorder by marching. There was a ford over the Khelnā at Lingwāri a mile west of Wellesley’s first point of observation, and hordes of Maratha irregular cavalry were seen to stand on both sides of it, but they took no part in the battle. Nearly three miles further down the river there was an unguarded ford at Pipalgāon-Warud. The British General planned to keep to the south bank of the Khelnā for two miles, then cross the river at this second ford and roll up the enemy’s left wing south of Assaye.
v4.c58.s6.2
The British army advanced eastwards, their own cavalry riding on their left to screen their infantry in the centre from the enemy’s observation on the opposite bank. They crossed the Khelnā at the ford chosen and marched into the delta to form their battle order, in a north to south line from Assaye to the Khelnā bank. The fork of the two rivulets which united a mile below the ford, served as a natural cover for both the flanks and rear of the British battle line against any attack by the myriads of Maratha light horse.
v4.c58.s6.3
The Marathas, at the first sight of Wellesley’s force at noon, broke up camp and drew their infantry in a long line facing the Khelnā, and parallel to the two rivers. But as soon as they saw him crossing the Pipalgāon ford, they rapidly wheeled a quarter circle to their left and drew up with their first line north to south at right angles to the two rivers, barring Wellesley's path of attack on their left flank. Their second line was formed west to east along the south bank of the Juah nālā, meeting their first line at the village of Assaye, both lines pivoting upon that village. Assaye was also the hinge of the British line. The field over which the battle was fought was a quarter-circle or half-opened fan. Wellesley's plan was to work with his own left along the circumference of this quarter-circle, from the south to the west, strike the enemy's right on the Juah nālā, and roll their entire line eastwards back upon Assaye, whose trenches and powerful guns would then be abandoned by an enemy defeated all along their front. Therefore, his left wing would have to cover four times as much ground as his right and also to keep out of the range of the enemy's heavy guns in Assaye during the first stage of this tactical operation.
v4.c58.s6.4
But in the actual execution the General's plan was mangled, a needless slaughter of the British right wing followed, and a disaster to the British army which would have led to the suicide* of Wellington was averted only by the heroism and endurance of the British Dragoons and the shameful cowardice of the Marātha cavalry. When brought face to face with the enemy's lines, Wellesley had to change his battle plan immediately. As the enemy's infantry and line of guns greatly outflanked his first line on both hands, he ordered it to be lengthened by bringing the second line within the first, and forming one long line with the two Highland Regiments (the 78th Ross-shire Buffs and the 74th Campbells) at the two extremes and the five Madras Sepoy battalions in the centre. At the same time, his cavalry instead of being kept back as a reserve or third line, was pushed on to the rear of his extreme right, in order to guard that flank up to the Juah nālā. His first misfortune was that the fighting started before this second formation could be completed. Next, all his guns had to be left behind by reason of their bullocks and drivers being killed by the superior Maratha artillery, so that the British fought all the later stages of this battle without any artillery assistance of their own. And worst of all the General’s plan was wrecked by the folly of Colonel Orrock, who commanded the picquets in the extreme right and whose troops were to act as the battalion of direction in the advance upon the enemy’s line.
v4.c58.s6.5
∗ Arthur Wellesley said to Elphinstone after the battle, "So-and-so would have happened if we had been beat, and then I should just have made a gallows of my ridge-pole and hanged myself." Elph., i. 80.
v4.c58.s6.6
§ 9. Battle of Assaye—first stage, disaster to the British right wing.
v4.c58.s6.7
Orrock had been ordered not to approach Assaye at his extreme right, but carefully keep outside the range of the big guns at that fortified village. But “from habits of dissipation and idleness he had become incapable of giving attention to an order to find out its meaning”, as Wellesley complained to Elphinstone. He marched his corps nearer and nearer to Assaye and on being assailed by its guns, continued to press on in the same direction without trying to incline to the planned route of advance. Thus a wide gap was formed between him and the sepoy battalions on his left. His wrong movement also masked the fire of the 74th Highlanders who were moving up from the second line in order to take post on the right of Orrock, as ordered by Wellesley to complete his new line.
v4.c58.s6.8
A storm of fire burst upon these two isolated corps from Assaye and the Maratha line outside it; all their own guns had now been thrown out of action by the enemy’s artillery. Orrock’s advance stopped, still Wellesley sent him an urgent order to move on without any gun. The advancing British line was mown down by the fire of a hundred guns, well posted and rapidly served. The havoc was severest in the right wing, where the picquets lost one third of their number. Assailed in front and flank, unable to match gun to gun, Orrock’s men at last broke and ran back in confusion upon the 74th marching behind them. Just then these Highlanders had lost their order in crossing some cactus hedges. Seizing this opportunity, the Household cavalry (*huzurāt*) of Sindhia charged, cutting down the soldiers.* The cavalry horde swept through the British right and charged back through them to its own place. Thereafter one of their leaders (Jādo Rao Bhāskar) "lounged his horse about near the 74th and every now and then dashed forward and killed a European." [Elph. i. 76.]
v4.c58.s6.9
The 74th were reduced to a quarter of their strength (having lost 401 men out of 565), but with Highland tenacity the remnant of the regiment still stood round their colours in the bloody field. On their left hand the British centre was broken, while their supreme commander leading the left wing of the line was hidden from view. But they were not destined to be lost. Suddenly on their right rear the bugle sounded the charge, a loud hurrah was heard, and the Greek helmets of the 19th Dragoons with their leopard skin front covers and dancing red tassels on the crest burst through the smoke and dust. The blue coats, mounted on superb horses, and followed by the 4th Madras cavalry, charged the Maratha troopers and drove them back to the Juah *nālā* and beyond it.
v4.c58.s6.10
The iron tempest that had overwhelmed the British right had also broken their centre, consisting of two battalions of native infantry. These Telingas, unable to advance or stand against such a fire, without the power of reply, swerved away from the enemy, and crowded in upon the 78th Highlanders on the extreme left. "In many cases the sepoys sheltered themselves from the deadly shower in hollows in the ground, and even in some few instances, not all the endeavours of their officers could persuade them to move forward." "Several sepoys who were either wounded or pretended to be so, crouched down with their backs to the enemy, in such a manner that their knapsacks completely sheltered them from everything but round shot." Nor did the terror altogether spare the whites; Elphinstone reports that "two of the European officers were vehemently accused of skulking in a *nālā*."* But the main body of the sepoys in the centre were at last rallied by their officers and led on to join Wellesley's new line parallel to the Juah, completed by the addition of the other two sepoy battalions from the original second line.
v4.c58.s6.11
∗ According to the *Amirnāmah* of Basawan Lal (my ms. 227) Sindhia himself took part in this charge, "he pierced the English line and beating them reached their rear, whence he charged back and regained his own troops." The leader of this attack, I believe, was Jādo Rao Bhāskar, his dīwān, leading the *Huzurāt* or Household Cavalry of the Raja. His feat was noticed, and it was also noted that this Maratha hero was shot by the 19th in the Juah *nālā*. Now, we know that Jādo Rao was the only leader shot in the *nālā*. No common Maratha trooper's death in the *nālā* would have been noticed by the English. Anand Rao Nimbālkar was another captain of Sindhia who fell among the cavalry. Gulgulé, 15 Oct., Kharé, xiv. 6749.